Theorist, William Lane Craig has put it this way and this is the point that I'm trying to make when trying to convey the apparent flaws in this argument:
I transcribed it from a video, because I can't do links I don't think.
Explaining the view of this argument:
"Foreknowledge equals foreordination, simply by knowing something will happen, that thing is foreordained to happen, and therefore human freedom is effectively removed. On this basis even the fall of man into sin was foreordained by God, it was necessary and pre-destined. Now, this view, however, not only removes human freedom but also rests very uncomfortably with the idea that God is not the author of sin, God is not the evil and yet on this view it would seem that by foreknowing Adam's fall into sin that God, in effect, foreordained it, that really, sin is the result of not Adam's choice, but God's choice, which I think ought to make all of us somewhat uncomfortable with this view."
His solution:
"Rather, I think a better response to this problem is to deny this equivalence, to say that foreknowledge does not equal foreordination. I think it's better to say that God knows in advance what choices people will freely make and that the free decisions of human beings, determines what foreknowledge God has of them, rather than the reverse. The foreknowledge doesn't determine the free decisions, rather the free decisions, in effect, determine the foreknowledge."
The part I think you'll hate:
"And here, we can distinguish between what we might call chronological priority and, logical priority. Chronological priority would mean that one thing comes earlier in time than something else and God's knowledge is chronologically prior to the event that he foreknows. But, logically speaking the event is prior to God's foreknowledge, so God's foreknowledge is chronologically prior to the event, but the event is logically prior to the foreknowledge. In other words, the event doesn't happen because God foreknows it, God foreknows it because it will happen. You see the event is logically prior to the foreknowledge; he foreknows it because it will happen, even though the knowledge is chronologically prior to the event that God foreknows."
His example:
"So, foreknowledge, on this view, would be sort of like foreshadowing, of something. When you see the shadow of someone say, coming around the corner, you see their shadow on the ground before you see the person, you know that person is about to come around the corner. But the shadow doesn't determine the person, right, it's the person who throws the shadow, who determines the shadow. And foreknowledge is sort of like the shadow, the foreshadow of future events, as it were. By seeing this foreshadowing you know the events that will happen, but the shadow doesn't determine what the reality is, it's the reality that determines the shadow. So, if you think of God's foreknowledge as sort of the foreshadowing of things to come, I think you can see that just because God knows something will happen, doesn't mean that therefore that foreknowledge, in any way prejudices or removes the freedom of that event that will happen. In fact, if that events were to happen differently, then God's foreknowledge would have been different."
Another example, which I can't be bothered transcribing is the idea of an infallible barometer. He says that "whatever the barometer says, because it's infallible, you know what the weather will be like." It's exactly in line with his arguments, the barometer does not determine the weather, it's the weather that determines the barometer.
If it's confusing, I understand but read it, it took me ages to transcribe.
Replies?
Alex.
There was once a few moments that I had several Little Women in my head, but that is a story, and it's for another day.
