A proof that p-zombies are logically incoherent.

[Soapy Sam]

"Just to remind or inform anyone who doesn't know. A p-zombie is an apparent person who acts and looks in every way like a normal human being, but who is in fact wholly lacking any consciousness whatsoever."
-Interesting Ian.

I have read the first two posts in this thread. Before I read the rest, can anyone tell me if there is any actual proof p-zombies (as defined above) exist?

 

[Mercutio]

I have read the first two posts in this thread. Before I read the rest, can anyone tell me if there is any actual proof p-zombies (as defined above) exist?

It is a philosophical exercise.

So...no. Or maybe, we all are.

 

[Z]

"Just to remind or inform anyone who doesn't know. A p-zombie is an apparent person who acts and looks in every way like a normal human being, but who is in fact wholly lacking any consciousness whatsoever."
-Interesting Ian.

I have read the first two posts in this thread. Before I read the rest, can anyone tell me if there is any actual proof p-zombies (as defined above) exist?

No and apparently they cannot exist either. If however they did exist materialism would be dealt a fatal blow. Unfortunately for non-materialists there is no possible way to conclude whether something is a p-zombie or not.

Apologies - my comma key is gone.

 

[Interesting Ian]

No and apparently they cannot exist either. If however they did exist materialism would be dealt a fatal blow.

No. They do not need to be physically possible, merely logically possible.

Unfortunately for non-materialists there is no possible way to conclude whether something is a p-zombie or not.

Apologies - my comma key is gone.

First of all it's your brain, now your comma key is gone too

 

[Z]

No. They do not need to be physically possible, merely logically possible.

And since they're not logically possible materialism is entirely safe.

First of all it's your brain, now your comma key is gone too

Ahhh... a mild insult. Who says I even have a brain Ian? Maybe I'm psychokinetically typing this directly with my mind...



Of course the logical counter-insult in this case would be to retort that at least I've still got a mind... you lost yours YEARS ago.

 

[cpolk]

When we come to understand what this soul is and start programming it, how will we know we've got it right?

There are two methods here - the first is that, if the soul is responsible for consciousness, we can tell by whether or not the creation is conscious. Under this hypothetical, if the soul were not functioning, the creation would not have self-awareness.

The other argument is that once we learn the make-up of the soul, we should be able to tell if it is functional before we insert it into the creation.

 

[cpolk]

First of all it's your brain, now your comma key is gone too

"First of all, it's your brain, and now your comma key is gone, too."

Judge not lest ye be judged.

 

[Soapy Sam]

Thank you gentlemen.

I shall await the movie. G'night all.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

That's meaningless. We're not talking about them in the context of any metaphysical position. We're supposed to be trying to think about p-zombies to precisely establish which metaphysical position makes sense.

How can we do that? I think it's the other way round: We decide whether we like the idea of p-zombies and then choose dualism. Otherwise we choose monism. Of course, even if we choose dualism, the idea still seems preposterous.

You can be conscious without being aware that you are a self. I don't know what it means to be aware without being conscious though unless you simply mean certain behaviour. If we are not conscious of an object in our enviroment, yet can point to it (blindsight), how is that being aware apart from saying we will behave in a certain way??

It's being aware of the object in the sense of realizing it or perceiving it, which is one of the definitions of awareness. As you say, it's just a behavior. For that matter, why should I assume that self-awareness is anything other than behavior?

Qualia is consciousness.

Then self-awareness isn't consciousness, unless you're saying that self-awareness is a quale. I suppose that's possible, since quale is so poorly defined.

Why should a behavioural indistinguishable android not be conscious, but a functional indistinguishable one is?

I can't answer this, because I don't know what we mean by a "behaviorally indistinguishable" p-zombie. If it's indistinguishable across all possible tests, then I'd say it's conscious.

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

No and apparently they cannot exist either. If however they did exist materialism would be dealt a fatal blow.

No. They do not need to be physically possible, merely logically possible.

You've said this 100 times. Why don't we do the logic? What are the premises and what is the conclusion? I have no idea.

~~ Paul

 

[Mercutio]

Thank you gentlemen.

I shall await the movie. G'night all.

Straight to video, I assure you.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

There are two methods here - the first is that, if the soul is responsible for consciousness, we can tell by whether or not the creation is conscious. Under this hypothetical, if the soul were not functioning, the creation would not have self-awareness.

How would we define self-awareness and how could we test whether the creation had it?

~~ Paul

 

[cpolk]

How would we define self-awareness and how could we test whether the creation had it?

~~ Paul

One idea is to see whether we can use psychology on it - something that can only be evident in creatures that are both self-aware as well as aware of its environment. After we've studied it and diagnosed a psychological pattern, we can attempt to manipulate its psychology, just as we do with humans.

If it is conscious, we will successfully manipulate its psychology. If it is not conscious, then it can only do what it is programmed to do, and will always revert to its original psychological pattern.

 

[Mercutio]

One idea is to see whether we can use psychology on it - something that can only be evident in creatures that are both self-aware as well as aware of its environment. After we've studied it and diagnosed a psychological pattern, we can attempt to manipulate its psychology, just as we do with humans.

If it is conscious, we will successfully manipulate its psychology. If it is not conscious, then it can only do what it is programmed to do, and will always revert to its original psychological pattern.

And if it is programmed to respond as if manipulated?

 

[Iacchus]

And if it is programmed to respond as if manipulated?

So the water, in the process of rolling down hill, digs a channel. This is what defines the river. So which came first? The river or the channel?

 

[Mercutio]

So the water, in the process of rolling down hill, digs a channel. This is what defines the river. So which came first? The river or the channel?

Iacchus, your circular example differs from mine in one crucial way. The program for the computer can be seen independently of its output. Your alleged programming (unless you are changing your version of this example for the first time in over 20 presentations of it) is only circularly inferred after the observed performance.

If we are to merely infer programming (or the lack therof) from observed behavior, then the example is as logically bankrupt as any of yours, I agree.

 

[Iacchus]

Iacchus, your circular example differs from mine in one crucial way. The program for the computer can be seen independently of its output. Your alleged programming (unless you are changing your version of this example for the first time in over 20 presentations of it) is only circularly inferred after the observed performance.

If we are to merely infer programming (or the lack therof) from observed behavior, then the example is as logically bankrupt as any of yours, I agree.

Yes, the channel does manipulate/maintain the behavior of the river. However, it would not be there if the water/river didn't begin to roll down the hill in the first place.

 

[cpolk]

And if it is programmed to respond as if manipulated?

Once the psychological manipulation ends, it should create an entirely different psychology than it had before and during manipulation. If it returns to either of those, then it is acting on a programmed routine. If it invents an entirely new one, then it is not acting as programmed.

We will know, because we will have programmed it. If it develops psychologies other than what we've programmed, it is conscious.

 

[HypnoPsi]

If p-zombies are logically possible, then, by definition, reductive materialism is false.

That depends at which point (and by what means) consciousness is said to occur, Ian. Think of combustion. If you put a lump of wood in a fan-assisted oven it will take quite a while at the highest temperature before it ignites in flames producing heat by it's own fuel.

To assume reductive materialism is true is, by definition, to assume that p-zombies are logically impossible.

If information processing is, as many of the materialists in here, the fundamental cause and/or nature of consciousness then this statement seems accurate.

AmateurScientist wrote:
Daniel Dennett (author of Consciousness Explained and very much a materialist, and TAM4 speaker) is a well-known and respected philosopher

I have no respect for him whatsoever.

I don't see why you should say that. I totally disagree with Dennett as well, but I admire his attempt to propose an explanatory model. Of course, it's not genuine science by any stretch of the imagination since his theory of conscious thermostats doesn't generate any testable hypotheses at all (let alone any testable hypothesis that resist sincere but fair attempts at falsification) but it makes an interesting difference to the usual materialist strategy.

In my view, someone who only takes the role of critic in a field, who does't have any theories of their own or, worse, who isn't prepared to subject their theories to scrutiny and criticism is not only extremely unscientific, they are also a coward.

Thesis defence is an academic and scientific rite of passage. It separates the men from the boys. So although I might disagree with Dennett's supporters in this forum with their conscious toilet cisterns, etc., I can respect the signs of some willingness to actually get involved in consciousness research properly. It is a very fascinating subject and we need more solid discussion rather than just the usual invective, name-calling and ridicule.

Whether thermostats are conscious or not; whether people can tell when they're being stared at or not or who's phoning them, has profound implications either way. We're all interested in this for the science, yes? Well, having some respect for those who present ideas - even if we all just end up agreeing to disagree - is important if we're to remove the element on both sides who are clearly just in the fray for the fighting.
_
HypnoPsi

 

[cpolk]

Whether thermostats are conscious or not; whether people can tell when they're being stared at or not or who's phoning them, has profound implications either way. We're all interested in this for the science, yes? Well, having some respect for those who present ideas - even if we all just end up agreeing to disagree - is important if we're to remove the element on both sides who are clearly just in the fray for the fighting.

I agree to put aside the argument of thermostats and cisterns, as any definition only defines, without changing, the reality; I don't regard those objects as anything more than you do.

We cannot "tell" if people are staring at us, if I am reading you right. We can make an assumption, but there is no way short of asking that we can "tell", even if they are staring right at us. How many times have you felt you were being stared at, just to realize no one was staring? Or thought someone was staring right at you, and they were actually staring at something that was merely in your general direction?

Anyone who claims otherwise should be a millionaire.

I agree - Let's put an end to semantical bickering and just have a discussion.