Addressing problems with the government's account

They didn't limit their investigation, they limited their conclusions. You've (deliberately?) misinterpreted their statements to support your accusations that no real investigation was done, when the quoted material simply does not support that position.

Feel free to chastise them for not blaming any particular individuals, but at least chastise them for the choices they actually made, rather than your own fantasies about what choices they made.
Hamilton: We made the decision very early on that we were not going to play the blame game, that that was not what we wanted to do and that if we were going to make a constructive, positive contribution to the future, we had to approach this in a different way.

And as we looked into it, we more and more became persuaded that the failures here were not individual but systemic. And that was what we then began to focus on.
Fantasies? These are his own comments.
 
Fantasies? These are his own comments.

Yes, fantasies. It's clear from Hamilton's quote that the commission, far from limiting its scope, chose initially not to limit it to assigning blame to the detriment of achieving a broader understanding. They then found, on examining the evidence, that the failures were systemic, a discovery they might not have made had they decided from the outset to point the finger at specific individuals. In other words, they set out to find out what happened rather than to support a predetermined conclusion. I can see why the truth movement disapproves.

Dave
 
Wherein any of that quoted material do they say they limited their investigation?

Feel free to chastise them for not blaming any particular individuals, but at least chastise them for the choices they actually made, rather than your own fantasies about what choices they made.

Examples of the investigation being limited:
More importantly, the 9-11 Commission refused to examine virtually any evidence which contradicted the administration's official version of events. As stated by the State Department's Coordinator for Counterterrorism, who was the point man for the U.S. government's international counterterrorism policy in the first term of the Bush administration, "there were things the [9/11] commission wanted to know about and things they didn't want to know about."
For example, the 9-11 Commission report fails to mention the CIA director's urgent warnings to top administration officials in July 2001 of an impending attack (indeed, the 9-11 Commission was briefed on these warnings, but denied they knew about them until confronted with contrary evidence). Moreover, numerous veteran national security experts were turned away, ignored, or censored by the 9/11 commission, even though they had information directly relevant to the commission's investigation. And the 9/11 Commission Report does not even mention the collapse of World Trade Center building 7 or any explosions in the buildings (the word "explosion" does not appear in the report). There are literally hundreds of other examples of entire lines of evidence which contradict the government's account which were ignored by the Commission.


Can you say limited? I thought so.
 
Swing, care to provide an effective, unbiased investigative route that would have the perfection that you obviously insist the 911 Commission should have had?
 
For example, the 9-11 Commission report fails to mention the CIA director's urgent warnings to top administration officials in July 2001 of an impending attack (indeed, the 9-11 Commission was briefed on these warnings, but denied they knew about them until confronted with contrary evidence).

Is this the July 5th Ashcroft briefing? The one described in the following passage from the 9-11 Commission Report?


That same day, the CIA briefed Attorney General Ashcroft on the al Qaeda threat, warning that a significant terrorist attack was imminent. Ashcroft was told that preparations for multiple attacks were in late stages or already complete and that little additional warning could be expected. The briefing addressed only threats outside the United States.23 The next day, the CIA representative told the CSG that al Qaeda members believed the upcoming attack would be "spectacular," qualitatively different from anything they had done to date.24

Seems a funny way of not mentioning it.

Dave
 
Yes, fantasies. It's clear from Hamilton's quote that the commission, far from limiting its scope, chose initially not to limit it to assigning blame to the detriment of achieving a broader understanding. They then found, on examining the evidence, that the failures were systemic, a discovery they might not have made had they decided from the outset to point the finger at specific individuals. In other words, they set out to find out what happened rather than to support a predetermined conclusion. I can see why the truth movement disapproves.

Dave

Dave they were asked by VP Dick to limit their investigation to intel failures. You have your timeline out of order.
President Bush and Vice President Cheney both contacted then-Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle in the months after 9/11 to insist on strict limits in the scope of any investigation into the attacks. Newsweek reported on February 4, 2002, that Vice President Cheney called Sen. Tom Daschle (D-SD) to "warn" him not to open hearings into the attacks. If Daschle pressed the issue, Cheney "implied he would risk being accused of interfering with the mission" against terrorism. And despite entreaties from the families of victims of 9/11 attacks and a bipartisan group of senators and congressmen, the president vocally resisted forming an investigatory commission. President Bush only relented on November 27, 2002, a year after the attacks.Source: Here

As well as the CNN
Bush asks Daschle to limit Sept. 11 probes article here:

If you really want to learn about the validity of the Commission, examine Bush and Cheney's original handling of the Commission and you can certainly understand why the Commission was viewed by many as simply a cover up.

One of the best analysis of the whole deal can be read here: 9/11 Commission: Opposition and Obfuscation
Very informative for both Bush supporters and haters.
 
Yes, fantasies. It's clear from Hamilton's quote that the commission, far from limiting its scope, chose initially not to limit it to assigning blame to the detriment of achieving a broader understanding. They then found, on examining the evidence, that the failures were systemic, a discovery they might not have made had they decided from the outset to point the finger at specific individuals. In other words, they set out to find out what happened rather than to support a predetermined conclusion. I can see why the truth movement disapproves.

Dave
Pure spin on your part. Hamilton admits that the blame game was too politically divisive. Then he just happens to conclude that the failures were systemic. How convenient.
 
Swing, care to provide an effective, unbiased investigative route that would have the perfection that you obviously insist the 911 Commission should have had?

Sure. One that eliminates the following analysis:

1. 9/11 Commission: Opposition and Obfuscation

2. 9/11 Commission: Our investigation was "obstructed"

3.

4. 9/11 Commission Ommissions and Distoritions

5.Whitewash as public service:
How The 9/11 Commission Report defrauds the nation -Harpers Magazine


6. Leading 9/11 Widows Declare 9/11 Commission A Whitewash


7. An investigation that holds the President and Vice President to the record,accountable, and under oath for what they say instead of off the record and behind closed doors with no clue as to what the head representative of the people of the United States had to say.

8. 9-11 Commission Funding Woes Is the Bush White House trying to put the brakes on the congressional panel created last fall to investigate 9-11 attacks?

9. Group of 9/11 widows 'question the veracity of the entire Commission’s report'

These select few out of 100's if not 1000's of stories would have no facts to be based upon and therefore would be non-existent in an appropriate investigation.
 
How do you figure them in particular? (please be specific)
Failure to hold a Cabinet level meeting on terrorism until September 4th. That would be on Bush and Rice.

Tenet's July 10 briefing with Rice. Evidently neither brought the FBI into the loop despite the fact that the FBI had jurisdiction. Tenet has referred to poor watchlisting procedures to explain CIA's failure to alert other agencies to the presence of al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar in the US. Why didn't Tenet simply tell Rice at this meeting?

Actionable intel. Known al Qaeda operatives in the US. One need not be a counterterrorism expert to realize finding them would have been a high priority.
 
Pure spin on your part. Hamilton admits that the blame game was too politically divisive. Then he just happens to conclude that the failures were systemic. How convenient.

No, it's pure spin on your part. I'm reading what Hamilton says. You're spinning it, and the post you've just made is a classic example. "Then" implies a causal connection between the desire to avoid being politically divisive and the conclusion reached. "Just happens to" suggests that the conclusion was falsely presented as a coincidence. "How convenient" is a sarcastic remark designed to imply falsehood without having the courage of your convictions to actually make an open accusation. The irony of a post in which you accuse me of spin and then use classic spin techniques to misrepresent your source is, I have no doubt, completely lost on you.

Dave
 
Failure to hold a Cabinet level meeting on terrorism until September 4th. That would be on Bush and Rice.

Tenet's July 10 briefing with Rice. Evidently neither brought the FBI into the loop despite the fact that the FBI had jurisdiction. Tenet has referred to poor watchlisting procedures to explain CIA's failure to alert other agencies to the presence of al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar in the US. Why didn't Tenet simply tell Rice at this meeting?

Actionable intel. Known al Qaeda operatives in the US. One need not be a counterterrorism expert to realize finding them would have been a high priority.
And what changes could have been done in that amount of time that the US population (at the time) would have accepted? Would congress have passed them? What actionable intel do you think we had? Hindsight is a great thing.

One thing that's nice to see is that you don't think that the USG did it to us (MIHOP).
 
And what changes could have been done in that amount of time that the US population (at the time) would have accepted? Would congress have passed them? What actionable intel do you think we had? Hindsight is a great thing.

One thing that's nice to see is that you don't think that the USG did it to us (MIHOP).
It isn't hindsight. At the time Tenet claims he was extremely worried about a terrorist attack. He had the names of known al Qaeda operatives with links to the Cole attack. Al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar were linked by association with bin-Attash and Quso who also attended the so called al Qaeda summit in Malaysia back in January 5-8, 2000.

It doesn't seem complicated. Tenet should have made sure the FBI had the damn names so they could find them and arrest them. That was actionable intel.
 
It isn't hindsight. At the time Tenet claims he was extremely worried about a terrorist attack. He had the names of known al Qaeda operatives with links to the Cole attack. Al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar were linked by association with bin-Attash and Quso who also attended the so called al Qaeda summit in Malaysia back in January 5-8, 2000.

It doesn't seem complicated. Tenet should have made sure the FBI had the damn names so they could find them and arrest them. That was actionable intel.
Nice job of ignoring the FACT that it was Illegal at the time for the FBI to make arrests or act in any way on CIA information, or, indeed, to even have access to that information, a matter which all members of the White House staff were well aware of.

So, you are advocating that the White House should act illegally based on tenuous information (tenous meaning--"there is something big getting ready to happen, probably overseas, but we don't know when or where")?
 
It isn't hindsight. At the time Tenet claims he was extremely worried about a terrorist attack. He had the names of known al Qaeda operatives with links to the Cole attack. Al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar were linked by association with bin-Attash and Quso who also attended the so called al Qaeda summit in Malaysia back in January 5-8, 2000.

It doesn't seem complicated. Tenet should have made sure the FBI had the damn names so they could find them and arrest them. That was actionable intel.
You do realize that it was illegal for the CIA to exchange information with the FBI don't you (from the Clinton administration)? Again what would the American people have accepted without solid evidence of what was going to happen? Stricter airport security without specific threats? I doubt it. Hey I'm an American and before 9/11 I would have bitched a lot more about being inconvenienced at the airport. This is the type of things that hindsight makes the options of what should have been done easier to make.
 
No, it's pure spin on your part. I'm reading what Hamilton says. You're spinning it, and the post you've just made is a classic example. "Then" implies a causal connection between the desire to avoid being politically divisive and the conclusion reached. "Just happens to" suggests that the conclusion was falsely presented as a coincidence. "How convenient" is a sarcastic remark designed to imply falsehood without having the courage of your convictions to actually make an open accusation. The irony of a post in which you accuse me of spin and then use classic spin techniques to misrepresent your source is, I have no doubt, completely lost on you.

Dave
You wrote:

Yes, fantasies. It's clear from Hamilton's quote that the commission, far from limiting its scope, chose initially not to limit it to assigning blame to the detriment of achieving a broader understanding. They then found, on examining the evidence, that the failures were systemic, a discovery they might not have made had they decided from the outset to point the finger at specific individuals.

How was a more conclusive understanding achieved by refusing to blame individuals? IMO, taking individual failures and systemic problems into account would have been the proper approach.
 
thatsmystory:
Just to be clear, you don't think that the USG made it happen right (MIHOP)? If you do your argument contradicts your belief.
 
Nice job of ignoring the FACT that it was Illegal at the time for the FBI to make arrests or act in any way on CIA information, or, indeed, to even have access to that information, a matter which all members of the White House staff were well aware of.

So, you are advocating that the White House should act illegally based on tenuous information (tenous meaning--"there is something big getting ready to happen, probably overseas, but we don't know when or where")?
This sounds like an Ashcroft talking point. Illegal to surveil or arrest known al Qaeda operatives? Absurd.

FBI agent Kenneth Maxwell:

"Two al Qaeda guys living in California--are you kidding me? We would have been on them like white on snow: physical surveillance, electronic surveillance, a special unit devoted entirely to them."

http://www.lawrencewright.com/WrightSoufan.pdf
 

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