Well, it delineates materialism/physicalism from idealism. If reality is idealistic, then nothing can exist indepedent of being perceived or thought of. Under my definition, a universe consisting of non-intelligent stuff (for example, just hydrogen and helium) would only be possible in a materialistic reality. That kind of universe can't exist if idealism is true.
Fair point. However, as we've been discussing in other threads, how then is idealism any different in principle to monist materialism (as opposed to something like Descarte's dualistic materialism)? I guess I'm trying to nut out how you can define 'material' as distinct from mind at all, if they all operate under the same set of laws and principles.
Which is why I made my definition fairly vague. I don't want to have pages of debate over definitions.
I have no problem with not wanting to get bogged down in semantics, however defining precisely what one means by a term can help clarify miscommunications. If by 'physical' you means something different to what I mean, we can't ever agree on definition alone.
If you've never given any thought to it, on the other hand, and left it vague intentionally, it means you yourself can create those same conflicts within your arguments. I'm curious to know if it's own definitions which conflict, or whether you simply don't have a clear understanding of it yourself.
I would just say matter is "stuff" which exists independent of thought and perception and when combined in certain ways makes "things" (which are also indepedent of thought and perception). I think the key is that a physical thing (e.g., chair made of atoms) can exist indepedent of mind while an immaterial or idealistic thing (e.g., "dream" chair or "bit of software code in Matrix" chair) can't.
Again, no problem there. However, if one starts with that definition already begging the question in such a way, then there is no way to logically establish it. I could just as well create my own definition for anything and wash my hands of any discussion. If 'physical' only ever refers to that which is external to perception, then you've simply ruled perception out as a physical process by definition, not by logic.
In a materialistic reality, if no one's looking at or thinking about a book, it's still there. In an idealistic one, it disappears (or never existed at all). That's a huge difference.
I disagree. I'd say in an idealistic reality, the laws which created your perception of that book cease to continue to do so when you are no longer perceiving it. To state boldly that the book disappears, you're making assumptions that are unsupported by your own observations. You cannot state the book no longer exists, as it conflicts with your very own definition of the book existing at all. See how definitions are now important?
In such a case, idealism is no different to materialism. In both cases, that statement is true. In your version, you've created a contradiction in meanings.
I think it's inherent in any definition of physicalism. I don't know of any materialists/physicalists who beleive physical matter exists and is mind-dependent. There are dualists who take that sort of position- that reality consists of physical matter made by God and dependent on God for it's continued existence and obeyance of the laws of nature (I had a metaphysics professor who argued that an electron does what it does because God is constantly intervening).
True. I apologise for creating any confusion.
Well, I would say a distinction between mind and what the mind is thinking (or dreaming or perceiving). I'm not sure what you're saying here. Rereading it, I think you're saying that idealism would be dualistic? I have no problem with that. That was the tack Berkeley took and I don't think he was being illogical in any way.
While dualism contains idealist principles, they don't have to be the same. I realise now what I was writing could be read that way, and I apologise for that confusion. I do, however, find it even more illogical than idealism itself.
To clarify, idealism on its own (IMO) seems identical in observation to materialism. Materialism relies on laws predicting how information will be perceived. That's the best that can be done. Beyond that, every speculation is the same as the last. As others have already said, if you want to believe in exactly the same laws that I do, with the added complication of it all being fabricated within a single mind, then go for it. It's not exactly going to be parsimonous, but meh...
Yet if 'physical' is distinguishable from 'mind', this presumes that the mind does not operate under physical laws. Observation clearly dictates otherwise, and logic says they need to interact by the very understanding that a physical 'external' reality is recognised by the mind.
Athon
