Some observations on the problem of evil

[Bri]

But it doesn't follow that our world provides just the right amount of struggle and challenge in just the right circumstances to be the best possible world. In fact it clearly doesn't - there is much suffering that serves no such purpose.

Can you prove that there is much suffering that serves no greater purpose, or are you stating that as an opinion?

-Bri

 

[Robin]

That doesn't seem to follow necessarily. If the greater good of the suffering is to provide a choice, then indeed the suffering is for a greater good regardless of the decision, and the decision also has its own moral consequences.

But since we are intrinsically incapable of knowing what that moral consequence is then it does not matter what we choose.

We don't know, for example, if the reason for the suffering is, as CS Lewis puts it, God's megaphone to bring an obstinate sinner to repentance.

Who are we to turn down the volume on God's megaphone?

So the Agnostic defense cuts both ways. If you are going to use it to say we cannot judge God, then you cannot abandon it and say that we are capable of judging the moral consequences of our own actions.

If we are not capable of judging moral consequences but we know that this suffering will achieve, or has achieved some greater good, so it does not really matter what we choose to do, because it would just be a lottery.

 

[Robin]

Can you prove that there is much suffering that serves no greater purpose, or are you stating that as an opinion?

-Bri

It can be proved to a necessary consequence of any theology that entails free will and moral behaviour.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Did God have to use the concept of energy at all?

I would argue "yes". "Energy", in its original sense, means "the capacity to do work". In its scientific sense it means "the capacity to do work in a physical system". Either way, I cannot imagine a reality where "no work is done". Surely nothing would ever happen?

Did God have to use the concepts of time and space?

According to Kant, who first appeared in this thread because of Dr. Adequate, yes. Geoff agrees with Kant on this one, also. There are no experiences of anything non-spatio-temporal.

Why? Who wrote that rule? Any universe has to add up to Zero?

That's not a rule. But it is a sensible suggestion?

I don't think that physicist necessarily believe that our universe adds to zero. Some suggest that you need variables from other universes to make the sums come out right.

Are you quoting Bohm's hidden variables at me?

So even if there were some logical requirement for everything to add to zero, God could have two universes add to zero.

OK, I give up. Yes he could.

 

[chriswl]

Can you prove that there is much suffering that serves no greater purpose, or are you stating that as an opinion?

-Bri

It's too self-evident to require proof. Explain to me how every single victim of the Asian Tsunami was necessary, why the world would be a worse place if even one fewer person had died.

There is no plausible mechanism that could ensure that every bit of suffering in the world contributes to the general good. We could just assume that such a mechanism exists but that we are incapable of understanding it, but this means that we are then incapable of making moral decisions because our instinctive assumption that suffering is a bad thing can no longer be trusted.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

It's too self-evident to require proof. Explain to me how every single victim of the Asian Tsunami was necessary,

I went to great lengths to explain this. No Tsumani -> No geological activity -> No hot/heavy/radioactive core -> No large magnetic field -> No protection from the solar wind -> all living things die.

Every victim of the tsunami was neccesary if the alternative is Earth being completely uninhabitable due to unshielded solar radiation.

 

[Robin]

I would argue "yes". "Energy", in its original sense, means "the capacity to do work". In its scientific sense it means "the capacity to do work in a physical system". Either way, I cannot imagine a reality where "no work is done". Surely nothing would ever happen?

Well if nothing could happen without energy, how did energy come about in the first place?

According to Kant, who first appeared in this thread because of Dr. Adequate, yes. Geoff agrees with Kant on this one, also. There are no experiences of anything non-spatio-temporal.

Did Kant really say that we couldn’t experience God? Maybe.

Even if that were true that there are no such experiences it would not imply that there could be no experiences of anything non-spatio-temporal.

Strictly speaking if the behaviour of physical objects in this world is governed by entities outside the R3 + t reality (as italmost certainly is) then there are already experiences of something outside the spatio-temporal

 

[Robin]

I went to great lengths to explain this. No Tsumani -> No geological activity -> No hot/heavy/radioactive core -> No large magnetic field -> No protection from the solar wind -> all living things die.

Every victim of the tsunami was neccesary if the alternative is Earth being completely uninhabitable due to unshielded solar radiation.

Every victim?

So if one of the people who died had been saved from dying by a passerby then he would not have died, and therefore no tsunami would have occurred and therefore there would have been no geological activity and therefore no large magnetic field and therefore no protection from the solar wind and therefore every living thing would die.

Wow, all that from one victim?

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Well if nothing could happen without energy, how did energy come about in the first place?

How long do you think I tried to answer that question before I offered you the answer you didn't like?

Did Kant really say that we couldn’t experience God? Maybe.

He used more words to say it, but he said something along those lines, yes.

Even if that were true that there are no such experiences it would not imply that there could be no experiences of anything non-spatio-temporal.

I don't like to argue from authority, and I don't always agree with Kant....but I think he was right on this one and most of the Critique of Pure Reason is aimed at defending this claim, and it's probably the most important philosophical book ever written, bar none. All experience must be spatio-temporal, according to Kant.

Strictly speaking if the behaviour of physical objects in this world is governed by entities outside the R3 + t reality (as italmost certainly is) then there are already experiences of something outside the spatio-temporal

R3 what?

 

[Tricky]

Yes, everything must die. It goes with living. But since we've established that good and bad are not absolutes, but depend on moral systems, we look for something as close to universally bad as we can. Now for this, murder is pretty much universal, though the definitions vary from place to place. But wanton killing without any discernable discrimmination, such as wiping out whole villages, women, children and pets, is about as close as you can get to a general agreement on something that is "bad".

Obviously you can come up with special cases that make it okay, like they were all carrying some incurable and highly contageous disease, but you obviously have to stretch very far to say this about a widespread disaster. Yet, you, Geoff, have done just this with your "we must have tsunami's" defense of natural disasters.

So this always resolves to the observation that we don't have any provable examples of pure evil. You can't even say something was "necessary" because that asks the question, "Necessary to whom or to what?" The so-called "question of evil" becomes moot. If you can't define evil, then there is nothing to question. Things are either good or bad based on your point of view.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

So this always resolves to the observation that we don't have any provable examples of pure evil.

Fred West?

http://www.bbc.co.uk/crime/caseclosed/fredwest1.shtml

And of all the things the road had to be called, it was "Cromwell Street".

Oliver Cromwell?

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oliver_Cromwell

 

[Robin]

How long do you think I tried to answer that question before I offered you the answer you didn't like?

Which answer I didn't like?

I don't like to argue from authority, and I don't always agree with Kant....but I think he was right on this one and most of the Critique of Pure Reason is aimed at defending this claim, and it's probably the most important philosophical book ever written, bar none. All experience must be spatio-temporal, according to Kant.

Didn't you spend many threads and pages arguing exactly the opposite?

R3 what?

Three dimensions plus time. If the behaviour of physical objects depends on anything outside of that, then we experience something outside of spatio temporal when we experience that behaviour.

 

[Robin]

Yes, everything must die. It goes with living.

Does not follow. Does living logically imply the necessity of dying?

So this always resolves to the observation that we don't have any provable examples of pure evil.

But you can demonstrate that such examples must necessarily exist in any theology that entails free will and moral choice.

You can't even say something was "necessary" because that asks the question, "Necessary to whom or to what?" The so-called "question of evil" becomes moot. If you can't define evil, then there is nothing to question. Things are either good or bad based on your point of view.

Naturally it all depends on the theology or lack thereof that is being considered. The problem of evil presupposes a traditional Judeo-Christian theology.

 

[Tricky]

Does not follow. Does living logically imply the necessity of dying?

In some ways, it does. One of the main characteristics by which biologists determine if a thing is "alive" is that it reproduces. So if things reproduced but didn't die, it would soon be a very small planet, one that could not sustain all that "life".

But you can demonstrate that such examples must necessarily exist in any theology that entails free will and moral choice.

Yep. But they are different examples. So that would suggests that what is evil depends on your theology, and ultimately, your personal moral code, wouldn't you say?

Naturally it all depends on the theology or lack thereof that is being considered. The problem of evil presupposes a traditional Judeo-Christian theology.

I think this is what Geoff was trying to get at. Presupposing a traditional Judeo-Christian theology cannot resolve the question of evil, so he proposed a non-specific method which uses the concept of "greater good", thus bypassing the theodicy problem. Yet while that eliminates the traditional Judeo-Christian theology as a way of judging evil, it merely substitutes a different set of moral values (his own) for determining "greater good".

 

[Bri]

But since we are intrinsically incapable of knowing what that moral consequence is then it does not matter what we choose.

What? We are incapable of knowing which decision is morally right? Robin, you can do better than that. You're skirting the issue.

We don't know, for example, if the reason for the suffering is, as CS Lewis puts it, God's megaphone to bring an obstinate sinner to repentance.

The reason for the suffering was the premise of my post, which you quoted in your response: "If the greater good of the suffering is to provide a choice, then indeed the suffering is for a greater good regardless of the decision, and the decision also has its own moral consequences."

Who are we to turn down the volume on God's megaphone?

So the Agnostic defense cuts both ways. If you are going to use it to say we cannot judge God, then you cannot abandon it and say that we are capable of judging the moral consequences of our own actions.

Of course we can judge the forseeable moral consequences of our actions, and of course we cannot judge the unforseeable greater good that might come from God's actions since we're not omnipotent. If we were omnipotent, we would be responsible for the greater good also, because we'd know every variable and every possible outcome of every action. Of course we're not omnipotent, so we are only responsible for the immediate, forseeable outcomes of our actions.

If we are not capable of judging moral consequences but we know that this suffering will achieve, or has achieved some greater good, so it does not really matter what we choose to do, because it would just be a lottery.

If the greater good achieved is to provide you with the opportunity to choose right over wrong, then indeed it does matter what your choice is. You have yet to address that possibility.

-Bri

 

[Robin]

In some ways, it does. One of the main characteristics by which biologists determine if a thing is "alive" is that it reproduces. So if things reproduced but didn't die, it would soon be a very small planet, one that could not sustain all that "life".

That is not a logic problem, that is a space problem.

Yep. But they are different examples. So that would suggests that what is evil depends on your theology, and ultimately, your personal moral code, wouldn't you say?

In which case why are we talking about the Problem of Evil at all?

I think this is what Geoff was trying to get at. Presupposing a traditional Judeo-Christian theology cannot resolve the question of evil, so he proposed a non-specific method which uses the concept of "greater good", thus bypassing the theodicy problem. Yet while that eliminates the traditional Judeo-Christian theology as a way of judging evil, it merely substitutes a different set of moral values (his own) for determining "greater good".

It is nothing new.

I can solve every philosophical problem in an instant as long as I am allowed to alter the problem. It is not that difficult.

I could instantly solve every mathematical and scientific problem the same way.

 

[Bri]

It's too self-evident to require proof. Explain to me how every single victim of the Asian Tsunami was necessary, why the world would be a worse place if even one fewer person had died.

I couldn't tell you since I'm not omnipotent, but I also couldn't say that it's impossible that it's not the case. Unless you have proof that it's impossible that the world would be a worse place if one fewer person had died, then your statement isn't self-evident, but rather an opinion.

There is no plausible mechanism that could ensure that every bit of suffering in the world contributes to the general good. We could just assume that such a mechanism exists but that we are incapable of understanding it, but this means that we are then incapable of making moral decisions because our instinctive assumption that suffering is a bad thing can no longer be trusted.

Why does assuming that we are incapable of understanding the greater good that might come out of a tsunami automatically negate our ability to make moral decisions? You'll have to explain that one to me.

If a greater good was achieved by providing the world a choice to ease the suffering of the tsunami victims, how exactly does that affect our ability to choose to ease the suffering of the tsunami victims?

-Bri

 

[ExitDose]

They might be, to a marginal extent. The point is that if humans have free will then determinism must be false and it logically follows that it is not possible even for an omniscient being to know the future. Just as even an omnipotent being cannot create a stone that is so heavy that even He cannot lift it, an omniscient being cannot know things which are logically unknowable - and that includes the future if determinism is not true.

This is one of the biggest contradictions in mainstream theology. The claim that humans have free will (which is an essential Christian claim) and the claim that God has perfect knowledge of the future (which is not an essential Christian claim but is believed by the vast majority of Christians anyway) are logically incompatible. One of them must be false.

I fail to see how this follows logically. That a deity may not know the final outcome would not preclude his knowing all possible outcomes. It would still know the final outcome.

 

[Robin]

What? We are incapable of knowing which decision is morally right? Robin, you can do better than that. You're skirting the issue.

Well for a start, let’s not misquote me OK? I said

But since we are intrinsically incapable of knowing what that moral consequence is then it does not matter what we choose.

It is not my premise, it comes from the theist side of the debate and is called the “Agnostic Defense”. You are using it yourself when it suits your argument, so why is it somehow skirting the issue when I use it?

As an atheist I am capable of being fairly certain which decision is morally right because I believe that when suffering appears gratuitous that it probably really is gratuitous.

But the argument is premised on the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent being that will ensure that each and every instance of suffering is individually and specifically necessary to some greater good.

Now I no longer know what decision is morally right because I have to believe that there is some purpose – unknown to me – behind each and every act of suffering.

The reason for the suffering was the premise of my post, which you quoted in your response: "If the greater good of the suffering is to provide a choice, then indeed the suffering is for a greater good regardless of the decision, and the decision also has its own moral consequences."

But we don’t know what those moral consequences are. Remember we do not know what the greater good is. It may not be to provide a choice. It may be something else as I have explained.

Of course we can judge the forseeable moral consequences of our actions, and of course we cannot judge the unforseeable greater good that might come from God's actions since we're not omnipotent.

For the purposes of this argument we do not need to be omnipotent, because we know from the premise that some greater good will eventuate. So we have on the one hand our own actions which might result in good or bad, and then we have God’s greater good which we know will occur.

We should choose God’s certain greater good and not our own uncertain good or bad.

If we were omnipotent, we would be responsible for the greater good also, because we'd know every variable and every possible outcome of every action. Of course we're not omnipotent, so we are only responsible for the immediate, forseeable outcomes of our actions.

And, as I have said, for the purposes of this argument the foreseeable outcomes are that some greater good will occur regardless.

If the greater good achieved is to provide you with the opportunity to choose right over wrong, then indeed it does matter what your choice is. You have yet to address that possibility.

Already addressed it. For a start you are assuming that we know what God’s motivations are. They might be nothing to do with offering a choice. We don’t know if the outcome of our actions will result in good or bad.

If the opportunity to choose right and wrong could really justify some act of suffering then you have got to stand by this.

If the mere provision of choice justifies the suffering “regardless of the decision” then that good has been achieved.

If it actually matters what our choice is then you have to lose the “regardless of the decision” part. You can’t have it both ways.

A further problem is that, as CS Lewis puts it “God’s good cannot be so far removed from our good that His black is our white, otherwise we are not saying ‘God is good’ we are saying ‘God is we know not what’”

Now if a human were to cause suffering in order to provide the opportunity for others to do good, we should consider this the worst kind of evil imaginable.

But if a Deity does it we consider this the best kind of good imaginable. So God’s good must be at the very opposite pole to ours.

 

[Robin]

I couldn't tell you since I'm not omnipotent, but I also couldn't say that it's impossible that it's not the case. Unless you have proof that it's impossible that the world would be a worse place if one fewer person had died, then your statement isn't self-evident, but rather an opinion.

Yet when I use this argument I am somehow "skirting the issue"

Why does assuming that we are incapable of understanding the greater good that might come out of a tsunami automatically negate our ability to make moral decisions? You'll have to explain that one to me.

Read his paragraph again. That is not what he said.

If a greater good was achieved by providing the world a choice to ease the suffering of the tsunami victims, how exactly does that affect our ability to choose to ease the suffering of the tsunami victims?

Again, you are assuming that you know God's motivations. We are incapable of knowing what the greater good is, so why assume that it is to provide a choice to help? Especially when this sounds so completely unreasonable.