Quite so, I can't remember a single posting from either Yahzi or Articulett that manages to be both polite and sensible.
Just as an aside, it does not seem to me clear that Popper was wrong. His work is a philosophy, not a scientific theory and it is not clear that a philosophy is falsifiable.
Accordingly, his criterion of falsifiability does not apply to his own work. Thus, although it is true that scientists do not actually do the things that, according to Popper's ideas, scientists should do, that does not that mean his philosophy is wrong. Most observers, certainly me at least, now feel that Popper's logic is part of an ethic of science rather than a sociological description of it. For the latter one must turn to Kuhn, Feyerabend, Knorr-Cetina, Mitroff, Ziman, Lakatos or others. Nobody really gives a single complete description.
The last two names I mention are notable for, as I perceive them, rather linking their descriptions with the body politic of science. Kuhn did that too, though I think more so in his, "The Essential Tension," rather than in "The Structure of Scientific Revolutions."
