Is free will a paranormal concept?

[Cuddles]

For people who like to argue religion...a Deity could have given you free choice while already knowing everything we'll choose to do.

This is precisely the flaw that shoots down a lot of religious philosophy. If a deity is omniscient then it must know everything we will do, and therefore we don't have free will, even if it seems so to us. Equally, if we have free will the any deity cannot know what will happen next, which contradicts at least the Christian view of god. The only way around this is to impose limits on the power of god, such as saying it can know everything now, but somehow lacks the ability to work out what will happen next. Either way, the concept of an all-knowing, all-powerful god is fundamentally incompatible with free will.

 

[DeviousB]

This is precisely the flaw that shoots down a lot of religious philosophy. If a deity is omniscient then it must know everything we will do, and therefore we don't have free will, even if it seems so to us. Equally, if we have free will the any deity cannot know what will happen next, which contradicts at least the Christian view of god. The only way around this is to impose limits on the power of god, such as saying it can know everything now, but somehow lacks the ability to work out what will happen next. Either way, the concept of an all-knowing, all-powerful god is fundamentally incompatible with free will.

Ah, but an omnipotent God isn't limited by mere logical constraints, hence can perfectly know the future even though it has yet to be determined by the actions of our free-will!

(Yes, I know this is nonsense, but I've had such an argument trotted out against me more than once!)

 

[IXP]

It seems to me that all discussion of a free will has the implicit assumption that there is some entity different than the physical body that possesses the free will. Science has no evidence of such an entity. If fact there is evidence that consciousness is more like a journal of what the brain has perceived and decided rather then the process itself.

IXP

 

[Mercutio]

But should pyschologists be content to predict and describe behaviour, or should they also be involved in explaining it? Nomothetic epistemology should be in the business of explaining before describing should it not?

Unless we can predict it, we have no business trying to explain it. Freud could "explain" behavior, after the fact, in a manner which was incredibly popular for a time. The problem was, with so many things "explained" by, say, an unresolved Oedipal complex, there was no way to predict, given an unresolved Oedipal complex, which of these many things might occur. The theory was crap. It is only when we are able to predict behavior that we are able to see what things might begin to explain it. If we are able to say "when A happens, a person will do B" (or better yet, manipulate A under controlled conditions and demonstrate that B follows), only then can we start to suggest explanations for that connection.

As a general rule, we progress from being able to describe, to predicting, to controlling, to finally explaining. If we try to explain first...like Freud, we may be creating a fanciful and elaborate fiction, and nothing more.

 

[PopeTom]

2) We can empirically determine that we have free-will. Present an individual with two identical coins. Ask him to choose one to keep. Which did he choose and why? Reverse the experiment. Give the subject two identical coins and have him hold both out towards you. Choose which he may keep and take back the other. Which did you choose and why? We act as though we have free will. We believe we have free will. To claim that these actions are deterministic is to put upon oneself the burden of proof. Our apparent free-will is the empirically observed phenomena to be explained. Saying it is deterministic, means proving it is deterministic; otherwise it is an argument from ignorance/incredulity.

Would this be the same as saying "You have free will because you are capable of deciding between two equally good choices"?

 

[Mercutio]

Except that we empirically experience free will every day of our lives.

Not by any definition I have ever seen. What definition do you use? "If it feels like free will, it must be"? We experience sunrise and sunset, too, but the truth is that these are illusions brought about by earth-rotation.

To have FW fit with an entirely deterministic/stochastic, we rationalise this evidence as an 'illusion'. The argument that it is an illusion is supported by the lack of any mechanism that is not deterministic/stochastic to provide for FW (i.e. argument from ignorance).

It is not merely a lack of mechanism; it is also a lack of evidence that would require said mechanism. And plenty of evidence of determinism.

If we had free will of the variety we often claim, we would be much better at predicting our own behavior. We are too often "not as hungry as I thought I was" for me to think I have libertarian free will.

Many aspects of modern physics are inherently unpredictable, radioactive decay for example. It does not stop physicists from investigating and explaining physical phenomena. In psychology, we enter Seldon's world, predicting average group behaviour, not individual responses. As you say, with some success.

Radioactive decay is quite predictable in the aggregate. We may use that model to look at human behavior as well. Only rarely are we able to predict a specific instance of a specific behavior (except in the case of reflexes and classical conditioning), but changes in rate of behavior are every bit as much evidence of determined behavior, and as you say, we are fairly successful at predicting group behavior.

It is not unlike other complex systems, such as weather. We are good at predicting what tomorrow's temps and precip are likely to be, and we are very good at knowing that summer will be warmer than winter...but whether or not it will rain on this particular field on the 3rd of September of next year? No. And yet, we do not claim that the weather has free will.

 

[Stellafane]

I tried to avoid this thread, but no matter how hard I tried I couldn't.

 

[Mercutio]

2) We can empirically determine that we have free-will. Present an individual with two identical coins. Ask him to choose one to keep. Which did he choose and why? Reverse the experiment. Give the subject two identical coins and have him hold both out towards you. Choose which he may keep and take back the other. Which did you choose and why? We act as though we have free will. We believe we have free will. To claim that these actions are deterministic is to put upon oneself the burden of proof. Our apparent free-will is the empirically observed phenomena to be explained. Saying it is deterministic, means proving it is deterministic; otherwise it is an argument from ignorance/incredulity.

There is a classic demonstration in social psych--we present people with 5 samples of hosiery--nylon stockings, labeled 1 through 5. We ask them to choose which is the softest and silkiest. A majority of them choose #5. Why? Do they freely choose that one, because it is indeed softest? The trick, of course, is that the samples are randomized between subjects, and are all the same brand in the first place! It is the situation, not the softness, that induces people to choose #5. (I would search for a citation, but I am at work, and I realized that if I put "hidden camera" and "stockings" into a google search, I would probably lose my job.)

It looks like your coin choice, but when systematically reviewed we see that the choice is determined. Indeed, have you actually done your coin experiment? Perhaps people choose one hand over the other significantly more often.

In your thought experiment, you ask people why they chose the coin they did. In the hosiery experiment they are also asked...they do not say "because it was the one on the right" or "because it was the last one" or anything of the sort--they say "because it was softest and silkiest". You are trusting our subjective experience as evidence of free will, when our subjective experience may be every bit as determined as our public behavior.

 

[simonmaal]

Unless we can predict it, we have no business trying to explain it.

An important example here is the Babylonian astronomy system. It was able to predict the 'movement' of the sun and stars with staggering accuracy. Its predictive value was commendable, but is explanatory power was lacking (it was based on the heavens moving, which we now know to be incorrect).

Now, for reasons relating to the 'nature of knowledge', biological and cognitive accounts of psychology are more concerned with explanations than descriptions. For example, evolutionary theory looks at the functional and adaptive relevance of a given behaviour; how this explains homosexuality is a problem, but I don't want to digress too far! What I am saying is the cause-effect relationship is the very core of an explanation. This is not necessarily the same thing as prediction: remember, the Babylonians could predict movements but were on the wrong horse completely when it came to explaining them.

Freud could "explain" behavior, after the fact, in a manner which was incredibly popular for a time.

And it fitted in with the Western European worldview of the time; we have to acknowledge the social and historical context in order to see where grandaddy Freud was coming from. He did start of from a scientific base, but he drifted into hermeneutic epistemology as a result of his clinical work with neurotic people. His theories evolved as he went along, which many use to attack him.

The problem was, with so many things "explained" by, say, an unresolved Oedipal complex, there was no way to predict, given an unresolved Oedipal complex, which of these many things might occur. The theory was crap.

Freud was trying to do both: explain and predict. He could predict that an unresolved Oedipal conflict would express itself in a person 'marrying his mother' as a result of unconscious motives. In actual fact, modern psychodynamics, object relations and systemic theory support this notion, and there is an impressive body of research to suggest we choose people who are similar to us. Perhaps Freud's knowledge was best described as partial.

It is only when we are able to predict behavior that we are able to see what things might begin to explain it. If we are able to say "when A happens, a person will do B" (or better yet, manipulate A under controlled conditions and demonstrate that B follows), only then can we start to suggest explanations for that connection.

The only problem with that line of thought is that people often change as a result of being studied (this is particularly true in clinical rather than academic psychology). In other words, we are not simply measuring the effect of one variable on the other. This should lead us to question whether psychology can be described as a science. Certainly, there are questions arising on whether the findings in the laboratory can be generalised to real life settings. There are severe problems with the ecological validity of experimental psychology.

As a general rule, we progress from being able to describe, to predicting, to controlling, to finally explaining. If we try to explain first...like Freud, we may be creating a fanciful and elaborate fiction, and nothing more.

One thing I would add is that Freud could cover all his bases: because psychodynamics is not amenable to testing, it can never be proven or disproven. So we are stuck with hypothetical constructs based on inductive use of clinical evidence. In short, the perfect circular argument.

 

[davidsmith73]

There is a classic demonstration in social psych--we present people with 5 samples of hosiery--nylon stockings, labeled 1 through 5. We ask them to choose which is the softest and silkiest. A majority of them choose #5. Why? Do they freely choose that one, because it is indeed softest? The trick, of course, is that the samples are randomized between subjects, and are all the same brand in the first place! It is the situation, not the softness, that induces people to choose #5.

There could be a further possibility - that a deterministic process (the situation) presents an "illusion" to conscious experience that one of the stockings is softer than the rest, then free will comes into play and intervenes to choose it. Thoughts?

(I put "illusion" in inverted commas because the experience that a stocking is softer is obviously not an illusion, but the extrapolation to objective reality would be)

 

[Jeff Corey]

... Certainly, there are questions arising on whether the findings in the laboratory can be generalised to real life settings. There are severe problems with the ecological validity of experimental psychology...

Not in behavior analysis. The laboratory analysis of behavior has been sucessfully exported to the appled setting for decades. After all, the laboratory is just a more controlled enviroment and part of the "real world".

 

[DeviousB]

Not by any definition I have ever seen. What definition do you use? "If it feels like free will, it must be"? We experience sunrise and sunset, too, but the truth is that these are illusions brought about by earth-rotation.

Free will is (i) the ability or discretion to choose, (ii) the doctrine that ascribes that ability to individuals.

To flirt with solipsism, your experiences are the only evidence you will have of anything. EP may allow us to identify bias in our perceptions, but it does dispute that they are perceptions. If you perceive yourself as making a free choice, it may very well be true that in fact you are obeying a preconditioned bias that led you to that choice. To go from that to hard determinism is a hasty generalization.

It is not merely a lack of mechanism; it is also a lack of evidence that would require said mechanism. And plenty of evidence of determinism. [...] Radioactive decay is quite predictable in the aggregate. We may use that model to look at human behavior as well. Only rarely are we able to predict a specific instance of a specific behavior (except in the case of reflexes and classical conditioning), but changes in rate of behavior are every bit as much evidence of determined behavior, and as you say, we are fairly successful at predicting group behavior.

So the fact that the radioactive decay of an atom is not deterministic does not stop us predicting decay behaviour quite well for groups of atoms. That we can predict the behaviour of groups of humans quite well is evidence that the behaviour of an individual human is deterministic. Ri-i-ight.

It is not unlike other complex systems, such as weather. We are good at predicting what tomorrow's temps and precip are likely to be, and we are very good at knowing that summer will be warmer than winter...but whether or not it will rain on this particular field on the 3rd of September of next year? No. And yet, we do not claim that the weather has free will.

But do we claim it is deterministic? (Answer: Yes and no; forcast models can be either deterministic or stochastic, with the later rapidly gaining popularity
[*]).

Without determinism, there is no support for hard determinism; and determinism is not a given.



[* I had this argument with a guy at CERN, does the fact that the numerical models of weather systems are chaotic mean the weather is chaotic? Or is the weather deterministic, but too incompletely described to be accurately modelled?]

 

[Jeremy]

Devious B,

1) If we assume that no action of a human being can ever really be 'voluntary', then any claim to hold copyright on a creative work is non-sensical. Scott Adams didn't create Dilbert, it is merely the inevitable consequence of his biology, he has no more creative rights to it than over the exhalations from his lungs. Yet on every cartoon he produces he puts a little copyright symbol, does he not believe his own argument then?

Utility in no way proves or disproves this theory. Gravity does not occur because we need it to hold ourselves to the ground.

Besides, their is a perfectly good explanation for this and other utility disputations (most notably the concept of fault and justice).
The reason we use these concepts as a society is because they are useful to us, not because they describe the nature of reality. Just because you own a ball, nothing changes about the ball. All these concepts exist only on the human level, the only physical correlation is found in human brains.

That does not mean we should abandon them, however. We simply should not mistake such things as justice, ownership, and various other ethical concepts as actually descriptive of nature.

 

[DeviousB]

Besides, their is a perfectly good explanation for this and other utility disputations (most notably the concept of fault and justice).

An explanation Adams specifically rejected in the linked-to discussion (apparently).

 

[simonmaal]

... Certainly, there are questions arising on whether the findings in the laboratory can be generalised to real life settings. There are severe problems with the ecological validity of experimental psychology...

Not in behavior analysis. The laboratory analysis of behavior has been sucessfully exported to the appled setting for decades.

Examples, please?

the laboratory is just a more controlled enviroment and part of the "real world".

Experimental methodology has trouble in accessing and understanding internal states. Also, what about demand characteristics? Experimenter effects? Tautological reasoning?

 

[Thinktoomuch]

You have therefore proved that there is free-will by assuming there is free will. Have a cookie.

No, I tried (unsuccessfully, it seems) to express my (poor) reasoning for liking to assume it.

Not much different from your statement "we empirically experience free will every day of our lives", methinks.

Thanks for the cookie.

 

[Jeff Corey]

Examples, please?
Experimental methodology has trouble in accessing and understanding internal states. Also, what about demand characteristics? Experimenter effects? Tautological reasoning?

Examples include articles published in the Jounal of Applied Behavior Analysis. I tried for a link, but my connection is fubar today.
And behavior analysis typically studies reliably observable behavior, not private events.
Other areas of experimental psych have studied sensation and perception for over 100 years, Apparently they have had no problem with measuring internal states.

 

[Thinktoomuch]

Anyway, the discussion has expanded a lot, but it seems to me that the original question "is free will a paranormal concept" has essentially been answered in the positive by everybody. Should the thread now become "is a scientifically baseless acceptance of the concept of free will compatible with skepticism?"?

 

[Mercutio]

An important example here is the Babylonian astronomy system. [snip]

[T]he Babylonians could predict movements but were on the wrong horse completely when it came to explaining them.

Remember... how we know they bet on the wrong horse, was that further predictions failed to come true. That is always the bottom line.

[snip]
Freud was trying to do both: explain and predict. He could predict that an unresolved Oedipal conflict would express itself in a person 'marrying his mother' as a result of unconscious motives. In actual fact, modern psychodynamics, object relations and systemic theory support this notion, and there is an impressive body of research to suggest we choose people who are similar to us. Perhaps Freud's knowledge was best described as partial.

First off, you must be reading different sources than I am. I have read an awful lot of Freud; I must have missed where he predicted any such thing. A source would be appreciated. Subsequent researchers have tried using Freud to predict... it is not pretty.

The only problem with that line of thought is that people often change as a result of being studied (this is particularly true in clinical rather than academic psychology). In other words, we are not simply measuring the effect of one variable on the other. This should lead us to question whether psychology can be described as a science. Certainly, there are questions arising on whether the findings in the laboratory can be generalised to real life settings. There are severe problems with the ecological validity of experimental psychology.

Heh...each of these problems was discovered as the result of partial failures to predict--systematic failures. These systematic failures to predict led to the inclusion of additional variables, but always the bottom line is whether or not we can predict. We simply cannot say we have explained something, if we cannot use that explanation to predict.

Some of the problems with the validity of experimental psych are due to cognitive psychology's attempt to explain before they can predict...as Corey suggests, not all experimental psych is created equal.

One thing I would add is that Freud could cover all his bases: because psychodynamics is not amenable to testing, it can never be proven or disproven. So we are stuck with hypothetical constructs based on inductive use of clinical evidence. In short, the perfect circular argument.

You will not see me argue against the notion of psychoanalysis as pseudoscience.

 

[Mercutio]

So the fact that the radioactive decay of an atom is not deterministic does not stop us predicting decay behaviour quite well for groups of atoms. That we can predict the behaviour of groups of humans quite well is evidence that the behaviour of an individual human is deterministic. Ri-i-ight.

Heh... my comment about radioactivity being predictable in the aggregate addressed your comment that, although radioactive decay was random, it was nonetheless scientifically studied. I agree--it is studied, and it is not unpredictable in the aggregate.

I note that neither randomness nor determinism--the two explanations being tossed about here--are "free will". Arguing for free will puts one in the interesting position of arguing against both randomness and determinism. The burden of proof is on one who suggests that something more is at work.