Idealists: What does 'physical' mean to you?

[RandFan]

Mere possibility is cheap. Anything's possible. It's possible I'm a crab dreaming it's a wallaby dreaming it's a brain in a vat being fooled by a Cartesian demon who is in turn being fooled by God.

Evidence, on the other hand, is worth something.

 

[Malerin]

Remember that Neo wasn't just asked to believe in a ridiculous proposition without evidence. He had reasons to doubt based on what he and others saw happening around him, and was shown the real world for what it was.

SK, this was what I was responding to. How do you know he was shown the "real world"? What would have prevented the computers from coming up with a matrix within a matrix for the unruly humans, so they could live out their fantasy of rebellion? Nothing.

 

[Malerin]

Man I hate to get back into this, but..........

What I think you misunderstand about Kevin's statements above and what David and I and many others have been trying to say to you is this:

the evidence of our senses is not evidence of a particular ultimate reality.

Right, which is the point I always make. Now, how do I reconcile this with another thread where you made an appeal to sense data as evidence for the existence of external objects and people?

None of us, as far as I know, even speaks about ultimate reality having any set characteristics that we can define. The evidence of our senses is evidence of our senses, so when we say that we have evidence of the reality of a coin, that is all that we mean -- that coin follows certain rules.

I would add "it seems" to follow certain rules, but I take your point.

When it comes to an ultimate reality, there is either monism, dualism, or pluralism. We approach this from a monist perspective. If monism is correct, then we can't say anything about the ultimate substance because words are defined in relation to one another. The only thing we can do is discover the rules by which what we see works.

How are you using "monism"? Do you think there's only one real thing and everything is a type of that thing? Monism has so many different meanings, but it usually implies oneness, so I'm not clear on what a "monist perspective" is.

I would argue that there are three broad categories of reality: materialism (physical objects existing independent of mind/perception; idealism (immaterial things dependent on mind/perception; and dualism (combination of material and immaterial (rocks and angels both existing)). All other "isms" are subsets of these three categories: existence monism , for example, would be a type of materialism where only one concrete thing exists and everything is a type of that thing.

If dualism is correct, then there is an interaction problem.

Well, what kind of problem? I don't see an ontological problem (it's logically possible). I think it's an epistemic problem because we have no clue how the interaction works, but that doesn't mean the interaction can't work.

How does the mind of God create the world? That's easy in a trivial sense, through thought. But the problem then becomes, what is God? If He is Other, then his mind does not work by the rules that we see around us (if it did then he would just be part of the same rule following thought-stuff), so how does he create the world? What is "mind"? We are left with only one answer -- magic, which means we can't understand it. That's perfectly fine with me as an explanation, though non-parsimonious and a little unsatisfactory.

I don't know why it should be unsatisfactory. If God does exist, then the last thing I would expect is to be able to comprehend God's mind, motives, and methods. It would be like trying to explain calculus to a two-year old.

It is certainly possible, and most monists would say that we can't tell the difference anyway, so it doesn't matter.

Again, need to know what type of monism you mean.

A consequence, though, is that "we" are just rule following bits of the mind of God doing its thing, so we are the same as a chair, in a sense -- everything is the mind of God. If everything is the mind of God, then our thoughts when they come to God are just God thinking itself, not "us" realizing God in some cosmic sense.

How do you figure? Idealism could consist of three seperate things: minds, God, and the things minds perceive. This is basically Berkeley's idealism. I think Berkely would say "everything that appears external to us" is a "projection" of the mind of God. That would not include our own minds, though. What you're describing is more like what the Cource in Miracles people think.

If you think that "we" have some separate form of free will, then "we" are something different from God and also different from chair, which would seem to imply neither monism nor dualism but pluralism. Why do we want to keep multiplying the "stuff" of the universe?

Because we want to consider all possibilities. The amount of "stuff" in a theory of reality isn't grounds for rejecting that reality, because you would have to have some sort of standard of evidence to apply (e.g., realities with multiple layers are less probable). But this standard of evidence is going to rest on circular reasoning (How do we know realities with lots of stuff are less probable? Because realities with less amounts of stuff are more probable. How do we know realities with less amouns of stuff are more probable? Because realities with lots of stuff are less probable. And so on.)

In other words, you need to know what kind of reality you're in in order to lay odds on competing models of reality.

It would seem to me that even from the perspective of idealist dualism there is only one being with free will and that is the Ultimate Mind. Everything else is some form of his thought, so an illusion.

I don't see why this follows at all. Again, you can posit a reality consiting of God, minds, and the things minds perceive. I don't see anything logically impossible in that.

I'm not sure how this helps anyone or differs in any way from a monist perspective. Hence David's frequent reply, "what difference does it make, since it's all the same anyway?"

I think AkuManiMani gave a good response. It all boils down to what your foundation is. If you're locked in to a certain view of reality, concepts and ideas that might occur to you might be closed off because of this narrow way of thinking.

 

[AkuManiMani]

If dualism is correct, then there is an interaction problem.

Well, what kind of problem? I don't see an ontological problem (it's logically possible). I think it's an epistemic problem because we have no clue how the interaction works, but that doesn't mean the interaction can't work.

I think what Ichneumonwasp meant is that interaction strongly implies some commonality the between interacting components.

I suppose it's conceivable that 2 or more fundamentally different somethings can interact but, as you said, it raises the epistemological problem of discerning how such an interaction would work. Since such a realm of empirical inquiry is far beyond what we can investigate right now it seems the safer default position would be monism. One thing that makes monism more favorable as a philosophical position, imo, is that is avoids some of the special pleading that seems inherent to pluralistic ontologies.

The main thing that I take issue with in pluralism is that assuming that there are fundamentally different "stuffs" makes what appears an unsupportable assertion as to what the "ultimate reality" is.

I'm not aware of whether or not you hold to a monist or plural position but are you aware of any justifications/reasoning behind considering pluralism more coherent than monism?

 

[Malerin]

I think what Ichneumonwasp meant is that interaction strongly implies some commonality the between interacting components.

I suppose it's conceivable that 2 or more fundamentally different somethings can interact but, as you said, it raises the epistemological problem of discerning how such an interaction would work. Since such a realm of empirical inquiry is far beyond what we can investigate right now it seems the safer default position would be monism. One thing that makes monism more favorable as a philosophical position, imo, is that is avoids some of the special pleading that seems inherent to pluralistic ontologies.

The main thing that I take issue with in pluralism is that assuming that there are fundamentally different "stuffs" makes what appears an unsupportable assertion as to what the "ultimate reality" is.

I'm not aware of whether or not you hold to a monist or plural position but are you aware of any justifications/reasoning behind considering pluralism more coherent than monism?

Yeah, my wife asked me the exact same question the other day (becasue she sees no distinction between thought and mind). Take monistic idealism (everything is made of mind or thought). This leads to the claim that either mind is a type of thought, or thought is a type of mind. Neither of those make any sense to me. It seems clear to me that thought is a byproduct of mind, not a type of mind. Monistic idealism is like claiming smoke is a type of fire.

All that being said, it might be possible that there is only God, and everything is a type of God. But that raises the question: why, if we are God (or a type of God), are we hiding from our true nature? Maybe God is schizophrenic, who knows?

That's my reasoning and it's not really based on any evidence. Just a feeling I have. I'm also absolutely convinced there is no literal Hell (lake of fire, eternal torment). I have no evidence for or against Hell, but I am as convinced of its nonexistence to the same degree most atheists here are convinced of materialism.

 

[arthwollipot]

I actually understood that.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

Right, which is the point I always make. Now, how do I reconcile this with another thread where you made an appeal to sense data as evidence for the existence of external objects and people?

You can't because I never made that appeal. I don't even think in that way, so I have no idea where you got the idea from. We have discussed this before and you know I don't hold that opinion. What I argued was that sense data provides evidence of something -- namely that we experience some interacting stuff that follows rules. It is simply wrong to say that there is no evidence of a chair just as there is no evidence of God -- that both propositions are equal. There is plenty of evidence of chairs -- just open your eyes. That evidence does not prove that a chair is material, mental, neutral monistic, whatever, but it is evidence. The same is not the case for God, unless you simply define the evidence into God (existence = God).

How are you using "monism"? Do you think there's only one real thing and everything is a type of that thing? Monism has so many different meanings, but it usually implies oneness, so I'm not clear on what a "monist perspective" is.

One ultimate substance. We can't know what the substance is, but it interacts together because it is all the "same stuff" at a fundamental level. You can call it vibrating energy comprising superstrings, you can call it the mind of God. Who knows? There is no way to know what it is. But monism holds that everything that is is comprised of the fundamental "stuff:, the ur-substance.

Well, what kind of problem? I don't see an ontological problem (it's logically possible). I think it's an epistemic problem because we have no clue how the interaction works, but that doesn't mean the interaction can't work.

But there is a fundamental intellectual problem. If an interaction is possible it occurs through some mechanism. Mechanism implies the working of the stuff we commonly call "material", so the problem revolves back to a monism that follows a simple set of rules. The only other solution is "magic" -- we don't know how it works and we can't know how it works. I can't imagine a more intellectually unsatisfying and unfalsifiable proposition.

I don't know why it should be unsatisfactory. If God does exist, then the last thing I would expect is to be able to comprehend God's mind, motives, and methods. It would be like trying to explain calculus to a two-year old.

See above. It means that it is all magic to us, so we can never be sure that it is correct. It may be the way things are, but it certainly won't help us. Essentially, this means that ontology is a waste of time.

Again, need to know what type of monism you mean.

By definition, there can only be one type of monism. Everything else is projection. Since we cannot know the ultimate substance any attempt to define it as "mental" or "physical" is just whistling in the wind, a waste of time, and a complete distraction.

How do you figure? Idealism could consist of three seperate things: minds, God, and the things minds perceive. This is basically Berkeley's idealism. I think Berkely would say "everything that appears external to us" is a "projection" of the mind of God. That would not include our own minds, though. What you're describing is more like what the Cource in Miracles people think.

So, there are three substances? If there is one mind that creates everything, then everything flows from that mind. Everything, therefore, follows the rules of that mind -- that it created from the beginning. If you want to stick to monism, then that mind is ultimately all that is, so "you" are merely an extension of that mind.

If you want to believe that there are three substances, then how do they interact? It seems that you must answer, "magic". So, you've created a situation in which you multiply the number of substances and can only have them interact through an unexplainable "mechanism". Do you see why I and many others find this an unsatisfactory way of approaching the world?

Because we want to consider all possibilities. The amount of "stuff" in a theory of reality isn't grounds for rejecting that reality, because you would have to have some sort of standard of evidence to apply (e.g., realities with multiple layers are less probable). But this standard of evidence is going to rest on circular reasoning (How do we know realities with lots of stuff are less probable? Because realities with less amounts of stuff are more probable. How do we know realities with less amouns of stuff are more probable? Because realities with lots of stuff are less probable. And so on.)

In other words, you need to know what kind of reality you're in in order to lay odds on competing models of reality.

Who says the other theories are impossible? I don't know anyone here who says they are impossible. What we say is that they are not parsimonious and they are generally intellectually unsatisfying.

I don't see why this follows at all. Again, you can posit a reality consiting of God, minds, and the things minds perceive. I don't see anything logically impossible in that.

If there is a single substance and that substance is God's mind, then your mind is composed of that substance, so "you" thinking about God is just God thinking about Himself ultimately. If you want to posit other substances -- God, other minds, etc. then fine; but that isn't monism.

I think AkuManiMani gave a good response. It all boils down to what your foundation is. If you're locked in to a certain view of reality, concepts and ideas that might occur to you might be closed off because of this narrow way of thinking.

Sure, if you're locked into that way of thinking. Have you considered that you haven't yet worked out the consequences of monism?

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

Monistic idealism is like claiming smoke is a type of fire.

I would say that monistic idealism makes no sense. Idealisms look to me like dualisms.

All that being said, it might be possible that there is only God, and everything is a type of God. But that raises the question: why, if we are God (or a type of God), are we hiding from our true nature? Maybe God is schizophrenic, who knows?

But that's just it. We can't hide from our true natures; it really doesn't even make sense to say such a thing. If monism is correct, everything we do is just God acting. There is no "us" properly speaking. To speak of "us" is to speak dualistically.

 

[Malerin]

Just so we're clear on the conversation:

Right, which is the point I always make. Now, how do I reconcile this with another thread where you made an appeal to sense data as evidence for the existence of external objects and people?

You can't because I never made that appeal. I don't even think in that way, so I have no idea where you got the idea from.

Maybe here?

Good God, what has gone wrong with you? Sense data is evidence for the existence of external things and people. It does not tell us absolutely that they exist (as I have mentioned repeatedly), but how could it be anything but evidence for their existence?

http://www.internationalskeptics.com/forums/showthread.php?t=129944&highlight=kicking+rock&page=4

So you can see why I'm a little confused.

One ultimate substance. We can't know what the substance is, but it interacts together because it is all the "same stuff" at a fundamental level. You can call it vibrating energy comprising superstrings, you can call it the mind of God. Who knows? There is no way to know what it is. But monism holds that everything that is is comprised of the fundamental "stuff:, the ur-substance.

But there is a fundamental intellectual problem. If an interaction is possible it occurs through some mechanism. Mechanism implies the working of the stuff we commonly call "material", so the problem revolves back to a monism that follows a simple set of rules. The only other solution is "magic" -- we don't know how it works and we can't know how it works. I can't imagine a more intellectually unsatisfying and unfalsifiable proposition.

I wouldn't say we "can't know how it works". Maybe after we die or there will be some revelation in the future. At the present time, the causal mechanism is unknown, but that's true in all branches of science too- there are always questions being asked that we don't have answers for.

But just because idealism wouldn't be intellectually satisfying to you in no way makes it implausible. You're just saying you would prefer reality to be a different way. Reality is what it is, no matter how much we wish otherwise.

IMO, the workings of the casual mechanism between materialism/immaterialism or God's mind and our mind isn't that interesting. But the idea that reality is within us (or God) is very interesting to me and I think about it a lot.

 

[Frozenwolf150]

SK, this was what I was responding to. How do you know he was shown the "real world"? What would have prevented the computers from coming up with a matrix within a matrix for the unruly humans, so they could live out their fantasy of rebellion? Nothing.

I'm going to avoid mentioning the First and Second Renaissance short films, because you're just going to ignore them anyway if I do.

As has already been said, possibility is cheap, but evidence is worth something. If the machines had created a second layer of illusion for this purpose, which was indistinguishable from reality, then it would still be moot (and the machines would have invested a hell of a lot of simulated effort into killing off the humans in the simulated war). In the distinction between simulation and reality that the movie actually focused on, Morpheus made it a point to show Neo rather than just telling him about it and asking him to accept speculative possibilities. My point, which you missed, is that this is very different from asserting that it's a matter of pure faith to apply our evidence to the materialistic world because you believe it could equally apply to other possibilities.

If it has already been demonstrated that there are glitches / inconsistencies in the world, and one has already been shown another layer of reality, then yes, it might follow that there are other layers of reality out there. If not, then the possibility is meaningless.

From your last post:

I wouldn't say we "can't know how it works". Maybe after we die or there will be some revelation in the future. At the present time, the causal mechanism is unknown, but that's true in all branches of science too- there are always questions being asked that we don't have answers for.

You're committing the argument from ignorance fallacy, so it's not at all analogous to the missing pieces in scientific knowledge. "After we die"? "Revelation in the future"? The fact that you've failed to qualify them in any meaningful way means they're not really answers at all. Science concerns itself with answers obtained through observation and testing.

But just because idealism wouldn't be intellectually satisfying to you in no way makes it implausible. You're just saying you would prefer reality to be a different way. Reality is what it is, no matter how much we wish otherwise.

You made the claim, therefore it's up to you to substantiate it. So far this looks like nothing more than special pleading that the mere possibility of idealism be elevated to proof or plausibility.

IMO, the workings of the casual mechanism between materialism/immaterialism or God's mind and our mind isn't that interesting. But the idea that reality is within us (or God) is very interesting to me and I think about it a lot.

I think the question of interaction is important if you're going to jump to conclusions about reality based on the possibility of something like a prime thinking entity.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

Just so we're clear on the conversation:






Maybe here?



http://www.internationalskeptics.com/forums/showthread.php?t=129944&highlight=kicking+rock&page=4

So you can see why I'm a little confused.

No, I cannot see why you're confused because we have had previous conversations in which I have been quite clear about my epistemic/metaphysical stance -- that I can't know what is really out there. Sense data is evidence of other people and other things. It doesn't tell us the ultimate make-up of those other people or other things (or even if they really exist), but it is certainly evidence of and for them. We cannot say the same for God. We have no reliable evidence supporting the existence of God in the same way that we have reliable evidence supporting the existence of the computer screen in front of you (since other people can see it repeatedly, act on it, etc. -- and that is how we define reliable evidence).

Evidence is not proof. Evidence is information used to support or deny some fact. That evidence may be wrong, or it may lead one to a wrong conclusion, but that does not stop it from being evidence. We speak of evidence primarily in pragmatic terms, especially in science. It does not refer to tiny peeks at ultimate reality. There is no peek at ultimate reality from a monistic stance. There are only the rules of the game and how it is played, and we spend our time trying to figure that out.

I wouldn't say we "can't know how it works". Maybe after we die or there will be some revelation in the future. At the present time, the causal mechanism is unknown, but that's true in all branches of science too- there are always questions being asked that we don't have answers for.

But just because idealism wouldn't be intellectually satisfying to you in no way makes it implausible. You're just saying you would prefer reality to be a different way. Reality is what it is, no matter how much we wish otherwise.

IMO, the workings of the casual mechanism between materialism/immaterialism or God's mind and our mind isn't that interesting. But the idea that reality is within us (or God) is very interesting to me and I think about it a lot.

Once again, who said idealism or dualism or pluralism are implausible or impossible? Certainly not me. They are not the most elegant solutions to the problem, however. Monism is a much more elegant solution.

As to revelation upon death -- works the same as magic. If that is what you want to believe, that is fine, but you have no basis now to decide what is and is not true except your own whims and desires (or someone else's if you wish to follow some previously decided upon dogma). You may want that all will be revealed at death, but wishing doesn't make it so. And it doesn't solve the problem -- whatever interaction, if possible, will still have to be "magic". If there is a mechanism, then it is "physical" -- meaning that it follows the rules of the game we see around us. If there is an explanation that doesn't amount to "magic", then there is a mechanism.

This is in a different class from scientific knowledge that we have not yet gained. This is a philosophical gulf that we cannot bridge.

For the record, I don't have any problem with whatever you want to believe for yourself. But if you commit errors when discussing it here, I or someone else is going to call you on it.

However, there is another issue that everyone must consider when discussing these matters. Whether we really exist as we think we do or not, it is clear that our psychology has a particular structure. We want to believe that we will live beyond death. That thought is comforting. We want to believe that justice will prevail. We want to believe that we are protected by our parents. We want to believe that the good prevail and the evil perish. Our minds are structured to project agency on others so that we can "see" that they have minds too. We see agency everywhere.

This should give us pause when discussing issues over ultimate ontology being "mind".

 

[Malerin]

No, I cannot see why you're confused because we have had previous conversations in which I have been quite clear about my epistemic/metaphysical stance -- that I can't know what is really out there.

This is, literally, the exchange that occurred:

Me: (from an earlier thread) Sense data is not evidence for the existence of external things or people.
You: (quoting verbatim here) Sense data is evidence for the existence of external things and people
Me: Remember when you said sense data is evidence for the existence of external things and people?
You: I never said that.

My confusion partly comes from our previous conversations. I would never have expected you to play the sense-data card, yet you did, which is obvious to anyone who can read, then you denied you would ever do such a thing.

So I'm even more confused now.

Sense data is evidence of other people and other things.

I notice you say it again, but you leave out the crucial word "external" (which you included earlier). It's trivial to say sense-data is evidence for other people and things because without the word "external" you can claim that those other things might or might not exist outside the mind. It's basically claiming that sense-data is evidence of something, which no one would deny. I don't deny that other people and objects exist, but whether they exist in my mind as ideas or they exist external to me is a hugely important question.

Likewise, it is NOT a trivial claim to say that sense-data is evidence for the existence of external people and things. THAT would be saying there are external things and people (as opposed to them existing internally in our minds), and our perceptions of them are evidence that they exist external to us. That is a much stronger claim. I suspect you realize this, which is why you left the word "external" out in the above quote. Maybe in the earlier quote you didn't realize you had included it?

It doesn't tell us the ultimate make-up of those other people or other things (or even if they really exist), but it is certainly evidence of and for them. We cannot say the same for God. We have no reliable evidence supporting the existence of God in the same way that we have reliable evidence supporting the existence of the computer screen in front of you (since other people can see it repeatedly, act on it, etc. -- and that is how we define reliable evidence).

OK, now you seem to be back to making the sense-data argument: I see the computer screen, other people see it, ergo my (and other's perception) of the computer is evidence for it's external existence (again, you shy away from this word, but it's certainly implied). But just a few posts ago you claim to "never think that way" so I don't know what you mean.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

This is, literally, the exchange that occurred:

Me: (from an earlier thread) Sense data is not evidence for the existence of external things or people.
You: (quoting verbatim here) Sense data is evidence for the existence of external things and people
Me: Remember when you said sense data is evidence for the existence of external things and people?
You: I never said that.

My confusion partly comes from our previous conversations. I would never have expected you to play the sense-data card, yet you did, which is obvious to anyone who can read, then you denied you would ever do such a thing.

So I'm even more confused now.

I don't want to have to go over this ten times again.

You seem to be interpreting everything I write from your dualistic pre-suppositions. Please approach this from another angle. You are also confusing epistemology with ontology.

Sense data is evidence for things and people. External or not, it is evidence for them. You cannot take this to mean that I have said that those people or things definitely exist externally (that they are proved) because I never said that. But sense data is evidence that they do exist externally (not definite, only that it is evidence for their external existence). Whether or not that sense data is an accurate reflection of ulitmate reality is an entirely different thing.

I notice you say it again, but you leave out the crucial word "external" (which you included earlier). It's trivial to say sense-data is evidence for other people and things because without the word "external" you can claim that those other things might or might not exist outside the mind. It's basically claiming that sense-data is evidence of something, which no one would deny. I don't deny that other people and objects exist, but whether they exist in my mind as ideas or they exist external to me is a hugely important question.

Likewise, it is NOT a trivial claim to say that sense-data is evidence for the existence of external people and things. THAT would be saying there are external things and people (as opposed to them existing internally in our minds), and our perceptions of them are evidence that they exist external to us. That is a much stronger claim. I suspect you realize this, which is why you left the word "external" out in the above quote. Maybe in the earlier quote you didn't realize you had included it?

How many different ways must I communicate "I am not making an ontological claim" here? Evidence is pragmatic. It does not prove any ontological existent. I have already claimed that I cannot know the nature of ultimate reality, so your repeated attempts to mischaracterize what I am saying is getting extremely annoying. Can you please take a step back and read what I have actually written and not what you think I mean based on some strawman characterization -- one that appears to arise from what look like dualistic assumptions on your part. This conversation is going to go exactly where the last one did if you continue to do the same thing. I didn't leave anything out of what I said on purpose or otherwise. I have been saying the same thing all along, but you have not read what I have written.

Let me repeat -- we cannot get to ultimate reality. Even if you believe in an idealistic monism, a dualism, whatever, we cannot get to ultimate reality. There is a reason why I do not subscribe to the correspondence theory of truth -- because it is a projection. All that we can do with our limited minds is project onto reality, guess at it.

When we speak of evidence we speak of using information that helps to affirm or deny some fact. Facts, in a pragmatic sense, cannot mean "that which is an accurate reflection of ultimate reality" because we don't know what ultimate reality is (you can guess at it; you can have faith in it, but you cannot know it). We know what works, what fits within the rules of the game that we see "out there". Evidence is information that fits within the rules of the game. Reliable evidence is that which can be affirmed by others in a reliable way -- like a scientific experiment that can be repeated to arrive at the same results. Unreliable evidence is that which cannot be affirmed by others.

So, we have reliable evidence of other people externally. Joe over there can see Sue just as I can and just as you can. That is not an ontololgical claim; it is an epistemic one. Evidence of God based on a feeling is not reliable evidence because one person's internal feeling cannot be experienced by others, so it cannot be affirmed. The types of evidence are not equal, so we cannot treat them as if they are equal.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Part of the problem here is with the word external. Sometimes people use the word to refer to things that exist separately from the observer. But sometimes people are referring to things whose coherency is maintained separately from the consciousness of the observer, without regard to what those things actually are. That's how I use the word, and I think Ichneumonwasp does, too.

It would be helpful if people would clarify what they mean by external.

I notice you say it again, but you leave out the crucial word "external" (which you included earlier). It's trivial to say sense-data is evidence for other people and things because without the word "external" you can claim that those other things might or might not exist outside the mind. It's basically claiming that sense-data is evidence of something, which no one would deny. I don't deny that other people and objects exist, but whether they exist in my mind as ideas or they exist external to me is a hugely important question.

Those other things clearly exist outside your conscious mind. That is sufficient reason to call them external.

~~ Paul

 

[Malerin]

I don't want to have to go over this ten times again.

You seem to be interpreting everything I write from your dualistic pre-suppositions. Please approach this from another angle. You are also confusing epistemology with ontology.

This isn't some matter of interpretation.

You said X
I reminded you of when you said X
You denied saying X
I quoted you as saying X

Whatever my perspective, I have your own quotes. You clearly made a claim you later denied making. You're either changing definitions midstream, or twisting yourself into knots to avoid a pretty trivial point. Maybe you had a different meaning of "external" a few weeks ago. I don't know. Moving right along...

Sense data is evidence for things and people. External or not, it is evidence for them.

Well, let's examine that a little. Is your claim that when I look at a computer, the visual sense data is evidence that there is an actual computer, existing independent of me? Not some "dream" computer. A computer that is made of "stuff", and doesn't go away when no one's looking at it or thinking of it.

You cannot take this to mean that I have said that those people or things definitely exist externally (that they are proved) because I never said that. But sense data is evidence that they do exist externally (not definite, only that it is evidence for their external existence). Whether or not that sense data is an accurate reflection of ulitmate reality is an entirely different thing.

I never claimed you said it was proof. Again, this hinges on what "external" means. I take it to mean "not in the mind" or "existing independent of thought or perception". If that's what external means, then you're saying sense-data is evidence that reality is a certain way (i.e., things exist that are outside the mind and are not mind-dependent). Is this what you mean?

How many different ways must I communicate "I am not making an ontological claim" here?

It seems like you're making two claims: ontologically, you're saying "reality is a certain way" (external thigns exist). This IS an ontological claim because reality could consist of no external things (e.g., idealism). Espistemically, you're saying "sense-data" is evidence for reality consisting of external things.

Evidence is pragmatic. It does not prove any ontological existent. I have already claimed that I cannot know the nature of ultimate reality, so your repeated attempts to mischaracterize what I am saying is getting extremely annoying.

Because you keep making ontological claims about external reality and then appealing to sense-data as evidence. OK, I looked up external and I think I know where you're coming from:

"1 a: capable of being perceived outwardly <external signs of a disease> b (1): having merely the outward appearance of something : superficial (2): not intrinsic or essential <external circumstances>
2 a: of, relating to, or connected with the outside or an outer part <the building's external features> b: applied or applicable to the outside <a lotion for external use>
3 a (1): situated outside, apart, or beyond ; specifically : situated near or toward the surface of the body (2): arising or acting from outside <an external force> b: of or relating to dealings or relationships with foreign countries c: having existence independent of the mind <external reality>"

Are you using the first definition of external? I'm using the 3rd. But if you're using the 1st definition, you're making a pretty trivial claim: sense-data is evidence that reality can be perceived? That is tautologically true, so of course I would agree with that. Necessarily, if there is sense-data and perception going on, there is a part of reality being perceived.

If you're using 3(c), then you're making an ontological claim.

 

[athon]

I'll have a stab at clarifying by reiterating what I said in my last post;

Our perceptions make it appear as if there is a reality external to our perception of it. There is no evidence to suggest this is an illusion. Why go to the trouble of supposing it is an illusion - that it does not have an existence independent of my perception of it - if there is no observation which supports that concept?

We can't definitely say one way or another. We don't need to. The observations consistently appear that way, and our behaviour supports it. To add weight to the thought that it is any other way would demand some reason to believe so, such as at least a flaw that disrupts the illusion.

Athon

 

[Malerin]

I'll have a stab at clarifying by reiterating what I said in my last post;

Our perceptions make it appear as if there is a reality external to our perception of it. There is no evidence to suggest this is an illusion. Why go to the trouble of supposing it is an illusion - that it does not have an existence independent of my perception of it - if there is no observation which supports that concept?

We can't definitely say one way or another. We don't need to. The observations consistently appear that way, and our behaviour supports it. To add weight to the thought that it is any other way would demand some reason to believe so, such as at least a flaw that disrupts the illusion.

Athon

You can picture an Egyptian priest making a similar argument: the sun seems to go around the Earth, and we have no evidence to suggest otherwise, so let's just say Ra does it and be done with it.

I will grant you that reality appears materialstic (objects appear to exist in three dimensional space, and they stay put where you leave them), but that is also consistent with a lot of non-materialistic models of reality. It does add another layer to suggest that this is all an illusion, but unless we had some sort of evidence that reality is non-illusionary, the illusionary aspect of certain models of reality can't be counted against them.

And one last point on simplicity (which I think you're arguing for). Materialism is far from a simple theory. No one on Earth understands it completely, because humans don't have the memory or time to achieve advanced degrees in the dozens of materialistic fields you'd have to master to get a handle on it.

 

[athon]

You can picture an Egyptian priest making a similar argument: the sun seems to go around the Earth, and we have no evidence to suggest otherwise, so let's just say Ra does it and be done with it.

And in that situation, I'd have no problem with their conclusion. However, at some stage in history there were observations which came about which meant that conclusion was no longer adequate.

The thing is, there is no problem speculating 'what if?'. Yet to seriously suggest an alternative, you need an observation which demonstrates a short-fall in the current explanation.

I will grant you that reality appears materialstic (objects appear to exist in three dimensional space, and they stay put where you leave them), but that is also consistent with a lot of non-materialistic models of reality.

That's not the point. It's also consistent with fairies working behind the scenes, with butterfly dreams, computer simulations, and everything being built by tiny invisible elves. It's consistent with an infinite array of possible scenarios. Yet the reason why parsimony is assumed is that deferring only to what is consistent with a theory is virtually useless.

Surely in making other decisions in life you don't give all possibilities that are consistent with an idea equal weighting? Why would you in this case?

It does add another layer to suggest that this is all an illusion, but unless we had some sort of evidence that reality is non-illusionary, the illusionary aspect of certain models of reality can't be counted against them.

This seems like an odd way to form a philosophy, and one I suspect you don't apply to all decisions you make. If you were driving down the road, and the petrol gauge 'appeared' to say 'empty', I'd doubt you'd consider it equally likely that the gauge was broken. Hell, the observation is consistent with 'broken gauge', yet an empty tank is parsimonous, hence you'd pull into a station and fuel up.

And one last point on simplicity (which I think you're arguing for). Materialism is far from a simple theory. No one on Earth understands it completely, because humans don't have the memory or time to achieve advanced degrees in the dozens of materialistic fields you'd have to master to get a handle on it.

Ok, most of the stuff you've said so far has been (more or less) reasonable, even if ultimately it does come down to a conflict with parsimony. It's kept me interested in the hope you'd bring some thoughtful comments to the table (which you have). But this is just plain silly.

What we're discussing here is not a matter of 'simplicity of concept' but of parsimony. Given two possible ideas, the one that uses all of the observations with the fewest assumptions (all else being equal) is to be selected for testing or application. To do the reverse makes no sense.

Athon

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

This isn't some matter of interpretation.

You said X
I reminded you of when you said X
You denied saying X
I quoted you as saying X

Whatever my perspective, I have your own quotes. You clearly made a claim you later denied making. You're either changing definitions midstream, or twisting yourself into knots to avoid a pretty trivial point. Maybe you had a different meaning of "external" a few weeks ago. I don't know. Moving right along...





Well, let's examine that a little. Is your claim that when I look at a computer, the visual sense data is evidence that there is an actual computer, existing independent of me? Not some "dream" computer. A computer that is made of "stuff", and doesn't go away when no one's looking at it or thinking of it.

Grrrr........

As I have repeatedly said, I have absolutely no idea what exists "out there" -- what form it takes, if it actually exists, however you want to frame it. Evidence for something external is to me means "I can see something external to me and you can see something external to me too" (it is a pragmatic definition). This does not mean that there actually is something external to me. For the fourth time, I am not making an ontological claim. I am claiming that there is sense data and nothing else (by nothing else I do not mean that nothing else exists necessarily, but that sense data is all we have to go on). How can you not understand that?

The problem is not in what I said; it is in your interpretation.


ETA:
Malerin, what you have done is take words I wrote and stripped them of their context so as to arrive at a conclusion alien to me. If you want to know what I meant, then you must consider the context. I have not changed my stance on any of this. If you doubt my sincerity, then please ask anyone else with whom I have had similar discussions. I can't recall everyone, but you can certainly ask Paul, Mercutio, Nick, Robin, Dancing David, Rocketdodger, BDZ and several others. I did not make an ontological claim because I do not believe that I can make an ontological claim. We have discussed this previously. You can fault me for assuming that you would take that into consideration, but please stop playing this trolling game.

 

[Malerin]

Grrrr........

As I have repeatedly said, I have absolutely no idea what exists "out there" -- what form it takes, if it actually exists, however you want to frame it. Evidence for something external is to me means "I can see something external to me and you can see something external to me too" (it is a pragmatic definition). This does not mean that there actually is something external to me. For the fourth time, I am not making an ontological claim. I am claiming that there is sense data and nothing else (by nothing else I do not mean that nothing else exists necessarily, but that sense data is all we have to go on). How can you not understand that?

The problem is not in what I said; it is in your interpretation.


ETA:
Malerin, what you have done is take words I wrote and stripped them of their context so as to arrive at a conclusion alien to me. If you want to know what I meant, then you must consider the context. I have not changed my stance on any of this. If you doubt my sincerity, then please ask anyone else with whom I have had similar discussions. I can't recall everyone, but you can certainly ask Paul, Mercutio, Nick, Robin, Dancing David, Rocketdodger, BDZ and several others. I did not make an ontological claim because I do not believe that I can make an ontological claim. We have discussed this previously. You can fault me for assuming that you would take that into consideration, but please stop playing this trolling game.

Do you really think I'm trolling? Come now. Arthwollipot seems to be enjoying all this and he actually understood something I wrote! I think I know why we're not understanding each other. What do you mean by "external"? This claim that you've made:

Sense data is evidence for the existence of external things and people.

Is either a trivial point or an epistemic point with an ontological assumption (i.e., reality consists of external things and sense-data is evidence of them). It all hinges of what you think "external" means. So can you tell me how you're using it?