Darth Rotor
Salted Sith Cynic
- Joined
- Aug 4, 2006
- Messages
- 38,527
??Ok, fine; I could of course equally say that your statements are smothered in post hoc derationalisation. Let's go ahead and see what you have got.
Yes. If you were around in the mid 1990's, and in the military, as I was, and paying attention to the partisan squabbling over budget matters as the deficit was being roped and branded, you found that some Senators and Congressmen on both sides of the aisle had reservations about how deeply Paneta drove Clinton's wedge into the low slope drawdown of Powell's base force, and how rapidly the slope of drawdown increased beyond the initial Cheney / Bush drawdown initiated in late 89/early 90.Ok, so they were opposed to Clinton's strategy and had something different in mind, involving, partly, more funding, right...
The theme was "Defense budget cut was too deep, need to recapitalize or we will have a hollow force." PNAC was not alone in agreeing with that. Their paper is not evidence of a plot, but a reflection of a widely held opinion that Clinton had gone overboard on cuts, while at the same time increasing the wear and tear on operating forces with frivolous deployments to places like Bosnia. If you note the process they undertook to write the piece, they consulted a host of military and defense experts while doing their analysis.
Given your position that the Pearl Harbor illustration was evidence of a plan, rather than a piece of political analysis of what it takes to get America on a war footing, I find your position unsupported by anything other than a post hoc rationalization. If you read the report from front to back, the tone is hardly one of hopeful anticipation of a new Pearl Harbor event.You have just given a background on the political thought that was swirling around the RAD doc in the 90's, and then you state that my conclusions are intellectually dishonest.
Given that I was someone who disagreed completely with the idea of the US continuing to play "world's policeman" while maggots at the UN cried about dues, and when we undertook multi billion dollar operations in Africa for "no credit to peacekeeping funds," I have no desire to defend PNAC's vision of a more vigorous engagement policy. I considered it ill advised when it came out, and was far more interested in a "let them play" policy that allowed civil wars to run their course, as America's civil war was allowed to run its course with little interference from foreign powers.1stly, you try to argue that such a conclusion, as to the desirability for such a transformation to happen soon, cannot be justified, since it shows "a profound misunderstanding" of military civilian patterns. I'm sorry, i do appreciate your diligence and courage in replying to my post at length, but this has zero substance. You have to show why people would want a world changing, peace bringing, democracy, love and happiness exporting change to happen in decades, rather than soon.
Again, the PNAC initial statement of principal was in 1997, and the RAD paper was begun in 1998.
(Signed by the usual suspects: Elliott Abrams, Gary Bauer, William J. Bennett, Jeb Bush, Dick Cheney, Eliot A. Cohen, Midge Decter, Paula Dobriansky, Steve Forbes, Aaron Friedberg, Francis Fukuyama, Frank Gaffney, Fred C. Ikle, Donald Kagan, Zalmay Khalilzad, I. Lewis Libby, Norman Podhoretz, Dan Quayle, Peter W. Rodman, Stephen P. Rosen, Henry S. Rowen Donald Rumsfeld, Vin Weber, George Weigel, Paul Wolfowitz)statement of principle said:Our aim is to remind Americans of these lessons and to draw their consequences for today. Here are four consequences:
- we need to increase defense spending significantly if we are to carry out our global responsibilities today and modernize our armed forces for the future;
- we need to strengthen our ties to democratic allies and to challenge regimes hostile to our interests and values;
- we need to promote the cause of political and economic freedom abroad;
- we need to accept responsibility for America's unique role in preserving and extending an international order friendly to our security, our prosperity, and our principles.
Such a Reaganite policy of military strength and moral clarity may not be fashionable today. But it is necessary if the United States is to build on the successes of this past century and to ensure our security and our greatness in the next.
I have not ruled out, in my own mind, the low probability chance that a deliberate indifference/negligence was undertaken as a matter of policy vis a vis terrorist and criminal activity. Much of my evidence for this is indirect, the well known complaints of Scheuer and Clarke, and others, about issues being brought up and not acted on between January and Sept of 2001.2ndly, you state "LIHOP? Maybe". If I have you right, you believe that 911 was "maybe" an inside job?
I can't prove it, but I can't rule it out completely. Given that the evidence is locked inside the intentions of policy makers at a very high level, I don't expect to be able to dig it out, seeing as how this indifference/negligence would be grounds for serious charges regarding 9-11 events. No one who knows is going to talk anyway, out of fear. I wonder at the utility of this "independent" investigation you suggest. Who is going to make anyone talk? Notice how they lawyered up over the Plame case?
Please don't try to put words into my mouth. Thanks. Where did I ever say I don't support such an investigation? I note that the official 9-11 investigation chaired by Lehman was beset by the contamination of political agendas.But you dont support the idea of an indepedent investigation to ascertain this??
Since you have built your house on sand, that the Pearl Harbor reference was a sign of intent, rather than analysis, I find it hard to find this objection credible.For someone who spends much time arguiing the importance of various rhetorical features, it is actually hypocritical.
The base motivation for the position paper was made public in 1997-1998 in the statement of principles. The RAD paper represented a detailed elaboration on the original theme, based on research begun in 1998, and published after a long process in 2000.More to the point, I dont understand your point. Why was Rumsfeld not interested in US strategy? Why would he be killing people "for his own ends"? Where does 1998 come into this?
From PNAC's own words. 1998. The opportunity referred to was "being the sole superpower" and all that rot.The Project for the New American Century was established in the spring of 1997. From its inception, the Project has been concerned with the decline in the strength of America’s defenses, and in the problems this would create for the exercise of American leadership around the globe and, ultimately, for the preservation of peace.
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With this in mind, we began a project in the spring of 1998 to examine the country’s defense plans and resource requirements. We started from the premise that U.S. military capabilities should be sufficient to support an American grand strategy committed to building upon this unprecedented opportunity. We did not accept pre-ordained constraints that followed from assumptions about what the country might or might not be willing to expend on its defenses.
Yet they refer to Pearl Harbor also in the Naval Strategy section:But no. The point I was replying to was the assertion that these guys couldnt be wickedly intelligent (i.e. pulled off 911), and then bumblingly stupid (RAD).
In PNACspeak:
Absent a rigorous program of experimentation to investigate the nature of the revolution in military affairs as it applies to war at sea, the Navy might face a future Pearl Harbor – as unprepared for war in the post-carrier era as it was unprepared for war at the dawn of the carrier age.
False dichomoty. You seem to ignore the context of the paper, to inform Presidential level policy making, which for their purposes, GOP, would be either one term or two: That's a 4 or 8 year time horizon, NOT "a few decades." The also discuss, in the body of the work, the lengthy procurement process that hampered "rapid" change, and "revolutions" in military affairs, a sound byte that ignores how military change is most often evolutionary, not revolutionary. Just because PNAC wanted the change to be fast does not mean such is possible, given Congressional processes.If you want to contest this, you very simply have to show that they did not want such a revolutionary transformation to happen as soon as it feasibly could, but rather wanted to wait a few decades.
In any event, your demand is irrelevant. The broad strategy for transformation was spelled out as a strategy, in language consistent with the mid to long term timelines consistent with procurement programs. The tone of the entire paper reflects that. Your cherry picking is an attempt to present a different tone.RAD p 75 said:Nevertheless, we believe that, over time, the program we advocate would require budgets roughly equal to those necessary to fully fund the QDR force – a minimum level of 3.5 to 3.8 percent of gross domestic product. A sensible plan would add $15 billion to $20 billion to total defense spending annually through the Future Years Defense Program; this would
result in a defense “topline” increase of $75 billion to $100 billion over that period, a small percentage of the $700 billion onbudget surplus now projected for that same period. We believe that the new president should commit his administration to a plan to achieve that level of spending within four years.
Paradoxically, as American power and influence are at their apogee, American military forces limp toward exhaustion, unable to meet the demands of their many and varied missions, including preparing for tomorrow’s battlefield. Today’s force, reduced by a third or more over the past decade, suffers from degraded combat readiness; from difficulties in recruiting and retaining sufficient numbers of soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines; from the effects of an extended “procurement holiday” that has resulted in the premature aging of most weapons systems; from an increasingly obsolescent and inadequate military infrastructure; from a shrinking industrial base poorly structured to be the “arsenal of democracy” for the 21st century; from a lack of innovation that threatens the technological and operational advantages enjoyed by U.S. forces for a generation and upon which American strategy depends.
Pearl Harbor was mentioned twice, in two different contexts. In both cases, it was to use a historical example of either mobilization of public will, or of Naval Forces improperly configured to handle a new style of warfare. (Which was a bogus reference, since Billy Mitchell had already demonstrated the vulnerability of ships to aircraft in the late 1920's. )1982 said:Whether it was intended to embarrass Clinton is neither here nor there; the Pearl Harbour notion is what matters here.
I spent 25 years as a Navy pilot and later on, staff officer.I assume you work with the military in some capacity, but none of what you say is germane to the point I'm afraid.
All of them, but in particular UAV's, whose origins go back to the DASH of the 1960's. Stryker was already in the pipe. JSF was already in the pipe. F-22. V-22. Nothing significantly new has hit the battlefield since 2000 beyond advantages accrued by increased processing power, and continual improvements in C2 capability, that I can discuss in a non classified environment. You can call the proliferation of small UAV's in Iraq at the tactical level an evolutionary change that was, again, in the pipe in the 1990's as part of Force XXI.I'm pretty sure this has been dealt with in the original post, with details of the weapons/equipment that have been developed since 911, but would you go into detail as to what you mean by "toys"?
A variety of innovations in EW I am not at liberty to discuss. Sorry. I signed the NDA's,l and unlike Scooter Libby and Richard Armitage, I give a crap about OPSEC. Still.
Since your sole point seems to be "Pearl Harbor" there isn't much to contest, other than your attempt to spread misunderstanding of a strategy proposal. You will note that the CV elimination, and JSF elimination, did not happen for the usual Congressional/political/Pentagon reasons: not everyone agreed with this Brave New World of the PNAC folks, who tended toward silver bullet advocacy: Neither in Congress, nor in the Military.
BFD. In a war, end strength rises less than two percent. How is that significant?Right, but the number is still up, as I have stated, from 1.41-1.43
It was an opporunity to weight the US Forces more toward Light and SOF, until Iraq was invaded. Had the WoT remained just that, and an Afghan nation building exercise at the same time, you might have had a point, as Rummy's obsession with SOF and tech would have had lots of space on his point papers and procurement priorities. By taking on Iraq, the cruel reality of full spectrum warfare, and the inherently human nature of war, returned to the fore, and quite frustrated Rummy's attempt to transform the military.A global war against an implacable, unbeatable, invisible, ubiquitous and ever renewing enemy is the perfect environment for such to happen.
In the language of the 1990's defense thinking, extra national political entities who use armed force, and the threat of armed force, to achieve a political end.the last half of your sentence is important- who is a terrorist? Anyone Bus wants to label as such. Olmert? no. Ahmadinejad? Yes. It is not about right and wrong, terror or anti terror. Those who labelling as terrorists will be propitious to the US geo politic will be labelled as such, those who dont, wont.
What is your definition of a terrorist?
Except that you ignore the other use of Pearl Harbor, in the completely Naval context, and show that your cherry picking is simply that: grasping at straws.Yes, it was overtly a peacetime document, except for the sentence that states that were there to be a catastrophic and catalysing event, such changes would happen a lot quicker.
Mission Enemy Terrain Troops - TimeYou'll have to explain METT-T
Conceptual framework for "what situation am I in, what is on hand to solve it, and how much time do I have." Military jargon, sorry.
That is your post hoc reading into the document. Pearl Harbor was used to illustrate, as a threshold, given the political climate of the US in the late 1990's, and Viet Nam as a marker, how big an event had to happen for the American public to back a significant defense build up in the short term.I am not arguiing that RAD makes 911 an inside job, I am arguing that it states the propitiousness of a new PH to policy; i.e. it would grant the "excuse" for the neo cons to pursue essentially the policy laid out in RAD.
The problem is, there is little evidence of funding going to transformative change, but an immense amount of men and material and wealth being expended on a war that has, once again, hampered Rummy's desired transformation.
They are not, the war in Iraq is, but those features were all part and parcel of the Clinton era defense policies, absent some of the detail on space mmilitarization IIRC. I'd have to reference some old papers on international space agreements to discuss the details, but that is rather off topic to your contention, that Pearl Harbor as an illustration is evidence of much of anything.Please tell me how the militarisation of space, the use of cyberspace as a defense tool, the global posture review, are eroding the US as a military capability.
Not quite. It was published in 2000, the project was begun in 1998, so 1998/1999 is the contemporary political context.Errr... 1stly the paper was written in 2000.
No duh, it was like stating that Texas is next to Mexico. Viet Nam for fifty, Alex, though PNAC was somewhat wrong. The Kuwait/Iraq War of 1990-1991 did not require a Pearl Harbor.The comment does indeed imply that absent a new PH it would be hard to get the US behind a war;
But the war has not demonstrably sped those changes. Rummy tried to do this on the cheap crap, tech heavy, troop light, and it bloody well didn't work. He wanted to reduce the CV frce, and cancel JSF. DID NOT HAPPEN. Do you notice results much? The Army and Marines are bellowing for more troops, not less, as the transformative model demands.Hence if a war would speed these changes, a new PH would be propitious to policy.
Again, it does not necessarily follow that this outcome was intended. The Pearl Harbor example was, in analysis, an event that would make easier a re prioritizing of money to the defense budget, which otherwise, as noted in the body of the paper, would take the usual tooth pulling and hard work of the normal peacetime Congressional/political process.
Wrong! It is an example of US Foreign Policy, and security posture, since the end of WW II.No, because to take an example, "forward basing and presence" is not an examply of RMA, but is of the WOT
DR
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