(bolding mine)Frank J Tipler said:His discussion of the scientific possibility of miracles provides an impressive, credible scientific foundation for many of Christianity's most astonishing claims, including the Virgin Birth, the Resurrection, and the Incarnation. He even includes specific outlines for practical experiments that can help prove the validity of the "miracles" at the heart of Christianity.
That's only true if we assume that the simulation is algorithmic, which is certainly not necessary.ETA: For the simulation conjecture to stand any chance of succeeding, a clear demonstration is required, showing that consciousness is in fact algorithmic. This won't be easy.
Over the whole CPU, the differences in energy consumption are very minor. For a PC CPU, probably less than 5%. (The number of transistors AMD added to the existing Athlon core to make it 64-bit was less than 5%.)What is the relationship between energy requirement and processing capacity? Say on the level of a pc, between the energy requirements of a 32bit CPU and a 64 bit CPU would there be a simple exponential relationship? This may not even be a relevant question - as i know very little about computers....but i'm interested to learn![]()
This sounds a little like a rehash of Tipler to me.
Over the whole CPU, the differences in energy consumption are very minor. For a PC CPU, probably less than 5%. (The number of transistors AMD added to the existing Athlon core to make it 64-bit was less than 5%.)
If you cut things down to look just at the integer ALU (arithmetic/logic unit) within the CPU, comparing a purely 32-bit ALU against a 64-bit ALU, then energy requirements would roughly double. Some functional units, such as operand and operator selection, are constant with word size; others, including the bit-wise operators, are linear; others are geometric (multiplication) or are constrained by clock speed (addition - having to ripple the carry through 64 bits takes twice as long; you can get around this using more complex carry circuitry, but that uses more power...)
Sensational page that links to.
I'll come back when I've had a thorough look around.
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Level IV on the other hand is that which is applicable to CS - [Wolfram, Tegemark]
and provides the answer to Wheeler's question "Why these particular equations and not others?" posed of the spectacular ability for mathematics explain the physical world. At its heart it employs Platonic reality of mathematical structures - which reduces algorithmic complexity and thus serves as an argument from Occam's razor.
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Accepting that "Why?" is an appropriate or relevant question is to make a "value judgment".
In the end can you argue that the CS argument is anything but "solipsism" with the simulation replacing the usual "I" and dressed up in the language current technology?
ah..
That is an interesting analogy, but whereas solipsism can explain nothing outside the self, CS is able to explain our entire universe. ...snip...
assumptions;
1) human civilisiation will progess to the technological level sufficient to completely generating a virtual reality world
2) if capable of doing so then we will.
3) If we do, then we will generate countless virtual worlds for reasearch and for pleasure.
If you accept assumptions (1) (2) and (3) then the overwhelming statistical likelyhood is that our world as we experience it is virtual - for there is but one "real" world and innumerable virtual ones.
actually, this is a form of Nick Bostrom's computer simulation argument - the paper is http://www.simulation-argument.com/simulation.html
The one you label as #5. Appealing to ignorance is not a fallacy if the conclusion reached is "I don't know."Which CO version do you prefer?
(1)By the same argument this "posthuman civilization" might also be a simulation run by some "post-post human civilization", which in turn might also be just another simulation of a "post-post-post" ... etc. ad infinitum. Thus, any reality, even one running a simulation, has no better or worse chances of being a simulation than any other. Therefore, the simulation argument is irrelevant.
(2) Assuming that Occam's Razor applies, it is safe to reject simulated reality.
I disagree. A sufficiently-advanced simulation would have no such evidence. If it did, and the simulants discovered it, then the simulation would become a failure. Since we have discovered such "reality pixels" (most of which have the name "Planck" associated with them), and the gods running the simulation have not shut it down yet, we can safely assume that they are not evidence of a simulation.If we are simulated we still exist and must behave according to our environment, but I don't think we can or should reject the possibility that there could come conclusive evidence that we are simulated.
I disagree. A sufficiently-advanced simulation would have no such evidence. If it did, and the simulants discovered it, then the simulation would become a failure. Since we have discovered such "reality pixels" (most of which have the name "Planck" associated with them), and the gods running the simulation have not shut it down yet, we can safely assume that they are not evidence of a simulation.
The one you label as #5. Appealing to ignorance is not a fallacy if the conclusion reached is "I don't know."
#1 - the universe is a fluke - is unsupportable. We only have this one universe to observe, you see, so we can't tell whether it's a fluke or not.
#2 - the universe is one of many - is unsupportable for the same reason. Note that this is not the same as the Many Worlds Hypothesis of quantum mechanics, since the MWH assumes that each universe obeys the same set of physical laws. #2 assumes that there are an infinity (specifically, aleph-0) number of physical laws, and therefore an infinity (aleph-1 this time) number of universes, each with a subset of the physical laws.
#3 - goddidit - and #4 - this is a CS - are functionally equivalent. The programmers of the simulation are, by all reasonable definitions, gods of the simulation.
If the "real real world" does not have reality pixels, then any simulation which does is going to diverge from reality eventually, and thus become useless. A sufficient (but not necessary) condition for this divergence would be the acquisition of knowledge of the reality pixels by the simulants. They would stop behaving as an accurate simulation and start behaving as something with no real-world predictive use for the programmers.There is no reason to assume the need or even ability to have perfect simulations. And our discovery of 'reality pixels' does not absolutely require we are simulated only allows that we might be, so by your own idea there would be no reason to shut it down yet.
It still comes down to real-world utility, no matter how many levels of simulation there are. Why would programmers want to simulate something with no predictive use?But there could be any other number of reasons for running simulations, and there might be reasons for not bothering to turn them off. What if the simulators are themselves simulations and are trying to run simulations to determine the best way for society to handle knowledge of this simulation? There could thus be an indefinite number of simulated realities run for just this purpose. WE might run them for this purpose.
I don't buy this. If the world you lived in was not known to be a simulation, as this one isn't, then why would you want to simulate one where it was known? Any knowledge of how to get rich or powerful that you would take away from a simulation like that would be very unlikely to work in the real world.Even if you live in a simulation you would still want to get rich or power, so you might run simulations to predict markets and geopolitical trends in a world with incipient knowledge of it's own simulation, etc.
At the top level, though, the occupants of the real world would not know that they were in a simulated reality for one simple reason: they're not in a simulated reality. Whether they know they're not is irrelevant; what's relevant is that they don't know they are. To simulate any human behavior such as the ability to get rich or powerful, they would have to ensure that the simulation was as close to the same as the real world as possible. And a world where the inhabitants knew they were simulated would be so vastly different than a world where the inhabitants didn't know that as to make the simulation useless. Deeper levels of simulation would not change this.Our knowledge of simulation becomes a necessary feature for the predictive value of simulations if you are trying to use them to predict events that may occur in your own simulated reality. Simulating a reality where the participants never know they are simulated would provide much poorer results.