Do Materialism and Evolution Theory Undermine Science?

[Nick227]

And yet I know it’s me who’s eating and not someone else.

I would say there's awareness of the process going on, but "I" only comes into it when we start to articulate what's going on.

And since most of us live in a society it’s pretty much given that other people we meet also have the ability to think, communicate and make distinctions. If someone demonstrates selfhood, then you might as well conclude that that someone knows he’s he and not you.

For sure, but to my mind there's still no need to treat selfhood as a priori. There are things happening. They only happen to someone when thinking and identification with thought takes place.

Nick

 

[Nick227]

I told you how I define it. For a self referential system S, "I" is the reference of S, within S.

Thus thermostats have "I", worms have "I", dogs have "I", and humans have "I".

It just so happens that the self-reference of a human mind is much more complex and involved than that of a thermostat mind.

Personally, I would not consider that there is an "I" until there is the thought "I," or the assumption of "I" created by thinking.

But you said yourself that "effect", "identification," and "thought" are all just processes.

So there is no "effect," there is no "identification," and there is no "thought," just like you contend that there is no "I."

You can't even communicate with us because, actually, your nouns mean nothing (they are all just different terms for processes), you are just a process, and we are just processes.

You can't even meditate to reach the truth, because meditation is just a process.

Well, the barriers of language are considerable here. The assumption in articulation is that one is giving a concrete statement of "what's going on." But of course this is not the case. It is merely that a narrative is being created. That it can utilise symbols, infer processes, or talk of relationships does not mean that these things actually exist, beyond our conception of them, merely that this is how we articulate.

You seem to me to be assuming that the narrative mirrors reality. Narratives are just narratives. Thinking is just thinking.

Nick

 

[Nick227]

What is the qualitative difference between "I" and selfhood?

I would say that the sense of self is created through a variety of neurological processes - mirroring, body-map, some effects of attenting, perhaps. "I" to me is another aspect of selfhood, one created via thinking. So to me the qualitative difference is that "I" is one aspect of selfhood but not the whole of it.

Wait... I thought you said "I" doesn't exist....

But if you are talking about it... then....

Well, what I said was that there is no hard, objective evidence for "I." This is not the same thing. Using the word "It" certainly assumes selfhood, not necessarily "I."

I would not dispute that there is the sensation of "I." I wouldn't be able to participate in many discussions without it! I also would not dispute that this "I" is useful and indeed necessary. Without it language cannot identify with what it articulates. It is just that I don't figure the "I" to be a priori, to quote the mistake Descartes made. It just chugs along somewhere after the fact.

Nick

 

[Nick227]

He has some beleif that if you loose you subjective identity , suddenly you life gets better.

I do consider that subjectivity may be a pathological disorder, yes, if that's what you mean. This is kind of an extreme position, though, which I do accept. I've noticed that people who articulate and express more of their inner states do seem to be happier and healthier. It may even be that this is the "I"'s only raison d'etre.

Nick

 

[rocketdodger]

Nich certainly has some strange beliefs, most of which are not supported by any research. There is the common self of the body, that is all that there is, Nick227 has some strange beliefs that extend past that. He has some beleif that if you loose you subjective identity , suddenly you life gets better.

Nick also has an obsession with projecting some strange magical beliefs onto others. This is partly because it reinforces Nick making a living through unethical therapeutic treatments that are unfounded and untested.

Is that his profession?

 

[rocketdodger]

Personally, I would not consider that there is an "I" until there is the thought "I," or the assumption of "I" created by thinking.

How is the "thought 'I'" qualitatively different from any other kind of self reference?

You seem to me to be assuming that the narrative mirrors reality. Narratives are just narratives. Thinking is just thinking.

Narratives are reality. Thoughts are reality. That is a consequence of materialism.

What you mean is that I assume thoughts mirror what they represent or reference in some way. Of course I assume that. What is the point of a reference if there is no useful correspondence between the reference and its referrent?

I don't assume they mirror exactly. Why should they? That would be very inefficient.

It is clear to me that you lack the requisite knowledge in the fields of cognitive or computer science to even understand the computational model of consciousness, let alone argue against it. Of course, that hasn't stopped anyone else in your shoes...

 

[Dancing David]

Is that his profession?

I don't know, but he stated that he engages in therapeutic practices with no research basis.

He also never understood Mercutio and got hung up on the teleporter as proof of something strange.

 

[Dancing David]

Nick has a preference for his narrative but they will tell you it is not a narrative. Sheesh.

 

[rocketdodger]

I would say that the sense of self is created through a variety of neurological processes - mirroring, body-map, some effects of attenting, perhaps. "I" to me is another aspect of selfhood, one created via thinking. So to me the qualitative difference is that "I" is one aspect of selfhood but not the whole of it.

What are the other aspects of selfhood that don't fall under "I?"

Well, what I said was that there is no hard, objective evidence for "I." This is not the same thing.

Yes, in the context of materialism, it is. Of course, if you were a materialist like you recently ceased pretending to be, you would understand that.

I would not dispute that there is the sensation of "I."

According to materialism, everything is material.

So how on Earth could something non-existent, in a material sense, evoke a sensation?

It can't. It is clearly nonsense to think it could. That is why dualism is nonsense.

Thus "I" exists. What it is and how it evokes that sensation are irrelevant. The fact that it evokes a sensation is objective proof of its existence.

Of course, if you were a materialist like you recently ceased pretending to be, you would understand that.

It is just that I don't figure the "I" to be a priori, to quote the mistake Descartes made. It just chugs along somewhere after the fact.

Nobody here has ever said otherwise.

 

[rocketdodger]

Nick has a preference for his narrative but they will tell you it is not a narrative. Sheesh.

I don't even think "narrative" is a very good word for... whatever he intends it to be used for.

I have always just assumed that he didn't know much about the underlying theory or mechanisms of the human brain and thus was restricted to using such ill-fitting terms.

 

[billydkid]

No.

 

[lupus_in_fabula]

I would say there's awareness of the process going on, but "I" only comes into it when we start to articulate what's going on.

I find it quite implausible that I simply articulate myself into existence, and that I have to keep on articulating in order to continue to exist. Although the sensation if “I” does fluctuate through out the day and in relation to activities, it is highly resilient to forgetfulness in the longer run.

Thus, as I already said, I prefer a more practical definition for “I”: “I” is the distinguishable system wherein the sensation of “I” arises and wherein it’s perceived as such.

For sure, but to my mind there's still no need to treat selfhood as a priori. There are things happening. They only happen to someone when thinking and identification with thought takes place.

While it’s true that there must be a process that creates the feeling of self (thus the process, whatever it is, is a priori), I find it impractical to simply limit the perspective to a first-person’s ephemeral sensation. If we assume there being an underlying process, then why not account for that into the definition, rather than simply focusing on the end-of-the-pipe result.

Hence, if a seagull flies into a chaps head, the collision is happening to someone, regardless of the chap loosing consciousness and not being “someone” at that particular moment. And when he wakes up, he will most probably conclude that he was unconscious for a while rather than that he wasn’t he during that particular time.

 

[Nick227]

How is the "thought 'I'" qualitatively different from any other kind of self reference?

Do you mean different from, for example, saying "Nick's thoughts?" If so, then I find it's usually far more emotive to identify. Saying "Nick's feeling happy" feels a lot different from saying "I'm feeling happy." The act of identifying with the inner state in this manner brings more feelings up. That's the qualitative difference.

Narratives are reality. Thoughts are reality. That is a consequence of materialism.

What you mean is that I assume thoughts mirror what they represent or reference in some way. Of course I assume that. What is the point of a reference if there is no useful correspondence between the reference and its referrent?

I'm not saying they do not reflect reality at all. I'm pointing out that thinking comes about after the fact. We use symbols and language to articulate what's going on for us and in so doing create experiences and notional self. Or rather, identification creates experience and notional self.

Nick

 

[Nick227]

What are the other aspects of selfhood that don't fall under "I?"

Body-map for example.

Yes, in the context of materialism, it is. Of course, if you were a materialist like you recently ceased pretending to be, you would understand that.

So you agree with me now....but I'm still wrong!

According to materialism, everything is material.

So how on Earth could something non-existent, in a material sense, evoke a sensation?

It can't. It is clearly nonsense to think it could. That is why dualism is nonsense.

Thus "I" exists. What it is and how it evokes that sensation are irrelevant. The fact that it evokes a sensation is objective proof of its existence.

The belief evokes a sensation. That you believe in something does not mean it must exist. Kids get very upset sometimes when they learn that there's no Father Christmas. This does not mean he exists.

What, I submit, is truly nonsense to a genuine materialist is the notion that someone is experiencing something. It's a linguistic convenience and a social and psychological necessity in many ways to behave in this manner, but that does not mean it's real. As soon as you posit experiencer-experience you are creating a duality. Things happen but they do not happen to anyone until thinking takes place. You can become aware of the monist, or at least non-dual, reality that constantly exists before the conceptualised duality created by the thinking mind comes about. This is why meditation, materialism and monism are very closely linked.

Nick

 

[Nick227]

I find it quite implausible that I simply articulate myself into existence, and that I have to keep on articulating in order to continue to exist. Although the sensation if “I” does fluctuate through out the day and in relation to activities, it is highly resilient to forgetfulness in the longer run.

Thus, as I already said, I prefer a more practical definition for “I”: “I” is the distinguishable system wherein the sensation of “I” arises and wherein it’s perceived as such.

Well, the more you keep thinking about it, the more it is anyway reinforced! So one might say that this "I" has a considerable investment in discussing endlessly! I think Susan Blackmore even considers "I" to be basically memetic in nature, though not completely sure about this.

While it’s true that there must be a process that creates the feeling of self (thus the process, whatever it is, is a priori), I find it impractical to simply limit the perspective to a first-person’s ephemeral sensation. If we assume there being an underlying process, then why not account for that into the definition, rather than simply focusing on the end-of-the-pipe result.

Hence, if a seagull flies into a chaps head, the collision is happening to someone, regardless of the chap loosing consciousness and not being “someone” at that particular moment. And when he wakes up, he will most probably conclude that he was unconscious for a while rather than that he wasn’t he during that particular time.

For sure, from the "I"'s perspective it is highly practical. On a social or psychological level it is practical and maybe even a necessity - identification can help prevent psychosis, for instance. However, imo if you want to know what is actually true and what is actually not then sometimes pragmatism and being practical may be have to be put aside for a while.

 

[rocketdodger]

Do you mean different from, for example, saying "Nick's thoughts?" If so, then I find it's usually far more emotive to identify. Saying "Nick's feeling happy" feels a lot different from saying "I'm feeling happy." The act of identifying with the inner state in this manner brings more feelings up. That's the qualitative difference.

1) Only because you grew up in a culture that uses "I" primarily for the self reference. Japanese, for instance, makes much less use of "I."

2) "More" feelings isn't a qualitative difference, it is a quantitative difference.

I'm not saying they do not reflect reality at all. I'm pointing out that thinking comes about after the fact. We use symbols and language to articulate what's going on for us and in so doing create experiences and notional self. Or rather, identification creates experience and notional self.

I can't comment on this because we disagree on the definitions for half of the words you used.

 

[rocketdodger]

Body-map for example.

You are claiming that your body-map is not part of your notion of yourself?

That is interesting because, to me, it seems like my notion of "the foot that is linked to the body that is me" is the same as my notion of "my foot."

When I step on a nail, I think "ow my foot."

So you agree with me now....but I'm still wrong!

No. My "yes" was a response to your "that is not the same thing."

In the context of materialism, the fact that "I" exists is hard objective evidence for "I."

The belief evokes a sensation. That you believe in something does not mean it must exist. Kids get very upset sometimes when they learn that there's no Father Christmas. This does not mean he exists.

Something exists to evoke the sensation. I can define "the real father christmas" to be "whatever it is that evokes the sensation of father christmas in a child," and it becomes a trivially true fact that such a thing exists.

Thus the real "I" exists -- it is simply whatever evokes the sensation of "I."

What, I submit, is truly nonsense to a genuine materialist is the notion that someone is experiencing something. It's a linguistic convenience and a social and psychological necessity in many ways to behave in this manner, but that does not mean it's real. As soon as you posit experiencer-experience you are creating a duality. Things happen but they do not happen to anyone until thinking takes place. You can become aware of the monist, or at least non-dual, reality that constantly exists before the conceptualised duality created by the thinking mind comes about. This is why meditation, materialism and monism are very closely linked.

No. It is only nonsense if you assume dualistic meanings for the terms involved.

If, on the other hand, you assume meanings such as "someone == a material system that human beings recognize as another human being" and "experiencing == a material process that occurs in human beings" then there is no problem at all.

And those are the types of meanings that are used and understood by materialists.

And this is the kind of thing you won't understand until you learn about materialism and cognitive/computer science.

 

[lupus_in_fabula]

For sure, from the "I"'s perspective it is highly practical. On a social or psychological level it is practical and maybe even a necessity - identification can help prevent psychosis, for instance. However, imo if you want to know what is actually true and what is actually not then sometimes pragmatism and being practical may be have to be put aside for a while.

I’m not sure what truth you’re referring to, but defining away the process underlying the self-referential behaviour of an organism is hardly productive. Immediately jumping below the description level it exists on doesn’t seem to be very fruitful, and neither is the consequential proclamation of non-existence especially enlightening.

 

[Nick227]

You are claiming that your body-map is not part of your notion of yourself?

I'm claiming that both body map and "I" are aspects of selfhood.

That is interesting because, to me, it seems like my notion of "the foot that is linked to the body that is me" is the same as my notion of "my foot."

When I step on a nail, I think "ow my foot."

Yes, those thoughts can come up.

In the context of materialism, the fact that "I" exists is hard objective evidence for "I."

Well, that might be your vision of materialism. I don't share it. To me your position is akin to a religious type claiming that "the fact that God exists is hard, objective evidence for God."

Something exists to evoke the sensation. I can define "the real father christmas" to be "whatever it is that evokes the sensation of father christmas in a child," and it becomes a trivially true fact that such a thing exists.

So, according to your vision of materialism Father Christmas exists?

Thus the real "I" exists -- it is simply whatever evokes the sensation of "I."

But is there really a sensation of "I?" I think I should not have used the word "sensation" before. There is a sensation of the body but "I" is not really a sensation. My mistake, apologies. Perhaps it would be better to use the phrase "sense of I", or "notion of I." There is a body map. There is behaviour derived from mirroring and attenting. There are thoughts. These processes go on and they maintain the sense of selfhood, but this does not mean that selfhood is real beyond this sense.

In breaking down the processes which create this sense of selfhood, including this sense of "I", so this notion of personal identity is inevitably dissipated.

In considering monism to be real, one is of course left with the question of how a monist reality can create such dualistic experiencing. This question can be dealt with here, because it can be seen that it is only with the arisal of thought and the presence of identification with thought that "I" arises. The bulk of duality is created through thinking.

No. It is only nonsense if you assume dualistic meanings for the terms involved.

If, on the other hand, you assume meanings such as "someone == a material system that human beings recognize as another human being" and "experiencing == a material process that occurs in human beings" then there is no problem at all.

Now you are, to my mind, instituting duality at an even deeper level. It's quite needless to do this imo. You are, I submit, doing just what Descartes did. He assumed that "I" must be present. He took it as a given. The pattern of identification in Descartes' brain caused this to happen so he could not see around his preconception.

There is simply no need to immerse yourself so deeply in duality. It is unnecessary to define things in such a complex manner when one appreciates that thoughts are just happening. When there is less identification the process by which a monist reality creates this dialectical reality becomes much clearer.

Nick

 

[Nick227]

I’m not sure what truth you’re referring to, but defining away the process underlying the self-referential behaviour of an organism is hardly productive. Immediately jumping below the description level it exists on doesn’t seem to be very fruitful, and neither is the consequential proclamation of non-existence especially enlightening.

Well, in simply considering this "self-referencing" conceptually there must to my mind be problems. If there are only phenomenal representations at what point does this "self" come into actuality? The organism is considered to be independent only through a variety of processes which take place. Thus it can be concluded that it is not actually separate, but that it merely appears to be. The notion that self-referencing is taking place only to my mind reinforces the illusion.

The majority of scientists and philosophers already accept monism. Thus the underlying nature is already accepted. All that is needed to begin to understand the bridge between monist reality and dualistic interpretation is to witness for yourself how an apparently dualised reality is constantly being created from a non-dual substrate.

Nick