Do Materialism and Evolution Theory Undermine Science?

[Nick227]

Even if I grant that, your argument is still entirely beside the point.

Right. So, in trying to determine the inner workings of a machine it is beside the point to examine the finished product it creates? Do me a favour, Pixy. I submit, the typical model of selfhood the human has is that of there existing an inner, causative agent that is responsible for what they do. We know this model is incorrect. Yet it is the model that the machine usually creates.

I'm not "rearranging the internal conceptual structure".

I'm defining my terms.

You are defining terms, yes, in a manner, a manner which rearranges how language is conceived of referring internally. Nothing wrong with that. But, for me, it would be greatly more constructive an approach to point out that the phrase "my body" appears to be tautological because of how we typical interpret the words "my body," rather than simply to charge off into claiming that the thoughts are referring to their relationship with their substrate.

Nick

 

[Dancing David]

The fact that humans communicate in what may be considered discrete messages does not imply that the thoughts leading to those communications are also discrete.

As I said, give me an example of a discrete thought. Hint: For a thought to be discrete, it would have to lead to no other thoughts.

Which by defintion would be a real problem as 'thoughts' are very fuzzy they are not limited in area or association, they are very plastic in terms of how the brain functions. It is more like a vote in a democratic body than anything else.

 

[Nick227]

Yeah, well, what you are talking about here is, once again, language.

And the appropriate response to any argument about the nature of reality based on the nature of language is a punch in the snoot. If language disagrees with reality, language is wrong. So what? Language is often wrong.

Am I to take it then that you would refute that language could be in any way responsible for aspects of neural function?

Consider that we have an organism, traditionally understood to have developed solely from genetic natural selection, that has developed this massive brain for little visible purpose, that creates a deeply flawed notion of self. I mean, why would this happen unless there are other forces driving the process?

Nick

 

[Nick227]

A minor nitpick, the name is actually Baars (2x a).

Thanks. To nitpick back, Dennett has 2 x t!

I don't think so, but I guess it would always depend on what you mean by "actually". I mean, the narrative self is by definition already a kind of closed deal (it assumes its very abstract conclusion), and thus not a very satisfying approach. It doesn't really tell us anything empirically, thus we must venture into neuronal space. The view on selfhood could look very different from there, hence why he proposes particular brain regions as potentially important for different aspects of selfhood.

It doesn't tell us much about the nature of the brain, for sure. However, I do find it interesting that this machine, so adept at so many things, would create what is in many ways an acutely disfunctional model of self. It will be very exciting, I think, when the whole thing is unravelled and just how it does it is laid bare.

Nick

 

[PixyMisa]

Am I to take it then that you would refute that language could be in any way responsible for aspects of neural function?

How is that even relevant?

Consider that we have an organism, traditionally understood to have developed solely from genetic natural selection, that has developed this massive brain for little visible purpose, that creates a deeply flawed notion of self.

Why should I consider that? It's just evolution buried under a pile of unsupported assumptions.

I mean, why would this happen unless there are other forces driving the process?

Why shouldn't it?

 

[PixyMisa]

Right. So, in trying to determine the inner workings of a machine it is beside the point to examine the finished product it creates?

Depends on the machine.

If the machine is a computer, then yes, it is entirely beside the point.

Failure modes, on the other hand, illuminate function marvellously.

Do me a favour, Pixy. I submit, the typical model of selfhood the human has is that of there existing an inner, causative agent that is responsible for what they do. We know this model is incorrect. Yet it is the model that the machine usually creates.

Even if I grant that, it is irrelevant.

You are defining terms, yes, in a manner, a manner which rearranges how language is conceived of referring internally.

You mean, my definitions are different to yours.

Nothing wrong with that.

Particularly since I am right and you are wrong.

But, for me, it would be greatly more constructive an approach to point out that the phrase "my body" appears to be tautological because of how we typical interpret the words "my body," rather than simply to charge off into claiming that the thoughts are referring to their relationship with their substrate.

For you, perhaps. In the real world, no.

 

[lupus_in_fabula]

It doesn't tell us much about the nature of the brain, for sure. However, I do find it interesting that this machine, so adept at so many things, would create what is in many ways an acutely disfunctional model of self. It will be very exciting, I think, when the whole thing is unravelled and just how it does it is laid bare.

Well, I don't know what exactly it is you mean by dysfunctional. What would be the opposite to dysfunctional in this case, and how would we measure the level of functionality?

 

[Nick227]

Well, I don't know what exactly it is you mean by dysfunctional. What would be the opposite to dysfunctional in this case, and how would we measure the level of functionality?

I consider the narrative self disfunctional in that it has no physical existence yet appears to do so. The organism creating it typically believes that there is some inner self there - some inner agent that is causing it to act, that is having beliefs, possessing things etc. Yet there is not. I mean, this dichotomy cannot be healthy. It cannot be healthy to intellectually model self in a manner that is quite different from how it is. There are all sorts of issues that could arise, because the organism has its biological needs, and then it also has all the needs of this non-existing narrative self. There will inevitably be conflicts.

I mean, it's a long and interesting discussion (well, would be for me anyway!)

Nick

 

[Nick227]

Why should I consider that? It's just evolution buried under a pile of unsupported assumptions.

Why shouldn't it?

As far as I know, no one has come up with a well-accepted gene-based explanation for the considerable expansion in human brain size over the last couple of million years. Thus it seems reasonable to me to consider that there may be other replicators operating on us - memes.

If units of cultural information are now driving the brain's evolution then to me this creates further concern about the narrative self. It may be that it is barely functioning according to genetic need at all. It could simply be a parasitic entity infesting the organism and directing its energy towards fulfilling the meme's drive for continued existence. This is Blackmore's hypothesis.

Anyway, we're drifting OT well and truly now, but these things do concern me.

Nick

 

[Nick227]

Moreover, Dennet seems to have moved on from his "multiple drafts" metaphor toward that of "fame in the brain". He also seems to be interested in the Global Workspace Theory of Consciousness (promoted by Baars). Blackmore acknowledges that there is indeed a sort of consensus among many scientists that GW in some form or another might be a fruitful approach. It seems that Blackmore, who criticizes it, seems to be in the minority here.

I read some more background here and it seems to me that Dennett's "fame in the brain" idea is essentially a condensation of GW with MD. Both anyway consider the brain to be a parallel processor. MD is more a philosophical model, as I see it, and GW at least moving towards neurobiology. Issues still occur with selfhood, though it seems not so much because of the GW model itself, but rather in how human scientists attempt to understand it.

Some seem to consider that Dennett has done a considerable volte-face by looking at GW, because of it's overtly theatrical imagery. I would say, however, that this just demonstrates a rather superficial understanding on their part. I'm pretty sure Baars himself states that no one is watching the theatre. The GW "broadcast" is consciousness, is fame in the brain. It is not observed. The big, weird issue with MD, that of not being able to make an authoritative statement of just what exactly is present in consciousness at any point in time, still remains. It's not clear for me how this sits with GW.

Anyway, personally, I figure Dennett and MD are still going strong, and Cartesian Materialism alive and well and still thriving in the minds of many a consciousness researcher today!

Nick

 

[lupus_in_fabula]

I read some more background here and it seems to me that Dennett's "fame in the brain" idea is essentially a condensation of GW with MD. Both anyway consider the brain to be a parallel processor. MD is more a philosophical model, as I see it, and GW at least moving towards neurobiology. Issues still occur with selfhood, though it seems not so much because of the GW model itself, but rather in how human scientists attempt to understand it.

Some seem to consider that Dennett has done a considerable volte-face by looking at GW, because of it's overtly theatrical imagery. I would say, however, that this just demonstrates a rather superficial understanding on their part. I'm pretty sure Baars himself states that no one is watching the theatre. The GW "broadcast" is consciousness, is fame in the brain. It is not observed. The big, weird issue with MD, that of not being able to make an authoritative statement of just what exactly is present in consciousness at any point in time, still remains. It's not clear for me how this sits with GW.

Anyway, personally, I figure Dennett and MD are still going strong, and Cartesian Materialism alive and well and still thriving in the minds of many a consciousness researcher today!

I think the whole objection against Cartesian Materialism is somewhat of an amusing straw man here. The danger with creating such a straw man is of course that people who strongly crusade against it from a philosophical point of view, might ultimately get it wrong on the empirical plane, which is indeed what seems to have happened to Dennett. He rejected the notion that 'no one is filling in' apparent holes in visual information due to blind spots (which is correct), thus he also proposed that the visual system doesn't do such 'filling in' at all because there's no need for it (which apparently is incorrect). The visual cortex seems to indeed be involved in such a process.

I don't think him being wrong at that point refutes his general model though (although some do). I think however that his model was, and still is, ultimately just a metaphor, which should be kept in mind. His new metaphor – "fame in the brain" – is a way of consolidating new empirical finding with his philosophical framework. Empirical findings should change the philosophical framework, not the other way around. Philosophical straw men are never reliable platforms for predicting what's actually happening. Dennett's movement towards GW should be seen in the light of new empirical evidence surfacing – i.e. in relation to information that wasn't available when he wrote his book almost two decades ago.

I'm pretty sure new findings will give rise to yet another metaphor by him eventually.

 

[Nick227]

I think the whole objection against Cartesian Materialism is somewhat of an amusing straw man here. The danger with creating such a straw man is of course that people who strongly crusade against it from a philosophical point of view, might ultimately get it wrong on the empirical plane, which is indeed what seems to have happened to Dennett. He rejected the notion that 'no one is filling in' apparent holes in visual information due to blind spots (which is correct), thus he also proposed that the visual system doesn't do such 'filling in' at all because there's no need for it (which apparently is incorrect). The visual cortex seems to indeed be involved in such a process.

What I recall, and I stress that my memory and understanding isn't perfect here, was that Dennett claimed that "filling in" couldn't take place, presumably because there was no one for whom it was needed. Ramachandran discovered that filling in did take place. It would seem to me that the GW model might explain this inconsistency... if we say that consciousness is but GW on "broadcast" then perhaps the filling in is undertaken for the benefit of the other modules being broadcast to.

I don't think him being wrong at that point refutes his general model though (although some do).

Plenty of researchers seem only too willing to dismiss Dennett at any given opportunity. He took a real stand, I think, and created the basis for a workable model that still dominates the field, if you ask me, today.

The issue, as I've said several times in this thread, is that it does not really matter if you have a PhD and 20 years experience working with AI or cognitive neuroscience. You are still going to struggle on a personal level with Dennett's MD model unless you've really been able to examine your mind's own personal investment in selfhood. Dennett's model is so counter-intuitive there will inevitably be resistance, particularly amongst a group of people so used to using their heads. So I think he's right to have a pop at those he calls "Cartesian Materialists." It brings the real issue back to the surface repeatedly.

I think however that his model was, and still is, ultimately just a metaphor, which should be kept in mind. His new metaphor – "fame in the brain" – is a way of consolidating new empirical finding with his philosophical framework. Empirical findings should change the philosophical framework, not the other way around. Philosophical straw men are never reliable platforms for predicting what's actually happening. Dennett's movement towards GW should be seen in the light of new empirical evidence surfacing – i.e. in relation to information that wasn't available when he wrote his book almost two decades ago.

Yes. I'm going to have a go at reading one of Baars' books. I like his model, what I've seen of it. He's bringing Freud back in, as I see it. Its Freud + Dennett, basically - a winning combination!

Nick

 

[AWPrime]

Plenty of researchers seem only too willing to dismiss Dennett at any given opportunity. He took a real stand, I think, and created the basis for a workable model that still dominates the field, if you ask me, today.

You contradict yourself. He dominates but the flied dismisses him? That sounds like its only dominates the minds of those that believe in it.

The issue, as I've said several times in this thread, is that it does not really matter if you have a PhD and 20 years experience working with AI or cognitive neuroscience. You are still going to struggle on a personal level with Dennett's MD model unless you've really been able to examine your mind's own personal investment in selfhood. Dennett's model is so counter-intuitive there will inevitably be resistance, particularly amongst a group of people so used to using their heads.

Or its just simply that flawed, that its only used by people who overlook the 'counter-intuitive' nature of it because of their personal investment.

 

[Nick227]

You contradict yourself. He dominates but the flied dismisses him? That sounds like its only dominates the minds of those that believe in it.

Well, Dennett's model is still dominant, if you ask me, and does deal with the issue of selfhood which, as most commentators admit, is finally the core issue. It seems to me consistent with Baars' GWT, and in addition does deal with the issue of selfhood, which Baars' model, as I understand it, did not set out to do.

The remaining issue, imo, is not so much to do with the model itself but rather that many researchers still cannot themselves mentally model MD (or GWT without a self) because it is so counter-intuitive.

Or its just simply that flawed, that its only used by people who overlook the 'counter-intuitive' nature of it because of their personal investment.

I think we all know what the intuitive model of self looks like, and that actually it isn't like this in the brain. There's no "cpu." There's no homunculus. No one is watching. It's tough to reconcile what we know with "how it feels it should be inside," but Dennett's model provides a means to do so.

Nick

 

[AWPrime]

You're just repeating your statement.
"if you ask me" -> Personal opinion, not fact.

The remaining issue, imo, is not so much to do with the model itself but rather that many researchers still cannot themselves mentally model MD (or GWT without a self) because it is so counter-intuitive.

Again you confirm that it isn't dominant and frankly unworkable (a good indication of a failed model).

Even your strawman of the intuitive model doesn't help, because most us the material process version, which has nothing to do with that strawman.

 

[Nick227]

You're just repeating your statement.
"if you ask me" -> Personal opinion, not fact.

Again you confirm that it isn't dominant and frankly unworkable (a good indication of a failed model).

Even your strawman of the intuitive model doesn't help, because most us the material process version, which has nothing to do with that strawman.

What are your actual issues with Multiple Drafts? Please state them and then we can look. Go on, show me you actually have the first understanding of the subject matter.

Lupus mentioned "filling-in." Fair enough. Now you have a go. What are the real issues for you?

Nick

 

[AWPrime]

What are your actual issues with Multiple Drafts?

One of the foundations of the theory was the conflict between Orwellian (post-experiential) or Stalinesque (pre-experiential) false perception hypotheses. When/where this occurs in the brain is what Dennett calls the 'Cartesian theater'. He then refuted the 'Cartesian theater' by saying that there is no privileged place in the brain where consciousness starts, in other words no theater.

However the 'Cartesian theater' is nothing more then a strawman, Dennet was the one that introduced it and stated that this is the limit of materialism. That view is false; he constructed his strawman by simplifying and limiting both the perception problem and materialism.

On review he should have known that his theory would be outdated.

Its clear that the mind is a continuous process and that different areas of the brain are optimized for different tasks. The former nukes the notion of drafts and the latter does tell us there are distinguishable sections.
This leads to the conclusion that the mind has sub-processes and that the consciousness, as part of the mind, covers a set of these sub-processes. It requires no 'theater' and is still materialistic.

 

[Nick227]

One of the foundations of the theory was the conflict between Orwellian (post-experiential) or Stalinesque (pre-experiential) false perception hypotheses. When/where this occurs in the brain is what Dennett calls the 'Cartesian theater'. He then refuted the 'Cartesian theater' by saying that there is no privileged place in the brain where consciousness starts, in other words no theater.

What I recall is that Dennett observed different ways in which the brain integrates perceptual information, labelling the options Stalinesque or Orwellian revisions. I don't recall him claiming that this took place in Cartesian Theatre. As I understand it, Dennett's Cartesian Theatre referred to the notion that information is somehow "entering consciousness" at one place in the brain, possibly or possibly not with some observing entity or system present.

However the 'Cartesian theater' is nothing more then a strawman, Dennet was the one that introduced it and stated that this is the limit of materialism.

Could you cite me where Dennett states this?

That view is false; he constructed his strawman by simplifying and limiting both the perception problem and materialism.

On review he should have known that his theory would be outdated.

Its clear that the mind is a continuous process and that different areas of the brain are optimized for different tasks. The former nukes the notion of drafts and the latter does tell us there are distinguishable sections.
This leads to the conclusion that the mind has sub-processes and that the consciousness, as part of the mind, covers a set of these sub-processes. It requires no 'theater' and is still materialistic.

But Dennett is a materialist. He's a strong AI theorist.

What do you mean by "mind" here? If you mean "consciousness" then, yes, there is the sense of it being a continuous process, but what I understand Dennett to be saying is that it is not really possible to articulate at any point in time just what the so-called "contents of consciousness" are, what really is definitively happening. The brain is a parallel processor and the action of interrogating one of the drafts being continuously created has a result, but you have no way to assert that it is definitively accurate. As I understand it, this viewpoint is echoed in Blackmore's assertion that there is no such thing as a "stream of consciousness."

I don't see Cartesian Materialism as Dennett's straw man. I see it as a valid label for a still prevalent contradiction between behaviour and belief noticeable in certain researchers. Happy to be proven wrong!

Nick

 

[Nick227]

But Dennett is a materialist. He's a strong AI theorist.

What do you mean by "mind" here? If you mean "consciousness" then, yes, there is the sense of it being a continuous process, but what I understand Dennett to be saying is that it is not really possible to articulate at any point in time just what the so-called "contents of consciousness" are, what really is definitively happening. The brain is a parallel processor and the action of interrogating one of the drafts being continuously created has a result, but you have no way to assert that it is definitively accurate. As I understand it, this viewpoint is echoed in Blackmore's assertion that there is no such thing as a "stream of consciousness."

I don't see Cartesian Materialism as Dennett's straw man. I see it as a valid label for a still prevalent contradiction between behaviour and belief noticeable in certain researchers. Happy to be proven wrong!

Nick

Hi AW,

Did you run out of Wikipedia articles to rip off for criticisms of Multiple Drafts?

Nick

 

[AWPrime]

Actually I completely forgot about this thread.

What I recall is that Dennett observed different ways in which the brain integrates perceptual information, labelling the options Stalinesque or Orwellian revisions. I don't recall him claiming that this took place in Cartesian Theatre. As I understand it, Dennett's Cartesian Theatre referred to the notion that information is somehow "entering consciousness" at one place in the brain, possibly or possibly not with some observing entity or system present.

Don'/can't you see the connection?

Could you cite me where Dennett states this?

The term was coined by him.

It requires no 'theater' and is still materialistic.

But Dennett is a materialist. He's a strong AI theorist.

That little section was actually a FYI for our resident idealist/dualist (that being you).

What do you mean by "mind" here?

If you can't understand terms such as "mind" and "consciousness", then why are you here?

I don't see Cartesian Materialism as Dennett's straw man. I see it as a valid label for a still prevalent contradiction between behaviour and belief noticeable in certain researchers. Happy to be proven wrong!

You must mean 'Cartesian Theatre', other wise you fail English. Also you have yet to show any contradiction.