Automatons

[Nick227]

I'm not arguing that there's a soul. I've been asking everyone how they grapple with the fact that they're soulless, physical objects. The discussion deviated from that, which is probably my fault for using terms like "automatons" to frame it.

Well, to me it's just like growing up really. I used to believe in Father Christmas when I was very little. Now I don't. If you ask me, people believe in souls, destinies, and similar teleological notions because they don't want to deal with the simple reality of death.

Nick

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

I'm not arguing that there's a soul. I've been asking everyone how they grapple with the fact that they're soulless, physical objects. The discussion deviated from that, which is probably my fault for using terms like "automatons" to frame it.

Then what do you mean? You used the term "automaton" to mean something. You're talking about something that is lacking if you lack a soul, otherwise you would have framed your question the opposite way, "All you dualists who believe in a soul, what do you think the soul adds since everything else we know about the human mind can be explained by the complex structures in the human body?"

In other words, the fact that believing a human is a soulless, physical object is something to be "grappled" with, implies that believing we have souls would not be something you have any difficulty with. (I'm not assuming you believe in a soul--but you are asking a question that's based on the notion that having a soul is less problematic than not having one.)

 

[westprog]

If complexity is defined in that way, then yes.

But there is no reason to think that there is any behavior of a human mind that an automaton cannot reproduce.

But there is also no certainty that the human mind is an automaton, and that the "emergent properties" are simply creations of complex behaviour. This would not be certain even if an automaton could be created which appeared, externally, to have all the characteristics of a human mind.

 

[Nick227]

But there is also no certainty that the human mind is an automaton, and that the "emergent properties" are simply creations of complex behaviour. This would not be certain even if an automaton could be created which appeared, externally, to have all the characteristics of a human mind.

I agree that this does seem to be a major sticking point, from what I understand of the situation. We have theories of consciousness, but not yet any machines that can actually see, in the human sense of the word.

eta: I wonder if it's even likely to be possible in the short term. It seems to me that the human sense of sight could be so highly dependent on specific human neuroanatomy as to be very hard to replicate, and by no means easy to test.

Nick

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

We have theories of consciousness, but not yet any machines that can actually see, in the human sense of the word.

If you're talking about subjective consciousness, we also have no way to prove that any human other than oneself has it.

In other words, the problem is the same for human or AI or anything else.

There's still no reason to postulate a soul. At best, people who do so are pointing out a gap in our knowledge and trying to fill it with something supernatural instead of offering any evidence or support for their contention.

ETA: We can certainly today make a machine that can receive and process what we call "visual information" and report it back to us (or even use it to manipulate things in its environment). We can even program it to report "I can see". A sophisticated AI might even be able to claim spontaneously, "I think I can see." We can probably reproduce every external manifestation of human "seeing", but we can't really say anything about for the part we can't test even in other humans (that subjective experience of seeing). And who knows? Maybe a sophisticated enough machine does experience seeing subjectively. We'd have to take its word for it the same way we do with other humans.

 

[rocketdodger]

But there is also no certainty that the human mind is an automaton, and that the "emergent properties" are simply creations of complex behaviour. This would not be certain even if an automaton could be created which appeared, externally, to have all the characteristics of a human mind.

Quite frankly -- who cares?

We can say the same about your wife/husband/friend/whatever. They only appear, externally, to have all the characteristics of a human mind.

I am constantly amazed by how far people that seem to be otherwise fairly intelligent go to obfuscate this topic.

Mercutio has been preaching this for literally years and people clearly still don't get it. Behavior is all there is. End of story.

 

[Nick227]

If you're talking about subjective consciousness, we also have no way to prove that any human other than oneself has it.

Well, finally that might be so, to prove it to the nth degree, but I don't believe in p-zombies! Also, in terms of neuroanatomy, people are acutely similar. I think the notion of subjectivity is a bit of a smokescreen really. Finally no one is experiencing anything. Machines are processing and in that processing creating constructs like "I" and "experience." That's my take. If there are two acutely similar machines it seems reasonable to me that they create acutely similar experiences.

Nick

 

[Nick227]

Quite frankly -- who cares?

We can say the same about your wife/husband/friend/whatever. They only appear, externally, to have all the characteristics of a human mind.

I am constantly amazed by how far people that seem to be otherwise fairly intelligent go to obfuscate this topic.

Mercutio has been preaching this for literally years and people clearly still don't get it. Behavior is all there is. End of story.

You've never seen, say, a colour then?

Nick

 

[six7s]

Quite frankly -- who cares?

Navel-gazers
Wannabe philosophers
The religulous

IOW: wooists

 

[rocketdodger]

You've never seen, say, a colour then?

Nick

Seeing a color isn't a behavior?

At what level?

Particles interacting with other particles -- behavior at the quantum level.

Neurons firing and triggering each other -- behavior at the celluar level.

My consciousness observing a color -- behavior at the cognitive level.

Me being aware that I am observing a color -- behavior at the meta-cognitive level.

Me being aware that me being aware I am observing a color is a behavior -- behavior at the meta-meta-cognitive level.

.
.
.

So, where?

 

[Nick227]

Seeing a color isn't a behavior?

At what level?

Particles interacting with other particles -- behavior at the quantum level.

Neurons firing and triggering each other -- behavior at the celluar level.

My consciousness observing a color -- behavior at the cognitive level.

Me being aware that I am observing a color -- behavior at the meta-cognitive level.

Me being aware that me being aware I am observing a color is a behavior -- behavior at the meta-meta-cognitive level.

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.
.

So, where?

Those are thoughts. I'm asking you if you've ever seen colour. I don't find it such a complicated question.

Nick

 

[six7s]

I don't find it such a complicated question.

That's probably because, despite asking it, you're incapable of understanding the question, let alone recognising an answer

 

[westprog]

Quite frankly -- who cares?

We can say the same about your wife/husband/friend/whatever. They only appear, externally, to have all the characteristics of a human mind.

That's certainly true, but most of us, I think, work on the reasonable basis that similar things will have similar characteristics. If other people tend to look like me, and behave like me, then it's reasonable to infer that they have a similar internal experience - especially when they claim to have something similar.

What blue looks like to another person is impossible to establish.

I am constantly amazed by how far people that seem to be otherwise fairly intelligent go to obfuscate this topic.

Mercutio has been preaching this for literally years and people clearly still don't get it. Behavior is all there is. End of story.

I'm continually amazed that people think that to simply state behaviour is all there is is sufficient to end the argument. The reason that they don't accept a mantra just because it is constantly repeated is because they have direct access to something other than behaviour. And while I know that Mercutio doesn't believe that experience is something other than behaviour, I still insist that they are two different things.

 

[westprog]

Seeing a color isn't a behavior?

At what level?

Particles interacting with other particles -- behavior at the quantum level.

Neurons firing and triggering each other -- behavior at the celluar level.

My consciousness observing a color -- behavior at the cognitive level.

I don't regard this as behaviour. Nobody is doing anything. There is nothing to be observed. There is only observation.

The critical point is not whether we describe this as behaviour or not, but in the recognition that the passive experiencing of something is qualitatively different from doing something, and remains unexplained.

Me being aware that I am observing a color -- behavior at the meta-cognitive level.

Me being aware that me being aware I am observing a color is a behavior -- behavior at the meta-meta-cognitive level.

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.
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So, where?

 

[Nick227]

That's probably because, despite asking it, you're incapable of understanding the question, let alone recognising an answer

Well, looking back I was a little unfair to RD. He is articulating a model for vision, but these are just thoughts. I am asking him a more direct question. Of course, in an internet forum, all we can use are thoughts to communicate but still I feel he could be a little more direct in his answer.

OK, that cleared up, why would I be incapable of understanding my own question? I asked RD if he saw colour. Do you find this an inanswerable question too?

Nick

 

[Nick227]

I'm continually amazed that people think that to simply state behaviour is all there is is sufficient to end the argument. The reason that they don't accept a mantra just because it is constantly repeated is because they have direct access to something other than behaviour. And while I know that Mercutio doesn't believe that experience is something other than behaviour, I still insist that they are two different things.

There certainly is this rather cult-like feeling to the behaviourists on this forum. It's like we keep just repeating "It's all behaviour" over and over again and finally we'll hypnotise ourselves into actually believing it.

Behaviourism is just a thought-based model of reality. It runs straight away into trouble with "things" (I use the word for want of something better) like colour because they are too direct. Colour is not a thought and cannot be reduced to thought. You can have no thoughts whatsoever and colour is still there.

Nick

 

[lupus_in_fabula]

One thing is pretty obvious thou: Without certain neuronal behaviours, there will definitely not be any seeing of the colour red.

 

[Nick227]

One thing is pretty obvious thou: Without certain neuronal behaviours, there will definitely not be any seeing of the colour red.

Care to state which specific neuronal "behaviours" are responsible for seeing?

Nick

 

[Lonewulf]

Care to state which specific neuronal "behaviours" are responsible for seeing?

Nick

He was alluding to "seeing red", I.E., through rage.

 

[lupus_in_fabula]

Care to state which specific neuronal "behaviours" are responsible for seeing?

Nick

Actually we don’t have to go down that route at all – and besides, this is better left to people with familiarity with the subject anyway. We know however that without neurons firing, there’s not much happening, especially in terms of seeing or sensing. We also know that just any random firing by any neurons, will not suffice either. I.e. only certain behaviours by the neurons in our brains will make seeing red possible for us. Thus, only certain kinds of behaviours seem to lead to certain kinds of results. You could exchange the term behaviour with process if you like, although I think it’s perfectly valid to speak about behaviour – we’re doing the observation/assessment about what’s happening after all.