The relationship between science and materialism

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Reductionism:

Allows talk about minds.
But is implicitly dualistic because of this, and thus vulnerable to logical refutation.

There is nothing implicitly dualistic about it, unless you insist on cramming dualism down its throat. Furthermore, if it is vulnerable to logical refutation, then so is eliminative materialism, because they are ontologically identical.

A dozen times around the carousel is my limit.

~~ Paul

 

[UndercoverElephant]

First of all, Im sorry because I do not have the time to properly follow the discussion, let alone participate in the right manner. That said, I was thinking that someone could argue that, so far, everything points to mind=brain function. And then you can pospone the "definitive answer" stating that nothing indicates that a mind can exist without a brain and so, we have no good reasons to suppose that minds have a clear ontological status beyond brains.

That's reductionism and it's incoherent. If you want to know why see my reply to Paul quoting Kevin.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Paul - in order to be able to reduce X to Y you need both an X and a Y.

Agreed, but only in the World of Geoff does the word reduce imply that X is dualistic.

~~ Paul

 

[UndercoverElephant]

There is nothing implicitly dualistic about it, unless you insist on cramming dualism down its throat.

Paul
_____________________________________________________________
IT ISN'T ME THAT MAKES ACCUSATIONS OF DUALISM EACH TIME THE WORD "MIND" IS MENTIONED. IT IS MERCUTIO AND SOMETIMES YOURSELF. YOU ARE ARGUING WITH YOURSELF! NOT ME.
_____________________________________________________________

Furthermore, if it is vulnerable to logical refutation, then so is eliminative materialism, because they are ontologically identical.

Completely wrong. They are indeed ontologically identical. The difference is in their choice of terms. Reductionism allows the definition of mind. Eliminativism DOES NOT. Because it DOES NOT it is not vulnerable to logical refutation. I don't have any terms to refute it with.

A dozen times around the carousel is my limit.

Why has it taken you a dozen times round the carousel to figure out you cannot defend physicalism? You cannot. So step off the carousel. You are going round in circles because you are having a disagreement with yourself.

Look on the bright side, Paul. At least in your case the circles are getting smaller.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Agreed, but only in the World of Geoff does the word reduce imply that X is dualistic.

~~ Paul

NO!!!!!

It's in the world of PAUL and MERCUTIO where this is the case. It's YOU, Paul, who kept accusing ME of "begging the question" every time I tried to define "mind" as something which couldn't be replaced by a physical term. Every time you made that accusation YOU accused me of being dualistic. Now you are trying to accuse me of lacing the word "mind" with dualism. Why? It's not my position you are arguing with! It's YOURS!

Paul - I stopped defining any of these words several hundred posts ago. You are going round in circles trying to find a way to defend physicalism. There is no way to defend it. It's got nothing to do with anything Geoff has defined. You are arguing with yourself.

 

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

That's reductionism and it's incoherent. If you want to know why see my reply to Paul quoting Kevin.

There are hundreds of replies, so I will try to digg it. Still, let me put it in other words. If someone says that "life=certain functions of organic matter" would you say that its reducing something to other thing... or maybe just using different words to imply the very same thing.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

There are hundreds of replies, so I will try to digg it. Still, let me put it in other words. If someone says that "life=certain functions of organic matter" would you say that its reducing something to other thing... or maybe just using different words to imply the very same thing.

Unfortunately that is a useless example, because "life" includes conscious creatures and it is consciousness which is causing all the problems. In other words, this reduction is as problematic as the reduction of mind to matter because it impicitly includes that reduction. It is also obscuring the issue, since it is the relationship between mind and matter that we're interested in rather than the rich and complex phenomena called "life".

 

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

Unfortunately that is a useless example, because "life" includes conscious creatures and it is consciousness which is causing all the problems. In other words, this reduction is as problematic as the reduction of mind to matter because it impicitly includes that reduction. It is also obscuring the issue, since it is the relationship between mind and matter that we're interested in rather than the rich and complex phenomena called "life".

Granted. But the point is still there. What would happen to the argument if what we call "mind" does not exist? Take in consideration that we have been using "mind" more or less in a free way. I remember that P1 and P2 was a way to "tackle" the issue about a proper definition, but I could be wrong.

Now, if minds were non existent (not because of some obscure ontological argument), then the reduction would be absurd. An epistemological problem, not and ontological one as I believe you are arguing.

Damn, I wish I have the time to read every post and improve my questions. You see, Im interested too in what physicalists would say about the subject, but I also think that maybe the problem is about language and definitions and not a "real" one.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Granted. But the point is still there. What would happen to the argument if what we call "mind" does not exist?

Then this might be a possible candidate for reduction.

Now, if minds were non existent (not because of some obscure ontological argument), then the reduction would be absurd.

If you mean "if minds are non-existent then there is no need to reduce them" then you are correct.

An epistemological problem, not and ontological one as I believe you are arguing.

It's an ontological problem. I don't know what you think is an epistemological problem.

Damn, I wish I have the time to read every post and improve my questions. You see, Im interested too in what physicalists would say about the subject, but I also think that maybe the problem is about language and definitions and not a "real" one.

Sure, it's a problem about definitions, but it's very real if you are a physicalist because it is the definition of what "physical" means which is at the heart of the problem. The problem is that physicalism cannot specify a set of terms which are all three of the following :

a) logically coherent
b) actually specifying physicalism and not dualism
c) sane

 

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

Yes I mean that if minds were not existing in the first place then the necessity of "reducing them" would be absurd. So, if we assume (for the sake of the argument) that what we denominate as "a mind" is merely speculation (epistemological problem because of the way we relate and talk about the world its implicitly dualist, and this dualism itself could be just a byproduct of our use of language), then we could argue that "brain function" its a better definition and ergo your problem would be rendered as meaningless.

 

[Mercutio]

And as for Mercutio:

There is one position and one position only which you could still use to challenge mine. So far nobody's mentioned it:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jacques_Derrida

Should you attempt such a defence, I would probably accept it. But I do not believe for one moment your imaginary position is deconstructionism.

Geoff

Two things. First, thanks for that link; it's the first I have really read anything about it. Sure, I had heard of deconstructionism, but it is nothing I am familiar with. So, nope. From a cursory examination of the link, it sounds like it is a completely different animal. So, you are wrong about "one position and one position only".

Second...It does not bother me a whit that you call me a liar, but I am offended that you call Wasp one as well. Your attempts at goading are perhaps understandable--beats defending your own position--but in doing so, you are being rude to someone who only recently joined the forum. If you only had my word for it, and called me a liar, that would be one thing. But when someone vouches for me, and is called a liar for doing so, I have no problem pointing out rude behavior. Stop it. I think we have established that you will not be able to goad me; all that remains is for you to defend your view. Being rude does you no favors.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Yes I mean that if minds were not existing in the first place then the necessity of "reducing them" would be absurd. So, if we assume (for the sake of the argument) that what we denominate as "a mind" is merely speculation (epistemological problem because of the way we relate and talk about the world its implicitly dualist, and this dualism itself could be just a byproduct of our use of language), then we could argue that "brain function" its a better definition and ergo your problem would be rendered as meaningless.

It would mean there is no logical problem. I stated 33 pages ago that I do not argue with eliminativists, and you are now defending eliminativism - a claim that minds do not exist which is directly analagous to the claim that there has never actually been a "sun rise" - only earth-turns. This position is impossible to refute because it is internally logically coherent and impossible to disprove empirically. However, when examined closely, almost everybody is forced to conclude it is insane. Here is Paul's response upon realisation of what eliminative materialism is claiming:

definition from the web: Reductive materialism (Identity theory) claims that...conscious phenomena are nothing over and above the neural level, thus it can be reduced to that level.

Paul's response:

If this is not eliminative materialism, then eliminative materialism must be something bizarre.

Reductive materialism is not eliminative materialism. Reductive materialism is defined above. Conclusion : eliminative materialism is indeed something bizarre.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Two things. First, thanks for that link; it's the first I have really read anything about it. Sure, I had heard of deconstructionism, but it is nothing I am familiar with. So, nope. From a cursory examination of the link, it sounds like it is a completely different animal. So, you are wrong about "one position and one position only".

Until you prove otherwise, that is nothing but more hot air.

Second...It does not bother me a whit that you call me a liar, but I am offended that you call Wasp one as well. Your attempts at goading are perhaps understandable--beats defending your own position--but in doing so, you are being rude to someone who only recently joined the forum.

This is pathetic.

 

[Mercutio]

Until you prove otherwise, that is nothing but more hot air.

And absolutely irrelevant to the matter at hand. The success or failure of your idea depends not one bit on what mine is. And it does not bother me a bit for you to call it hot air. You are quite right, it is as yet undemonstrated. We can take that as read. It is completely irrelevant to the current thread. Now...your ideas? This made-up, circularly defined neutral monism propping up your dualism? Can we get back to that?

This is pathetic.

Yes, concern over aspersions cast toward people posting in good faith. Horrible.

 

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

This position is impossible to refute because it is internally logically coherent and impossible to disprove empirically. However, when examined closely, almost everybody is forced to conclude it is insane.

That would be a denial for emotion, because you have stated you have no logical reason to deny it. QM is also absurd, insane, weird and we can add several other emotional qualifiers...

Still, that doesnt render it false.

 

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

Oh Geoff. Try not to fall in to emotional responses, I believe what Mercutio told you is not pathetic. This makes you more like Ian, and I think we agree in that we cant discuss if we start to take things in a personal way.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

That would be a denial for emotion, because you have stated you have no logical reason to deny it. QM is also absurd, insane, weird and we can add several other emotional qualifiers...

Still, that doesnt render it false.

Absolutely. If you are arguing that eliminative materialism is true regardless of how bizarre it seems to us, I will not challenge you. Hammegk might, but not me.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Oh Geoff. Try not to fall in to emotional responses, I believe what Mercutio told you is not pathetic. This makes you more like Ian, and I think we agree in that we cant discuss if we start to take things in a personal way.

Oh give over. He's spent 33 pages claiming he has "a position" which he's emailed to a couple of people. He keeps saying his position is a refutation of mine. But 33 pages into the thread, we are still waiting for mercutio to declare this position. And now he's trying to have a go at me for being rude to a new member by implying he lied about mercutio's proof. What a waste of time. Nobody is interested in reading this.

Now, I kindly ask you to get back to the actual topic.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

And absolutely irrelevant to the matter at hand. The success or failure of your idea depends not one bit on what mine is.

Erm, Merc....the discussion, for several pages now, has been about eliminative materialism.

This made-up, circularly defined neutral monism propping up your dualism? Can we get back to that?

Nobody seems particularly interested in doing so. You haven't asked me any questions about it. Nobody else has mentioned it recently. I think I explained it as well as I am going to. And none of it makes any difference to the matter at hand, from which you wish to distract attention. i.e. the fact that you can't defend physicalism.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Completely wrong. They are indeed ontologically identical. The difference is in their choice of terms. Reductionism allows the definition of mind. Eliminativism DOES NOT. Because it DOES NOT it is not vulnerable to logical refutation. I don't have any terms to refute it with.

And what is reductionism's definition of mind?

~~ Paul