Some observations on the problem of evil

[Robin]

If a greater good was achieved by providing the world a choice to ease the suffering of the tsunami victims, how exactly does that affect our ability to choose to ease the suffering of the tsunami victims?

I mean let’s face it, this scenario is so utterly implausible as not to be worth even considering.

Let’s take one tiny example of this suffering, a father who was holding on tight to his baby found at the end that he was only holding onto an empty carry cot. I can almost begin to imagine his pain, but then my imagination fails me.

Now to suggest that this might be justified by providing me with the opportunity of popping down the bank and chucking some money into a relief fund is so contrary to my idea of morality as to appear utterly and unambiguously evil.

The idea that it could even justify the sum total of the world’s relief effort still seems utterly out of proportion. Not to mention all the other tragedies.

Now if God’s value system could be so incomprehensible to me as this would be – if this could somehow be good, then how could I possibly be qualified to judge good from evil?

 

[Tricky]

That is not a logic problem, that is a space problem.

LOL. You could say it is both. Logic depends on its assumptions. The assumption that we could live forever would also require the assumption that there is space for us to do so, given the other assumption that life includes reproduction.

In which case why are we talking about the Problem of Evil at all?

'Cause we just love to talk. Haven't you noticed? You don't seriously think it will resolve anything do you?

I can solve every philosophical problem in an instant as long as I am allowed to alter the problem. It is not that difficult.

In order to alter the problem, you must know what the problem is. In order to solve the "problem of evil" you must know what evil is. So before you can either solve it or alter it, you must have a comprehensive definition of "evil". Calling it "that which does not serve the greater good" only redirects the question to "What is the greater good?"

Personally, I think the word "evil" means nothing more than "that which is strongly against my moral code". That makes it a relative thing, not an absolute.

I could instantly solve every mathematical and scientific problem the same way.

That is why math and science are so careful to define their terms. The scientific definition of "life" is very strict, but even then, there are some things that can't be fit in the definition, such as viruses. Truly, mathematics is about the only thing where you can actually prove anything, because it allows no changing of definitions.

Philosophy, on the other hand, is awash in conflicting definitions, so proof is a very rare commodity there.

 

[Robin]

In order to alter the problem, you must know what the problem is. In order to solve the "problem of evil" you must know what evil is. So before you can either solve it or alter it, you must have a comprehensive definition of "evil". Calling it "that which does not serve the greater good" only redirects the question to "What is the greater good?"

However he is altering the definitions of God as well.

That is why math and science are so careful to define their terms. The scientific definition of "life" is very strict, but even then, there are some things that can't be fit in the definition, such as viruses. Truly, mathematics is about the only thing where you can actually prove anything, because it allows no changing of definitions.

Philosophy, on the other hand, is awash in conflicting definitions, so proof is a very rare commodity there.

Ironically, science which relies so much on precision does not use proofs. Philosophy which relies on so much imprecision is awash with "proofs".

 

[UndercoverElephant]

I fail to see how this follows logically. That a deity may not know the final outcome would not preclude his knowing all possible outcomes. It would still know the final outcome.

Eh?

Knowing that if you roll a dice, then you will either roll a 1, a 2, a 3, a 4, a 5 or a 6 isn't knowing the outcome of your dice roll.

 

[elliotfc]

I mean let’s face it, this scenario is so utterly implausible as not to be worth even considering.

Robin...you're the one who invokes omnipotence/omnisciensce...are you saying that such a scenario is outside of God's power?

Let’s take one tiny example of this suffering, a father who was holding on tight to his baby found at the end that he was only holding onto an empty carry cot. I can almost begin to imagine his pain, but then my imagination fails me.

Now to suggest that this might be justified by providing me with the opportunity of popping down the bank and chucking some money into a relief fund is so contrary to my idea of morality as to appear utterly and unambiguously evil.

Can suffering ever be justified in your morality Robin? Just wondering.

I think that suffering exists, first and foremost, for a causal reason, and not for a justification reason. Meaning, it happens because of what came before, and it doesn't happen because of what will come after. Now, as a *response* to suffering, yes, it can be an opportunity for good.

I too sympathize with the father. We diverge in one significant point. I think the father will see the son again, and you don't. I don't know what the father thinks.

The idea that it could even justify the sum total of the world’s relief effort still seems utterly out of proportion. Not to mention all the other tragedies.

I agree that the response to suffering doesn't justify it. Suffering isn't meant to be justified; rather, it is to be endured and then conquered. Good acts can be a way to fight against suffering; only the triumph of the Cross conquers it.

Now if God’s value system could be so incomprehensible to me as this would be – if this could somehow be good, then how could I possibly be qualified to judge good from evil?

I think every person is qualified to judge good from evil.

-Elliot

 

[Tricky]

However he is altering the definitions of God as well.

LOL. God is another thing that we don't have a comprehensive, detailed definition of.

Ironically, science which relies so much on precision does not use proofs. Philosophy which relies on so much imprecision is awash with "proofs".

That's true. Philosophy (at least many kinds of philosophy) attempts to "prove" that if you accept certain assumptions, the system is logically consistant. Science, on the other hand, works to get evidence for the assumptions. I guess you could say that science makes the assumption that real things have evidence, but I think that is an assumption that we must make unless we want to admit that we cannot possibly know anything about reality.

 

[chriswl]

I went to great lengths to explain this. No Tsumani -> No geological activity -> No hot/heavy/radioactive core -> No large magnetic field -> No protection from the solar wind -> all living things die.

And I explained why this was wrong. My virtual reality example shows how God could have given us experiences that were not subject to these limitations. If I can show even one way that this could be accomplished then it cannot be logically impossible. Your point about whether such a world could be considered "real" is irelevant to the PoE issue, especially as the inhabitants have no way of distinguishing "real" worlds from virtual ones.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

And I explained why this was wrong. My virtual reality example shows how God could have given us experiences that were not subject to these limitations.

And I explained why your response is invalid. The example you give is not of a real reality. First, you are requiring God to have invented virtual reality technology. Second, if you think about whether you would actually want to live in a "Stepford Wives" reality where everything was perfect I believe you will conclude that this would be indescribably nightmarish. What would be the point in living?

Aldous Huxley did a very good job of exposing our deluded thinking when it comes to utopian visions. What most humans think would be a utopian reality would in fact be close to the ultimate nightmare.

If I can show even one way that this could be accomplished then it cannot be logically impossible. Your point about whether such a world could be considered "real" is irelevant to the PoE issue, especially as the inhabitants have no way of distinguishing "real" worlds from virtual ones.

It is directly relevant. I am arguing that this is the best possible world. A world where everybody is hooked up to virtual reality machines providing them a fake reality is not a better possible world than this one. Wouldn't you rather live in a real world where things go wrong than an artificial world where everything was perfect and none of the people with whom you are interacting are real conscious humans? Are you seriously telling me you'd choose to live in such a world instead of living in this one????

 

[rocketdodger]

Wouldn't you rather live in a real world where things go wrong than an artificial world where everything was perfect and none of the people with whom you are interacting are real conscious humans? Are you seriously telling me you'd choose to live in such a world instead of living in this one????

You have not convinced us that living in a better world where we still interact with real conscious humans is not possible.

I can think of one way to make it better without loosing anything -- simply make it impossible for humans to take each other's lives.

 

[Bri]

But since we are intrinsically incapable of knowing what that moral consequence is then it does not matter what we choose.

What? We are incapable of knowing which decision is morally right? Robin, you can do better than that. You're skirting the issue.

Well for a start, let’s not misquote me OK? I said

But since we are intrinsically incapable of knowing what that moral consequence is then it does not matter what we choose.

A minor point, but if you're going to accuse someone of misquoting you, don't post the exact same quote that they quoted as evidence.

It is not my premise, it comes from the theist side of the debate and is called the “Agnostic Defense”. You are using it yourself when it suits your argument, so why is it somehow skirting the issue when I use it?

I've never used the argument that somehow our capability to understand the moral consequences of a choice vanishes if the choice was itself a greater good that came about as a result of human suffering. I don't know what the "Agnostic Defense" argument is (I still don't).

As an atheist I am capable of being fairly certain which decision is morally right because I believe that when suffering appears gratuitous that it probably really is gratuitous.

So, you're saying that if you suspected that the suffering resulted in a greater good (i.e. wasn't gratuitous) by providing you the opportinity to make a moral choice, that you would no longer be able to do what you believe to be morally right?

I suspect that the real reason you know what is morally right and morally wrong is because you can predict the probable immediate consequences of your actions. And a theist is capable of knowing which decision is morally right for the same reason. The question of whether or not a greater good was achieved because of the suffering is irrelevent to how one acts because even if a greater good was accomplished, one must still act in a way that one can reasonably predict is morally right.

But the argument is premised on the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent being that will ensure that each and every instance of suffering is individually and specifically necessary to some greater good.

Now I no longer know what decision is morally right because I have to believe that there is some purpose – unknown to me – behind each and every act of suffering.

Amazing! So many theists believe that an omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent being that will ensure that each and every instance of suffering is individually and specifically necessary to some greater good, yet are perfectly capable of acting in a moral way! How do you explain that? Generally, when some bit of logic doesn't seem to match reality, there is a problem with the logic.

But we don’t know what those moral consequences are. Remember we do not know what the greater good is. It may not be to provide a choice. It may be something else as I have explained.

But the greater good may in fact be to provide a choice. What if it is? The fact that we don't know means that we cannot eliminate that as a possibility, and therefore we are capable of making moral choices based on what we do know. Congratulations, you've answered your own question!

For the purposes of this argument we do not need to be omnipotent, because we know from the premise that some greater good will eventuate. So we have on the one hand our own actions which might result in good or bad, and then we have God’s greater good which we know will occur.

We should choose God’s certain greater good and not our own uncertain good or bad.

Why would you assume that the two are mutually exclusive? Theists don't assume that the two are mutually exclusive, for the very reasons you mentioned.

And, as I have said, for the purposes of this argument the foreseeable outcomes are that some greater good will occur regardless.

You keep saying this, but I still have trouble understanding your argument. How does the greatest good occur from failing to act in a moral way if the greater good that arrises from suffering is to provide the choice of acting in a moral way? Yes, a greater good occurs regardless, but the greatest good still depends on your acting in a moral way. In other words, if you don't act in a moral way, a greater good has occurred than if you didn't have a choice at all, but your acting in a moral way would still increase the resulting good even more. Let me illustrate:

• no suffering - good
• suffering, but presenting a choice to another person who makes the wrong choice - better
• suffering, but presenting a choice to another person who makes the right choice - best

The act of presenting a choice is a greater good than no suffering at all. But that doesn't change the fact that the correct moral choice still increases the good in the world compared to the incorrect moral choice.

Already addressed it. For a start you are assuming that we know what God’s motivations are. They might be nothing to do with offering a choice. We don’t know if the outcome of our actions will result in good or bad.

Please quote where I have assumed that we know God's motives. To the contrary, I am assuming that we have no idea what God's motives are. If we knew what God's motives are, then your argument would make some sense -- we could act or not act based on God's motives. But God's motives could be to offer a choice (or something similar in which the greater good would always occur but the greatest good would occur from us reacting in a morally right way). As such, we cannot use your argument as an excuse to not act in a morally right way.

If the opportunity to choose right and wrong could really justify some act of suffering then you have got to stand by this.

If the mere provision of choice justifies the suffering “regardless of the decision” then that good has been achieved.

Correct, that good has already been achieved, and may have absolutely nothing to do with any good that would be achieved by a bystander acting in a morally right way.

If it actually matters what our choice is then you have to lose the “regardless of the decision” part. You can’t have it both ways.

No idea what this means.

A further problem is that, as CS Lewis puts it “God’s good cannot be so far removed from our good that His black is our white, otherwise we are not saying ‘God is good’ we are saying ‘God is we know not what’”

Now if a human were to cause suffering in order to provide the opportunity for others to do good, we should consider this the worst kind of evil imaginable.

But if a Deity does it we consider this the best kind of good imaginable. So God’s good must be at the very opposite pole to ours.

It is true that God's "good" couldn't involve, for example, murder without any reason whatsoever. But killing is justified by humans as long as the forseeable outcome is better than not killing (such as killing someone in self-defense, for example). Likewise, even though we may not be able to understand the reasons, killing by God would be considered "good" if it results in a greater good that is forseeable by God. That is undoubtedly what C.S. Lewis meant.

This simply means that God is responsible for the unforseeable (by us) greater good, while we are responsible only for the forseeable good. In other words, God's morality would appear to differ from ours due to his omniscience (since we cannot forsee what God can forsee, we cannot determine the consequences of an action by God). That is undoubtedly the case, as atheists often like to bring up events from the Bible that would undoubtedly be considered evil if a person were to do them.

-Bri

 

[UndercoverElephant]

You have not convinced us that living in a better world where we still interact with real conscious humans is not possible.

I can think of one way to make it better without loosing anything -- simply make it impossible for humans to take each other's lives.

"simply"?

How are you going to simply do this? There is only one way: to deny human beings free will. I am right back where I was in the opening post. Any world where human beings have free will is better than a world where they don't, even if it is possible to prevent murder in the world where they don't. If we have free will then it is surely the most valuable thing we have. I would not trade it in in order to live in a world where nobody murdered anybody else. What could be more valuable than metaphysical freedom of this sort? Nothing, as far as I can see.

Many of my freedoms are compromised in this world, and many people spend their whole lives fighting to achieve some sort of freedom or other - usually freedom from oppresion by other human beings. But what you are suggesting is much worse. You are advocating denying human beings the freedom to act and speak freely on a metaphysical level. You are actually claiming that it would be better to have God employed as a sort of metaphysical policeman, intervening to prevent you from acting freely. I cannot believe you have actually thought through the consequences of living in such a world. If I found myself in such a position then I would immediately commit suicide. Life would not be worth living, because I would have been denied the freedom to act as an individual conscious entity - I would have been robbed of the very thing that makes my life worth living. Do you really want God looking over your shoulder at every moment, denying you the ability to act freely if you are considering doing something ethically suspect? Really??? Could you actually bear to continue existing under such circumstances?

I would rather be locked up in prison for the rest of my life than denied the metaphysical freedom to act immorally. In fact, I would rather be dead than denied that freedom.

You are sovereign over your actions. You have free will. You are actually advocating giving up that sovereignty! Sorry, but I think this is completely insane. You cannot possibly mean what you say. You are free, and you are claiming the world would be better if you weren't.

 

[Bri]

Yet when I use this argument I am somehow "skirting the issue"

I've no idea what argument you claim you were using.

Read his paragraph again. That is not what he said.

I did re-read it and may still misunderstand what he said. His argument assumes that we have an "instinctive assumption that suffering is a bad thing" which is certainly not the case. Suffering is only bad if the forseeable consequences are no better than the suffering itself. It's not "bad" to give a life-saving injection to a child is it?

Again, you are assuming that you know God's motivations. We are incapable of knowing what the greater good is, so why assume that it is to provide a choice to help? Especially when this sounds so completely unreasonable.

You'll have to show me where I have assumed to know God's motivations. Quite the opposite -- the fact that we don't know God's motivations means that we cannot use them as an excuse to act or not act immorally. It is completely reasonable to assume that an omnibenevolent God must have motivations that increase good regardless of our decisions, and that our decisions must further increase good only if we act in a morally good way. I've provided one scenario by which this might be accomplished, but by no means claim that it is the only possibility.

-Bri

 

[rocketdodger]

"simply"?

How are you going to simply do this? There is only one way: to deny human beings free will.

Where on earth do you get this conclusion from?

You probably mean free action, but we are already denied that anyway. I want to fly. I want to be capable of telekinesis. I want to be able to switch sexes at my whim. I want to have predator like thermal vision. Can I do any of these -- no.

You probably also mean that for this to be simply done in our universe, considering the current human form, we would need to be denied free will. Well, I agree. But nobody said that the human form couldn't be altered or the laws of the universe changed.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Where on earth do you get this conclusion from?

You probably mean free action, but we are already denied that anyway.

No, I meant free will. This thread is a rejection of the argument from evil against the existence of God, on the basis that human beings have free will. Free will is not merely "free action". "Free action" is compatible with determinism. I am not talking about compatibilism. I am talking about libertarian, co-creational free will. That means that the course of history and of individual human lives is not predetermined. This means that you actually have real control over what happens to you and that human beings are responsible for the course of history, not God. In the world of the compatibilist, that freedom is nothing but an illusion - it might have felt like your actions were free, but actually they were not. Instead, the whole course of your life would be predetermined by the laws of physics.

I want to fly. I want to be capable of telekinesis. I want to be able to switch sexes at my whim.

All of these things involve breaking physical laws. Free will does not include the ability to break the laws of physics. It only includes the capability to act freely within them.

You probably also mean that for this to be simply done in our universe, considering the current human form, we would need to be denied free will. Well, I agree. But nobody said that the human form couldn't be altered or the laws of the universe changed.

Then you are talking about some sort of world that bears no resemblance whatsoever to our own. In which case, I have no idea what you might mean.

Having libertarian free will is the ultimate gift from God - but the price is the existence of human-created evil. God has delegated to us the power to create the future, then we blame him for what we have created - and in your case we are arguing that we should never have been given that freedom in the first place.

 

[chriswl]

It is directly relevant. I am arguing that this is the best possible world. A world where everybody is hooked up to virtual reality machines providing them a fake reality is not a better possible world than this one. Wouldn't you rather live in a real world where things go wrong than an artificial world where everything was perfect and none of the people with whom you are interacting are real conscious humans? Are you seriously telling me you'd choose to live in such a world instead of living in this one????

You are mixing together two separate issues here. Would I want to live in a supposedly perfect world? Perhaps not, it's hard to imagine what such a world would be like. But a virtual world does not have to be anyone's idea of utopia, it can be exactly like this world but with a few small tweaks to make it incrementally better e.g. no earthquakes. In what way would a virtual world, that was identical to this world apart from the absence of earthquakes, be worse than this world? It would clearly be a better world, if only slightly. If you object simply on the ground that it is virtual then I would ask you how you know that this world isn't virtual anyway?

 

[chriswl]

I did re-read it and may still misunderstand what he said. His argument assumes that we have an "instinctive assumption that suffering is a bad thing" which is certainly not the case. Suffering is only bad if the forseeable consequences are no better than the suffering itself.

Quite obviously if suffering now, leads to less net suffering in the future then it may be justified. But we are still making the assumption that sufferring is bad. If our morality is based on the Christian principle of "do unto others as you would have them do unto you" then this pretty much implies that we must act to reduce sufferring, because none of us want to suffer.

 

[chriswl]

Having libertarian free will is the ultimate gift from God

How can libertarian free will be a gift if there is no way we can distinguish it from compatibilist free will? Why would you care about having something which, when you have it, you can't even tell that you have it? And why would we choose to have this invisible, undetectable "gift" when it comes at the price of so much human misery?

 

[UndercoverElephant]

You are mixing together two separate issues here. Would I want to live in a supposedly perfect world? Perhaps not, it's hard to imagine what such a world would be like.

Exactly. We look at the terrible state of this world and assume that there must be something better than this which is at least possible. But when we actually think of what we would have to change to create that better world, it's not actually at all obvious.

But a virtual world does not have to be anyone's idea of utopia, it can be exactly like this world but with a few small tweaks to make it incrementally better e.g. no earthquakes.

Yes, but along with those small tweaks there is a great big negative factor - it's not real anymore. Your argument depends on this not being a particularly big deal. It's a big deal to me. I want my reality real. Christ, if I didn't I'd just dose myself up to the eyeballs with tranquilisers - that'd solve the problem, wouldn't it?

In what way would a virtual world, that was identical to this world apart from the absence of earthquakes, be worse than this world?

It would not be real!!!!

It would clearly be a better world, if only slightly. If you object simply on the ground that it is virtual then I would ask you how you know that this world isn't virtual anyway?

I don't, but if I thought it was then I would go insane.

 

[chriswl]

I don't, but if I thought it was then I would go insane.

So you believe the world is "real" because you would go insane if you didn't? No problem. You would choose to believe exactly the same thing for exactly the same reason in a virtual world. You would be as convinced that your world is real as you are now. And I would be just as convinced that it is a completely unimportant distinction.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

How can libertarian free will be a gift if there is no way we can distinguish it from compatibilist free will?

You mean empirically? It's not an empirical question.

However, we certainly can distinguish libertarian free will from compatibilist free will. They are completely different concepts. In one case, the future is indeterminate - created by the actions of metaphysically free sentient creatures, and in the other the future is already predetermined and the sentient creatures are unwittingly no more free than if they were made of clockwork. There is a massive difference between these two situations - they have massively different implications and consequences.

And why would we choose to have this invisible, undetectable "gift" when it comes at the price of so much human misery?

Because the alternative is metaphysical slavery. You seem to think the only things which matter in this life are visible (physical, detectable) objects. This is not true. What could be more valuable than the freedom to determine your own destiny!? If you don't understand this, I have no idea how to explain it to you. If you had to choose between the freedom to determine your own destiny and living in a co-ordinated reality where you have no control whatsoever over your decisions and destiny you are trying to tell me you would choose the latter. I simply do not believe you. I think if you were offered the choice you would choose free will every time, whatever you are telling me now. These are not small issues. We are talking about the reason for unavoidable evil in this world and about the ability of human beings to co-create reality. The reason that it is worth the price of so much human misery is that it provides life/existence with meaning that would be completely absent without it. Nothing, nothing at all, is more important than this. It is the baseline requirement for a reality worth existing in.

You are seriously asking me why I want the ability to influence my own destiny? I don't understand why you have to ask the question, or why you believe you would voluntarily give up that power over your own life, even if it allowed the elimination of human-created evil.