Where We Get Our Morals From

[blobru]

God has not accepted anything, God created everything.. including moral truth.

On what day did he do that?

Truthsday.

 

[six7s]

This is going to be very difficult to follow if you insist on arguing with what I say instead of what I mean

Why not simply say what you mean?

This ain't the first time... with a bit of effort on your part, it could be the last

Perhaps you could make a start by answering my question from the 1st page:

a world governed entirely by scientific thinking

Which galaxy is that in?

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

Well, of course. This is going to be very difficult to follow if you insist on arguing with what I say instead of what I mean. In fact, it may end up difficult to follow.

Yeah, been there, done that. It's bad enough that we don't have non-verbal communication in this format; it's all too easy to leave out qualifiers.

For what it's worth, I agree and hope that we can rise to some universalizable level of moral discourse. I fear that it may just be another form of high-fallutin' rationalization, since we are always blind to the things about which we are blind; but it would seem that, if we are rational about it, we can arrive at a better morality.

The problem, of course, is that moral reasoning is always shackled to emotion, since that is the source of value. We must always tread warily whenever we think we have a universal ethic and try to knock it down. That's where skepticism can be very, very valuable.

 

[rocketdodger]

No.

Oh really? Well I must have misunderstood, then, why you wrote all of this:

The concept of human dignity as being absolutely inviolable revokes it from any possible list of relative, subjective utilities. Because it is non-negotiable, non-compensable by any amount of utility.

Let me clarify this based on a drastic example.

A well-known recent sentence of our German Constitutional Court nullified an anti-terror Law which had permitted to shoot down an airplane under terrorist control under certain conditions.

The Court made it crystal clear that as long as there is just one single innocent passenger on that plane no German law can ever legalize its shooting. Even if authorities are regarding this act as the only way to save the life of thousands of people in a sky scraper the plane is seemingly going to crash into.

There cannot be any legal blessing whatsoever which degrades this one innocent passenger to a mere object of state authority. None.

Do you still not understand that this kind of reasoning cannot comply to your utility thinking? There is no way.

Now that everyone knows you did make such an assertion, will you answer the question?

Why does deciding to shoot down the plane make the someone the object of state authority while deciding to let it collide with the skyscraper does not?

 

[westprog]

Yeah, been there, done that. It's bad enough that we don't have non-verbal communication in this format; it's all too easy to leave out qualifiers.

Well, if you're going to be gracious about it, that spoils the whole thing. Not very waspish of you.

More responses soon. Maybe.

 

[I Ratant]

God has not accepted anything, God created everything.. including moral truth.

On what day did he do that?

.
That's on His to-do list. Wait 'til day 8.

 

[Herzblut]

Now that everyone knows you did make such an assertion, will you answer the question?

Where did I say "there is a German law prohibiting the state from making the decision to shoot down a hijacked plane"?

 

[westprog]

Why not simply say what you mean?

Yes, I left a "not" out of a sentence. Remiss of me. iWasp spotted my mistake, told me it didn't make sense and was perfectly gracious about it.

This ain't the first time... with a bit of effort on your part, it could be the last

On the other hand, if I just carry on as I am, I will do OK.

Perhaps you could make a start by answering my question from the 1st page:

I'd assumed that it was a rhetorical question. If not, please itemize the galaxies you're interested in, and I'll list them in order of preference.

 

[six7s]

please itemize the galaxies you're interested in, and
I'll list them in order of preference.

What I want to know from you is which world(s?) are "governed entirely by scientific thinking"

 

[westprog]

The phrase "morals are relative" does not in any sense imply that people don't have consciences, or that society does not regulate behaviour. Both these concepts are true. We do have consciences, and those consciences are shaped by our society as we mature. In my article (linked at the beginning of the thread) I give two examples: the feudal samurai of the 14th-16th centuries, and the Old Religion of Fiji.

The implication seems to be that morality is a matter of whatever human beings think it is. It's a set of motivations. That's a perfectly good definition, but it's not necessarily the only one.

 

[jimtron]

If morality comes from god, which interpretation of which scripture of which religion do you consult? Or is there another way to find out how god wants us to live? Christians can't agree on how to interpret the Bible, let alone adherents of different religions.

If morality isn't relative, or if there is an absolute morality, please tell us where we can see what the rules are. eta: and how to properly interpret them.

p.s. sorry I didn't read through the entire thread; if I'm making a redundant point, call me a sinner...

 

[westprog]

Then I am mistaken. My apologies.

Now I just feel crude and clumsy, as if I'd passed the port the wrong way or refused to fight a duel.

As to valuation, there is not necessarily an either/or. Why not both? As to where does inherent valuation come from? -- why from our evolutionary heritage that provides us with different motivational states, emotions, tendencies toward community, disgust at killing innocents, etc.

I'm still grappling with this. There's a viewpoint that morality is simply a description of how human beings are motivated, and how they behave. In such a view, it can be collapsed into simple physics. There's also a view that morality has a real, independent existence of some kind, and that it is possible to objectively state that one action is more moral than another. Is there an intermediate position, whereby morals evolve and develop, but have some kind of real existence?

 

[westprog]

What I want to know from you is which world(s?) are "governed entirely by scientific thinking"

Hypotheticals.

 

[six7s]

There's also a view that morality has a real, independent existence of some kind, and that it is possible to objectively state that one action is more moral than another.

Rather than 'a view', I'd call that a 'vision' or an 'hallucination'

Seriously

 

[jimtron]

Originally Posted by westprog
There's also a view that morality has a real, independent existence of some kind, and that it is possible to objectively state that one action is more moral than another.

Let's hear it then: which actions are objectively more moral than others. If this is the case, is there a reference for this that can be consulted? If not, why not?

 

[rocketdodger]

Where did I say "there is a German law prohibiting the state from making the decision to shoot down a hijacked plane"?

You are right -- you said there was a German court ruling that stated there could not be a law that would allow the decision to shoot down a hijacked plane if there were innocent passengers aboard. What is the difference?

Why have you been dodging this question for weeks? Look, I will make it simple for you -- just tell me if you agree or disagree with these statements:

1) The state making the decision to shoot down a hijacked plane and kill innocent passengers in order to save a larger number of innocent lives degrades those passengers to mere objects of state authority.

2) The state making the decision to allow a hijacked plane to smash into a skyscraper, thereby killing all innocents in the plane as well as many more in the building, does not degrade anyone to a mere object of state authority.

 

[sopsyched]

a digression

Just ran across this thread, and, going back to the broad topic, figured that I'd point out that there are some academic psychologists who have done a lot of research and writing about about this very question, with some intriguing theories.

For instance, you might look at papers by Jonathan Haidt ( website: haidt.socialpsychology.org ) , as several are freely available. A recent one that directly addresses this topic is "Social intuitionists answer six questions about moral psychology." The paper is a bit academic-y, but is interesting and based on some neat research. BTW, their answer to where we get our morals from, which is merely the overview, is:

Moral beliefs and motivations come from a small set of intuitions that evolution has prepared the human mind to develop; these intuitions then enable and constrain the social construction of virtues and values.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

I'm still grappling with this. There's a viewpoint that morality is simply a description of how human beings are motivated, and how they behave. In such a view, it can be collapsed into simple physics. There's also a view that morality has a real, independent existence of some kind, and that it is possible to objectively state that one action is more moral than another. Is there an intermediate position, whereby morals evolve and develop, but have some kind of real existence?

I'm not sure I would say 'independent existence', but I think the 'intermediate position' describes the world in which we live. We have been left with moral intuitions that make morality possible. We have been left, unfortunately, with tendencies that contradict one another -- tendencies toward community and tendencies toward selfish action. But we have also been left with rational thought that can generalize what we want to express morally. We have, at minimum, two different styles of thinking about moral decision-making -- which basically boil down to concerns over harm (and consequences) and concerns over fairness. All of this is part of our evolutionary heritage.

The history of ethical thought concerns our attempts to move beyond the pure emotivism of our moral intuitions into more generalized, or even universalized, moralities. Morality, in this way of thinking cannot consist of simple rule following (God said it so we must do it -- that isn't morality anyway) and it cannot consist only of the way we intuit what feels right or wrong in a particular situation. Full moral expression also includes our rational thinking about those intuitions and the ways that we negotiate not only the rational thought but also the initial intuitions with other people.

That is why I would not say that it has an independent existence. Morality depends on several factors, but it is still embodied only in us. It is relative to who and what we are as creatures. The universe still doesn't care, except that it does in a way -- because we are part of the universe, its stardust in new and amazing forms.

 

[Fiona]

@Ichneumonwasp: I really like the way you have expressed this, both here and in another thread. It has helped me to clarify my thoughts, certainly.

You have proposed two things which underpin the emergence of moral thinking, and I agree they are both important. I am wondering whether you believe there might be a third. Some of our behaviour seems to me to be based on our own picture of ourselves (for want of a better phrase), and who we would like to be. This does not seem to be about rules which are external to ourselves: and it does not seem to be consequentialist either. Neither does it seem to stem from "rationality", if that concept includes any necessary degree of self interest or of communal benefit. For example there are occasions when a person will take a stance which is apparently idiosycratic. That stance may be at odds with the rules of the society in which he or she lives, even up to the point where they will be killed for holding that position. (think of people who have lost their lives helping slaves escape; or hiding jews in nazi germany): it need not be based on any religious or ethical system which provides rules to live by. Some such people are so informed, like for example, christian martyrs. But there are people who act in a similar way who are atheists or agnostics and who do not hold strongly to any obvious external moral system, I think. Such people may act in this way because they think the world will be a better place if they stand up for what they believe, but in circumstances where one is wholly at odds with the values of the society or community that is hardly rational: one person is very unlikely to make a difference ( though it does happen that one such inspiring stand can have long lasting and very profound impacts, I suspect that is quite rare). Some may self identify with a different social group but again I do not think that is always the case: there are those who cry out against their own group's behaviour but still see themselves as part of that group; indeed it is sometimes the fact that they deplore the behaviour of their peers which leads to the extreme opposition in the first place. In the short term (and even in the long term) such a person can cause a lot of grief for themselves and also for their society, and in that sense I do not necessarily see a "utility" in the action. So for me there is something else at work in those cases and I do not know how to characterise it. I have the idea that we each build a story for ourselves about who we want to be and that there are occasions when that narrative leads us to actions which are neither rule bound nor rational nor consequentialist in the sense we have been discussing. Perhaps there is some way to subsume this kind of thing within the terms you have proposed: but I tend to think this is a third important strand in our morality and I wondered if you had any thoughts

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

@Ichneumonwasp: I really like the way you have expressed this, both here and in another thread. It has helped me to clarify my thoughts, certainly.

You have proposed two things which underpin the emergence of moral thinking, and I agree they are both important. I am wondering whether you believe there might be a third. Some of our behaviour seems to me to be based on our own picture of ourselves (for want of a better phrase), and who we would like to be. This does not seem to be about rules which are external to ourselves: and it does not seem to be consequentialist either. Neither does it seem to stem from "rationality", if that concept includes any necessary degree of self interest or of communal benefit. For example there are occasions when a person will take a stance which is apparently idiosycratic. That stance may be at odds with the rules of the society in which he or she lives, even up to the point where they will be killed for holding that position. (think of people who have lost their lives helping slaves escape; or hiding jews in nazi germany): it need not be based on any religious or ethical system which provides rules to live by. Some such people are so informed, like for example, christian martyrs. But there are people who act in a similar way who are atheists or agnostics and who do not hold strongly to any obvious external moral system, I think. Such people may act in this way because they think the world will be a better place if they stand up for what they believe, but in circumstances where one is wholly at odds with the values of the society or community that is hardly rational: one person is very unlikely to make a difference ( though it does happen that one such inspiring stand can have long lasting and very profound impacts, I suspect that is quite rare). Some may self identify with a different social group but again I do not think that is always the case: there are those who cry out against their own group's behaviour but still see themselves as part of that group; indeed it is sometimes the fact that they deplore the behaviour of their peers which leads to the extreme opposition in the first place. In the short term (and even in the long term) such a person can cause a lot of grief for themselves and also for their society, and in that sense I do not necessarily see a "utility" in the action. So for me there is something else at work in those cases and I do not know how to characterise it. I have the idea that we each build a story for ourselves about who we want to be and that there are occasions when that narrative leads us to actions which are neither rule bound nor rational nor consequentialist in the sense we have been discussing. Perhaps there is some way to subsume this kind of thing within the terms you have proposed: but I tend to think this is a third important strand in our morality and I wondered if you had any thoughts

Thank you, once again.

Hmmm, not sure, but a few thoughts off the top of my head.........

First, I think this may fit better in the way we act rather than in the way we should act, but I'll leave that aside.

My first reaction is that this would be subsumed under our gut moral feelings -- some of it seems to fit there. All you need to want to save your neighbor from the Nazis is the feeling that they are your neighbor and what those bastards want to do is just wrong. This obviously depends on some learning -- a point I wanted to bring up earlier, but the gut feeling of help those who you see on a daily basis underlies it.

But, like you, I'm not sure that works for all such situations. I don't know how to explain the whole process, but I came across something recently -- I think it was in the latest issue of Seed magazine -- about how the dopamine system is involved in moral decision making. It turns out that there are dopaminergic neurons that respond the same to a classically conditioned stimulus as they once did to the primary stimulus. So, for instance, there is a group of cells that might respond when a rat is presented with apple juice --dopamine, if others don't recall is a "pleasure" neurotransmitter. If you condition those animals with a sound that is paired to presentation with apple juice, over time the same exact cells will begin to respond to the sound in the exact same way that they responded to the apple juice in the past. So, it is clear that our reinforcement center can be activated by an abstract symbol in anticipation of a reward.

The same thing probably happens with religious beliefs and martyrdom. We pair an abstract idea with expected reward based on some idea and act accordingly. It's clearly learned behavior and not necessarily very rational. While it ultimately depends on some instincts, it itself is not an instinct. So, yes, there must be at the very least a third part to all of this -- at least in discussion about how we do act. There are probably many others, but what you have identified is clearly an additional part of the story.

And, yes, I agree that is has something to do with the story we construct for ourselves. Sorry that I can't take it much further than that.