Nothing else controls his choices. There are things that could impede his choices.
I played that game. I no longer play it. I work with what I know at a given point in time. I test what I know whether it is verifiable or not. I then make decisions based upon what I know.
This reply doesn't really advance the discussion at all...
(there is a dual meaning lol)
Point taken, however. I was considering it was time to be quiet and listen for a while.
I guess it's hard to say. I'm aware that I might not fully appreciate a 2D lifestyle, but that's not to say that any 3D being couldn't or couldn't simulate 2D in such a way as to become more aware of what that entails. Perhaps I couldn't fully appreciate another being's 3D lifestyle for that matter.Both of these are interesting points, but I have slight quibbles with each.
A 3D being can observe a 2D world, but can it actually fully appreciate a 2D lifestyle? (Yes, I have read Flatland. I currently own a copy.)
You're quite right, that would require it to be deterministic. A slight change of concept to allow for free will: the forward/rewind is of the completed time-line and is just for viewing, so in effect it's a recording of the finished simulation.But in that case, does action and free will apply? Rewinding and fast-forwarding require a deterministic environment, or else the story could be different each time.
ETA: In addition, the very notion of rewind and fast-forward are themselves time dependent.
I don't care what the definition of god is to whomever. A point here is that if you are trying to figure out an equation you have to define a starting point. If the starting point is god, in that god does or does not allow someone to have free will, one has to define god and present god as tangible.
I don't think you have to present god as tangible if you define him as intangible!
I think, as you probably do too, that the basic question of "God and Free Will" is essentially nonsensical, but I think we are approaching it from opposite ends.
I say that if there is a god (of the sort that theists usually seem to mean when they use the word, and it doesn't matter whether or not we agree that such a thing is possible, etc. etc.....), then that god requires a huge loophole or exemption from the laws of logic and physics. That is, such a god must, by definition, be transcendent. If you assert that this is simply not a possibility, then the discussion ends. But if transcendence is allowable or conceivable, then the question of whether God can grant free will is empty speculation, because he can do anything he damn well pleases, but we cannot use rational argument to discuss his rules. Logic is suspended here. If we play the game of speculating about free will at all, we do so in theistic terms, or not at all.
You seem to be saying that it's nonsense as well, and the question is not even admissible because God is not tangible and therefore not definable, but then you insist on trying to provide an answer anyway.
I don't think you have to present god as tangible if you define him as intangible!
I think, as you probably do too, that the basic question of "God and Free Will" is essentially nonsensical, but I think we are approaching it from opposite ends.
I say that if there is a god (of the sort that theists usually seem to mean when they use the word, and it doesn't matter whether or not we agree that such a thing is possible, etc. etc.....), then that god requires a huge loophole or exemption from the laws of logic and physics. That is, such a god must, by definition, be transcendent. If you assert that this is simply not a possibility, then the discussion ends. But if transcendence is allowable or conceivable, then the question of whether God can grant free will is empty speculation, because he can do anything he damn well pleases, but we cannot use rational argument to discuss his rules. Logic is suspended here. If we play the game of speculating about free will at all, we do so in theistic terms, or not at all.
You seem to be saying that it's nonsense as well, and the question is not even admissible because God is not tangible and therefore not definable, but then you insist on trying to provide an answer anyway.
Yes.
Nothing else controls his choices. There are things that could impede his choices.
I agree. Basically, the issue is where does one logically draw the line as to what entities do what things based on some finite set of parameters. One could suppose no one thing does anything at all if we continue going backward in the reasoning based on the assumption each entity depends on every other preceding entity to produce the future state (event). In a way, Determinism is its own "Turtles all the way down" sort of situation.
I say that if there is a god (of the sort that theists usually seem to mean when they use the word, and it doesn't matter whether or not we agree that such a thing is possible, etc. etc.....), then that god requires a huge loophole or exemption from the laws of logic and physics. That is, such a god must, by definition, be transcendent. If you assert that this is simply not a possibility, then the discussion ends. But if transcendence is allowable or conceivable, then the question of whether God can grant free will is empty speculation, because he can do anything he damn well pleases, but we cannot use rational argument to discuss his rules. Logic is suspended here. If we play the game of speculating about free will at all, we do so in theistic terms, or not at all.
I agree. Basically, the issue is where does one logically draw the line as to what entities do what things based on some finite set of parameters. One could suppose no one thing does anything at all if we continue going backward in the reasoning based on the assumption each entity depends on every other preceding entity to produce the future state (event). In a way, Determinism is its own "Turtles all the way down" sort of situation.