Question to free will skeptics

[Robin]

I vote consciousness to be the average state of most brains where they confuse the model they have of themselves for themselves, and operate with that assumption of identity on call.

I would vote it to be a physical phenomenom generated by some machinery in the brain - ie a physical rather than abstract thing.

But then I would converge with you, the only use it has it to provide a model of reality and of "us" so effectively that we don't even realise it is a model.

The identity assumption is not such a bad one - I think "I" is that homo-sapien I see in the mirror and the stuff going on in its head. When I understand that I am in a model created by my brain to help me navigate reality it doesn't really change much about how I regard myself.

The idea of a "conscious decision" is a product of the cortex, I think the frontal specifically, and is many times (though I'll concede not all times) an assumption of "will" that the frontal cortex makes after an action occurs. Not all actions, and perhaps not many at all on a daily basis, are actions of conscious will. Rather they are lesser-conscious actions that are later, if considered post-hoc, appended an illusion of "will" to them.

Sure, there is probably a great deal we think that "we" have done that we just found out about as it happened. I think I drive to work but sometimes I have no recollection of having done so, although clearly I did. In the same way, sometimes I set off on a similar route to the ones I take to work and find I have taken the turnings toward work. It is hard to separate the auto-pilot from the intentional stuff.

I would submit that the only "fully consciously willed" choices we make are those we more deeply contemplate, where before actions are chosen they are considered through an awareness of cause, effect, our identities, etcetera. The more difficult a choice is to make, the more consciously-willed it probably is. I would suggest to think of this not in terms of black-and-white, but in a gradient, where a locus of higher faculties are considered more consciously-willed.

I think that is a very good analysis.

 

[President Bush]

Being determined to deny free will: argument from ignorance... or worse?

You decide.

1. Your brain does stuff based on the sum total of all input it gets.
2. It's impossible to know ahead of time with certainty what your brain is going to do.

That state of affairs we call free will.

You can argue about whether IF we had perfect knowledge of all input, WOULD we be able to predict what your brain is going to do. I say yes. Others say no. But that's all hypothetical and divorced from any practical value, because:

There's no way to have perfect knowledge of all input.

If there is some way to do that at some time in the future, then we'll have something to talk about. At this point, what's the fuss?

Vootie!! Why I said that denial of free will is an argument from ignorance.

Not to mention that if (causal) determinism were true, any denial of free will would be an act completely fixed by prior events and the laws of nature... wrap your head around that.

I apologize, l0rca... didn't intend to single you out.

 

[l0rca]

Vootie!! Why I said that denial of free will is an argument from ignorance.

Not to mention that if (causal) determinism were true, any denial of free will would be an act completely fixed by prior events and the laws of nature... wrap your head around that.

I apologize, l0rca... didn't intend to single you out.

What free will did I deny? I'm not aware that I made an argument at all. Instead, I suggested a form of argument that I would accept and think about. If a person has an idea of free will that they propose, the onus is on them to specify what they mean, and provide evidence.

I have my own feelings about free will, probably similar to Robin's, but I actually don't like the semantics involved. I think the term "free will" is a bad term to define what I would accept as "free will". I would instead call it something like a simple conscious posession of faculty. If people want to use the term though, I usually assume they're suggesting something contradicting determinism, and for that I think the onus is entirely on them.

 

[Darat]

...snip... whether it is illusory or real,

...snip...

Unless you assume that there is something other than "stuff" i.e. the supernatural there is in fact no distinction between whether something is "illusory" or "real". This is by the way more than a comment about semantics, it is about keeping in mind that the map is not the territory. In other words don't let the convenience of using labels like "illusory" and "real" seduce you into thinking they are meaningful in and of themselves.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

All of it, obviously.

Even more glib.

No it is not, the Mary in the black and white room argument is intended to demonstrate that subjective states are not physical and I am not saying that at all.

No it is not a subjective state if I have it programmed?

It is not even an argument. It is just an example to illustrate the concept of subjective states. I have no idea why materialists are so terrified of consciousness and subjective states.

I don't think anyone is terrified. We're just suspicious of glib statements like "but everyone know what consciousness is."

The Mary argument is, in any case, fallacious. Yes, something programmed into your brain could be a subjective state. Consciousness belongs to the "will" part of the definition, not the "free" part.

Okay.

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

But it seems to me that this debate is entirely divorced from any pragmatism at all.

1. Your brain does stuff based on the sum total of all input it gets.
2. It's impossible to know ahead of time with certainty what your brain is going to do.

That state of affairs we call free will.

That's only one possible definition of free will. The libertarian free willies have a completely different definition. Anyway, defining free will as meaning "I'm not sure what I'm going to do" seems quite bizarre.

All these free will conversations suffer from the lack of distinction between the definition of free will and whether we have it. We're all talking past one another because we have different definitions in mind.

~~ Paul

 

[FenrisWolf]

That's only one possible definition of free will. The libertarian free willies have a completely different definition. Anyway, defining free will as meaning "I'm not sure what I'm going to do" seems quite bizarre.

Err... why bizarre? Most examples people give of free will involve them saying "I could do A or I could do B." Somebody upthread was talking about making coffee before or after posting. Nobody knew which he would do.

I think ignorance of the eventual outcome is key to what people mean on a practical level when they talk about free will. A jury's decision in a courtroom is a good example. Nobody, not even the jury, knows what the outcome will be before the trial starts; that's why they have the trial.

People who want to prove free will does not exist, could do so if they were able to accurately predict the outcome of every trial, which presumably would require perfect knowledge of every atom in the jury's bodies prior to the start of the trial. And all the witnesses, too, and the air in the courtroom, and the food they'll eat during the trial, etc etc etc.

But such knowledge as that is currently way outside the realm of the possible. Therefore, free will exists until such time as it is no longer impossible, if that ever happens. Or so I think.

I don't see much point in arguing about "What would happen if this particular impossible thing were possible?" One might as well argue about what color a unicorn's eyes are. If we ever find a unicorn, we'll check. Till then, why bother?

 

[FenrisWolf]

Good question. The fuss, from my point of view, is to examine the concept of freedom, whether it is illusory or real, what it means, how useful the concept is, how important it is and how it could be empirically tested and how it could be applied in the real world.

In other words, whether all this is divorced from pragmatism is the question I am interested in.

Uhh... what do you mean, illusory or real? Are you talking about solipsism? It's pretty clear that people make unpredictable choices, isn't it?

I guess what I'm saying, to paraphrase Clarke, is that "Any sufficiently advanced chaos is indistinguishable from free will."

 

[Lord Emsworth]

ie Libertarian Free Will.

Correct, I think.

As for the rest, i.e. "non-libertarian free will" the "free" is pretty much redundant. If you do sth that you want (in accordance with your will) you act by definition voluntarily (free). If on the other hand you act against your will, you act involuntarily (either by being forced or by being incompetent).

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Err... why bizarre? Most examples people give of free will involve them saying "I could do A or I could do B." Somebody upthread was talking about making coffee before or after posting. Nobody knew which he would do.

Perhaps you meant: I'm not sure what I'm going to do until I decide. It sounded like you were saying free will is not knowing until it happens at random.

I guess what I'm saying, to paraphrase Clarke, is that "Any sufficiently advanced chaos is indistinguishable from free will."

For a certain definition of free will.

~~ Paul

 

[Robin]

Even more glib.

Not glib, just accurate. Tautological even. Everything that you are conscious of is consciousness. What is it that you experience that is not part of your consciousness?

No it is not a subjective state if I have it programmed?

I don't understand. All subjective states are, in some sense, programmed. When I eat a peach I am programmed to experience particular sensations.

I don't think anyone is terrified. We're just suspicious of glib statements like "but everyone know what consciousness is."

Except that I didn't just say this, I gave a reasonably full description of what I meant by consciousness:

It (consciousness) means having sensations, awareness and subjective states. It is the "what it is like to be you".

It is a higher level function of the brain, but I can't tell you the precise machinery that produces conscious states. I don't think the matter is scientifically settled yet.

Imagine eating a peach. You can get a functional description of all the neurological events that occur when this happens in as much detail as you like, but there is always one piece of information it can never convey. What is is like to eat a peach. You can only get that from actually eating a peach. That is a subjective state.

So let me get this clear, is anybody here arguing that an intentional action might mean a non-conscious action?

 

[Robin]

Uhh... what do you mean, illusory or real? Are you talking about solipsism?

I don't see how you got from the question of whether freedom is illusory or real - to solipsism. That is a pretty odd leap. But here is an example. I drive to work and take the same turnings every day. I think I am taking the turnings from my free will. But sometimes it just happens without the active involvement of my conscious mind, and yet I get to work safely. So sometimes when I think I am making a free conscious choice I am really just working by autopilot. That is what I would call illusory free will. But sometimes I think carefully and make a carefully considered decision. So that might be real free will (compatibilist).

It's pretty clear that people make unpredictable choices, isn't it?

Sure, but that would not be considered "free will" under any definition.

I guess what I'm saying, to paraphrase Clarke, is that "Any sufficiently advanced chaos is indistinguishable from free will."

Is Clarke talking about chaos in the mathematical sense? If so, do we have actual proof that this is the principle on which our minds work. Or is it analogous to a self organisational system like, for example, evolution?

I know that Chaos expert Ed Lorenz has doubts about whether the mind is a chaotic system.

 

[Robin]

Unless you assume that there is something other than "stuff" i.e. the supernatural there is in fact no distinction between whether something is "illusory" or "real". This is by the way more than a comment about semantics, it is about keeping in mind that the map is not the territory. In other words don't let the convenience of using labels like "illusory" and "real" seduce you into thinking they are meaningful in and of themselves.

I am not using the terms for their convenience - in fact I have discussed the nature of "real" in this forum in quite a lot of depth.

 

[Taffer]

There may well be no hidden variables/parameters governing radioactive decay.
Anyway if something is genuinely random, then matching physical variables does not fix the output, so your definition still doesn't work.

No, Jekyll. All physical variables include the outcome of a random variable. In other words, you would include the same outcome of the variable.

Are you changing your definition so it now includes some concept of "will" then? Because you were initially just saying, free will is just unpredictable decision making.

No. I did not include a definition of "will" originally because I thought it painfull obvious. If I need to, then perhaps I should change my definition.

 

[Taffer]

Slight derail to ask a question:

Isn't this particular hypothetical impossible?

My limited understanding of the math of QM is that when you hit the wave equation with an operator, you get an expectation value. That is, when I try to get the position of a particle from a set of identically prepared experiments, I only get a (whatever) percent chance of getting the same value from the measurements.

Can somebody either confirm for me that we cannot say that a state will ever be identical (that is, "all physical variables as being the same the second time around. This means even the random elements." does not exist), or point out the flaw in my understanding?

Thank you, and otherwise back to the debate...

Given current understanding and technology, yes, it is impossible.

But 'tis a thought experiment, don'cha know.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Not glib, just accurate. Tautological even. Everything that you are conscious of is consciousness. What is it that you experience that is not part of your consciousness?

Ah, well, if you agree that the definition is tautological then we're good to go.

If I'm driving along thinking about something and I suddenly realize I've driven 10 miles without paying conscious attention to the road, was I driving consciously?

Am I conscious when I'm dreaming?

Is a person with blindsight conscious of events to which he reacts?

~~ Paul

 

[The Man]

My definition of free will

The ability to make a choice that influences the porbable outcome of a physical system or systems, including those systems, which may or may not, influence or determine how that choice is made.

 

[The Man]

It has been suggested, on this and other threads, that “free will” is just an illusion of perception. It has also been suggested that reality, since we can only know it by what we perceive of it, is also possibly an illusionary perception. If we consider both to be true, then the illusionary perception of “free will” in an illusionary, perceived, universe is as real as anything can possibly be in that universe.

 

[cyborg]

Anyway if something is genuinely random, then matching physical variables does not fix the output, so your definition still doesn't work.

How do you prevent me from synthesising a fix by assuming the random variables would actually be the same the next time around?

 

[President Bush]

It has been suggested, on this and other threads, that “free will” is just an illusion of perception. It has also been suggested that reality, since we can only know it by what we perceive of it, is also possibly an illusionary perception. If we consider both to be true, then the illusionary perception of “free will” in an illusionary, perceived, universe is as real as anything can possibly be in that universe.

We are all brains in a vat... just not sure how large.