We Want To See Your Papers

[WildCat]

Assuming the data on these cards is readable, which it must be by definition, then a forger could take all my records and replace the biometrics with HIS on a fake card.

Which would be immediately recognized as fraudulent the first time it was used.

Please explain how it will be impossible for someone to seal my identity if all my identity details are right there in easily readable format (and, if they use RFID, readable from a distance)?

See above.

As I said, in any case these cards, however secure they are in themselves, can be no more secure than all regular ID we already have, which we are told are ineffective.

Absolute nonsense, any fake card would be spotted the first time it was used.

How do I prove to the authority issuing the new ID cards who I am, so they'll give me one? By supplying them with my current passport, driving license etc.!

Unless someone has already stolen your identity unbeknownst to you this is a non-issue. And if they did already steal your identity then you'll just have to go through more thorough methods to prove who you are and strike the fraudulent ID from the records. Just like you already have to do when someone steals your ID.

 

[Michael Redman]

The problem in the US is that you can pretty easily get a forged drivers license from some states having easily forged IDs, and present that to another state having lax verification procedures, and get a "legitimate" ID with incorrect information.

It would be harder to get a "legitimate" false ID if you were required to provide some combination of original documents, e.i. a verified birth certificate, social security card, passport, etc. to get an ID in every state, and if every new state required you to go back to these original documents, rather than simply trusting that the last state did its job.

In addition to that, Real ID has the states cooperate to share verification of the original documents, so if you, for example, present a birth certificate from one state to the license bureau in another, the new state will be able to verify with the old state that the birth certificate is legitimate.

The changes under Real ID make it harder to obtain a non-forged ID using false information. The ability to do this has been identified as a problem, both for security, and for identification theft. It should also make it somewhat harder to forge some state IDs.

Of course, it won't be perfect. Maybe it won't do enough additional good to justify the cost. However, I don't see any justification for the claims that this will somehow make it easier for the government to curtail our freedom. I don't see how it puts any information in the hands of anyone who doesn't currently have it anyway.

 

[Kestrel]

Which would be immediately recognized as fraudulent the first time it was used.


See above.


Absolute nonsense, any fake card would be spotted the first time it was used.


Unless someone has already stolen your identity unbeknownst to you this is a non-issue. And if they did already steal your identity then you'll just have to go through more thorough methods to prove who you are and strike the fraudulent ID from the records. Just like you already have to do when someone steals your ID.

Your assertion that fake ID cards will be instantly spotted doesn't seem to be supported by any evidence. Can you explain what bit of magic makes this happen?

 

[WildCat]

Your assertion that fake ID cards will be instantly spotted doesn't seem to be supported by any evidence. Can you explain what bit of magic makes this happen?

The fact that it is connected to a database that can verify it? Technology has come a long way in the last 100 years...

 

[volatile]

The fact that it is connected to a database that can verify it? Technology has come a long way in the last 100 years...

What makes you think the checksum can't be faked? Or what's to stop someone using a clone of my card?

 

[WildCat]

What makes you think the checksum can't be faked?

What makes you think it will, or that a checksum will be all there is to verify it?

 

[WildCat]

Or what's to stop someone using a clone of my card?

The picture and description will look nothing like the person cloning your card? Not to mention the biometric data will be wrong.

 

[Kestrel]

The fact that it is connected to a database that can verify it? Technology has come a long way in the last 100 years...

As I posted earlier, the same can be done with current ID cards. There is no need to imbed personal information in the card. A unique identification number that can be used to query the database is all that is needed.

 

[Michael Redman]

I would guess that we're going to go to a pure biometric scanning system in the not too distant future. That will make it very hard to pose as someone else at, say, a bank or airport.

Addressing privacy and liberty considerations and identity theft are really issues of network access and use at this point, and only will be more so in the future.

 

[WildCat]

As I posted earlier, the same can be done with current ID cards. There is no need to imbed personal information in the card. A unique identification number that can be used to query the database is all that is needed.

I'm not sure which system you're talking about, I was speaking of the proposed UK National ID, not Real ID.

At any rate, some info should be embedded - a picture for example, and a description.

 

[Kestrel]

I'm not sure which system you're talking about, I was speaking of the proposed UK National ID, not Real ID.

At any rate, some info should be embedded - a picture for example, and a description.

An embedded photo requires some kind of special device to read it.

Other than making money for the company selling these devices and imbedding the chip in the card, what purpose does this serve?

Once you require a device to verify the card, you may as well just query a database for the photo that should be on that ID. At the same time you also get handy information, such as a notice that the holder of this ID is wanted by the authorities.

 

[WildCat]

Other than making money for the company selling these devices and imbedding the chip in the card, what purpose does this serve?

To make sure the person possessing the card is the person on the card.

 

[ServiceSoon]

I'm sorry, I don't know what you are trying to say, and I don't understand the point of your explanation.

Regardless, you don't have to accept DHS's interpretation of the rules. The fact remains that you haven't presented any evidence to show the key facts (no national database, no additional federal access to personal information) are not as presented.

I can't show you evidence that the federal government will try to obtain these records because it hasn't happened yet, but based on the federal governments past behavior I guarantee that they will grant themselves the authority to this information in the future.

The point of that argument is to not trust the source of the rules. We don't live under a monarchy anymore. You don't have to take the DHS on their opinion of the rules they made. Don't allow the DHS to be the judge, jury & executioner. Trust but verify.

It is a "national system", obviously, but not a "national database" or a "national ID", as claimed.

Let me get this right. All of the separate states databases will be connected together, creating one database. How can it be a national system and not a national database?

Yes, your SS# could be entered into a network, and your information, including picture, could be retrieved. So if the current system would allow the harm you claim might come from Real ID, it really isn't creating anything new we should worry about, it is?

Government programs rarely stay the same size, they generally increase. More government equals less privacy and liberty. Does that suffice? This could also be used to increase the police state. That is where the Papers Please analogy comes from.

From the time the last UK ID card was issued during World War II to the time of its abolition in 1952, the functions of the card went up from 3 to 39. I gave the example of the social security program showing that the US government is no different in this aspect.

The federal government doesn't have the authority to enact this legislation. The problem is each state has to accept the other states identification due to the good faith and credit clause. The states were actively meeting to solve some of the issues you spoke of earlier, but because of the 9-11 commission report this law was snuck in. The main reason for this move by congress is to stop terrorism, but..... The 9-11 terrorist had valid identification. The Madrid bombings took place in Spain while they had a national ID card.

In fact, by creating a picture ID that can be relied on, it is less likely that anyone would feel compelled to access a network to confirm ones identity. If you can trust the card you don't need any additional information.

I can't wait to live in the utopia you think this card will create. It may sound wonderful to you but it won't work. Experts suggest that having all identification in one area will make fraud easier.

 

[Richard Masters]

And no one here has explained how we are even one bit closer to that with Real ID.

It's got less to do with the Real ID itself than the rationalization for it.

It's to "protect you from terrorists".

Of course they forgot to tell you that the RFID chip that some IDs will include can be used by wannabe terrorists to passively detonate explosives, effectively targeting Americans.

If by some technological miracle they managed to decrypt the signal they could, in fact, target specific government officials, thereby using our own "anti-terrorist" technology for terroristic purposes.

Then you have the consolidation of the images of at least 3 different identification documents. It's widely known that your identity is easier to find with two items of information than one. I, or anyone here could probably harvest the personal information of any one individual in JREF and create a bio sketch. Now add to that access to 3 identification documents, which include more than a couple items of data, and you can impersonate anyone. Find someone you look like, memorize their biographical data and start living under their name. Next thing you know, another terrorist attack. By someone with a Real ID.

What happens next? You can't trust your own ID system, so you take it up a notch, install biometric scanners and treat citizens like terrorists. Then someone like Rudy "Freedom is about Authority" Giuliani is elected president, and you'll be jailed for jaywalking and tracked anywhere you go.

Far-fetched, of course, but plausible and unnecessary.

 

[WildCat]

It's got less to do with the Real ID itself than the rationalization for it.

It's to "protect you from terrorists".

Of course they forgot to tell you that the RFID chip that some IDs will include can be used by wannabe terrorists to passively detonate explosives, effectively targeting Americans.

This is about as impractical as a terrorist attack can be.

If by some technological miracle they managed to decrypt the signal they could, in fact, target specific government officials, thereby using our own "anti-terrorist" technology for terroristic purposes.

Also highly imnpractical.

Then you have the consolidation of the images of at least 3 different identification documents. It's widely known that your identity is easier to find with two items of information than one. I, or anyone here could probably harvest the personal information of any one individual in JREF and create a bio sketch. Now add to that access to 3 identification documents, which include more than a couple items of data, and you can impersonate anyone. Find someone you look like, memorize their biographical data and start living under their name. Next thing you know, another terrorist attack. By someone with a Real ID.

Except that there cannot be 2 valid Real ID's for a specific person at one time.

What happens next? You can't trust your own ID system, so you take it up a notch, install biometric scanners and treat citizens like terrorists. Then someone like Rudy "Freedom is about Authority" Giuliani is elected president, and you'll be jailed for jaywalking and tracked anywhere you go.

Far-fetched, of course, but plausible and unnecessary.

Ah, so it's not Real ID that is the problem, but the strawman you built on speculation alone?

Still waiting to hear how Real ID leads to "papers please".

 

[Richard Masters]

Except that there cannot be 2 valid Real ID's for a specific person at one time.

Why do you need two?

 

[volatile]

Not evidence, of course, just a personal anecdote. I lived in Germany and France for a while. Both countries have compulsory national ID cards, which I, not being a citizen of either nation, did not carry.

I am covered in tattoos, and when living in Europe had facial piercings and dreadlocks. I was stopped and searched and asked to demand my papers twice in each country, during a six month period. Trying to explain to the policemen in question why I was sufficiently fluent in their langauge to pass as a native speaker but unable to produce a valid ID card led to full searches and phonecalls to my bosses to verify my employment status.

When carrying ID is compulsory, law enforcement do use the "Papers please" line, especially on those who look a little out of the ordinary. Now, of course I'm not saying France or Germany are totalitarian police states, just that making it against the law to not carry your ID obviously leads to the authorities checking for adherence to that law.

 

[volatile]

The picture and description will look nothing like the person cloning your card?

I don't know many people who look like their OWN passport photos, so that's a pretty moot point...

Not to mention the biometric data will be wrong.

As Bruce Scheiner points out, this is wrong for a few reasons. The first is that the underlying system can be changed. The second is that most places using these cards as ID won't be using the biometric scans anyway. The third relates to the point Richard is making, which is that if someone can get a Real ID as you before you get yours, or can alter the system in some way, or there is just some SNAFU cock-up in the initial data entry, how do you go about proving you're not the imposter?

Putting lots of faith in one system (and one that must be open and readable to a massively wide range of individuals and corporations) leads to the illusion of security, not security itself. Its monumentally expensive, minimally effective, and its aims can be better achieved by spending the money that you would have spent on the establishment and running of an enormous government IT system (see how well the UK has dealt with the NHS computer system for evidence of government incompetence in large-scale IT projects) into, say, more police officers, more immigration officers an the like.

 

[Richard Masters]

...f someone can get a Real ID as you before you get yours, or can alter the system in some way, or there is just some SNAFU cock-up in the initial data entry, how do you go about proving you're not the imposter?

Or just find someone that matches your characteristics, who lives alone; dump them in the sewage system and steal their Real ID.