Is It Possible There Is An Afterlife?

[Beleth]

The Universe as a fluke and multiverse theories are necessary options to explain universal fine tuning - the standard model of particle physics has 28 free parameters, cosmology may be said to introduce more, string theory the grand unifier introduces even greater constraints. If the proton to electron ratio were much smaller there would be no stars, if it were much larger, there would be no ordered structures like crystals or DNA, if protons were 0.2% heavier they would decay into neutrons and thus there would be no stable atoms, the list goes on. We can pretend that actually this isn't so, but it is. One can dismiss the conclusions by deciding that actually these parameters can be simplified - but this is not based on current scientific knowledge or reasoning but instead is just post hoc justification of an already held belief.

This is all assuming that the only way to make sentience is to have atoms, stars, DNA, etc. Like I said, we only have this one example of a universe, so it is pointless to say with any semblance of credibility that if things were different, sentience would not have developed.

there are fundamental differences between "I don't know" and #5. #5 requires that we reject all current human understanding/arguments/laws which would have us believe in our positive choice, and instead reject those positive choices on aesthetic grounds without recourse to any reason.

What evidence points to us being able to make a positive choice in this regard? You can argue all day about human understanding and whatnot, but in the end, you can't reason into existence evidence that isn't there.

Skepticism is evidence-based reasoning. Scientifically, "I don't know yet" is a well-respected conclusion. As a skeptic, I have no problem rejecting ideas which have no evidence to back them up. I can see how that would vex philosophers... even respected ones like this Bostrom chap. But that's really not my problem.

 

[Beleth]

The Universe as a fluke and multiverse theories are necessary options to explain universal fine tuning - the standard model of particle physics has 28 free parameters, cosmology may be said to introduce more, string theory the grand unifier introduces even greater constraints. If the proton to electron ratio were much smaller there would be no stars, if it were much larger, there would be no ordered structures like crystals or DNA, if protons were 0.2% heavier they would decay into neutrons and thus there would be no stable atoms, the list goes on. We can pretend that actually this isn't so, but it is. One can dismiss the conclusions by deciding that actually these parameters can be simplified - but this is not based on current scientific knowledge or reasoning but instead is just post hoc justification of an already held belief.

This is all assuming that the only way to make sentience is to have atoms, stars, DNA, etc. Like I said, we only have this one example of a universe, so it is pointless to say with any semblance of credibility that if things were different, sentience would not have developed.

there are fundamental differences between "I don't know" and #5. #5 requires that we reject all current human understanding/arguments/laws which would have us believe in our positive choice, and instead reject those positive choices on aesthetic grounds without recourse to any reason.

What evidence points to us being able to make a positive choice in this regard? You can argue all day about human understanding and whatnot, but in the end, you can't reason into existence evidence that isn't there.

Skepticism is evidence-based reasoning. Scientifically, "I don't know yet" is a well-respected conclusion. As a skeptic, I have no problem rejecting ideas which have no evidence to back them up. I can see how that would vex philosophers... even respected ones like this Bostrom chap. But that's really not my problem.

 

[Faithkills]

If the "real real world" does not have reality pixels, then any simulation which does is going to diverge from reality eventually, and thus become useless. A sufficient (but not necessary) condition for this divergence would be the acquisition of knowledge of the reality pixels by the simulants. They would stop behaving as an accurate simulation and start behaving as something with no real-world predictive use for the programmers.

Not so. We use imperfect models to study things all the time, weather, social trends, life itself, etc. We have models that run continuously that are FAR less accurate then the ones in question, yet they provide insight and are of academic interest. The imperfection of the model doesn't mean we don't use models, all models are imperfect yet we use them all the time.

As well the science of simulation itself could be the topic of interest to the denizens of primal reality. They may want to know how many reflections the mirror might be able to have?

Simulations which were shut down when they understood reality was simulated might exist but they would not be most of them, and in any case we don't know we are simulated yet, so we may have a little time

It still comes down to real-world utility, no matter how many levels of simulation there are. Why would programmers want to simulate something with no predictive use?

We do it all the time. Why wouldn't they?? From a psych perspective I would think it would be fascinating to see the results of a society that knew it was simulated! Also from a philosophical perspective, even a theological one. It could just be kids ant farms. Order you own reality today and be god for $19.99! Maybe that's what happened to god. He discovered porn and forgot about us. His ant farm is still running in the background.

Entertainment, perhaps. In that case I pity the programmer who thought simulating Alzheimer's, or muscular dystrophy, or the Holocaust, was entertaining.

They may have been kept to make the simulation more real. What 12 year old boy would want a wussified 'care bear' 'ant farm'?

Or it might have been a simulation from the start of the universe to see how life might develop the same, or differently. Another simulation I would LOVE to run.

I don't buy this. If the world you lived in was not known to be a simulation, as this one isn't, then why would you want to simulate one where it was known? Any knowledge of how to get rich or powerful that you would take away from a simulation like that would be very unlikely to work in the real world.

Right but the primal reality has many other reasons to run simulations than prediction and even prediction using flawed models is more useful than prediction using more flawed models. We see this all over in our own reality.

And for those that were predictive and were not based in the primal reality you would definitely want there to be signs the simulants could discover. ALSO you might want ones where it was very hard to discover so you could drawn some inferences about the primal reality.

At the top level, though, the occupants of the real world would not know that they were in a simulated reality for one simple reason: they're not in a simulated reality. Whether they know they're not is irrelevant; what's relevant is that they don't know they are. To simulate any human behavior such as the ability to get rich or powerful, they would have to ensure that the simulation was as close to the same as the real world as possible. And a world where the inhabitants knew they were simulated would be so vastly different than a world where the inhabitants didn't know that as to make the simulation useless. Deeper levels of simulation would not change this.

In order to refute the possibility of our reality being simulated you are saying:

1) we simulate for no other reason than prediction
2) imperfect models are of no value and would not be employed for prediction

Both of those we know to be false from our own reality.

Note that there only need be one simulation running in the primal reality. And only one reality need be simulated in it, etc, etc. Though there seems no reason to assume there would only be one at any level.

 

[Faithkills]

Skepticism is evidence-based reasoning. Scientifically, "I don't know yet" is a well-respected conclusion. As a skeptic, I have no problem rejecting ideas which have no evidence to back them up. I can see how that would vex philosophers... even respected ones like this Bostrom chap. But that's really not my problem.

For the record I would like to think we are not simulated. Also I see no conclusive evidence that we are. 'Reality pixels' don't necessitate simulation, at least so far as we have found.

But I'm not going to say it's impossible either. It's a lot more likely than an omnipotent god on a cloud

 

[andyandy]

This is all assuming that the only way to make sentience is to have atoms, stars, DNA, etc. Like I said, we only have this one example of a universe, so it is pointless to say with any semblance of credibility that if things were different, sentience would not have developed

.

it is not at all pointless, but based upon everything we know. If we retreat to a position of complete ignorance then we can make no claims based upon any knowledge we hold.

Skepticism is evidence-based reasoning. Scientifically, "I don't know yet" is a well-respected conclusion. As a skeptic, I have no problem rejecting ideas which have no evidence to back them up. I can see how that would vex philosophers... even respected ones like this Bostrom chap. But that's really not my problem.

For that to be a scientifically respected conclusion requires that one addresses the arguments. The conclusion "I am not prepared to address any of the arguments because they're just based upon current human understanding" is not to be respected. One can not just pretend universal fine tuning is not an issue that requires addressing - it does. One can not pretend that inflation theory and QM don't necessitate an infinite number of identical yous - they do. If one wants to retreat to a position of ignorance (the strong "I don't know") then that is one's perogative, but once there, there is no ground to dismiss any argument as "ridiculous." The weak "I don't know" simply expresses less than surity and requires that the arguments are considered and a weighting given to appropriate considerations. By not being willing to discuss the Goldilocks effect, or scientific models you can not be said to following any evidence based approach.

 

[Darat]

...snip...

One can not just pretend universal fine tuning is not an issue that requires addressing - it does.

...snip...

No it isn't a problem, it just may be a problem. The only time we would know it is a problem is if we did indeed have a self-consistent theory of everything that only accurately predicts the universe around us if we pick some arbitrary values. At the moment we do not have such a description of reality and we have no way of knowing if such a self-consistent description would require "fine tuning".

...snip...

One can not pretend that inflation theory and QM don't necessitate an infinite number of identical yous - they do.

...snip...

Just some versions may do and the one thing we can say with absolute certainty is that QM, inflation and indeed all our other theories are wrong; we know they are wrong because they do not describe the universe we see around us. Of course for some limited (but very useful for us) applications some of them are very good at accurately describing the universe.

Again I would attack your argument by stating at this time we do not know if the questions arising from such theories are really questions or merely the result of theories themselves being wrong. This isn't an escape into what I think you call "strong ignorance" since it is based on what we know we don't know.

It seems strange to me to using the "answers" from theories we know are fundamentally wrong as the starting point for other theories.

 

[Beleth]

.it is not at all pointless, but based upon everything we know. If we retreat to a position of complete ignorance then we can make no claims based upon any knowledge we hold.

Well, then, stop doing it.

I like things to be based on things we know instead of things we don't know. The CS hypothesis is based entirely on things we don't know.

- We don't know where the stuff in the universe came from.
- We don't know that humankind won't wipe itself out.
- We don't know that humankind will develop artificial intelligence of a level that would allow a CS of six billion+ people to be possible.
- We don't know that humankind will build computers of such sophistication that they can simulate the creation of a universe and let it run for 14+ billion years.
- We don't know that humankind would build an uncountably large number of these simulations.

You and Bostrom may find it "safe to assume" those things. Follow your bliss. But to then project those assumptions on the data we have so far gathered about the universe and say "nope, that's all fake, what's more likely is that we're just inside some big computer" is truly retreating to a position of complete ignorance.

For that to be a scientifically respected conclusion requires that one addresses the arguments. The conclusion "I am not prepared to address any of the arguments because they're just based upon current human understanding" is not to be respected.

Actually, it's to be highly respected. Actually coming to an evidence-based conclusion is more respected, but it takes a very honorable man to admit, after all the data he can collect has been analyzed, that the data does not support his hypothesis. It's much easier to say "I don't care what the data says, my gut feeling tells me that I'm right anyway"... and also very unrespected.

One can not just pretend universal fine tuning is not an issue that requires addressing - it does.

What do you mean?

One can not pretend that inflation theory and QM don't necessitate an infinite number of identical yous - they do.

Actually QM does not. The MWH is only one of the possible explanations of QM. Inflation theory has a lot of issues that still need to be worked out. Which, incidentally, gives more credence to position #5.

 

[andyandy]

No it isn't a problem, it just may be a problem. The only time we would know it is a problem is if we did indeed have a self-consistent theory of everything that only accurately predicts the universe around us if we pick some arbitrary values. At the moment we do not have such a description of reality and we have no way of knowing if such a self-consistent description would require "fine tuning".

based on everything which we know, it is something that requires explaining. As before, it may ultimately be explainable by a Big TOE - but we should base current theories upon what that which we know rather than that which we don't.

Just some versions may do and the one thing we can say with absolute certainty is that QM, inflation and indeed all our other theories are wrong; we know they are wrong because they do not describe the universe we see around us. Of course for some limited (but very useful for us) applications some of them are very good at accurately describing the universe.

i don't think you can claim that QM is wrong - it has exceptional experimentally verifiable accuracy at the microscopic - it may be subsumed within a larger TOE - but to claim it is wrong is to set up all theories as theories of everything - which they're not. Again this appears to be an argument for ignorance - science is built upon that which we know. That it will not be complete is accepted, but that doesn't mean that we can retreat to a position of non-knowledge. I expect a telekenisist would get short shift on JREF if he were to dismiss all scientific knowledge as incomplete and thus claim that one should not argue that his powers didn't in all probability exist.

Again I would attack your argument by stating at this time we do not know if the questions arising from such theories are really questions or merely the result of theories themselves being wrong. This isn't an escape into what I think you call "strong ignorance" since it is based on what we know we don't know.

We seem destined for Rumsfield-ian linguistics All we can do is formulate theories based on what we know - that there are known unknowns out there does not effect this.

It seems strange to me to using the "answers" from theories we know are fundamentally wrong as the starting point for other theories.

in one swoop you've just dismantled the whole of physics and cosmology

 

[andyandy]

- We don't know where the stuff in the universe came from.
- We don't know that humankind won't wipe itself out.
- We don't know that humankind will develop artificial intelligence of a level that would allow a CS of six billion+ people to be possible.
- We don't know that humankind will build computers of such sophistication that they can simulate the creation of a universe and let it run for 14+ billion years.
- We don't know that humankind would build an uncountably large number of these simulations.

hang on - have you actually read Bostrom's paper? None of those assumptions are made. Indeed he simply gives 3 alternatives

1) humans do not reach a posthuman stage
2) posthumans do not build multiple ancestor simulations
3) we are living in a CS

He makes an interesting argument as to the technologies required etc. to reach a posthuman stage - but his argument is simply that (1) (2) or (3) is true.

You and Bostrom may find it "safe to assume" those things.

please actually read his paper. I've linked it twice already.

http://www.simulation-argument.com/simulation.pdf

What do you mean?

The Goldilocks enigma - as has already been mentioned. (see linked articles)

Actually QM does not. The MWH is only one of the possible explanations of QM. Inflation theory has a lot of issues that still need to be worked out. Which, incidentally, gives more credence to position #5.

You're conflating MWH with hubble volume and BU parallel universes. They are completely different. MWH are level 3 parallel universes, Hubble volume and BU are I and II. they simply require chaotic fluctuatons at the quantum level driving inflation I did post on this already and link to an exceptional article by Tegmark on the subject.
http://space.mit.edu/home/tegmark/multiverse.pdf

also worth reading with regards to anthropic reasoning/observer selection effects and fine tuning is this paper....

http://anthropic-principle.com/preprints/spacetime.pdf

 

[Beleth]

Indeed he simply gives 3 alternatives

1) humans do not reach a posthuman stage
2) posthumans do not build multiple ancestor simulations
3) we are living in a CS

He makes an interesting argument as to the technologies required etc. to reach a posthuman stage - but his argument is simply that (1) (2) or (3) is true.

When you put it that way, it looks like a simple strawman. Why can't it be the case that humans have not yet reached a posthuman stage?

You have piqued my interest now. I shall read the paper. I don't think you are doing a very good job at summarizing it.

You're conflating MWH with hubble volume and BU parallel universes.

Actually, I'm trying to separate the conflation you put forth when you said "One can not pretend that inflation theory and QM don't necessitate an infinite number of identical yous - they do". That's why I had two separate sentences -- one for QM, and one for inflationary theory.

 

[andyandy]

perhaps the confusion can be cleared up by reading Bostrom's paper

the 3 relevant arguments are

i) "If A and B then C"
ii) At least one of ~A, ~B or C are true
iii) "A is true and B is true therefore C."


(i) is the form I presented the CS argument, and immediately next to that I presented Bostrom's argument (ii). No one has claimed (iii) and yet this seems to be what you are attacking. The paper provides an excellent discussion on the topic.

 

[andyandy]

You have piqued my interest now. I shall read the paper. I don't think you are doing a very good job at summarizing it.

well seeing as I linked the paper forgive me for actually assuming that you'd taken the time to read it, given your keenness to dismiss it as ridiculous.

Indeed on post 14 i had already posted this. I've bolded the part you seem to only have just realised 80 odd posts later.

this is a form of Nick Bostrom's computer simulation argument - the paper is http://www.simulation-argument.com/simulation.html

This paper argues that at least one of the following propositions is true: (1) the human species is very likely to go extinct before reaching a “posthuman” stage; (2) any posthuman civilization is extremely unlikely to run a significant number of simulations of their evolutionary history (or variations thereof); (3) we are almost certainly living in a computer simulation. It follows that the belief that there is a significant chance that we will one day become posthumans who run ancestor-simulations is false, unless we are currently living in a simulation. A number of other consequences of this result are also discussed.

Many works of science fiction as well as some forecasts by serious technologists and futurologists predict that enormous amounts of computing power will be available in the future. Let us suppose for a moment that these predictions are correct. One thing that later generations might do with their super-powerful computers is run detailed simulations of their forebears or of people like their forebears. Because their computers would be so powerful, they could run a great many such simulations. Suppose that these simulated people are conscious (as they would be if the simulations were sufficiently fine-grained and if a certain quite widely accepted position in the philosophy of mind is correct). Then it could be the case that the vast majority of minds like ours do not belong to the original race but rather to people simulated by the advanced descendants of an original race. It is then possible to argue that, if this were the case, we would be rational to think that we are likely among the simulated minds rather than among the original biological ones. Therefore, if we don’t think that we are currently living in a computer simulation, we are not entitled to believe that we will have descendants who will run lots of such simulations of their forebears. That is the basic idea. The rest of this paper will spell it out more carefully.

I'm not sure what clearer summary you could want of Bostrom's argument than that which was presented to you. It's all there - it simply requires reading. it's a pretty damning inditement that you've got to post 90 odd without feeling the need to actually read what it is you've decided you disagree with.

Actually, I'm trying to separate the conflation you put forth when you said "One can not pretend that inflation theory and QM don't necessitate an infinite number of identical yous - they do". That's why I had two separate sentences -- one for QM, and one for inflationary theory

again i had assumed you'd actually taken the time to read the linked sources and the earlier post which did explain that in depth. Again I was obviously assuming too much.

 

[arthwollipot]

Tipler is a discredited scientist who conflates rather a large number of disparate ideas as a post-hoc justification for God. Bostrom is a reputable philosophy professor and director of the Future of Humanity institute at Oxford University - I'd be interested to know where you disagree with his argument.

I didn't say I disagreed with it, only that it sounded a little like Tipler to me. You're reading too much in a simple statement.

 

[andyandy]

I didn't say I disagreed with it, only that it sounded a little like Tipler to me. You're reading too much in a simple statement.

fair enough, apologies

I'd still be interested in your opinions....

just promise not to shoot me with your laser beam eyes.....

 

[arthwollipot]

I'll let you know. I don't have a great deal of leisure to read and digest complex theories, but stay tuned.

 

[arthwollipot]

Ok, I've quickly read it and jotted down some of my impressions as I was reading it. The first thing that I noticed was the final clause of this sentence:

The argument provides a stimulus for formulating some methodological and metaphysical questions, and it suggests naturalistic analogies to certain traditional religious conceptions, which some may find amusing or thought-provoking.

Sure, interesting. But any use to anyone? Here in Australia, we call this sort of thing "wanking". Fun, but unproductive. Certainly not worth not doing just because of that, but it leaves one with the thought "well... what's the point?"

Such a mature stage of technological development will make it possible to convert planets and other astronomical resources into enormously powerful computers.

This, from memory (and it's been a long time) is one of the hallmarks of Tipler's "theory". However, where Tipler postulated an entire reconstruction of the universe, Bostrom postulates only simulations.

Bostrom states that unobserved things need not be simulated until they are observed, which coincidentally accords with quantum mechanics.

Assuming that the first part of the argument is true (that posthuman civilisations will create ancestor-simulations in vast numbers), then the rest follows by simple probability. If ten million simulations are run, then the probability that we are not one of them is one in ten-million-and-one. This is almost (but not quite) tautological. It also rests on the assumption that the first part of the argument is true.

In fact, reading through the "interpretations" section gives me a nagging suspicion that the author was on his summer break, throwing something out there as some kind of obscure joke. I can't prove this, of course, it's just a feeling I get.

This is reinforced by the apparently self-defeating final statement:

Unless we are now living in a simulation, our descendants will almost certainly never run an ancestor-simulation.

Not exactly a detailed analysis, I'll grant you. But these are my thoughts.

 

[Robin]

Note:

A common assumption in the philosophy of mind is that of substrate-independence. The idea is that mental states can supervene on any of a broad class of physical substrates. Provided a system implements the right sort of computational structures and processes, it can be associated with conscious experiences. It is not an essential property of consciousness that it is implemented on carbon-based biological neural networks inside a cranium: silicon-based processors inside a computer could in principle do the trick as well

So he has hidden another proposition in the text: (4) artificial consciousness turns out to be possible. Personally I find the idea of substrate independence to be as woo as belief in the afterlife.

 

[arthwollipot]

Note:

So he has hidden another proposition in the text: (4) artificial consciousness turns out to be possible. Personally I find the idea of substrate independence to be as woo as belief in the afterlife.

Fair enough, but I feel that substrate independence is more testable than belief in the afterlife - in principle. Not assuming substrate independence is tantamount to the claim that there is something "special" about organic brains that allows consciousness to happen - something that sets it apart from other kinds of matter.

 

[MelBrooksfan]

It's possible. It's also possible that said afterlife is an amalgamation of every movie Richard Greco ever made. Possibility isn't nearly as interesting or worthy of note as plausibility or probability.

 

[Darat]

based on everything which we know, it is something that requires explaining. As before, it may ultimately be explainable by a Big TOE - but we should base current theories upon what that which we know rather than that which we don't.

"based on everything we know" - that was my point, what we know is that our current theory is wrong, so we don't know that there is anything that needs to be explained (in the terms of the theories that we know are wrong seem to indicate there is).

There is also the more philosophical objection that I mentioned before - there is no reason that assigning a meaning to that particular "why" means that "why" intrinsically has any meaning, it's just a human value judgment.

i don't think you can claim that QM is wrong - it has exceptional experimentally verifiable accuracy at the microscopic - it may be subsumed within a larger TOE - but to claim it is wrong is to set up all theories as theories of everything - which they're not.

No it is wrong. It is wrong in the exactly the same way as say Newton's theories were wrong. They both work and are very good at describing a small slice of what we observe around us but they fail spectacularly when applied to the "bigger" and "smaller" picture.

The reason your argument is open to such an attack is because you are claiming that some quite theoretical solutions to some parts of what we usually call "QM" throw-up apparently strange things like multiple universes and so on. Yet we know QM is wrong. How does science deal with using theories that are wrong - quite simple really it checks the theory against what we can observe. When we have done that we can say that "QM is accurate at describing X". That is why basing your reasoning on unverified parts of QM is nothing more then speculation, since we do not know if that is one of the descriptions that QM is just wrong about.

Again this appears to be an argument for ignorance - science is built upon that which we know. That it will not be complete is accepted, but that doesn't mean that we can retreat to a position of non-knowledge.

But what you seem to be missing is that at times the knowledge we do have is that we do know what we don't know. So cosmology, QM and so on are theories that we have a very good understanding (in parts) of where they can make accurate descriptions and where they can not - because we can make observations and compare the theories descriptions against that.

This is no retreat to "non-knowledge" but using all the knowledge we do have. Your arguments are the ones that are ignoring the knowledge we do have of what we know we don't know. Like I say this does not disprove your arguments but it does demonstrate how shaky their foundations are and also that they do not incorporate everything we already know.

I expect a telekenisist would get short shift on JREF if he were to dismiss all scientific knowledge as incomplete and thus claim that one should not argue that his powers didn't in all probability exist.
...snip...

Please read above - you are missing my point, my point is not that there is stuff we don't know and/or understand.

We seem destined for Rumsfield-ian linguistics All we can do is formulate theories based on what we know - that there are known unknowns out there does not effect this.

Yes it does, see above.

in one swoop you've just dismantled the whole of physics and cosmology

In a way yes but only in the sense of acknowledging what we already know i.e. not only are our theories incomplete but they are wrong. And we know they are wrong because they cannot describe the actual universe we observe.