Blame the Dems for Iraq

[Garrette]

Thanks for the insight, I showed up about the time you left. I had heard similar tales of "not on the same team" from MNCI guys (originally CJTF-7) but Bremmer's departure changed the playing field a bit. Yes, damage done.

DR

I stayed a few months longer than my unit because the Education Ministry requested I do so, but I still like their tongue-in-cheek motto for when they left (in January 2004):

All I know is we were winning when I left...

 

[Garrette]

Thanks for the insight, I showed up about the time you left. I had heard similar tales of "not on the same team" from MNCI guys (originally CJTF-7) but Bremmer's departure changed the playing field a bit. Yes, damage done.

DR

I'll deny saying this because I'm not allowed, but I put most of the blame for non-cooperation on Sanchez' head as opposed to Bremer's, though I put the blame for bad decisions on his.

Sanchez had no fans amongst any of the troops or civilians I met and who would answer my questions, and I traveled extensively.

 

[RandFan]

I thought we should go to Iraq. However I can't forget George H. W. Bush's reasons for not going into Iraq following the first Gulf War. He predicted that Iraq would become a quagmire and there would be sectarian violence that would lead to instability or in other words what is happening now. Maybe he was right.

That said, I blame Ted Kennedy. The guy's a drunk and philanderer and there was that little road trip in Chappaquiddick.

I'm giving Bill Clinton a pass on this one.

 

[Darth Rotor]

anchez had no fans amongst any of the troops or civilians I met and who would answer my questions, and I traveled extensively.

That seems a common refrain. An infantry LTC I worked with had the same feeling. Not everyone rises to the occasion, but no matter who was in that job, it was bloody hard.

DR

 

[Upchurch]

Well, he did vote Democrat . . .

*ducks as Upchurch throws rotten produce*

Guess you missed how I spend my free time:



You're just lucky I don't have free time. ...and that that's not really me.

But in the fantasy world, watch out, buddy!

 

[Darth Rotor]

Guess you missed how I spend my free time:

Is that City of Heroes?

DR

 

[Upchurch]

Is that City of Heroes?

yes

 

[Gurdur]

If you really want to succeed in Iraq, better show some real political will.

To overcome the Shia/Sunni/Kurd/Arab splits, and to cure also the extremely high crime level (rarely mentioned but very important), you're going to have to really flood the whole country with troops, and to spends billions on rebuilding infrastructure.

That means a draft. The USA armed forces are in no position to do all that and also be ready for any other problem area (such as North Korea) at this time -- largely owing to the fashion rabbiting on about "small, modern forces" when what you really need is stacks and stacks of infantry actually trained in policing. Empty words about "not pussyfooting around" are only that: empty. Deal with realities.

So: you're going to need a USA draft, stay in Iraq a long long while, and you're going to need to spend big money for a long time.

And every day that slips away without you doing that makes it all that much harder; every day you fail on that means you're going to have to send even more troops and money.

And if that doesn't happen, it will all end in ignominious failure; and forget about the peacekeeper idea after pulling out, any such peacekeeper idea will fail for exactly the same reasons as the current occupation is failing.

So: you're going to need a USA draft, stay in Iraq a long long while, and you're going to need to spend big money for a long time.
Got the political will?

 

[egslim]

So: you're going to need a USA draft, stay in Iraq a long long while, and you're going to need to spend big money for a long time.
Got the political will?

What's really needed is a serious study to come up with a realistic ballpark figure of the costs you mention. Only then can be decided wether such intervention would be worth it.

For example, what would be the cost of fielding a 500,000 men army in Iraq for a duration of 10 years?

It's not just about the political will, it's also about the effects on the US economy.

 

[geni]

I understand you're joking.

Yes and no. It is a logical solution to the problem faceing you even if you chose to reject it for moral reasons.

I said then, and I say it now: "Kill 'em all" won't work.

Genghis Khan would dissagree. And he didn't have nukes.

And suggesting more troops does not equate to advocating "kill 'em all."

Suggesting more troops is a feel good action that doesn't get you one step closer to a solution (remember historically it has been posible to conquer iraq and impose a suportive regeam with less than 40K troops). Consider the number of troops the Soviets threw at afganistan.

 

[Gurdur]

What's really needed is a serious study to come up with a realistic ballpark figure of the costs you mention.

Actually, the Pentagon ran some very valid war-games before Iraq2 started, showing the number of troops needed would be very high. The White House ignored those studies.

You could have another serious study done as well, and it would get ignored as well. In any case, everyone now knows Bush has failed in Iraq; the question is not if he will pull out, but when.

It's not just about the political will, it's also about the effects on the US economy.

As soon as you leave room to consider the effects on the USA economy, there simply isn't enough political will to "win" in Iraq.

 

[hgc]

...
As soon as you leave room to consider the effects on the USA economy, there simply isn't enough political will to "win" in Iraq.

Hence the reason the country was not put in a war footing. If people were really affected by the cost of fighting a war, then the required level of justification for waging war would rise. Thus the cost of the war is funded by money borrowed from China and from the Social Security trust fund.

 

[a_unique_person]

But increasing troop strength is not enough. We must change how they are employed and we must put much more effort into rebuilding the basic infrastructure AFTER security has been established.

I believe the infrastructure rebuilding program has been completed now, with all the money spent.

 

[egslim]

You could have another serious study done as well, and it would get ignored as well. In any case, everyone now knows Bush has failed in Iraq; the question is not if he will pull out, but when.

I think a new study would be needed, because the situation in Iraq is now different from three years ago. And probably even more expensive to solve.

As soon as you leave room to consider the effects on the USA economy, there simply isn't enough political will to "win" in Iraq.

I expect many of those who claim to support "winning" in Iraq would cease to if they were explained the economic costs required.

 

[Garrette]

If you really want to succeed in Iraq, better show some real political will.

To overcome the Shia/Sunni/Kurd/Arab splits, and to cure also the extremely high crime level (rarely mentioned but very important), you're going to have to really flood the whole country with troops, and to spends billions on rebuilding infrastructure.

That means a draft. The USA armed forces are in no position to do all that and also be ready for any other problem area (such as North Korea) at this time -- largely owing to the fashion rabbiting on about "small, modern forces" when what you really need is stacks and stacks of infantry actually trained in policing. Empty words about "not pussyfooting around" are only that: empty. Deal with realities.

So: you're going to need a USA draft, stay in Iraq a long long while, and you're going to need to spend big money for a long time.

And every day that slips away without you doing that makes it all that much harder; every day you fail on that means you're going to have to send even more troops and money.

And if that doesn't happen, it will all end in ignominious failure; and forget about the peacekeeper idea after pulling out, any such peacekeeper idea will fail for exactly the same reasons as the current occupation is failing.

So: you're going to need a USA draft, stay in Iraq a long long while, and you're going to need to spend big money for a long time.
Got the political will?

I believe that's what I've been saying.

 

[Darth Rotor]

Actually, the Pentagon ran some very valid war-games before Iraq2 started, showing the number of troops needed would be very high. The White House ignored those studies.

General Zinni's staff at CENTCOM had an OPLAN that called for just under 300,000 troops, with the weighting in the post conflict, SASO phase. (Source: Cobra II) Shinseki's planning staff (when he was Chief of Staff) came up with a smaller force, somewhere around 220,000 IIRC. Ref the same.)

You could have another serious study done as well, and it would get ignored as well. In any case, everyone now knows Bush has failed in Iraq; the question is not if he will pull out, but when.
Yes, when not if, and in what direction. Along the MSR's through the south starts to become a dicey situation when one looks at a fifth column movement (possible) sponsored and funded by Iran and local Shia factions, see T. E. Lawrence, a Turk foreign army, and guerilla warfare as a chilling test case.

As soon as you leave room to consider the effects on the USA economy, there simply isn't enough political will to "win" in Iraq.

That was true from day one, and the BushCo fully recognized that. The sales job was a combination emotional momentum of 9-11, and a promise of a quick war, with no nation building since, as it was presented in a variety of venues, "the money to rebuild Iraq is available in the national oil reserves" -- unlike most basket case nations where no such wealth was available to draw on for resourcing a rebuilding effort. (See most African nation building operations, or Haiti, for what was used in contrast.) It was a big gamble, that the US led coalition could cajole disparate groups into not fighting over that wealth, but rather convince all of the factions to work toward a "common good." What ever could have been done to achieve that was of modest effectiveness since Iraq could not be isolated from its surroundings and worked on without interference by interested parties. Given the abject failures to cajole a number of old allies into suupporting the effort, the failure to induce the local factions into harmonious, collective efforts isn't much of a surprise.

When, not if, and to whose political detriment?

Consider the "big hand little map" people in Washington. How cynically must they approach hard problems in order to mentally insulate themselves from the blood price?

DR

 

[Garrette]

Yes and no. It [Killing everyone]is a logical solution to the problem faceing you even if you chose to reject it for moral reasons.

No.

Genghis Khan would dissagree. And he didn't have nukes.

Not if he were being honest.

Not if he were honest.

1207 – Mongols begin conquest of China

1227 – Genghis dies. Different areas of empire ruled by his four sons. China rebels.

1230 – Begin reconquest of China

1235 – Mongolian armies sent “East and West”

1236 – Korea rebels and must be reconquered

1258 – Baghdad sacked

1264 – Different areas of empire begin to act independently

1267 – Kublai Khan moves capital to Dudai to concentrate on China and virtually abandons remainder of the empire

1294 – Empire begins to fragment

1335 – Mongols kicked out of the Mideast

1369 – Yuan Dynasty (Kublai’s) overthrown in China


The Mongols had to keep fighting. They had little peace in their conquered territories, and even with the world’s most effective fighting force occupying lands with a fearsome hand, it was not sustainable.

Suggesting more troops is a feel good action

Actually, for those in the military, as I was and am, it's a damned sight closer to feel bad than feel good. I've had to write letters to families about deceased loved ones. I do not relish it and would never lightly take action that makes it more likely.

that doesn't get you one step closer to a solution

Yes, it does, but it is not a sufficient step, nor a guarantor.

(remember historically it has been posible to conquer iraq and impose a suportive regeam with less than 40K troops).

This is a complex issue, if you're referring to the post WWI era. Supportive regime, yes. Supportive populace, no. The Kurds weren't happy. The "supportive regime" threw in against the new state of Israel and never signed the peace agreement after that initial war. The Kurds eventually rebelled. The 1958 Baathist takeover was definitely not a good sign for the US and could be at least indirectly traced to the roots of the new Iraq.

Consider the number of troops the Soviets threw at afganistan.

I have, extensively. The Soviets went in as the Mongols did but with far less success. The US went in in a different fashion that worked initially but was not tied to any long term political plan.

 

[Garrette]

I believe the infrastructure rebuilding program has been completed now, with all the money spent.

I can't tell how serious you are with this. If you mean we're done spending much more money on it, perhaps you're right. If you mean we've actually rebuilt them, you're wrong, but I suspect you know that.

I think it is important to point out that by "rebuilding" I do not mean repair the damage caused by the invasion; that was done early in 2003. Rebuilding, to have any significance, must include repairing the damage from looting and the damage caused by decades of Saddam's neglect. I worked on schools; apart from the addition of Saddam's picture to the front page of each textbook and the addition of pro-Saddam and anti-U.S. propaganda to the substance of each textbook, there were exactly zero updates to the texts and curricula (through high school; I know less about university level) since at least the late 60's when Saddam's uncle was in charge. The school facilities received the same amount of (in)attention.

The electricity situation is a bit confusing. By the end of the summer of 2003, the country was producing more wattage than prior to the war, but it was distributed differently (Saddam had forcibly imported the electricity from the Dhokan dam hydropower plant in Kurdistan and from the dams in the Shiite areas down south) and the demand was significantly increased (satellite dishes appeared like magic on rooftops beginning in May 2003). Add to that, that western engineers charged with keeping power plants running discovered that no maintenance had been conducted on them in years and that several were ready to fail. To avoid catastrophic losses, plants had to be shut down and major overhauls done. That was the status when I left.

 

[Garrette]

Yesterday I said I would try to address Darth Rotor's post from page 1 (#34). It's not as complete as I would like, but here it is:

A curious idea, yours, when you consider how warily the US populace views its own government, which is reasonably stable. What has the current government done to shore up its image as being trustworthy among the Sunni tribes? Among the Shia?

Try this article from the September 18, 2006, NYT. Most Tribes in Anbar Agree to Unite Against Insurgents.

But please don’t confuse what I say needs to happen with what I think has happened or might reasonably happen.

This government, drawn from those very factions and tribes, is going to carry with it the same three way test for loyalty that US representatives and senators face: loyalty to country, loyalty to party, loyalty to constituency. It is a very hard balance to maintain. At the moment, the clearest loyalty is to faction/constituency and party. That leaves "country" (the toughest to sell back to one's constituency, particularly in a land with double digit unemployment -- 30-50 percent, depends on who is citing the figures.)

I absolutely agree with this idea, if not totally with the particulars. The on-the-ground military recognized early on that Iraq is in a very real sense still feudalistic. Again, there were excellent efforts made by various military units and by different offices of CPA to deal with this. What was absent, and what I will continue to point out was absent, was an overarching, unifying political approach that all these efforts could be brought under to support.

1st loyalty: Family
2nd loyalty: Tribe
3rd loyalty: Religious leader
4th loyalty: Country, if you insist

We cannot affect the first. We cannot supplant the 2nd or 3rd but we could have supplemented them if we had worked with them in an organized fashion. We can (could have?) affect the 4th only by demonstrating the government’s legitimacy. The first order of business in doing that is providing security to the populace. Second order of business is provision of basic services.

Consider Italy, the mid 1990's. In the Northern Half of the country, one of the small engines of the European economy was busy purring away, while in the southern half, (south of Rome) unemployment was between 15-20 percent.

Umberto Bossi garnered considerable support under a coalition based on Northern Italians (Lega Nord, Padania) and held quite a few seats in the parliament. I think they got near 10% of the seats, but memory is shaky.

This was around the time the centrist Romano Prodi became Prime Minister. They seem to hold around 6% of the seats in the Senate and Chamber of Deputies now, and are realigned with Berlusconi, who they helped boot out in the early 1990's. (Italian politics is most entertaining.)

I knew nothing of this. Thanks.

The core difference is that in Italy, folks are secure enough nowadays not to back up their passionately held political positions with arms.

Agreed. Which is why provision of that security in Iraq is paramount, if we’re serious about it.

Too many folks in Iraq are not.

See above.

The factions badly mistrust one another . . . perhaps for good reason.

The Sunnis mistrust the Shiia because the fear reprisals. Indications that reprisals will not occur can alleviate this.

The Shiia are angry and fear a repeat of disenfranchisement. And yet Ayatollah Sistani has been a voice of calm and reason, and his calls have been repeatedly heeded.

There remains hope, even if dim.

Take a look at the Rwandan civil war, and how a majority went after a minority: Hutus going after Tutsis. I don't doubt that many Sunni Iraqis, even those who are sick and tired of the foreign Al Qaeda groups, worry that a similar Shia led blood bath is inevitable, along similar lines, if the US departs and "let 'em play!"

See above.

You break it, you buy it. America bought it.

Agreed, but that’s an argument for staying, not for leaving.

---

This probably isn’t new to you, DR, but just in case, and as a demonstration to others of techniques that can work, I refer you to Major Paul Stanton’s article, Unit Immersion in Mosul: Establishing Stability in Transition, in the July-August 2006 issue of Military Review.

Speaking more generally, try Lieutenant Colonel Douglas Ollivant’s and First Lieutenant Eric Chewning’s article, Producing Victory: Rething Conventional Forces in COIN Operations, in the same issue.

Finally, for a superb outline of the military aspect of successful counterinsurgencies, try Capt Zachary Martin’s article, By Other Means, in the September 2005 issue of the Marine Corps Gazette.

Finding that article again led me to realize a mistake of mine from yesterday. I said “CORDS” was beginning to pay dividends in Vietnam. I meant “CAP.”

 

[Luke T.]

Senator Carl Levin, Democrat, who is poised to become the Chairman of the Senate Armed Services committee, was just on NPR a few minutes ago.

He said his plan is to begin troop withdrawals from Iraq in six months.