A proof that p-zombies are logically incoherent.

[cpolk]

"To be exhibiting 'all apparrent consiousness', the p-zombie must have the awareness of self that is generaly defined to be consiousness".

You had a strong point until you decided to throw this in there. The reason is that "to be exibiting all apparent consciousness", all the p-zombie must do is be, in whatever way, programmed good enough to fool a human into thinking that it is exhibiting actions of conscious thought, not actually have conscious thought.

If you remove that reference from your post, I think your argument against p-zombies is pretty solid.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

So a p-zombie is self-aware, yet is not conscious.

Hang on, I said nothing about self-awareness. But are we talking about a p-zombie in the context of materialism or dualism or what?

If it is not conscious then a fortiori it is not a self. Yet it is aware that it is a self? This is absolute gobbledegook.

What does it mean for something to be "a self"?

Worse yet Dancing David said:

"To be exhibiting 'all apparrent consiousness', the p-zombie must have the awareness of self that is generaly defined to be consiousness".

So David is saying that to be aware is to be conscious.

At best, he is saying that to be self-aware is to be conscious. I have no idea whether that's right, because we're using the term conscious to mean 385 different things. If consciousness is qualia, for example, then self-awareness is an entirely different matter.

I'm sure you guys just love to introduce words with ambigious meaning precisely in order to conceal the fact that your position is completely nonsensical.

That's rich.

~~ Paul

 

[Interesting Ian]

Okay, sorry to come in late, but that's the way it goes after a vacation. Which sort of p-zombie are we talking about?

http://www.skepticwiki.org/wiki/index.php/P-zombie

~~ Paul

WOW! Thank you Paul! I was thinking of drawing this distinction but you guys seem to have enough trouble understanding this stuff as it is.

Now I wonder why you couldn't have thought up this distinction yourself without searching the net. I certainly did.

I have in mind zombies which are functionally identical. If you are a materialist functionalist (which makes a great deal more sense than identity theory and is vastly more popular), then it would be logically impossible for an android not to be conscious. I'm guessing that people here are maintaining this functionalist position.

 

[Interesting Ian]

You had a strong point until you decided to throw this in there. The reason is that "to be exibiting all apparent consciousness", all the p-zombie must do is be, in whatever way, programmed good enough to fool a human into thinking that it is exhibiting actions of conscious thought, not actual have conscious thought.

If you remove that reference from your post, I think your argument against p-zombies is pretty solid.

That's not what I said. I was quoting Dancing David.

 

[Mercutio]

Consciously, I am just aware. I have no sensation in the least of this thing called "a brain." This is because it -- i.e., the brain -- is functioning properly.

You have no sensation of the function of the brain, but that does not at all mean that it is "neutral" with regard to perception. There are well-known biases in perception and cognition which are not known by the perceiver, but which are easily demonstrable if you apply the proper controls. It is this sort of thing that shows A) the uselessness of introspection as a means by which to explore the function of the brain, and B) the uselessness of using your own perception of your awareness as an argument.

 

[Iacchus]

You have no sensation of the function of the brain, but that does not at all mean that it is "neutral" with regard to perception. There are well-known biases in perception and cognition which are not known by the perceiver, but which are easily demonstrable if you apply the proper controls. It is this sort of thing that shows A) the uselessness of introspection as a means by which to explore the function of the brain, and B) the uselessness of using your own perception of your awareness as an argument.

So, and if you vary any of the circuitry in the stereo amplifier -- which, produces the same music I hear with my ears by the way -- it will no doubt affect how the output signal is "controlled" as well.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

You had a strong point until you decided to throw this in there. The reason is that "to be exibiting all apparent consciousness", all the p-zombie must do is be, in whatever way, programmed good enough to fool a human into thinking that it is exhibiting actions of conscious thought, not actual have conscious thought.

So you're saying that a p-zombie is really a sort of Turing test? How well does it have to do? Does it have to fool me after casual conversation, or does it have to be fully externally indistinguishable from a human? If the latter, then we could not today program a p-zombie. When the day comes that we can program one, how will we test whether it is, in fact, a p-zombie, as opposed to a "conscious" entity?

~~ Paul

 

[Iacchus]

You have no sensation of the function of the brain, but that does not at all mean that it is "neutral" with regard to perception. There are well-known biases in perception and cognition which are not known by the perceiver, but which are easily demonstrable if you apply the proper controls. It is this sort of thing that shows A) the uselessness of introspection as a means by which to explore the function of the brain, and B) the uselessness of using your own perception of your awareness as an argument.

All this tells us is that the brain is designed to operate within certain parameters. And, the fact that I'm not aware of it, suggests that it is designed to suit me -- the occupant -- not the other way around.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Now I wonder why you couldn't have thought up this distinction yourself without searching the net. I certainly did.

Which distinction?

I have in mind zombies which are functionally identical. If you are a materialist functionalist (which makes a great deal more sense than identity theory and is vastly more popular), then it would be logically impossible for an android not to be conscious. I'm guessing that people here are maintaining this functionalist position.

Functional identity does not imply that an android would be conscious, unless the electronics mimics each and every aspect of neurons and all other components of the brain. But let's say it does. Then the android would be conscious, and I'm not sure why you would say otherwise.

~~ Paul

 

[cpolk]

That's not what I said. I was quoting Dancing David.

Thus, my use of the word "reference".

 

[cpolk]

So you're saying that a p-zombie is really a sort of Turing test? How well does it have to do? Does it have to fool me after casual conversation, or does it have to be fully externally indistinguishable from a human? If the latter, then we could not today program a p-zombie. When the day comes that we can program one, how will we test whether it is, in fact, a p-zombie, as opposed to a "conscious" entity?

"Conscious" entities exist. "P-zombies" don't. That makes it very easy.

If it is our souls that make us conscious, then we cannot program anything that mimics a consciousness into a machine unless we program something that mimics the soul.

 

[Mercutio]

All this tells us is that the brain is designed to operate within certain parameters. And, the fact that I'm not aware of it, suggests that it is designed to suit me -- the occupant -- not the other way around.

Douglas Adams said it better than I ever could hope to:

This is rather as if you imagine a puddle waking up one morning and thinking, ‘This is an interesting world I find myself in—an interesting hole I find myself in—fits me rather neatly, doesn’t it? In fact it fits me staggeringly well, must have been made to have me in it!’ This is such a powerful idea that as the sun rises in the sky and the air heats up and as, gradually, the puddle gets smaller and smaller, it’s still frantically hanging on to the notion that everything’s going to be alright, because this world was meant to have him in it, was built to have him in it; so the moment he disappears catches him rather by surprise.

From his speech at Digital Biota 2.

 

[Iacchus]

Douglas Adams said it better than I ever could hope to:

From his speech at Digital Biota 2.

Well, perhaps he should stick with mud puddles then? It doesn't change the fact "I" exist. Neither can it change that fact by merely destroying the body.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

If it is our souls that make us conscious, then we cannot program anything that mimics a consciousness into a machine unless we program something that mimics the soul.

When we come to understand what this soul is and start programming it, how will we know we've got it right?

~~ Paul

 

[Mercutio]

Well, perhaps he should stick with mud puddles then? It doesn't change the fact "I" exist. Neither can it change that fact by merely destroying the body.

Yes, we all know that your delusions of grandeur lead you to believe that your intellect dwarfs Adams's. And nobody said you did not exist. But yes, if your body is destroyed, that's it for you.

We all eagerly await any evidence at all to the contrary.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Hang on, I said nothing about self-awareness. But are we talking about a p-zombie in the context of materialism or dualism or what?

That's meaningless. We're not talking about them in the context of any metaphysical position. We're supposed to be trying to think about p-zombies to precisely establish which metaphysical position makes sense.

What does it mean for something to be "a self"?

A self or the "I" is the grouping together of certain families of conscious experiences. Thus a self can listen to music and eat ice cream and these experiences are only had by the one self*. Another self does not partake in these experiences but has his/her own family of experiences.

*Assuming the non-existence of ESP.

At best, he is saying that to be self-aware is to be conscious.

You can be conscious without being aware that you are a self. I don't know what it means to be aware without being conscious though unless you simply mean certain behaviour. If we are not conscious of an object in our enviroment, yet can point to it (blindsight), how is that being aware apart from saying we will behave in a certain way??

I have no idea whether that's right, because we're using the term conscious to mean 385 different things. If consciousness is qualia, for example, then self-awareness is an entirely different matter.

Yes of course it is. A materialist can't believe in a self at all! That site says:

"Furthermore, there are several different qualities a p-zombie might lack. Often, a p-zombie is assumed to lack qualia, but other possible qualities are intentionality, free will, consciousness or soul".

Qualia is consciousness. It is any possible experinece, not just perceptual experiences. The soul is simply a self which survives the death of the body (to believe in a self obviously doesn't necessitate that one survies the death of ones body). To have free will presupposes a self it seems to me (and obviously presupposes consciousness). Intentionality presupposes consciousness.

For the materialist all there are is a series of successive similar psychological states. This leads to the illusion of a self -- not a true self. A "self" for the materialist is just the sum of all your experiences. A proper self is the author of experiences. Experiences are had by such a self.

 

[Interesting Ian]

WOW! Thank you Paul! I was thinking of drawing this distinction but you guys seem to have enough trouble understanding this stuff as it is.

Now I wonder why you couldn't have thought up this distinction yourself without searching the net. I certainly did.

I have in mind zombies which are functionally identical. If you are a materialist functionalist (which makes a great deal more sense than identity theory and is vastly more popular), then it would be logically impossible for an android not to be conscious. I'm guessing that people here are maintaining this functionalist position.

Actually this needs to be clarified. The android's electronic brain would need to mirror all the functions of our own brains. So it would modify its behaviour according to its environment. But one can imagine an android which was exhaustively programmed to respond appropriately to any situation i.e it wouldn't "learn" so to speak. Presumably a behaviourist would say such an android is conscious, but a functionalist wouldn't (and of course the identity materialist would deny we have any reasons to suppose either type of android is conscious).

 

[Z]

What has been made vitally clear is that any metaphysic which allows for the existence of p-zombies is irrational and illogical. IF a p-zombie can be shown to exist then we must embrace an irrational and illogical metaphysic. Else we must presume that those things which act conscious are conscious.

 

[Iacchus]

Yes, we all know that your delusions of grandeur lead you to believe that your intellect dwarfs Adams's. And nobody said you did not exist. But yes, if your body is destroyed, that's it for you.

Hey, if it makes you feel better, sure.

We all eagerly await any evidence at all to the contrary.

Indeed, your time will come too.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Which distinction?


Functional identity does not imply that an android would be conscious, unless the electronics mimics each and every aspect of neurons and all other components of the brain. But let's say it does. Then the android would be conscious, and I'm not sure why you would say otherwise.

~~ Paul

Yes yes, I just said that. I would say otherwise because all materialist positions are absurd. This does not exclude functionalism.

Why should a behavioural indistinguishable android not be conscious, but a functional indistinguishable one is?

They would both pass the Turing test. Given the non-existence of ESP you would be equally psychologically convinced both are conscious.