Is free will a paranormal concept?

[Thinktoomuch]

Basically, if all thought is a product of the entirely naturalistic processes of the brain, then free-will is an illusion. You would be physically incapable of ever thinking or deciding anything other than what the output of the hypercomplex state-machine in your head was inflexibly bound to do.

In my ignorance, it appears to me that this "free will" equates to a supernatural ( I use this term loosely to indicate anything for which there is not yet a physical explanation) "mind" separate to the physical brain. Unless there have been recent developments in brain research of which I am not aware, it is still uncertain how (if) the brain produces thougth. Does not this discussion then hinge on whether there is now undisputed evidence that the brain actually produces thought?

If nurture is a factor that modifies the physical structure of the brain, not the hypothetical mind capable of independent thought (~= free will), would not this imply that we all remain passive recipients of external stimuli even after our brain has developed the capacity to avoid stimuli that we perceive as bad? This would appear to me to be a contradiction in terms.

 

[simonmaal]

Does not this discussion then hinge on whether there is now undisputed evidence that the brain actually produces thought?

An interesting example is the blunted emotions reported by quadraplegics and paraplegics; consequently, it would seem that the subjective experience of emotional states is related to physiological changes in places other than the brain. Because cognition and emotion have a reciprocal relationship (e.g. mood congruent memory), I would have to say that thought is not entirely divorced from the body.

However, identifying the cause, the first step in this relationship, is rather more problematic.

 

[IllegalArgument]

It is a personal belief, and I am mainly basing it on the potential for cognition to have a non-determinist influence on behavior.

It is a belief, not a scientific premise. I don't have a belief on if the weather will be deterministic. More likely chaotic without the potential for free will. As I said , I aknowledge that free will could very likely be an illusion.

Susan Blackmore basically made the point at the 2005 Skeptics conference, that free will is an illusion, it's more like we have will won't.

I interpret that as the agent that most people associate as them has some veto power over the other agents.

I hope Merc see this thread, he's much more informed on this subject.

You should get the 2005 conference DVD is was fascinating.

 

[DeviousB]

A more sound position to take would have been, "Science suggests there is no such thing as free will."

I'm not even sure science goes that far. I think science sticks its nose in the paper and loudly 'harrumph's when the subject of free will comes up.

Besides, I thought Scott Adams believed all his good fortune had come about by using 'affirmations' ("Hundreds of people have told me affirmations worked for them in incredible ways that seem beyond their own doing."), and that not only does he have a free-will, but that the exercise of it changes reality ("Every day it gets harder for me to believe my thoughts are separate from reality."). I hate to 'poison the well', but Adams thinks he's an uber-skeptic because he doubts things other skeptics don't. Scientific skepticism is the view that some things have been demonstrated beyond reasonable (n.b., not all) doubt and should be accepted as facts, Scottadamsian skepticism is little more than better-dressed solipsism.

 

[EGarrett]

People always bring topics like this up, and it seems so simple.

Free will and determinism aren't necessarily opposed.

If I put a rat in a tunnel with a pile of cheese on one side and a visible rattlesnake on the other. The rat is FREE to go either way. But I can also predict with all reasonable certainty what he will choose.

You can be free to choose, while also having your choices be totally predictable...or having it already known or "decided" what that free choice will be.

 

[DeviousB]

If nurture is a factor that modifies the physical structure of the brain, not the hypothetical mind capable of independent thought (~= free will), would not this imply that we all remain passive recipients of external stimuli even after our brain has developed the capacity to avoid stimuli that we perceive as bad? This would appear to me to be a contradiction in terms.

If we perceive a stimulus as bad, and have recognised or inferred enough precursor stimuli to be able to avoid that stimulus, and if this behaviour is not instinctive, then the stimulus must have had an effect on the state/structure of our brians.

 

[DeviousB]

People always bring topics like this up, and it seems so simple.

Seems, is right.

If I put a rat in a tunnel with a pile of cheese on one side and a visible rattlesnake on the other. The rat is FREE to go either way. But I can also predict with all reasonable certainty what he will choose.

If I put a heat seeking robot in a tunnel with a block of dry-ice on one side and a hot-plate on the other. The robot is FREE to go either way (certainly no part of his mechanism prevents him from doing so). But I can also predict with all reasonable certainty what he will chose.

Ergo, robots have free will.

 

[EGarrett]

The robot is FREE to go either way (certainly no part of his mechanism prevents him from doing so).

That's the hole in the paragraph. The robot is not free to go either way. It has no brain that can override the mechanism. It is pure mechanism.

 

[simonmaal]

That's the hole in the paragraph. The robot is not free to go either way. It has no brain that can override the mechanism. It is pure mechanism.

But is the rat's response due to free will or reflex?

 

[DeviousB]

That's the hole in the paragraph. The robot is not free to go either way. It has no brain that can override the mechanism. It is pure mechanism.

What part of a rat's brain, or yours for that matter, is not mechanism? The whole point of the argument is that a purely reductionist and/or naturalistic approach would conclude that neither you nor the rat has any more freedom than the robot in terms of the responses.

By this view, you are merely a more complex robot.

 

[jskowron]

If I understand things correctly- and I may not- at the quantum level, free will (or, more specifically the absence of super-determinism), would require what Einstein called "spooky action at a distance." This involves one particle instantaneously affecting another distant particle, thus requiring action at faster than the speed of light. An alteranative to this faster than light effect is that everything has already been determined. Both options seem quite paranormal, until you do the math. Unfortunately, very few people actually understand the math! I certainly don't.

c.f.: Gribbin, J. (1990) The man who proved Einstein was wrong. New Scientist, 24, 43-45.

 

[Jekyll]

3) http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~jas/one/freewill-theorem.html

Yeh, what's going on there is summed up quite well by the end Q&A.

When the floor was opened for questions, one member of the audience questioned Dr Conway's use of the term "Free Will". She asked whether Dr Conway was "confusing randomness and free will".

In a passionate reply, Dr Conway said that what he had shown, with mathematical precision, that if a given property was exhibited by an experimenter than that same property was exhibited by particles. He had been careful when constructing his theorem to use the same term "free will" in the antecedent and consequent of his theorem. He said he did not really care what people chose to call it. Some people choose to call it "free will" only when there is some judgment involved. He said he felt that "free will" was freer if it was unhampered by judgment - that it was almost a whim. "If you don't like the term Free Will, call it Free Whim - this is the Free Whim Theorem".

Secondly, this is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for Free Whim (i.e. just because particles move randomly it doesn't mean that people will).

Thirdly, I'm stealing that picture for my avatar .

 

[Thinktoomuch]

If we perceive a stimulus as bad, and have recognised or inferred enough precursor stimuli to be able to avoid that stimulus, and if this behaviour is not instinctive, then the stimulus must have had an effect on the state/structure of our brians.

Yes, I do not argue with that. What I am laboriously trying to say is:
- we are born with instincts etc (nature)
- in infancy we receive external stimuli that affect our brain (nurture)
- at a certain time our brain develops to the point of establishing patterns of behaviour (abilities). One such ability is the ability to choose on the basis of "recognised or inferred precursor stimuli"
- after achieving this ability to choose, "nurture" is what we decide to be exposed to, not something on which we have no control.

What I find difficult to accept is the proposition that this ability to choose is only imaginary because our thought is produced by the brain "nurtured" to produce what appears to be a decision but is instead only the response determined by the state of the neurons at the time of establishing the imaginary ability. Probably I am trying to express my understanding of what Dancing David calls "the potential for cognition to have a non-determinist influence on behavior".


Both the examples of the rat and the robot appear illogical to me: the rat has only instinct, is unable to choose the rattlesnake for being aware of having a terminal illness and wanting to die on its own terms; the robot can not choose to contradict its heat seeking mechanism. Have I missed something?

 

[Mercutio]

Science says, "We don't know what causes (the illusion of*) free will." [* Delete as applicable]. Scott Adams says, "Science tells us there is no such thing as free will."

Scott Adams is wrong.

I would argue that science assumes, axiomatically, that there is no free will. It must. If this assumption is shown to be unsupported, science will be forced to abandon it, but we cannot even begin to do behavioral science without the assumption of determinism.

Consider: If there was an element of free will involved in, say, gravity, we would not have Newton's Laws of motion. We couldn't. Remember, inertia and gravity replaced animistic ideas, where things fell to earth because they wanted to be closer to it...but if something could literally choose not to fall, we would not have the systematic, lawful observations of bodies in motion from which to generate our Laws.

If our goal is to predict human behavior, we cannot begin by positing that it is not predictable, and this is precisely what the assumption of free will does. We must begin with an assumption of determinism, or there is no reason to continue. If this assumption is wrong, we will soon know it; the lawful relationship of reinforcement schedule to behavior, for instance, will not hold true for humans as it does for, say, rats. But it does, predictably enough that we can build entire cities (Las Vegas is a particularly salient example) on the strength of the Variable Ratio Schedule of Reinforcement.

The conference that IllegalArgument refers to demonstrated that research in many areas (cognitive neuroscience in particular) is pointing to the same conclusion: our assumption of "no free will" has been a very fruitful one, and is leading to a greater and greater understanding of our actions and of ourselves.

 

[EGarrett]

What part of a rat's brain, or yours for that matter, is not mechanism?

I could bring up the "experiencer," but truth is we're now moving into an area of science that none of us understand enough to properly discuss.

(you could say that that alone makes us different than our robots)

The whole point of the argument is that a purely reductionist and/or naturalistic approach would conclude that neither you nor the rat has any more freedom than the robot in terms of the responses.

By this view, you are merely a more complex robot.

Well, I'm only referring to free will as it's normally imagined. Being able to choose to do something or not...can be experienced at the same time as our actions being determined.

Things can be set up so that you're free to choose what you do, but I already know beforehand what you'll choose (with reasonable certainty).

For people who like to argue religion...a Deity could have given you free choice while already knowing everything we'll choose to do.

 

[simonmaal]

- we are born with instincts etc (nature)
- in infancy we receive external stimuli that affect our brain (nurture)

There is research to support the idea that stimuli affect our brain before infancy (i.e. in the womb). Check The Cat in The Hat study by DeCasper and Spence (1994), and also consider the effect that certain chemicals have on the physical development of the brain (e.g. fetal alcohol syndrome). However, Fantz found that newborn babies had an attraction towards human faces, which cannot be due to pre-birth environmental influences.

The point is that there is a huge problem in identifying 'genetic predispositions' as the cause of behaviours and cognition in neonates.

 

[DeviousB]

I could bring up the "experiencer," but truth is we're now moving into an area of science that none of us understand enough to properly discuss.

(you could say that that alone makes us different than our robots)

Well, I'm only referring to free will as it's normally imagined. Being able to choose to do something or not...can be experienced at the same time as our actions being determined.

Things can be set up so that you're free to choose what you do, but I already know beforehand what you'll choose (with reasonable certainty).

For people who like to argue religion...a Deity could have given you free choice while already knowing everything we'll choose to do.

In other words, free will involves an appeal to the supernatural and hence is no more scientific than other woo.

 

[simonmaal]

If our goal is to predict human behavior, we cannot begin by positing that it is not predictable, and this is precisely what the assumption of free will does. We must begin with an assumption of determinism, or there is no reason to continue.

But should pyschologists be content to predict and describe behaviour, or should they also be involved in explaining it? Nomothetic epistemology should be in the business of explaining before describing should it not?

 

[DeviousB]

- after achieving this ability to choose, "nurture" is what we decide to be exposed to, not something on which we have no control.

Decide on the basis of existing nature/nurture. Which (a) is beyond our control, and (b) rigidly deterministic of our responses.

What I find difficult to accept is the proposition that this ability to choose is only imaginary because our thought is produced by the brain "nurtured" to produce what appears to be a decision but is instead only the response determined by the state of the neurons at the time of establishing the imaginary ability. Probably I am trying to express my understanding of what Dancing David calls "the potential for cognition to have a non-determinist influence on behavior".

All physical and chemical processes in science are believed to be either deterministic or stochastic. We might not be predictable (because of random input into our 'state' from quantum effects), but no part of us known to science obeys anything other than the strict physical laws. That we appear (to ourselves and others) to practise free will is either (a) evidence of a non-stochastic, non-deterministic, pyschomorphic effect, or (b) the most amazing emergent behaviour ever.

Both the examples of the rat and the robot appear illogical to me: the rat has only instinct, is unable to choose the rattlesnake for being aware of having a terminal illness and wanting to die on its own terms; the robot can not choose to contradict its heat seeking mechanism. Have I missed something?

Well, you've assumed quite a lot about rat behaviour to start with, but more importantly you have assumed that you can contradict your mechanism i.e. have free-will. You have therefore proved that there is free-will by assuming there is free will. Have a cookie.

 

[DeviousB]

I would argue that science assumes, axiomatically, that there is no free will. It must. If this assumption is shown to be unsupported, science will be forced to abandon it, but we cannot even begin to do behavioral science without the assumption of determinism.

Except that we empirically experience free will every day of our lives. To have FW fit with an entirely deterministic/stochastic, we rationalise this evidence as an 'illusion'. The argument that it is an illusion is supported by the lack of any mechanism that is not deterministic/stochastic to provide for FW (i.e. argument from ignorance).

If our goal is to predict human behavior, we cannot begin by positing that it is not predictable, and this is precisely what the assumption of free will does. We must begin with an assumption of determinism, or there is no reason to continue.

Many aspects of modern physics are inherently unpredictable, radioactive decay for example. It does not stop physicists from investigating and explaining physical phenomena. In psychology, we enter Seldon's world, predicting average group behaviour, not individual responses. As you say, with some success.