Proof of Strong Atheism

[Piggy]

This thread is a split from No God you say? Please read me.

After 800+ posts, the thread has bogged down, as they tend to do.

The proposal I want to continue here is this: We know enough now about the universe to state without reservation that God is not real.

I don't mean "unproven". I don't mean "until we see better evidence". I mean, on the ash heap of history, along with flat earth, geocentrism, phlogiston, cosmic ether, spontaneous generation, and Elvis still munching whoppers at Burger Kings in Kalamazoo.

I'll kick things off by reposting a few necessary posts from the original thread, including: A synopsis of the argument thus far; A few important terms, and; A refutation of the argument requiring logical impossibility.

I hope others from the parent thread will also repost items which they feel to be necessary to resuming the discussion.

Watch this space....

 

[thaiboxerken]

There are no gods is a better statement. Your statement seems to refer to only one god.

 

[Piggy]

A synopsis of the strong atheist argument thus far

Reposted from the original thread:

It has been proposed that "We know enough now about the world to state without reservation that God is not real".

The various faults of God-theory were introduced, including:

* God-theory has purely mythic/superstitious origins, independent of any verified models of reality.
* The theory is unverified in any and all particulars despite millenia of attempts.
* In every case in which God-theory has gone head-to-head with rational/naturalistic theory, it has lost, resulting in an ever-shrinking potential role of God in the universe.
* A coherent rational theory accounts for the existence of belief in God absent the actual existence of God.
* Many God-theorists persist in promoting claims about God which are unsupported and contrary to verifiable fact.
* God-theory admits a practically infinite variety of proposed God-entities, many of which are mutually exclusive, to such an extent that no core qualities exist.
* In order to avoid conflict with known fact, God must be relegated to an existence in no-place and no-time, so that its existence becomes indistinguishable from its non-existence.


The penultimate fault -- the incoherence of God-theory -- is the most damaging. In fact, it is fatal. Because if the concept has no core qualities, then no meaningful statements can be made concerning it.

Because no qualities necessarily adhere to the God-concept, statements about the existence of God, with reference to the uber-theory, have no value at all, since any statement which can be said to apply to some theories can equally be said not to apply to others. And when taken in conjunction with the other dilemmas, and the utter lack of any positive evidence whatsoever, and an explanation for the persistence of the concept which is consistent with what we know of the human mind... the God-theory becomes a non-theory.

And yet... there is one remaining argument to be made in its favor: We cannot close the book on God because one of the sub-theories which falls under the umbrella of the uber-concept might possibly be real.

However, if this argument is to be accepted as reasonable, its proponents must declare which sub-theory might possibly be real.

Because the uber-concept is a candy-dish theory, into which all sorts of totally unanchored ad-hoc proposals may be dropped without regard to consistency with other concepts already inside, it is unreasonable to demand that any credence be granted to the God-concept on the mere argument that some undesignated sub-theory may be correct.

In order to prevent the book being closed for good and all, proponents must specify which sub-theory is claimed to have merit on its own.

In this thread, a sub-theory was proposed -- at my request -- in the form of a definition, or set of properties: "The supernatural sole creator and ruler of the universe."

The term "supernatural" is not original with this definition. It was substituted for the term "divine" which is merely circular, being an adjectival synonym for the noun "God". Furthermore, the term was given the definition "not merely what is described by the scientific laws of nature". This substitution removed the circularity, retained the essense of the term "divine", and removed a fundamental problem with the original definition, which arguably allowed a GUT force to be God.

(NOTE: The term "ruler", for which clarification was requested very early on, may yet come back to haunt us, as it is a highly vague term, which proponents of the theory have so far declined to clarify. Also, it is my opinion that some element akin to consciousness, intelligence, or awareness will have to be introduced in order to truly separate the God-concept from the blind laws of nature as described by science and to conform the definition with non-fringe notions of God's core qualities. I may be wrong about both points, but we shall see.)

Objections were raised that the definition under consideration was a non-starter, but eventually these were withdrawn (on a nolo contendere basis) when "supernatural" as defined above was stipulated as a substitute for "divine" which had previously been stricken from the definition as being merely circular.

Since the definition was accepted as a candidate for a "God" which may be reasonably claimed to potentially exist -- that is, a God which does not reproduce the fatal plasticity of the uber-theory, which does not contradict known fact, and which is not said to exist in a way which is indistinguishable from not existing -- we have moved to the second phase of the procedure: Asking whether such a thing can be said, meaningfully, to potentially be real.

The first question asked was this: "If this thing exists, where does it exist?"

A generous definition of location was provided, which allowed for localization of highly abstract concepts such as justice, pervasive phenomena such as gravity, and dispersed entities such as asteroid belts.

So far, no answer has been provided which does not violate the necessary condition that God's existence be meaningful -- that is, that it be (1) distinguishable from non-existence, and (2) not merely the assertion of an unanchored concept situated in a purely imagined context.

Instead, attempts were made to argue for this God's existence on purely logical, abstract grounds. Therefore, it was explained why a demonstration of logical potential was not sufficient to prove actual phenomenal possibility (e.g., it can be shown that earthly fell beasts do not exist, even though it is not impossible for them to exist), and in fact why no statements regarding the potential for actual existence can be made without examination of what we know about the world in addition to what is claimed regarding the entity under consideration.

And that is where we are.

 

[Piggy]

There are no gods is a better statement. Your statement seems to refer to only one god.

Patience, m'lad. The reposts aren't up yet.

 

[Piggy]

A few important terms

A repost from the parent thread:

The Caveats

Bri, as I said above, I am going to reply to your recent posts in parts. The one following this one will respond directly. But first, I'd like to specifically address a few caveats that we should all keep in mind regarding this topic.

And I'd like to give them names, just as tags so they're easier to refer to later.

1. Unanchoredness:

While we have frequently made use of examples and analogies in this thread -- such as airplanes, dogs, and snakes -- we should keep in mind that when we speak of God we're in a significantly different situation, because God is an unanchored concept. There's nothing to point to as a concrete example. So we should be careful not to reason too far from these examples, but to merely use them for their limited purpose, comprehend the point being illustrated, then move on.

2. Specificity:

Because the larger god-concept (the uber-concept or umbrella-concept) allows a practically infinite number of variations which may be mutually exclusive, there can be no proof or disproof of it. It is so vague that it has no core meaning at all. It allows the ancient Hebrew god El, the modern conception of Jesus, New Age notions of subtle energy, the Enlightenment deistic God, animist nature spirits, Buddhist pantheism, Zen aconceptualism, the objects of ineffable mystic experience, and so on.

So we cannot make meaningful statements about God as described by the uber-concept, because it does not cohere. We are forced to choose (and describe) a particular God, and to discuss that. When we do this, we must be careful to remain focused on that God, and not make the error of shifting back in some of our statements to the incoherent uber-concept, or to alternative sub-definitions, except as it is clearly relevant (e.g., we cannot accept as valid a definition of any particular God which does not fall under the umbrella, such as a GUT force or Eric Clapton).

3. Narrowness:

A corollary to specificity, especially when considered together with unanchoredness. We must be careful not to merely reproduce the incoherence of the uber-concept in miniature in our sub-theory. If we do so, we are back where we started, unable to make meaningful statements about the concept under consideration.

This is not as significant a problem when dealing with anchored concepts. For example, when dealing with a definition of "snake", we can list certain species as examples to anchor the definition, which has the effect of limiting the potential vagueness inherent in all definitions. But if we define "God" so loosely as to allow mutually exclusive interpretations, we're stuck.

4. Localness:

The proposal under consideration is the possibility of the actual existence of God relative to (but not necessarily only within) our world, not relative to any world we may imagine. Therefore, we must be careful not to reason only in the abstract, without performing the indispensible task of considering what we know about reality.

In other words, it is not our task to consider whether the proposed God may exist anywhere, but rather, whether the proposed God possibly does exist for the world we live in.

5. Actuality:

We must be careful not to use people's ideas of God as our standard of proof. These are only under consideration to the extent that the proposed entity not violate the uber-concept (e.g. Clapton or GUT). We know the concept of God exists. What we are attempting to determine is whether an actual entity possibly exists.

 

[thaiboxerken]

Yea, but you make these arguments about "God." Which god? Do your arguments apply equally for all gods?

 

[Piggy]

A refutation of the argument requiring logical impossibility

A repost from the parent thread:

In fact, the issue of generic logical impossibility was one of the first red herrings I dispensed with.

I thought this point might need a little clarification.

What is the relationship between (A) demonstrating that a thing might actually be real, and (B) demonstrating that a thing could possibly exist?

It is this:

1. If we disprove the latter, the former cannot be true.
2. If we prove the latter, the former may or may not be true.
3. If we disprove the former, the latter may or may not be true.
4. If we prove the former, the latter must be true.

Examples:

1. An atom of table salt cannot possibly exist, because table salt is a compound. Therefore, we can safely say that there is no possibility of table-salt-atoms being real.

2. We can prove that earthly fell beasts could possibly evolve, because they are so similar to pterodactyls, which we know actually did evolve. This in itself does not tell us whether earthly fell beasts might actually be real -- more questions must be asked in order to determine that. Once we gather all our evidence, we may conclude that these things cannot possibly be real, even though it is not imposible in theory for such a thing to exist.

3. If we gather all the evidence (known fossil record, demonstrated principles of evolution, catalog of observed living species, satellite and aviation observations, etc.) and conclude that earthly fell beasts do not exist, this does not suddenly make it logically impossible for them to exist.

4. Because "things which might actually be real" (A) is a subset of "things which could possibly exist" (B), then if a thing fits in category A, it must also fit in category (B).

The difference is, loosely speaking, that the second statement at top answers a question about the thing, while the first statement answers a question about the world.

Answering that question about the world requires a broader inquiry than what is necessary to answer the question about the thing.

So when it comes to answering the question "Is it possible that God is real?", we cannot stop when we have an answer to the question "Is it not theoretically impossible for God to exist?" (unless the answer is that it is theoretically impossible) because these questions, while deceptively similar linguistically, do not have identical standards of proof.

 

[Piggy]

Yea, but you make these arguments about "God." Which god? Do your arguments apply equally for all gods?

Please read the reposts. The answer will become clear when you do.

 

[Piggy]

Ok, so there are my reposts. They are my posts, but contain reference to arguments made by others as well.

I've asked participants on the original thread to post anything they feel is necessary to get this discussion going again in context.

Looking forward to it....

 

[Piggy]

A clarification

In this thread, a sub-theory was proposed -- at my request -- in the form of a definition, or set of properties: "The supernatural sole creator and ruler of the universe."

Although I requested a definition be provided, I did not provide the definition. It is not mine. In fact, it was taken (by another board member) from the OED.

However, this was the definition offered as a description of a God which could be said to possibly be real. It is the one which was on the table when this thread split from the original thread.

It is the one offered as the potential salvation of God-theory.

 

[thaiboxerken]

Please read the reposts. The answer will become clear when you do.

Not really. They seem to be directed towards a specific god. Which one is that?

 

[Kopji]

Have you answered the assertion that even if there were no god(s), we should behave as if there were?

 

[Piggy]

Not really. They seem to be directed towards a specific god. Which one is that?

As described above, one of the problems with discussing the potential reality of "god" is the plasticity of the term.

When we examine it, there turns out to be nothing we can meaningfully say about it, because there are no core qualities which adhere to it. The term allows an apparently infinite range of entities to fall within its spectrum, many of which are mutually exclusive.

When taken together with the other problems with the concept, it turns out that "god" is actually a non-concept.

So, given the total absence of support for the idea, the need to revise (even gut) the notion in order to prevent it from contradicting verified observation, etc. etc. etc., there is no reasonable claim for the validity of god-theory.

Yet the last-gasp argument is put forth, that we cannot close the book on God because one of the definitions in the candy-dish might be real.

Yet it is not reasonable to argue for the validity of the concept merely on the unsupported claim that some unspecified sub-theory, among the multitude of often mutually exclusive sub-theories, might possibly be valid. In order for this argument to be taken seriously, an example must be provided.

In the parent thread, one definition was proposed: The supernatural sole creator and ruler of the universe. ("Supernatural" is defined here as "not merely what is described by the scientific laws of nature".)

So this is the definition we are bound to consider, unless another one is proposed for consideration.

Here is another repost from the original thread, providing a summary:

Why do we need a definition anyway?

Here's the situation. We have a concept that's in serious trouble: The God-concept.

It has its roots in superstition, there's no valid evidence for it, there's no universal agreement on any core set of qualities, every time it's come up against a challenge from rational/naturalistic/scientific inquiry it has lost and as a result it's been so re-rigged over the years that in order to avoid violating known fact it has to be defined as an indefinable entity in no-space and no-time.

Time to close the book on it, right?

"Wait!" we hear. "Stop! You can't do that."

"Why not?" we ask.

"Because it might correspond to something that actually exists. There's no evidence that it does, but it might. It could."

"Well, there's a problem there," we point out. "You see, there's no universally accepted set of core qualities, and in fact many proposed models are mutually exclusive, so there's no meaningful way to even search for or test the concept. It's simply incoherent. Sorry." Once again we begin closing the book in order to file it among the discarded notions of history, along with phlogiston, cosmic ether, sympathetic magic, and telepathy.

"Wait!"

"What now?"

"You can't do that. It's possible that one of those models might be right."

"Really?" we say, reopening the book and uncapping our pen, ready to take notes to guide our search. "Which one?"


That's why a definition is needed.

The God-concept, in light of modern knowledge of the world, turns out to be a non-concept, an unsupported and incoherent meme of bad parentage that's never won a challenge. We've found no God, only the idea of God, and modern rational theory has a perfectly good explanation for that.

Anyone who contends otherwise better be prepared to pony up with a description, a set of meaningful criteria for this alleged concept which doesn't in some way fall on its own sword. Otherwise the claim that "it might exist" -- the last argument left -- is not credible.

If you want to contend that it might exist, then given the state of affairs, you need to say exactly what might exist, and bring out a set of criteria that sufficiently describes it in a way that doesn't just re-create the current chaos in microcosm by covering a whole range of conflicting ideas, or a set of ideas that include ungodlike entities.

I'll believe it when I see it. And I ain't waiting up nights.

We've had all of human history, and nothing. At every turn, the concept gets weaker and even less coherent.

Just asserting that "It might be real" doesn't cut it anymore.

 

[Piggy]

Have you answered the assertion that even if there were no god(s), we should behave as if there were?

Why is that meaningful and relevant?

Even if there were no phlogiston, we should behave as if there were.

This is true.

Yet there is no phlogiston. There is oxygen.

 

[thaiboxerken]

Your arguments don't really apply to some gods, like Thor, for example.

 

[Kopji]

Why is that meaningful and relevant?

Even if there were no phlogiston, we should behave as if there were.

This is true.

Yet there is no phlogiston. There is oxygen.

Hey I like that, good example.

I see this argument come from a couple of sources, one is the Pope. It is expressed something like - 'we should act like we have faith in God, even if we cannot have faith'. (paraphrased, I can look it up). I think this is based on the belief that faith is a source of knowledge about morality(?).

The other is of Islamic origin but sounds about the same - Without a belief in God we are left with taking the place of a god, and this lack of thankfulness or humility before something greater is fundamentally destructive. Therefore belief becomes rational because it is essential for evolutionary survival, etc.

 

[Piggy]

Your arguments don't really apply to some gods, like Thor, for example.

Thor is one of the gods in the candy-dish. He is relevant insofar as he contributes to the incontrovertible evidence of the fatal incoherence of the uber-concept of "god".

The more specific arguments don't apply to Thor, because he does not fit under the definition which was proposed as a candidate for actual phenomenal reality.

 

[Dark Jaguar]

I'd agree to that level of atheism, the "same as elvis still walking around" and "geocentrism" thing, but to me that still falls in the same realm as "until evidence says otherwise" because if evidence did show up, yeah I'd accept the earth was flat. I just don't think that evidence will be showing up.

But to me that's "weak" atheism. Strong, to me, is blind faith there are no gods and the utter refusal to admit any evidence to the contrary. That view, of course, is silly. Then again, I don't know of too many atheists who hold this view. Well, maybe certain philosophy students...

 

[Piggy]

belief becomes rational because it is essential for evolutionary survival, etc.

This is actually an important point, which in the earlier thread wasn't brought up in this way, but which was highly relevant and discussed.

This is what was meant by the observation that there is a rational/naturalistic explanation for the persistence of the concept of God, or of belief in God.

I truly believe that if all scripture were destroyed, and all knowledge and memory and understanding of God or gods were erased from all human minds today, the year would not be out before religion had arisen anew.

The human mind is not evolved to always perceive truth. Why should it be?

The human mind is evolved to survive, and where accuracy is demanded, it will be accurate. But where accuracy is a detriment, illusion is the better option.

The human mind is a meaning-generator, a purpose-generator, an obsessive pattern-seeker with a demonstrated preference for human forms. It is self-centered. If it did not generate the perception of God, we would be scratching our heads and seeking a reason why.

 

[Piggy]

I'd agree to that level of atheism, the "same as elvis still walking around" and "geocentrism" thing, but to me that still falls in the same realm as "until evidence says otherwise" because if evidence did show up, yeah I'd accept the earth was flat. I just don't think that evidence will be showing up.

But to me that's "weak" atheism. Strong, to me, is actually believing there are no gods and the utter refusal to admit any evidence to the contrary. That view, of course, is silly.

It's not silly at all.

Your example is equivalent to saying, "If Santa Claus showed up and took me on a ride in his flying sleigh, I'd believe in Santa Claus". Yet this is no reason to hold out hope that evidence for Santa Claus might someday appear.