• Quick note - the problem with Youtube videos not embedding on the forum appears to have been fixed, thanks to ZiprHead. If you do still see problems let me know.

The relationship between science and materialism

davidsmith73 said:
...snip...

Also, you refer to someone "seeing redness" after zapping their brain. What do you mean by redness here?


...snip...
Click to expand...

That the person says "I see red" the same way they would if you held up a "red object" in daylight and ask them what colour they see. In other-words as far as we can determine they "see red" in both circumstances. (Which are both environmental stimuli.)
 
I guess that explains it: "I see red"="environmental stimuli". Thanks for clarifying. Happy now?

Just the usual bunch of closet dualists pretending they are real, 100%, materialists.
 
davidsmith73 said:
I think you have identified the nub of the materialist vs phenomenalist debate. I assert that any particular quality doesn't need these various relational parameters you mention, whereas you disagree. Are you right in saying we can't just hive off size, brightness and degree from redness? I don't think so. I think you are mistaken for attaching these relational definitions and attempting to define redness as such in the first place. They simply have no bearing on the qualitative nature of redness to begin with.
Click to expand...

I don't think there has ever been an instance of redness divorced from other relational parameters, has there? If not, hiving it off is a philosophical conceit that is not going to get us anywhere.

Also, you refer to someone "seeing redness" after zapping their brain. What do you mean by redness here?
Click to expand...

In my imagination they see a splotch of red when I zap them, much as you might when you rub your eyes.

I suspect you mean the same thing I do - the qualitative nature of an experience.
Click to expand...

No. I think the distinction between qualitative and quantitative is a linguistic one that the natural world has no obligation to uphold.
 
So far as I can see, you have no idea what you believe. I remain 100% certain thought exists. Your materialistic position -- assuming you ever bother to choose one -- is the one requiring magic.
 
Straw poll:

Who wants geoff to continue debating this?
Who doesn't?

Based on the responses (including whether or not they are flames), I'll decide whether or not to continue the charade.

Do you want more?
Or have you seen enough?

This could be a very long thread. :)

Geoff
 
Ichneumonwasp said:
Rather, I have attempted to define feeling in useful terms with which I think we can work. If we leave the definition in its circular form then we are simply left with a circle. That doesn't provide any means of using the word except as a referent within the circle. We can't do anything with it -- it means that you have essentially defined the issue as unresolvable by any means except recourse to itself (you have defined mind as something that simply "is"). That is fine. It's idealism and I certainly cannot prove that it is wrong and have no interest in doing so. But there are other ways of defining the word that provide a means of investigating claims about consciousness. That is where my interest lies. It may be that whole enterprise is doomed to failure. I don't think it is, but there is no way to know based on how the cards are stacked prior to the investigation.
Click to expand...
I am interested in this whole debate because I would like to get closer to the "truth". If quality/feeling/experience cannot be explained using relational descriptions then so be it. To me, that says something profound about the nature of reality. I don't want to be fooled by redefining quality as something it is not so that practical uses emerge from it. However if you accept this, investigating consciousness is still a worthwhile endevour because there are aspects of consciousness that are relational, for example, memory or learning. But here, you will only discover relational truths. I don't think you can say anything about qualitative truths by such means. The philosophical game at hand is how to account for one in terms of the other. I believe but cannot prove that it may be possible to define the foundation of reality as qualitative and then explain how quantitative reality emerges from that. After all, all knowledge of physical reality comes from experience.

Actually, yes, I do believe that you are wrong. There is no way that we can effectively speak of "feeling" in cerebellar function because we cannot investigate what happens if only a cerebellum is left intact (no speech possibility), but the question is basically meaningless since the cerebellum is tightly connected with the rest of the brain -- both motor and sensory areas. We know that impairment of the cerebellum certainly feels like something very different from intact cerebellum.
Click to expand...

I don't think you are addressing the issue. I was trying to pose a hypothetical scenario b) where there are physical process that are not ontologically equal to an experience in the sense of scenario a). Can I assume that you think scenario b) is actually possible ? Perhaps I could suggest a different example. What about a simple chemical reaction for b)? How do you account for the difference now?
 
JustGeoff said:
Straw poll:

Who wants geoff to continue debating this?
Who doesn't?

Based on the responses (including whether or not they are flames), I'll decide whether or not to continue the charade.

Do you want more?
Or have you seen enough?

Geoff
Click to expand...

Allow me to translate:

"*Beg* me to continue."
 
Kevin_Lowe said:
I don't think there has ever been an instance of redness divorced from other relational parameters, has there?
Click to expand...

Well yes. I can see it all the time. What do you mean by instance? Do you mean the experience or a definition of redness? If you mean the definition then I suppose not because a definition must be relational. The existential nature of the experience is something else. Lets say you inspect the contents of your experience. You notice that you are seeing a square of redness. If you focus on the physical dimensions of the square, you are no longer focussing on the qualitative nature of redness are you?

In my imagination they see a splotch of red when I zap them, much as you might when you rub your eyes.
Click to expand...

What do you mean by "red" when you say splotch of red?

No. I think the distinction between qualitative and quantitative is a linguistic one that the natural world has no obligation to uphold.
Click to expand...

In what sense is it a linguistic distinction?
 
davidsmith73 said:
No, but that is not the point is it? The point is, I don't need to prove that experience exists. It is impervious to doubt. It is, in essence, existence.
Click to expand...

Then we disagree (and my experience of existence does not tally with yours) - there is no certainty that I exist as far as I can tell!
 
Darat said:
That the person says "I see red" the same way they would if you held up a "red object" in daylight and ask them what colour they see. In other-words as far as we can determine they "see red" in both circumstances. (Which are both environmental stimuli.)
Click to expand...

I believe you've lost the referent. "red" is no longer refering to what it originally refered to by Kevin. You just have a long string of physical descriptions without any reference to experience. Curious...
 
Darat said:
Then we disagree (and my experience of existence does not tally with yours) - there is no certainty that I exist as far as I can tell!
Click to expand...

Not quite what I said. I said the existence of experience is impervious to doubt. I happen to think that the concept of "I" may be still be an illusion.
 
davidsmith73 said:
I believe you've lost the referent. "red" is no longer refering to what it originally refered to by Kevin. You just have a long string of physical descriptions without any reference to experience. Curious...
Click to expand...

You've lost me.

I can't see what other language (in principle) you can use then what I did to communicate to another person that I have experienced "red".

All you can do is ask me "Do you see red when I zap your brain?". I can answer yes or no, you can then show me a piece of red card and ask me "Do you see red when I put this card in front of you?" I can answer yes or no. You can then ask me "Was the experience of red the same?" I can answer yes or no, if I answer yes then we can conclude that I experienced the same thing from different stimulus.
 
You must log in or register to reply here.

Back
Top Bottom