I could not find any trustworthy paper that describes the hijacking protocols for the FAA on 9/11...
So I'll retract all I said about it as a fact. I'm sorry.
Though the claim is not false, it sure can't be proven. So, sorry.
Fortunately for you, I do know what the FAA's protocol was on 9/11.
You can read the relevant chapter
here or
here.
I also have a powerpoint presentation which summarises protocol and what happened on 9/11, which can be downloaded by this
direct link or can be view in html
here. Given the high graphic content, I advise downloaded it as the html misses all of this.
The pertinent facts to consider are as follows:
1) NORADs area of responsibility is a narrow band of airspace off the US coastline called the Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) which acts as a sort of "buffer" between the US and the rest of the world.
2) Aircraft passing through the ADIZ have to follow strict protocol and file flight paths with the FAA, or face NORAD interception.
3) Due to defense cutbacks at the end of the cold war, on 9/11 NORAD CONUS Region had only 7 pairs of fighters on alert duty. Two of these pairs were allocated to the North East Air Defense Sector (NEADS).
4) Standing hijack protocol at the time was based on a number of assumptions:
a) Hijacked aircraft would originate overseas.
b) Hijack would be confirmed by aircraft squawking 7500 code
c) Hijacked aircraft would remain in transponder contact
d) Hijacked aircraft would be landed at an airport where negotiations would take place
By now the problems with this system should be self evident. However, let's go over the protocol.
The FAA has three levels of ATC.
1) Airport Traffic Control Towers (ATCT)
2) Terminal Radar Approach Control Facilities (TRACON)
3) Air Route Traffic Control Centers (ARTCC)
The first two of these deal with landing and taking off, so we'll put those aside and focus on the ARTCCs.
The FAA has twenty-three ARTCCs spread across the country, which are coordinated by a National Air Traffic Control Center in Herndon, Virginia.
The FAA Headquarters is located in Washington DC.
On the military side of things, at the top we have the National Military Command Center (NMCC) which is located in The Pentagon.
Currently, NORAD is collected under one of the Unified Combatant Commands - NORTHCOM, which was created after 9/11.
However back in 2001 NORAD was under a different command structure (it's still under the same organisational structure, however NORTHCOM directs operations).
NORAD units are supplied by the 1st Air Force, an Air National Guard unit under the Air Combat Command, one of ten Major Commands that answers directly to HQ USAF.
NORAD itself - a joint US/Canadian operation - is divided into three regions - Alaska Region, Canada Region, and Continental US Region. CONUS is the region that's relevant to 9/11. CONUS is further divided into three Air Defense Sectors - North East (NEADS), South East (SEADS), and West (WADS).
Each ADS has a command center and control over a number of fighters. NEADS had two pairs of fighters under its authority - two F-16's at Langley AFB and two F-15s at Otis ANGB.
The key thing to note here is that nothing would be done about a hijacking until it was confirmed - the most common method being for the pilots to change their transponder to 7500 - an agreed hijack code.
Obviously in normal circumstances this is fine - hijackers need the pilots to fly the plane, and probably aren't going to pick up on a code quickly being coded in.
In the event of a
confirmed hijacking, the controller in question would notify his supervisor at the ARTCC, who would pass it up to the National ATC at Herndon.
The decision to request military assistance would be made at Herndon, at which point the FAA Hijack Coordinator (located at FAA Headquarters in Washington, DC) would be notified.
The Hijack Coordinator would communicate the request to the NMCC who would either approve it or deny it (although there's not really any reason to deny it).
From there an order would be issued to USAF HQ, through to Air Combat Command to HQ NORAD at Cheyenne Mountain, Colorado Springs, and from there to CONUS and finally Colonel Marr in the Battle Cab at NEADS. He'd inform Major Nasypany, the Mission Crew Commander, who would in turn direct the various elements involved in the mission (ID Techs, etc) including the Weapons Team, led by Major Fox. Major Fox's team handles the fighters, so they contact operations at the air base, who in turn pass these orders on to the pilots.
At the same time the NMCC authorises direct communication between the FAA and NEADS. This is important, because NEADS' technology isn't sufficient to find an aircraft on their own. From the National ATC they gather aircraft information to direct the fighters to the right place.
So that's the protocol.
Now that's not what happened on 9/11. Well, it was, but it's not the only thing that happened.
The chain of command was engaged prematurely for AA11 - before a hijack was confirmed. I suppose they figured it was best to be on the safe side.
Ironically, the processing of AA11 actually interfered with the processing of the other flights. the system wasn't designed to deal with multiple hijackings.
As a result ARTCC's didn't know what was happening. For example when UA175 was initially called in, the managers at Herndon couldn't be contacted because they were busy in a meeting about AA11. Likewise, Indianapolis Center, unaware that there was a possibility of continued hijackings, reported AA77 as crashed, and no one made the connection straight away.
On top of this, remember that suddenly any airliner that wasn't responding (and radio communication is not the flawless system it appears to be in movies, there are constant mis communications and drop outs) was a potential hijack. Well before Herndon was aware of UA175 they were already far overloaded with a number of suspected hijacks, and more added every minute.
As it turned out, the escort request never even got as far as the NMCC and no formal order was issued to NORAD. The entire thing happened backwards - with the ARTCC itself initially trying to contact the actual air base, before contacting NEADS.
Colonel Marr then passed it up the chain of command to General Arnold, who commanded CONUS Region. Arnold made a quick decision at that point to approve an unauthorised scramble order. As he said to Marr "I'll get permission later".
The problem of course with all of this is no one was coordinating the information. NEADS were talking directly to ARTCCs as well as Herndon and CONUS, and Herndon were talking to ARTCCs and NEADS and the airlines while trying to contact both the NMCC and FAA HQ.
And all of them were also watching things like CNN once the news started kicking in.
To make matters worse, the hijackers were doing a lot of things that the system assumed they wouldn't do - such as killing pilots, turning off transponders, changing direction without warning, and crashing their planes.
So it was a mess, but it was a fast-responding mess. If everyone had followed protocol everything would have been much more organised, but the attack would have ended before anyone acted at all.
I do however still believe (arg. from incredulity, yah) that the FAA controlers screwed up bigtime in keeping track of the hijacked planes, even though they had transponders turned off and got off-radar at some points.
How are the ARTCCs meant to keep track of flights if they go off radar or fly into buildings? All they have to go on are little icons on a screen. That's it.
But at this point in time I don't trust the 9/11 Commission anymore, so I don't believe their word either.
You don't have to trust the commission. The information is available elsewhere.
My belief comes from the understanding that air controllers are usually very impeccable people, and whoever was responsible for keeping track of the planes, either had their tracking capabilities sabotaged, or simply failed to comply with their duty.
Yes, their tracking capabilities were sabotaged, by the hijackers.
I don't trust the 9/11 Commission Report since they only blame errors in communication and on the "surprise" factor of the attacks. I personally don't believe such half-assed excuse should be accepted at face value when it could very well be a cover-up of ignorance...
I am sure if you review the facts of the day with an open mind, you can only come to the same conclusion I did - the FAA and NORAD did exceptionally well to deal with a completely unprecedented threat that their system were totally incapable of dealing with.
I do agree with him however that the FAA and NORAD have a much better control over the US airspace than they claimed to have in the commission hearings. It is of my opinion only, and you don't have to agree on this one necessarily, that there should have been more investigations and more interviews into specific air controller officers that were on track of the planes, get their own timelines, corroborate testimonies, etc. Not just take the first answer they get and stick with it.
But that's precisely what was done. In fact they didn't just interview people, they also reviewed audio and radar recordings. That's how they worked out NORAD's first timeline was wrong.
-Gumboot
Who wrote that stuff anyway?