Where We Get Our Morals From

[Herzblut]

You are right -- you said there was a German court ruling that stated there could not be a law that would allow the decision to shoot down a hijacked plane if there were innocent passengers aboard. What is the difference?

Yeah, right. What's the difference between

1) being prohibited by law and
2) not being prohibited by law.

It seems we need somebody with a professional juridical background to qualify this subtle nuance.

 

[Olowkow]

Just ran across this thread, and, going back to the broad topic, figured that I'd point out that there are some academic psychologists who have done a lot of research and writing about about this very question, with some intriguing theories.

For instance, you might look at papers by Jonathan Haidt ( website: haidt.socialpsychology.org ) , as several are freely available. A recent one that directly addresses this topic is "Social intuitionists answer six questions about moral psychology." The paper is a bit academic-y, but is interesting and based on some neat research. BTW, their answer to where we get our morals from, which is merely the overview, is:

Thanks I'm going to see if I can find some articles. Here is the URL;
http://haidt.socialpsychology.org/

ETA: I like this one Affect, culture, and morality, or is it wrong to eat your dog?
From http://people.virginia.edu/~jdh6n/publications.html

 

[rocketdodger]

Yeah, right. What's the difference between

1) being prohibited by law and
2) not being prohibited by law.

It seems we need somebody with a professional juridical background to qualify this subtle nuance.

...huh? What does this have to do with whether or not you agree with the two statements I made?

You know what? Just forget it. I , everyone else here, and you yourself know that you are simply sidestepping the issue (over and over) because you 1) weren't intelligent enough to realize the implications when you said it and 2) aren't honest enough to admit when you are simply wrong.

So I will just finish off the discussion without you. You are wrong about the inviolate nature of human dignity because allowing the plane to crash and kill innocent people also violates human dignity. This is a situation where human dignity will be violated regardless of the result of a decisison. So how is human dignity inviolate if there can be situations where it must be violated?

It isn't, unless you try to make a move like the one that put you in this pickle -- some sort of action/inaction distinction. As the intelligent know, however, the action/inaction distinction is arbitrary and hence meaningless. You caught that eventually, it seems, but it was too late -- you had already made the statement and your hubris prevented you from retracting it.

So now you are in the situation of refusing to answer a simple question because either way you answer you will be admitting something you don't want to. On the one hand, if you admit that letting the plane crash also violates human dignity, you will have been wrong. On the other hand, if you admit that letting the plane crash does NOT violate human dignity, then you are breaking away from the moral system you claim to follow. Your solution? Simply avoid answering the question. Bravo, herzblut, bravo.

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

I completely agree. This is why different cultures have different moral complexes.

Yep--within a surprisingly narrow range of variation. And any human with a normally functioning brain can be raised to learn any system of morality (or any human language). The moral capacity evolved, and moral systems are conventional.

Sounds a lot like language.

 

[Skeptic Ginger]

I'm not sure I would say 'independent existence', but I think the 'intermediate position' describes the world in which we live. We have been left with moral intuitions that make morality possible. We have been left, unfortunately, with tendencies that contradict one another -- tendencies toward community and tendencies toward selfish action. But we have also been left with rational thought that can generalize what we want to express morally. We have, at minimum, two different styles of thinking about moral decision-making -- which basically boil down to concerns over harm (and consequences) and concerns over fairness. All of this is part of our evolutionary heritage.

The history of ethical thought concerns our attempts to move beyond the pure emotivism of our moral intuitions into more generalized, or even universalized, moralities. Morality, in this way of thinking cannot consist of simple rule following (God said it so we must do it -- that isn't morality anyway) and it cannot consist only of the way we intuit what feels right or wrong in a particular situation. Full moral expression also includes our rational thinking about those intuitions and the ways that we negotiate not only the rational thought but also the initial intuitions with other people.

That is why I would not say that it has an independent existence. Morality depends on several factors, but it is still embodied only in us. It is relative to who and what we are as creatures. The universe still doesn't care, except that it does in a way -- because we are part of the universe, its stardust in new and amazing forms.

So much more well put than my nature/nurture evolution summary.

 

[blobru]

Just ran across this thread, and, going back to the broad topic, figured that I'd point out that there are some academic psychologists who have done a lot of research and writing about about this very question, with some intriguing theories.

For instance, you might look at papers by Jonathan Haidt ( website: haidt.socialpsychology.org ) , as several are freely available. A recent one that directly addresses this topic is "Social intuitionists answer six questions about moral psychology." The paper is a bit academic-y, but is interesting and based on some neat research. BTW, their answer to where we get our morals from, which is merely the overview, is:

Very interesting site, sopsyched; and not a digression at all.

In brief, in Haidt's social intuitionism, moral thinking is a chain with six links:

1) Intuitive Judgment -- gut reaction: preconscious feeling an act is either right or wrong.

2) Post-Hoc Reasoning -- search for arguments to support one's Intuitive Judgment.

3) Reasoned Persuasion -- use of arguments to reach a moral consensus with others.

4) Social Persuasion -- urge to conform to group consensus, reasoned or not.

5) Reasoned Judgment -- unhappy with Intuitive Judgment, using logic to override it; produces "dual attitude", public vs private

6) Private Reflection -- imaginative sympathy triggers new Intuitive Judgment, original or contradicting original

Haidt etal. argue that the last two links are very rare, in cases of genuine moral dilemma; most moral thinking is covered by the first four. As #1 & #4 are preconscious, and #2 & #3 stem from #1, this model doesn't allow for much impartial, "objective" reasoning, traditionally the sine qua non of morality. Which is why they cite Hume, "reason is slave to the passions", as a philosophical basis.

My intuition (heh) is that cognitive intuitionism is correct, we aren't blank slates, but I'm not sure about moral intuitionism; there are certainly behavioral urges, unchosen gut feelings which we strongly identify with and rationalize, but I don't know if they're "moral" until we decide they are; urges need to be filtered through experience and group stucture before they're moral... maybe; if it's true that intuitions, independent of reason, are moral, then it forms a sort of middle ground between moral objectivism and relativism; the forms of moral intuitions, "fairness", "concern", "right", "duty", "reputation", "identity", etc, would be universal to humans, part of any individual or group morality; while the content, though tending toward an evolutionary optimum, "helping is better than harming" or somesuch, roughly "objectivism", would of course be subject to individual mutation, sometimes propagated through the group, hence "relativism".

Anyway, lots to think about. Thanks again for the link.

 

[Dogdoctor]

Just ran across this thread, and, going back to the broad topic, figured that I'd point out that there are some academic psychologists who have done a lot of research and writing about about this very question, with some intriguing theories.

For instance, you might look at papers by Jonathan Haidt ( website: haidt.socialpsychology.org ) , as several are freely available. A recent one that directly addresses this topic is "Social intuitionists answer six questions about moral psychology." The paper is a bit academic-y, but is interesting and based on some neat research. BTW, their answer to where we get our morals from, which is merely the overview, is:

Moral beliefs and motivations come from a small set of intuitions that evolution has prepared the human mind to develop; these intuitions then enable and constrain the social construction of virtues and values.

I am happy to hear that someone agrees with what I have been thinking. The simple yet concise description is great. Thanks

 

[arthwollipot]

The implication seems to be that morality is a matter of whatever human beings think it is. It's a set of motivations. That's a perfectly good definition, but it's not necessarily the only one.

True - but I still think you may be missing the point. And if you're not, it's worth reiterating anyway. . Morality is not a matter of what individual human beings think it is, it is a result of the collective motivations of large groups of people. Individuals may have aberrant moral judgement without this affecting the society as a whole.

Morals are, by and large, a group phenomenon. This is one reason why...

Yep--within a surprisingly narrow range of variation. And any human with a normally functioning brain can be raised to learn any system of morality (or any human language). The moral capacity evolved, and moral systems are conventional.

Sounds a lot like language.

A lot like language indeed.

 

[I Ratant]

Moral behavior is learned.
Smacking the kid's hand when it does something naughty, and telling him/her why it's so teaches them.
Not everyone gets expert guidance this way.
Kids don't come with a user's manual, the two people who generated it are expected to have had a "moral" upbringing themselves.
When they're merely spawning because of compatible genitals, that's when the lack of any innate moral code shows up in the behavior of the spawn.
And their spawn.
Etc thru time.

 

[Herzblut]

So I will just finish off the discussion without you. You are wrong about the inviolate nature of human dignity because allowing the plane to crash and kill innocent people also violates human dignity. This is a situation where human dignity will be violated regardless of the result of a decisison. So how is human dignity inviolate if there can be situations where it must be violated?

What do you mean by "allowing the plane to crash"?
How do you even know the plane will crash?

Of course, at least in theory, you can construe examples like the well-known trolley problems.

 

[westprog]

True - but I still think you may be missing the point. And if you're not, it's worth reiterating anyway. . Morality is not a matter of what individual human beings think it is, it is a result of the collective motivations of large groups of people. Individuals may have aberrant moral judgement without this affecting the society as a whole.

The implication of that seems to be that the popular view is by definition the correct view. So if the occasional German hides a Jew in a cellar, say, or the man in the pub who says he doesn't mind if transvestites get served is acting immorally if the majority think differently?

 

[westprog]

I'm not sure I would say 'independent existence', but I think the 'intermediate position' describes the world in which we live. We have been left with moral intuitions that make morality possible. We have been left, unfortunately, with tendencies that contradict one another -- tendencies toward community and tendencies toward selfish action. But we have also been left with rational thought that can generalize what we want to express morally. We have, at minimum, two different styles of thinking about moral decision-making -- which basically boil down to concerns over harm (and consequences) and concerns over fairness. All of this is part of our evolutionary heritage.

The history of ethical thought concerns our attempts to move beyond the pure emotivism of our moral intuitions into more generalized, or even universalized, moralities. Morality, in this way of thinking cannot consist of simple rule following (God said it so we must do it -- that isn't morality anyway) and it cannot consist only of the way we intuit what feels right or wrong in a particular situation. Full moral expression also includes our rational thinking about those intuitions and the ways that we negotiate not only the rational thought but also the initial intuitions with other people.

It seems that this view of morality is similar to the view of religion. Nobody denies that religion exists - but clearly it is possible to deny that religious beliefs have objective reality.

That is why I would not say that it has an independent existence. Morality depends on several factors, but it is still embodied only in us. It is relative to who and what we are as creatures. The universe still doesn't care, except that it does in a way -- because we are part of the universe, its stardust in new and amazing forms.

Saying that morality only applies to creatures capable of making decisions doesn't necessarily mean that it doesn't have independent reality, though. Most people would agree that a comet striking Jupiter has no moral context, while a man striking his wife does.

I probably think of it in the same way as the reality of pi. The undiscovered digit of pi has only one possible value. It can't have any relevance to a non-intelligent mathematician, though.

 

[rocketdodger]

What do you mean by "allowing the plane to crash"?
How do you even know the plane will crash?

Of course, at least in theory, you can construe examples like the well-known trolley problems.

It was your example.

Are you going to backtrack now and claim that you think the court ruled this way because there is a possibility that the plane wouldn't crash in reality?

I find that interesting, since it seems to imply a decsision based on the utility of possible outcomes, which is what you are arguing vehemently against. Factoring in the worth of human dignity, they seem to have arrived at the conclusion that it would require an unattainable level of confidence that the plane would hit the building before it is ethical to shoot it down. Hence, they feel it is never ethical in reality to shoot hijacked planes down.

But they didn't reach this conclusion because of the "inviolate nature of human dignity." They reached it because they assigned a utility to human dignity and then performed the calculations to maximize it. Most of the calculation was probably subconscious, but it was done nevertheless.

I guarantee you the court would rule differently, for example, if the hijacked plane was approaching a German city with a thermonuclear weapon stashed on board. Human dignity is not "inviolate" -- it just has an extremely high utility in some cultures.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

Saying that morality only applies to creatures capable of making decisions doesn't necessarily mean that it doesn't have independent reality, though. Most people would agree that a comet striking Jupiter has no moral context, while a man striking his wife does.

I probably think of it in the same way as the reality of pi. The undiscovered digit of pi has only one possible value. It can't have any relevance to a non-intelligent mathematician, though.

I am not merely saying that morality only applies to rational creatures, but that it does not exist independent of such creatures.

This is really now an ontological discussion. I am not a Platonist and you are, so on this issue we will not see eye to eye. I'm afraid that I just don't see a way to make dualism work.

 

[westprog]

I am not merely saying that morality only applies to rational creatures, but that it does not exist independent of such creatures.

This is really now an ontological discussion. I am not a Platonist and you are, so on this issue we will not see eye to eye. I'm afraid that I just don't see a way to make dualism work.

I agree that the fundamental disagreement can't be reconciled, but I think it's possible to explore the implications of the two ways of looking at the world. Possibly fruitfully, possibly not.

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

Moral behavior is learned.

So are specific languages, but the capacity to learn languages or moral systems is something that evolved in human brains as an adaptation to living in social groups.

So when people use the terms "language" or "morality" you have to determine whether you're talking about the learned conventional system or the innate capacity.

 

[Herzblut]

Are you going to backtrack now and claim that you think the court ruled this way because there is a possibility that the plane wouldn't crash in reality?

I'm not guessing. I know the rule. You don't. You're speculating.

I find that interesting, since it seems to imply a decsision based on the utility of possible outcomes, which is what you are arguing vehemently against.

Really?

Under the applicability of Article 1.1 of the Basic Law (guarantee of
human dignity) it is absolutely inconceivable to intentionally kill
persons who are in such a helpless situation on the basis of a statutory
authorisation.

http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/en/press/bvg06-011en.html

 

[I Ratant]

So are specific languages, but the capacity to learn languages or moral systems is something that evolved in human brains as an adaptation to living in social groups.

So when people use the terms "language" or "morality" you have to determine whether you're talking about the learned conventional system or the innate capacity.

.
The "innate capacity" for both obviously exists, but it's the manner in which that capacity is used by people to behave "morally". (I wanna say "languagely" also, but will leave that alone right now. )
The existence of the capability for moral behavior doesn't force any particular behavior on the person.
The "moral bankrupt" seldom exercises anything more than a very personal "morality"... "What'd good for me, I'll do. Screw you."
These people can be the result of no training by parents and peers, or have a short-circuit in their brain wiring that prevents the usual Golden Rule behavior most of us expect in social interfacings.
The former may tend to be the common criminals, the latter our beloved leaders, it seems.

 

[arthwollipot]

The implication of that seems to be that the popular view is by definition the correct view. So if the occasional German hides a Jew in a cellar, say, or the man in the pub who says he doesn't mind if transvestites get served is acting immorally if the majority think differently?

That is kind of the case. If the Nazi regime had couched its antisemitism in moral terms (and I believe it sort-of did), then hiding the Jew in the cellar would have been an immoral act from the point of view of the majority at the time.

But I'll point out a fallacy in your first statement - and that is the use of the word "correct". Where morals are relative as I have been describing, there is no such thing as "correct". All you can say is that the popular view is by definition the popular view. Of course, it is completely impossible to excise the idea of "right" and "wrong" when you are talking about morals, but your statement assumes an outside, objective moral judgement. We can have opinions about whether we think that the Nazis were "right" or "wrong", but they are our own moral judgements - learned from growing up in a society with a moral complex that puts genocide and murder into the "immoral" camp. From our point of view, the German hiding the Jew in the cellar was doing the "right" thing. From the point of view of the Nazi authorities, he was doing the "wrong" thing. There is no objective point of view which is not flavoured by the observer's own moral complex.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

I agree that the fundamental disagreement can't be reconciled, but I think it's possible to explore the implications of the two ways of looking at the world. Possibly fruitfully, possibly not.

Depending on how you mean this, it would probably require a different thread, since this would represent a clear off-shoot from the original issue in this thread. If you only mean this in terms of morality, then we might be able to discuss it here -- but, my guess is that it would veer widely from the origin since it would need to delve into several consequences of both ontologies.

We've bullied through several monism vs dualism threads but never quite from the vantage of direct implications. It might be very interesting.