Blame the Dems for Iraq

[Upchurch]

Again, agreed. But I also think that if people are given a stable country that provides rule of law and daily necessities - fresh water, roads, electricity, etc.- then maybe people would want democracy and we could put the gun down.

That would be lovely. Right now, with calls for more troops to defeat the insurgancy, the plan I'm hearing to get to that stablized state we first need to beat them down into submission.

I've been told many times that "when all you have is a hammer, all problems start to look like nails."

Yes, more troops will give us a stable Iraq. However nobody seems to be finishing that sentence: "...as long as we keep those troops there."

Seems like most Iraqis have only known death and destruction since America deposed Saddam. Maybe that's not true, I don't know. But if it is, how can we expect support for the US or democracy when they're associated with such suffering? Now, if Iraqis associated the US and democracy with fresh water, good schools, safe streets, and so on, then "winning" may not be such a pipe dream.

Is that possible now? I do not know.

It will, as I said, take generations to get most of the Iraqis to see us as a possitive influence. You and I may never know if they finally do.

 

[geni]

Ok it appears we have people looking for a millitry solution.

So lets see what that would require.

Ok first increaseing troop numbers. No evidence that this can be done to any degree large enough to have an effect. The good news is that doesn't matter as long as you are prepared to use a more effective militry doctrine.


First you need local proxies. At the moment you have US troops out on the streets. That is not good. They are expensive don't know the local culture and have to spend to much time on irrelivant training.

You don't use you soldiers from home to do day to day fighting. You hold them in reserve for when someone tries to pull a fallujah.

So where are you going to get these proxies from? First Iraqies are literaly dieing to get into the police so it is clear you have a fair number of locals ready to join up. So set up something like "The Iraqi freedom army". Ask Israel about how they set up the SLA.

Now of course you are going to have some of this army deserting but enough should stay around for the next weeks pay. After a few months the militia groups will likely hate them enough that they have no choice but be on your side. Sure some wont be but you can take that into account.

They will know the local culture so will be in a far better position to know what is going on, it is less of a problem when they get killed and they allow you to afford a bigger force.

You keep your troops as much as posible in their bases away from the local population.

Next you look at the existing miltias. How can you get those on your side. Promising the Kurds an independant state would probably do it but that would have diplomatic problems and the kurds are probably a can of worms best left unopened.

Next the Mahdi Army. Muqtada al-Sadr has proved unhelpful. Probably time to stop messing around and kill him replaceing him with someone prepared to work with you. At the very least this will split the movement.

Use simular methods on the leaders of other miltias.

Of course there will still be rebellions from time to time but these will be more of the nature of conventional conflicts and nothing that copying the russian tactics from the second chechen war can't sort out.

 

[Upchurch]

Back to the question: what does "win" mean? What political aim, achieved, constitutes "win?" With the current forces in place, I could offer a few ideas on what can be achieved, but that may not match the image, vision, or saleable political commodity of "win."

One could always take it to the other extreme and wipe Iraq off the face of the Earth. That would take far less than the current troop level.

However you look at it, Iraq is in for a bad century.

 

[Garrette]

The Philippines? The one that took nearly 50 years for us to withdraw from and (source):

That's the one.

1. We forcibly took the Philippines in 1898. An insurgency began in 1899. By 1902 it was largely over.

2. The Philippines were stable for three decades. In 1935 we began the transitional government to independence.

3. WWII and its destruction intervened.

4. In 1946 we went ahead with the planned independence, 1 year late.

5. At the behest of the new government, we put down the Huk rebellion.

6. The Philippines had freely elected, fairly liberal governments for several decades, and it was not until the 1960s that anti-US sentiment began to arise when there were disputes over us military bases.

7. The troubles with Marcos (and later issues) stem from internal problems not related to the counterinsurgencies. They may be related to bad US foreign policy, but not to the COIN. Just as other nations with internal problems are not related to US COIN.

You consider this a good example of a democracy at gun point?

No. That term is yours. I consider it a good example of counterinsurgency which establishes the conditions by which a nation can rule itself, by basically democratic means.

I do not consider it an example of a perfect action that results in a perfect outcome. That doesn't exist.

I'd say this backs my argument more than yours.

I can think of very few (if any) times I can honestly say this, because you're usually right on the money, but here goes:

Then you're missing the point and don't know enough about it.

 

[Garrette]

Ok it appears we have people looking for a millitry solution.

While it may seem contradictory for me to say so, I am not in that bunch.

The solution must be reached via political processes internal to Iraq, but those processes cannot occur successfully without a military component.

The difference is subtle but crucial. Counterinsurgencies, to be successful, must use a combined civil-political-military approach with the political arm taking primacy. All military actions must be taken only when they are in support of furthering the political aim.

That has been a large part of the problem, and largely driven at the Rumsfeld level: Military actions were not sufficiently coordinated with political intent. What makes it remarkable is that Rumsfeld had control over both DoD and the CPA and yet this fatal separation existed/exists.

 

[Darth Rotor]

Next the Mahdi Army. Muqtada al-Sadr has proved unhelpful. Probably time to stop messing around and kill him replaceing him with someone prepared to work with you. At the very least this will split the movement.

The opportunities to take out al Sadr presented themselves in the fall of 2003, in Spring 2004, and during the fight in An Najaf in 2004. The opportunity was not acted upon, for what where then called "political reasons." Fear of him being martyred, and a worsening of the political position, played into that. Taking counsel of one's fears can lead to bad outcomes.

A decision to eviscerate the Mahdi Army has always been an option, not exercised for a number of reasons.

There are a number of initiatives, still as I understand it, to work with the various Sunni tribal leadership groups, with mixed success. The dialogue has been underway for some time. The bloodthirsty nature of some of the Shia militias significantly hampers those efforts. The prize, control of central Iraq, is a great one, as it implies significant control of Iraqi oil revenue for whoever ends up with it. A number of factions are playing no stakes poker in an effort to win that jackpot.

DR

 

[geni]

While it may seem contradictory for me to say so, I am not in that bunch.

The solution must be reached via political processes internal to Iraq, but those processes cannot occur successfully without a military component.

The difference is subtle but crucial. Counterinsurgencies, to be successful, must use a combined civil-political-military approach with the political arm taking primacy. All military actions must be taken only when they are in support of furthering the political aim.

Or you could just kill everyone.

 

[thaiboxerken]

In order to win or succeed in Iraq, a clear goal has to be set. This is something that the republicans haven't done. They started this war and insist we stay until the job is done. They just don't tell anyone what the job is.

If "winning" is

imprecisely and quickly defined here as withdrawal from an Iraq capable of sustaining its own basically democratic government, providing for the security of its people from internal threats, not seriously threatened by its neighbors, and not hostile to the US

Then the job will never be done, no matter who is in charge. We can't make those people like the USA.

 

[Garrette]

Or you could just kill everyone.

I understand you're joking.

A couple of weeks before the election I wrote a Letter to the Editor to the Louisville Courier Journal. I had written several, but this was the first used, and they used it exactly as I wrote it except for changing how I referenced the previous letter to which I was responding. And it was the featured LtE, too.

That previous letter basically said, in a very white-washed, mealy-mouthed way, "Kill 'em all."

I said then, and I say it now: "Kill 'em all" won't work. And suggesting more troops does not equate to advocating "kill 'em all."

 

[Garrette]

Then the job will never be done, no matter who is in charge. We can't make those people like the USA.

1. I didn't say "like the USA." I said "not hostile to."

2. The Kurds already do. Many of the more secular did for a while and are willing to again. The Shiia could. I don't know about the Sunni.

3. I agree it will likely never be done to a perfect degree.

 

[Upchurch]

Then you're missing the point and don't know enough about it.

Entirely possible.

I'd love to be wrong and that the only thing needed to clean this mess up is just more troops.

 

[Garrette]

Entirely possible.

I'd love to be wrong and that the only thing needed to clean this mess up is just more troops.

I wish I wrote as clearly as many of the other people on this forum, because what I want to say is so often clear in my head and less clear in my posts.

I hope you don't think I have been saying that more troops is "the only thing needed."

If we had 3 million troops and 3 hundred years, it would not fix the mess if they were not properly employed.

 

[Darth Rotor]

That has been a large part of the problem, and largely driven at the Rumsfeld level: Military actions were not sufficiently coordinated with political intent. What makes it remarkable is that Rumsfeld had control over both DoD and the CPA and yet this fatal separation existed/exists.

We agree on what the principles of CI are, but I disagree with you on the actions not being coordinated. They were, and were under resourced. Those who call the last three years "a game of whack a mole" are very much on target. The "spreading oil spot" approach was first damaged by the decision to quit the Fallujah fight in spring 2004, as it gave a counter spreading ink stain, Zarqawi's, a chance to spread. Again, a decision taken at the political level due partly to cold feet at the Iraqi end (the provisional government at the time, while Bremmer was still there.)

Third ACR did a very good job of securing Tal Afar, but the follow through was missed due to lack of resources. Fallujah II, and Samara in 2004 as well.

The border problem was another place where some factions were able to draw support, weren't isolated, and so could spread their oil spot.

The significant weakness at the political end, IMO, was the cut and run of the UN after their HQ was bombed, and the inability of BushCo to get more international support for the reconstruction, nation building, as soon as "mission accomplished" was declared. Again, I point to Bosnia, and the significant multinational effort, with lots of contributors, that helped move them forward.

Failure to make the political deals (I recall a press conference by Rumsfeld or Cheney, in which "those who showed up got first cut on rebuilding contracts" was bluntly spelled out. ) That struck me at the time as short sighted, and I think my hunch played out.

DR

 

[Garrette]

The opportunities to take out al Sadr presented themselves in the fall of 2003, in Spring 2004, and during the fight in An Najaf in 2004. The opportunity was not acted upon, for what where then called "political reasons." Fear of him being martyred, and a worsening of the political position, played into that. Taking counsel of one's fears can lead to bad outcomes. ---snip---

Bingo.

I was there in 2003 when he declared himself Mayor of Baghdad. I was one of quite a few military folks advocating he be captured at a minimum, and killed if necessary.

I challenged anyone to name me one martyred insurgent, terrorist, Imam, or anyone within the past fifty years whom the Islam world viewed as a rallying cry.

 

[Garrette]

We agree on what the principles of CI are, but I disagree with you on the actions not being coordinated. They were, and were under resourced. Those who call the last three years "a game of whack a mole" are very much on target. The "spreading oil spot" approach was first damaged by the decision to quit the Fallujah fight in spring 2004, as it gave a counter spreading ink stain, Zarqawi's, a chance to spread. Again, a decision taken at the political level due partly to cold feet at the Iraqi end (the provisional government at the time, while Bremmer was still there.)

Third ACR did a very good job of securing Tal Afar, but the follow through was missed due to lack of resources. Fallujah II, and Samara in 2004 as well.

The border problem was another place where some factions were able to draw support, weren't isolated, and so could spread their oil spot.

The significant weakness at the political end, IMO, was the cut and run of the UN after their HQ was bombed, and the inability of BushCo to get more international support for the reconstruction, nation building, as soon as "mission accomplished" was declared. Again, I point to Bosnia, and the significant multinational effort, with lots of contributors, that helped move them forward.

Failure to make the political deals (I recall a press conference by Rumsfeld or Cheney, in which "those who showed up got first cut on rebuilding contracts" was bluntly spelled out. ) That struck me at the time as short sighted, and I think my hunch played out.

DR

Actually, I don't think we disagree so much on that, either.

I was at CPA from the beginning until April 2004. I met Sanchez both when he was 1AD Commander and when he was CFLCC Commander. I met Bremer more than once, and his deputies fairly frequently (most frequently Patrick Kennedy). I spoke with Meghan O'Sullivan a fair amount when she was probably Bremer's closest political advisor. (Somehow I missed meeting Larry Diamond; go figure). I (among others) briefed the CFLCC DCG weekly. And it wasn't a two minute PowerPoint amidst a stream of PowerPoints; it was a round table discussion that sometimes lasted two hours.

Bremer and Sanchez did not get along. They did not coordinate beyond the merest "you have to give me this convoy protection or people will die."

Civil Affairs on the maneuver side was a competitor of Civil Affairs on the CPA side. There was no overarching political theme or goal which the military actions (either fighting capability or nation-building action) were designed to support.

There were great things happening, because if you put soldiers and driven State Department officials in a needy place, they improvise and do things, but the great things were never tied together.

 

[Darth Rotor]

I challenged anyone to name me one martyred insurgent, terrorist, Imam, or anyone within the past fifty years whom the Islam world viewed as a rallying cry.

I am with you, and I was likewise frustrated at the opportunity missed.

I mean, fer flock's sake, he was in exile in Iran -- America's ideological enemy since 1979 -- and made a return, with Iranian support. (under the table and otherwise)

How hard was that one to call? Made one want to call the Pentagon and ask

"Hello? McFly?"

My guess was that the politicians in DC thought that "More Shia = More Votes" and they figured a Shia grassroots revival was politically desirable. I can't come up with a lot of other explanations that make even remote sense to me.

I just had a brain flash: we need to re issue REM's Fables of the Reconstruction CD, with the Iraqi Shia singing the part of the Radical Reconstructionists.

DR

 

[Upchurch]

I hope you don't think I have been saying that more troops is "the only thing needed."

No, I was being dramatic.

If we had 3 million troops and 3 hundred years, it would not fix the mess if they were not properly employed.

Agreed.



I keep putting myself in their shoes. Imagine if a foreign power whose culture and belief system are completely different than your invades your country, deposes your government (which maybe you didn't like, but it was what you knew), and insists that you adopt a new form of government that is just like theirs. Hell, I'd fight tooth and nail against that, too.

 

[Garrette]

Hell, I'd fight tooth and nail against that, too.

Well, yeah, but you hate America.

 

[Darth Rotor]

Actually, I don't think we disagree so much on that, either.

I was at CPA from the beginning until April 2004. I met Sanchez both when he was 1AD Commander and when he was CFLCC Commander. I met Bremer more than once, and his deputies fairly frequently (most frequently Patrick Kennedy). I spoke with Meghan O'Sullivan a fair amount when she was probably Bremer's closest political advisor. (Somehow I missed meeting Larry Diamond; go figure). I (among others) briefed the CFLCC DCG weekly. And it wasn't a two minute PowerPoint amidst a stream of PowerPoints; it was a round table discussion that sometimes lasted two hours.

Bremer and Sanchez did not get along. They did not coordinate beyond the merest "you have to give me this convoy protection or people will die."

Civil Affairs on the maneuver side was a competitor of Civil Affairs on the CPA side. There was no overarching political theme or goal which the military actions (either fighting capability or nation-building action) were designed to support.

There were great things happening, because if you put soldiers and driven State Department officials in a needy place, they improvise and do things, but the great things were never tied together.

Thanks for the insight, I showed up about the time you left. I had heard similar tales of "not on the same team" from MNCI guys (originally CJTF-7) but Bremmer's departure changed the playing field a bit. Yes, damage done.

DR

 

[Darth Rotor]

Well, yeah, but you hate America.

Well, he did vote Democrat . . .

*ducks as Upchurch throws rotten produce*

DR