A proof that p-zombies are logically incoherent.

[Mercutio]

Once the psychological manipulation ends, it should create an entirely different psychology than it had before and during manipulation. If it returns to either of those, then it is acting on a programmed routine. If it invents an entirely new one, then it is not acting as programmed.

Every bit of "psychological manipulation" is done through physical means--the inputs are visual, verbal, tactile, etc.--we cannot directly manipulate "the mind".

We will know, because we will have programmed it. If it develops psychologies other than what we've programmed, it is conscious.

Suppose we have programmed it to try random variations and use what works? Both Natural Selection and Operant Learning use that mechanism.

I applaud your attempt to define (through programming) before the fact. It is what separates your answer from Iacchus's circular tripe. But I do not think that such a test would allow you to distinguish consciousness from programming. Heh...perhaps that is the point.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

If p-zombies are logically possible, then, by definition, reductive materialism is false.

Does anyone have a clue how we might approach a proof that p-zombies are logically possible? I'm particularly interested to see how we do this without regard to a particular assumed metaphysic.

~~ Paul

 

[69dodge]

So you're saying that a p-zombie is really a sort of Turing test? How well does it have to do? Does it have to fool me after casual conversation, or does it have to be fully externally indistinguishable from a human? If the latter, then we could not today program a p-zombie. When the day comes that we can program one, how will we test whether it is, in fact, a p-zombie, as opposed to a "conscious" entity?

We won't be able to tell. That's the whole point of a p-zombie.

So the fun philosophical fighting can continue forever.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

We won't be able to tell. That's the whole point of a p-zombie.

So the fun philosophical fighting can continue forever.

Indeed.

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Let me bring up a thought experiment that Stimpy mentioned previously.

Let's say we have a zombie world that appears identical to ours, except that the people are p-zombies. The causal laws are different so that the resulting physical facts are identical to ours, even though there is no phenomenal consciousness. Suddenly, one day, all the causal laws change so that the people are no longer p-zombies, phenomenal consciousness pops into existence, and the world is identical to ours.

Would the people of that world notice the change?

~~ Paul

 

[69dodge]

Let me bring up a thought experiment that Stimpy mentioned previously.

Let's say we have a zombie world that appears identical to ours, except that the people are p-zombies. The causal laws are different so that the resulting physical facts are identical to ours, even though there is no phenomenal consciousness. Suddenly, one day, all the causal laws change so that the people are no longer p-zombies, phenomenal consciousness pops into existence, and the world is identical to ours.

Would the people of that world notice the change?

This sounds like, what if the world were created a moment ago, all of us with all our (fake) memories?

We wouldn't know that's what happened.

So neither would the p-zombies who became conscious.

Similarly, do people notice their own death? No, not really. While they're alive they haven't died yet, and after they're dead they're not around to notice anything.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

This sounds like, what if the world were created a moment ago, all of us with all our (fake) memories?

We wouldn't know that's what happened.

So neither would the p-zombies who became conscious.

Doesn't sound the same to me. The p-zombie people existed prior to the change, with their experiences and memories. Nothing is being faked up when the causal laws change.

Part of our confusion here is that we can't decide exactly what it is that p-zombies are missing. They certainly have brains, experiences, memories, thoughts, etc., otherwise they would be distinguishable from us. For that matter, they must have some sort of qualia, or they couldn't talk about them. They must be self-aware, or they would certainly behave differently from us. What are they missing, exactly? It's way too glib simply to say "Well, they are missing phenomenal consciousness, of course."

~~ Paul

 

[sphenisc]

Doesn't sound the same to me. The p-zombie people existed prior to the change, with their experiences and memories. Nothing is being faked up when the causal laws change.

Part of our confusion here is that we can't decide exactly what it is that p-zombies are missing. They certainly have brains, experiences, memories, thoughts, etc., otherwise they would be distinguishable from us. For that matter, they must have some sort of qualia, or they couldn't talk about them. They must be self-aware, or they would certainly behave differently from us. What are they missing, exactly? It's way too glib simply to say "Well, they are missing phenomenal consciousness, of course."

~~ Paul

Several people on this forum have talked about PIUs, can I conclude they have them?

 

[69dodge]

For that matter, they must have some sort of qualia, or they couldn't talk about them.

I don't know about that. I don't think we talk about them very well. What we say about qualia only makes sense to other people because they've already experienced the qualia for themselves. We don't really describe them at all completely. So why couldn't a p-zombie who lacks them also describe them very incompletely?

I can say, a red apple looks different from a green apple; and so can a p-zombie. A p-zombie can't say exactly what either of the two apples does look like; but neither can I.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Several people on this forum have talked about PIUs, can I conclude they have them?

Sorry, what's a PIU?

A p-zombie is supposed to be identical to us, except for phenomenal consciousness. It doesn't seem fair to take away qualia, then add all sorts of additional brain mechanism to allow the p-zombie to talk about qualia even though it doesn't experience them. That's like saying that a p-zombie is sort of like a human, doesn't experience qualia, but is completely rigged up to behave as if it does. What then would be the difference between qualia and "completely rigged up like qualia"?

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

I can say, a red apple looks different from a green apple; and so can a p-zombie. A p-zombie can't say exactly what either of the two apples does look like; but neither can I.

But you can do a better job than that, if you are pressed to try. Could a society of p-zombies come up with the millennia of philosophical conversation about qualia that we have? According to the definition of p-zombies, they're supposed to be able to.

~~ Paul

 

[sphenisc]

Sorry, what's a PIU?

A p-zombie is supposed to be identical to us, except for phenomenal consciousness. It doesn't seem fair to take away qualia, then add all sorts of additional brain mechanism to allow the p-zombie to talk about qualia even though it doesn't experience them. That's like saying that a p-zombie is sort of like a human, doesn't experience qualia, but is completely rigged up to behave as if it does. What then would be the difference between qualia and "completely rigged like qualia"?

~~ Paul

sorry, pink invisible unicorn (it's the standard examplar of unprovable things on this forum.) Any way , I was only making the point that 69dodge made better.

I'm not sure why you feel removing qualia is unfair; I think that qualia are felt to be the things we are conscious of. A p-zombie can't have qualia without being conscious, in which case it wouldn't be a p-zombie.

 

[69dodge]

Sorry, what's a PIU?

invisible pink unicorn?

Sort of like, UTC is coordinated universal time...

A p-zombie is supposed to be identical to us, except for phenomenal consciousness. It doesn't seem fair to take away qualia, then add all sorts of additional brain mechanism to allow the p-zombie to talk about qualia even though it doesn't experience them. That's like saying that a p-zombie is sort of like a human, doesn't experience qualia, but is completely rigged up to behave as if it does. What then would be the difference between qualia and "completely rigged up like qualia"?

Huh. I don't imagine p-zombies as having any additional brain mechanisms. I figure they have exactly the same brains as we do, except that in the hypothetical world in which they exist, such brains aren't accompanied by consciousness.

There would be no difference that we could see. The difference is that in one case, they can see, and in the other case, they can't.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Originally Posted by Interesting Ian :
If p-zombies are logically possible, then, by definition, reductive materialism is false.

HypnoPsi
That depends at which point (and by what means) consciousness is said to occur, Ian. Think of combustion. If you put a lump of wood in a fan-assisted oven it will take quite a while at the highest temperature before it ignites in flames producing heat by it's own fuel.

I don't think this is relevant to what I said. What you're referring to here is that there is a certain threshold of physical complexity whereby consciousness will spontaneously come into being. I don't think this can be applied to reductive materialism because they can't believe in the existence of consciousness at all. I mean otherwise there would, by definition, be a distinction between real people and p-zombies. But they consistently deny any such distinction.

This idea that consciousness spontaneously comes into being applies to positions which hold that consciousness is conceptually distinct from the underlying physical processes but ontologically dependent on such physical processes i.e non - reductive materialism and also various dualist positions such as epiphenomenalism, genuine emergentism (http://progressiveliving.org/emergentism_defined.htm) and even maybe interactive dualism (it seems to me that one can be an interactive dualist but still believe that consciousness is created by the brain)

AmateurScientist wrote:
Daniel Dennett (author of Consciousness Explained and very much a materialist, and TAM4 speaker) is a well-known and respected philosopher

II
I have no respect for him whatsoever.

Hypnopsi

I don't see why you should say that.

. . . .

Thesis defence is an academic and scientific rite of passage. It separates the men from the boys. So although I might disagree with Dennett's supporters in this forum with their conscious toilet cisterns, etc., I can respect the signs of some willingness to actually get involved in consciousness research properly. It is a very fascinating subject and we need more solid discussion rather than just the usual invective, name-calling and ridicule.

Do we? I don't agree.

In similarity to the subject of the paranormal there is a great deal of complete and total mutual incredulity on both sides of the debate regarding their opponents position.

But their incredulity is wholly and entirely unjustified where as mine is entirely justified. Dennet thinks that neither he nor anyone else have ever been conscious. He himself has stated that he is a p-zombie and he thinks that everyone else is too. According to him and many people contributing to these forums, no one has ever experienced anything. No one has ever experienced redness, the smell of a rose, the feeling of hunger . .nothing whatsoever. They suppose that consciousness doesn't exist.

And since I cannot prove I am conscious i.e experience qualia, they suppose that it doesn't exist. How is it possible to have a "solid discussion" about this? I know with absolute complete and total certainty I am right. If they truly believe they are not conscious, then either they're right and they truly are p-zombies -- which I find incredibly implausible -- or they are insane.

This is not to say I necessarily dislike them, it's just on this one issue they can be no resolution. Yeah it is inaccurate to say I have no respect for Dennet. I just think that he's either insane or having us all on (the same applies to a lot of people on here).

Whether thermostats are conscious or not; whether people can tell when they're being stared at or not or who's phoning them, has profound implications either way. We're all interested in this for the science, yes? Well, having some respect for those who present ideas - even if we all just end up agreeing to disagree - is important if we're to remove the element on both sides who are clearly just in the fray for the fighting.

Thermostats being conscious is a perfectly reasonable hypothesis. Hell, solipsism is a perfectly reasonable hypothesis compared to what these guys are proposing!

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

I'm not sure why you feel removing qualia is unfair; I think that qualia are felt to be the things we are conscious of. A p-zombie can't have qualia without being conscious, in which case it wouldn't be a p-zombie.

Does a p-zombie lack qualia, self-awareness, and/or something else?

Huh. I don't imagine p-zombies as having any additional brain mechanisms. I figure they have exactly the same brains as we do, except that in the hypothetical world in which they exist, such brains aren't accompanied by consciousness.

Then if we asked the p-zombie "Are you conscious?," what would make it say "Yes."?

We're still being too glib.

~~ Paul

 

[Interesting Ian]

If it is our souls that make us conscious, then we cannot program anything that mimics a consciousness into a machine unless we program something that mimics the soul.

Of course we can. It is obviously in principle possible to program a computer, robot or android who acts exactly like a human being. They would not of course be conscious since it is our souls which are conscious.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Dennet thinks that neither he nor anyone else have ever been conscious. He himself has stated that he is a p-zombie and he thinks that everyone else is too.

You're taking this out of context. He said it to be provocative. He believes we should study consciousness as heterophenomenology rather than autophenomenology: a theory about human consciousness can be derived from the third person. In that sense, we are all p-zombies.

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Of course we can. It is obviously in principle possible to program a computer, robot or android who acts exactly like a human being. They would not of course be conscious since it is our souls which are conscious.

Really? So our souls are contributing absolutely nothing to our internal experience or our behavior that can't be simulated mechanistically?

Note that such a robot is not what a p-zombie is supposed to be.

~~ Paul

 

[Interesting Ian]

II
Why should a behavioural indistinguishable android not be conscious, but a functional indistinguishable one is?

Paul
I can't answer this, because I don't know what we mean by a "behaviorally indistinguishable" p-zombie. If it's indistinguishable across all possible tests, then I'd say it's conscious.

Think of a computer playing noughts and crosses (or tic tac toe or whatever the denizens in the USA call it). We can simply program it to always respond in a certain way eg if its opponent places a cross in one of the corners then the computer is simply programmed to place an "O" in one of the 2 adjacent corners (but not the corner across) in order to avoid defeat.

The same goes for . .say . .chess. The 50 move rule ensures there are a finite number of possible games of chess. Thus a computer could in principle be simply programmed to make the best move in every possible game of chess on any move -- just like in the noughts and crosses. And an android could be specifically programmed to respond in an appropriate manner to all possible environmental situations.

Obviously it would be ludicrous in the extreme to say such an android is conscious, right? So we can reject behaviourism.

But there is another possible type of android. Let's think of a computer playing chess again. This time all its programmed with all the rules of the game and a "desire" to win. It's not even programmed that the Queen is valuable and that taking opponents pieces is generally advantageous to the goal of winning. Instead it learns everything by trail and error, and thus keeps improving until it too in a finite time plays perfect games of chess, just like the other chess playing computer. Again an android could be in principle created which always responded appropriately due to "learning" from experience.

But the 2 androids are externally absolutely indistinguishable. I'm assuming though that people on here would wish to say the 1st android is definitely not conscious, but the 2nd one definitely is?

It's the distinction between materialist behaviourism and materialist functionalism.

 

[Interesting Ian]

You're taking this out of context. He said it to be provocative.

He either believes it or he doesn't. He has stated he does. Should I suppose he is lying?

He believes we should study consciousness as heterophenomenology rather than autophenomenology:

Never heard of either word.

a theory about human consciousness can be derived from the third person.

No it can't.

In that sense, we are all p-zombies.

~~ Paul

There is only one sense that we can be a p-zombie, and speaking for myself I know with absolute certitude that I am not one.