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9/11 Foreknowledge - Did they just let it happen?

Johnny Pixels

Graduate Poster
Joined
Nov 24, 2005
Messages
1,389
I dunno if this is covered elsewhere, but a severe simplification of the whole 9/11 CT is that the government let it happen. This gets rid of the whole exploding building etc, and merely focuses on the rather more shadowy world of politics.

How would you show that they didn't have prior knowledge of 9/11, and then let it happen so they could take advantage of the situation? How would you tell the difference between this and plain old incompetence?
 
The term used is LIHOP, Let It Happen On Purpose. As opposed to MIHOP: Made It Happen On Purpose. LIHOP is usually pretty straight-forward, wheras MIHOP has a thousand variations to cover gaping holes in the idea.
 
i think the farthest id go with LIHOP is that they knew the hijackers were up to something, but figured it was just goign to be a standard hijacking, land, pay ransom, everyone goes home

i cant reasonably believe that anyone in the govt knew over 3000 registered voters would be killed and allowed it to happen
 
i think the farthest id go with LIHOP is that they knew the hijackers were up to something, but figured it was just goign to be a standard hijacking, land, pay ransom, everyone goes home

i cant reasonably believe that anyone in the govt knew over 3000 registered voters would be killed and allowed it to happen

Playing Devil's advocate, I'd argue that getting the country united behind them on the war on terror would outweigh the negative impact of letting the country get attacked, as it did, and then allow them to rush through legislation to secure their position in the name of protecting the country.

Without the tinfoil hat on, I'd say the risk was too great. Being found out for murdering 3000 people would be devestating.

I'm just trying to build a case for when I come up against this idea.
 
Playing Devil's advocate, I'd argue that getting the country united behind them on the war on terror would outweigh the negative impact of letting the country get attacked, as it did, and then allow them to rush through legislation to secure their position in the name of protecting the country.

Without the tinfoil hat on, I'd say the risk was too great. Being found out for murdering 3000 people would be devestating.

I'm just trying to build a case for when I come up against this idea.

The key to the LIHOP approach is finding the smallest number of people who would have (1) found out about the plot and (2) been able to make sure no one else found out about the plot; without anyone blowing the whistle.
 
I guess it actively works against the controlled demolition theories, because there's no guarentee that the hijacking would work, and there's no way the CD CTs would let their theory go.

The same goes with the LIHOP theory too I suppose, because there's no guarentees it'll work.

The problem would be that the attack would be discovered fairly low down in the intelligence gathering structure, so everyone from there on upwards knows about it, all the way to the president. Then when the order doesn't come back down to do something about it, everyone in that chain is going to get suspicious. Unless there are two separate chains for incoming intelligence, and outgoing actions, but then there's still all the people from the upward chain who would talk after 9/11, asking why nothing was done.
 
I guess it actively works against the controlled demolition theories, because there's no guarentee that the hijacking would work, and there's no way the CD CTs would let their theory go.

The same goes with the LIHOP theory too I suppose, because there's no guarentees it'll work.

The problem would be that the attack would be discovered fairly low down in the intelligence gathering structure, so everyone from there on upwards knows about it, all the way to the president. Then when the order doesn't come back down to do something about it, everyone in that chain is going to get suspicious. Unless there are two separate chains for incoming intelligence, and outgoing actions, but then there's still all the people from the upward chain who would talk after 9/11, asking why nothing was done.

But isn't that basically what happened? I think the only question may be whether it was LIHOP or incompetence.
 
But isn't that basically what happened? I think the only question may be whether it was LIHOP or incompetence.

That's the problem I've had while thinking it through. How to show which of the two it was. Is there firm evidence to show that the LIHOP idea is wrong? I'd say its ridiculous because of the logistics of actively covering it up, because just turning a blind eye wouldn't work. I'd just like to have some firmer evidence than a thought experiment if possible.
 
That's the problem I've had while thinking it through. How to show which of the two it was. Is there firm evidence to show that the LIHOP idea is wrong? I'd say its ridiculous because of the logistics of actively covering it up, because just turning a blind eye wouldn't work. I'd just like to have some firmer evidence than a thought experiment if possible.

For it to truly be LIHOP then there had to be someone who knew definitively (or with ~90% certainty) what the plan of the hijackers was. And even then it's still worthwhile to apply Hanlon's Razor.
 
Trying to prove LIHOP didn't happen, seems, to me, to involve proving a negative.

How can you prove someone didn't know about something?

Especially given anything like this is going to be (for obvious reasons) classified.

In a situation like this, before I can really consider LIHOP I'd need to hear a solid motive.

Why let it happen?

I have heard a lot of proposed motives, but to my way of thinking, none of them fit.

After having looked through the complete 9/11 timeline, I wrote a bit of a speculative opinion piece on how 9/11 came to happen.

This was my conclusion:

(Just want to emphasise this is PURELY speculation)

Three factors are involved in how 9/11 came to happen:

FACTOR ALPHA
Liberal courts. In the desire of a free and fair court system, much of the west, the US included, seems to have a fairly incompetent justice system, in that a high portion of people guilty of crimes are found not guilty because of technicalities, flaws in law, failure by prosecutors to gather evidence in precisely the right way, etc. The end result being, no matter how strong the evidence arrayed against a suspect, there can never be any guarantee that they will be convicted, and if convicted, will receive an appropriate sentence.

FACTOR BRAVO
Arrogance. This is perhaps too strong a word, but perhaps not. Essentially an over-confidence in the abilities of its own systems and people for achieving their objectives. This covers both an exaggerated opinion of intelligence abilities and of military/defence
capabilities.

FACTOR CHARLIE
Hesitancy. What I mean is a reluctance to commit to military actions in order to address a situation. In particular, a reluctance to commit questionable strikes and pre-emptive strikes.

Okay, now how is this relevant?

Over the course of the decades prior to 9/11 the US has had an enormous number of opportunities to take direct action against various members of different terrorist networks, most notably members of Al Qaeda, and in particular those involved in 9/11. These opportunities varied, from actually capturing known terrorists (but letting them go), to being offered terrorists by other countries and refusing them, to knowing the location of terrorists in the USA and not acting.

Now, the ALPHA, BRAVO, and CHARLIE factors mentioned caused problems for any three of the potential actions in each case.

Firstly, the obvious action to take when you know the location of a significant terrorist is to send people to kill them. However CHARLIE steps into play here. The US has had policy of not assassinating people. While admirable, it is also, I think, unwise. I'm not advocating assassination as a way to solve political problems, but it should always be there as an option.

This is an example of a wider American reluctance to become involved in military actions. This is not new. America was incredibly reluctant to enter both world wars, and countless actions post-World War 2. In Somalia, for example, thousands of troops sat in ships off the coast of Mogadishu with heavy armour doing nothing while a hundred lightly armoured and armed infantry were caught in an enormous gun fight. The government even pulled support such as gunships as this was considered too high profile.

Even Post 9/11, when it is clear that America's strategy has failed miserably, they sent only 150,000 troops into Iraq after military commanders said a minimum of 300,000 were needed.

Countless opportunities to snatch or kill identified enemies of the US have been missed because of a reluctance to deploy clandestine operations on foreign soil. I am guessing the much quoted fear of upsetting political allies or creating a crisis are responses to the failed Operation Eagle Claw (attempt to rescue US hostages in Iranian Embassy). This response itself is unfair I believe. It is too easy to write off Eagle Claw as a "dismal failure". I disagree. The gutsy and risky plan had ever chance of succeeding. It only had a single flaw in its plan (though a big one) which was immediately addressed through extension of US capabilities.

Given that US reluctance to execute military operations, the response of killing terrorists must be ruled out.

That leaves two options.

One - arrest the terrorists and put them on trial

Two - allow the terrorist to go free and continue to monitor them

One would, of course, be preferred by the FBI, who are primarily law enforcers - they want to catch bad guys.
Two would be preferred by the CIA, who are in intelligence and are interested in gathering information about targets so the military can act (which, of course, they won't, due to factor CHARLIE)

ALPHA causes major problems for One. I believe factor ALPHA is primarily responsible for the enormous number of times the FBI either failed to act on evidence and arrest a terrorist, or let a terrorist go that they had in their custody.

There are a number of problems with putting a terrorist on trial, aside from the simple truth that in the west you can never guarantee a conviction, regardless of your evidence.

In these cases, one of the big problems was the nature of the evidence. Western courts have very vigorous conditions for what is acceptable as evidence and what isn't. It does not favour convicting terrorists (a large number of those caught are actually convicted on minor crimes such as passport forgery).

There are three basic ways in which intelligence (evidence) is gathered. Open gathering involves anything where the target is aware of what you are doing. An interview, for example.

Covert gathering is when you are open about what you are doing (official) but the target is not aware of it. For example getting a court order to tap someone's phone and using conversations recorded.

The final one is clandestine gathering. This involves actions that officially never even happened. In other words spying. Most evidence gathered by intelligence agencies in a clandestine manner would not be acceptable as evidence in a court. Unfortunately, virtually all information gathered on terrorists is gained in this way. Further more, revelation of such evidence at trial will require exposure of significant intelligence assets. These are likely to undermine ongoing intelligence operations and potentially risk lives. So you can't reveal this information until you've got someone significant on trial (like Osama bin Laden).

This is essentially the great flaw in using spy systems to apprehend criminals for trial. That is not what they are for. They are for gathering intelligence so that military operations can be executed. The evidence gathered by them is never intended to stand up to the rigours of civil court, and nor should it. Military intelligence is not about investigating (or even preventing) crimes. It is about assessing threats.

So, there are obvious risks in taking a known terrorist to trial. At best, the guy walks free, at worst anything in place to gather intelligence on the wider terrorist network is exposed and the entire infrastructure has to be rebuilt (which can take decades).

The only other option open is to let them go and continue to monitor them, and I suspect in the majority of cases this is the action that the US decided to take.

And herein comes factor BRAVO. The major reason people believe the US government had something to do with 9/11 is that they can't accept that Osama Bin Laden and associates managed to run circles around the US intelligence community for several decades, including having double (or even triple) agents working with the CIA. It is inconceivable that the US system for protecting the country was simply beaten by better opponents (especially given those opponents were a bunch of "cave-dwelling towel-heads"). This is extreme arrogance.

From what I can see, Al Qaeda have an exceptional understanding of the American political mindset and their judicial system, and I believe they quite effectively used these factors against the US efforts to stop them. They exploited CIA involvement in Afghanistan and the prevailing US fear of the "Red Terror", they exploited the US' weak immigration policies, and they exploited the US' reliance on Mid-east oil resources. They did these things brilliantly. Not because of the incompetence of US officials (or even compliance).

Lastly, I believe US over confidence also led to officials at policy level to grossly underestimate the threat these terrorists possessed. Thus, with policy the way it was, even when the few agents at the lower levels identified threats and could have acted, policy prevented it (through budget restraints, etc...) such as with the Phoenix FBI Office Counter-Terrorist investigations.

In considering these three factors, ALPHA, BRAVO, and CHARLIE, I have found them evident not only throughout US history, but throughout world history.

With the exception of the liberal courts (only relevant in the modern age where democratic societies have the naive notion that you can simply arrest and trial enemies of the state) these factors (BRAVO and CHARLIE) occur throughout history.

Edited to Add:
An example can be seen in the First Gulf War. Had the western world had the willingness to use force to remove Saddam, and had they not had the arrogance to think they could contain him and make him do what they wanted simply by using the UN, much may have changed. Osama bin Laden's war against the US started because of the US presence in Saudi Arabia. Had Saddam been removed in 1991, with the full efforts of the United Nations, both the war in Afghanistan and the war in Iraq would never have needed to be fought.

-Andrew

Edited to fix layout and tweak a few things.
 
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a less strong word for arrogance could be complacency, but otherwise a very good rundown
 
Cheers Gumboot, that's good stuff, especially the unwillingness to commit covert acts and become engaged in war, because it is in direct conflict with the CT claims that the government is acting to create war for political gain.
 
Cheers Gumboot, that's good stuff, especially the unwillingness to commit covert acts and become engaged in war, because it is in direct conflict with the CT claims that the government is acting to create war for political gain.

:D

Yup that's exactly the problem I have with the LIHOP claim, I don't see motive. I guess it's probably a filter thing... they see every little example of the US going out to conquer the world as evidence of imperialism, but ignore all the other times the US didn't do this.

I think Colin Powell summed up my thoughts best when he responded to the former ArchBishop of Canterbury's claim that the US preferred "hard power" (military force) over "soft power" (diplomacy):

It was not soft power that freed Europe. It was hard power. And what followed immediately after hard power? Did the United States ask for dominion over a single nation in Europe? No. Soft power came in the Marshall Plan. Soft power came with American GIs who put their weapons down once the war was over and helped all those nations rebuild. We did the same thing in Japan.

We have gone forth from our shores repeatedly over the last hundred years and we’ve done this as recently as the last year in Afghanistan and put wonderful young men and women at risk, many of whom have lost their lives, and we have asked for nothing except enough ground to bury them in, and otherwise we have returned home to... live our own lives in peace.

-Andrew
 
In these cases, one of the big problems was the nature of the evidence. Western courts have very vigorous conditions for what is acceptable as evidence and what isn't. It does not favour convicting terrorists (a large number of those caught are actually convicted on minor crimes such as passport forgery).

Short of catching them actually in possession of a bomb I see no way around this. Without this, no other evidence can ever prove that someone is going to commit a terrorist act. The only alternative is to lock people up because someone thinks they might do something, which seems to be what the US and UK governments want, but contradicts the basic principle of modern law -innocent until proven guilty. Surely it is better to charge them with minor charges than lock up people who might be innocent?

Otherwise, very good argument.
 
Short of catching them actually in possession of a bomb I see no way around this. Without this, no other evidence can ever prove that someone is going to commit a terrorist act. The only alternative is to lock people up because someone thinks they might do something, which seems to be what the US and UK governments want, but contradicts the basic principle of modern law -innocent until proven guilty. Surely it is better to charge them with minor charges than lock up people who might be innocent?


I think, ultimately, that is the problem the west is making with terrorists. We treat them like criminals. They are not criminals. They are enemies. It is a war, whether we like it or not.

The problem is, we don't really have a system for fighting this kind of war.

-Andrew
 
I think, ultimately, that is the problem the west is making with terrorists. We treat them like criminals. They are not criminals. They are enemies. It is a war, whether we like it or not.

The problem is, we don't really have a system for fighting this kind of war.

-Andrew
Yet . . . unless you include Delta Force. (Gratuitous Chuck Norris move reference, yay me! :D )

Really, there is no such thing as Delta Force. The guy in the black suit told me so! ;)

DR
 
Short of catching them actually in possession of a bomb I see no way around this. Without this, no other evidence can ever prove that someone is going to commit a terrorist act. The only alternative is to lock people up because someone thinks they might do something, which seems to be what the US and UK governments want, but contradicts the basic principle of modern law -innocent until proven guilty. Surely it is better to charge them with minor charges than lock up people who might be innocent?

Otherwise, very good argument.
If we ever find out what truly happened pre-9/11 (Able Danger and whatnot) I suspect that we'll discover that these 19 men (20 including Moussaoui) were being surveilled pretty closely, and that intelligence agents knew they were up to something but hadn't yet worked out exactly what they were up to and were expecting to gather more evidence (such as explosives purchases) before rounding them up. This would explain their soft handling of Moussaoui--they didn't want to tip their hand before they had hard evidence of a plot. I suspect the handling of foreknowledge can be reduced to tragic miscalculation in a system ill-equipped to handle terrorism.
 
If we ever find out what truly happened pre-9/11 (Able Danger and whatnot) I suspect that we'll discover that these 19 men (20 including Moussaoui) were being surveilled pretty closely, and that intelligence agents knew they were up to something but hadn't yet worked out exactly what they were up to and were expecting to gather more evidence (such as explosives purchases) before rounding them up. This would explain their soft handling of Moussaoui--they didn't want to tip their hand before they had hard evidence of a plot. I suspect the handling of foreknowledge can be reduced to tragic miscalculation in a system ill-equipped to handle terrorism.


Another issue (as I understand it) is that different agencies had different pieces of the puzzle, and didn't share that info. For example, one group (FBI, I believe) knew they were taking pilot training. CIA knew that al-Queda was planning something, etc. Inter-agency communication failed here, as well. We (the U.S.) had enough info to put the picture together, but the right hand wasn't talking to the left hand, and the left foot wasn't talking to the knees, and the spleen was all out on it's own.
 
Another issue (as I understand it) is that different agencies had different pieces of the puzzle, and didn't share that info. For example, one group (FBI, I believe) knew they were taking pilot training. CIA knew that al-Queda was planning something, etc. Inter-agency communication failed here, as well. We (the U.S.) had enough info to put the picture together, but the right hand wasn't talking to the left hand, and the left foot wasn't talking to the knees, and the spleen was all out on it's own.
The core problem is the issue of courts, evidence, and public discussion of extremely sensitive material (unique HUMINT sources) in the course of a legal proceeding against a terrorist nabbed before he does anything. (IMO, better a quiet knife)

For source security, and "rice bowl," reasons, law enforcement and intelligence groups develop separate stove pipes. It is my opinion that the 1970's era attacks on the CIA in Congress, which resulted in more thorough oversight as one of the few benefits, were a contributing cause to this stovepipe mentality.

The stovepiping problem had come to the surface during the Clinton administration. Volumes have been written on that issue, but I don't see that a great deal has been done about it, even with the creation of the DHS. This creates a seam, for both an internal plot (more on that anon) and any underground operatives to slip through. If you just leave the seam there, in time someone will slip through it.

A series of decisions and actions, or lack of them, occurred between March and September 2001 (Clarke and others discuss this at length) that led to a curious lack of emphasis on terrorists, and counter terrorist operations. For a plot to work and not be exposed, the plausible deniability piece begins with non-benign neglect, and then gets fit into the PNAC position of forcing a change in the Middle East. The need for a cataclysmic event to evoke public support is a necessary pre condition for a war. Proving that those two pieces were indeed fit together will require, IMO, a confession by a participant in such decisions "to not do this yet." I don't think that will ever be forthcoming, absent "robust interrogation methods."

The other evidence against that intra government plot theory was the well known round of defense spending cuts that were coming in force structure.

When Gore lost to Bush in 2000, and Cheney/Rumsfeld wandered back into the arena of defense policy, a lot of us (I was on active duty at the time) predicted a further reduction in forces, and more spending on toys, within the first two years of the administration. The first ripples of that tremor were being felt in the summer of 2001 as Rumsfeld began driving his "unclog the Pentagon bureaucracy" efforts. (The common number of Carrier Battle Groups was being called at 8, versus the current 12)

If the PNAC crowd were going to start a war, they'd not first gut the forces they were going to fight it with -- which is exactly what the Secretary of Defense was intent on doing with the force structure.

Well, they wouldn't do it unless these same self proclaimed experts believed that "war can be done on the cheap." The old "silver bullet" mentality leaps to the fore.

If you've read Cobra II, or seen the delta between recommended (military staffs) and approved (sec def) force levels, it becomes obvious someone thought war on the cheap -- one of the oldest strategic shortcomings in the book -- was the mental framework.

That leaves us still wondering at was going on inside a few critically placed heads.

Plots and conspiracies typically require an insider's betrayal, or gaffe, to expose. Until such happens in the case of our hypothetical insiders "let it happen and make it look like we just goofed up" scenario, I don't think the defnintive gaffe, nor confession, is available for review.

DR
 
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