A proof that p-zombies are logically incoherent.

[Mercutio]

The problem of pain was expoused by Wittgenstein. I'm not sure if he was the first, but certainly he is the one to which the criticism is ascribed. Witt also had much to say (or really nothing to say) about this thread in general. By putting inference outside of ourselves he concludes that presuppositions are arrived a priori.

Perhaps it has been too many decades since my Wittgenstein classes--I took two as an undergrad, from a real Witt scholar and total character--but I do not recall reaching this conclusion. Could you refer me to which book(s) you draw this from?

Group think, or group arrival at a definition is ultimately flawed as any real path to truth, because as he notes, it is nonsensical to say "Socrates is indentical." Indentical holds no real properties in an of itself, yet somehow when we compare the color red, we are saying "You're perception of red is the same as mine."

Again, your reading is quite different from mine (either that, or the behaviorists have not stopped with Witt, and have filled in where you say he stopped). "No real properties in and of itself" is not the same as "having no publicly available referents from which to learn the term". Categories of behaviors or objects will do just fine, although the more abstract, the more hazy our definitions will be.

It reality we have said nothing about the object itself, thus we must conclude that... "of that which one cannot speak, one must remain silent." Which in essense, negated much of what he said.

Flick

Ah, but we can speak of things with public referents. (his point, perhaps, was exactly what I have been saying here--we learn from our public referents; we cannot talk about things which our language community cannot somehow point to examples of to teach us the words.)

I may very well need to re-read his notebooks. This is as good an excuse as any...

 

[Interesting Ian]

Just to clarify here. If a p-zombie is logically impossible, then if a computer, robot acts identically to a human being, then by definition it is conscious.

Well I suppose identity theorists would disagree with that. But then identity theory is no longer popular. Functionalism, the most common materialist position, would certainly hold this.

 

[Jekyll]

Is there any kind of a coherent definition of consciousness on this thread?

 

[dougsmith]

And I am saying that this is total nonsense. What's more, even if it weren't total nonsense, the definition would elide the difference. The proof simply accepts the definition as written. If you claim that conscious beings can say something, then, by definition, p-zombies can say something.

That's what you could call proof-by-definition.

I'll prove that there are no automobiles. By "automobile" I mean something that is both a sphere and a cube at the same time. So by definition there are no automobiles.

 

[sphenisc]

Is there any kind of a coherent definition of consciousness on this thread?

As is usual on these threads, the argument is over preferred definition.

1) Anything with the verifiable properties associated with consciousness is conscious.

2) As above, but also including the awareness of internal precepts or qualia.

 

[uruk]

Interesting point. I think this is what Ian is arguing about that undetectable property that distinguishes a conscious human being from a p-zombie.

Just because a p-zombie tells you over and over that it feels like he is conscious, it does not make him conscious, there is still something missing.

Mary

But if that thing is undetectable how would you know that the p-zombie is a p-zombie? How would you know if you were not a p-zombie if you can't even detect this thing in yourself? If you can't detect it how would know you have it?

 

[PixyMisa]

David, this thread is not about whether consciousness is dependent on the physical.

Right.

We are discussing whether a p-zombie is logically coherent.

Right.

This question directly pertains to reductive materialism.

Wrong.

It requies neither reductionism nor materialism.

Non-reductive materialism where consciousness merely supervenes on brain processes is not being discussed.

Yes it is.

 

[PixyMisa]

Just to clarify here. If a p-zombie is logically impossible, then if a computer, robot acts identically to a human being, then by definition it is conscious.

If p-zombies are logically possible, then the question remains open to as whether a computer, robot is conscious.

Almost right. By definition, we cannot say the robot is not conscious.

 

[PixyMisa]

That's what you could call proof-by-definition.

I'll prove that there are no automobiles. By "automobile" I mean something that is both a sphere and a cube at the same time. So by definition there are no automobiles.

Yep. But for some reason, there are people who take the concept of p-zombies seriously. It's not my fault that the definition is nonsensical.

 

[stamenflicker]

Perhaps it has been too many decades since my Wittgenstein classes--I took two as an undergrad, from a real Witt scholar and total character--but I do not recall reaching this conclusion. Could you refer me to which book(s) you draw this from?

His first one, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus . My Latin spelling is horrible. I think the book is available on-line if you don't own it. I too will likely need to go back and read it, since I was posting from a 3 or 4 year old memory of the book. It might make a good POM thread, cause I need a refresher also.

Again, your reading is quite different from mine (either that, or the behaviorists have not stopped with Witt, and have filled in where you say he stopped). "No real properties in and of itself" is not the same as "having no publicly available referents from which to learn the term". Categories of behaviors or objects will do just fine, although the more abstract, the more hazy our definitions will be.

I agree with you. Wittgenstein said at the beginning that there are real facts, and those are atomic facts. But he then, if I'm remembering correctly proceeded to demonstrate basic logic problems in acertaining what these facts are, due precisely to the sorts of things we are talking about. Again, I like you am probably due for a re-read.

Ah, but we can speak of things with public referents. (his point, perhaps, was exactly what I have been saying here--we learn from our public referents; we cannot talk about things which our language community cannot somehow point to examples of to teach us the words.)

I'm not sure he would agree. Well, he might agree that we can talk about them since, of course we are right now. But I think he would find truth claims regarding item X as suspect when they depend on public referrents.

I may very well need to re-read his notebooks. This is as good an excuse as any...

POM? We could just take a chunk and break it down. I do know later in life he admitted that much of what was in his first book was a philosophy he no longer held. But I find his first book to be the best to me personally. The problem of pain came in a later writing, I don't remember which but promise to look it up.

Flick

PS-- I've picked up my copy of Tractatus and started skimming (dangerous I realize). I think 5.X is the place where my memory got lodged. 5.44 -- "Truth functions are not material functions...." You are correct on the Socrates is identical bit (in 5.473 thru 5.4733), he was making a different argument regarding "a possible sign must also be able to signify." So I'm wrong there. Probably wrong elsewhere... I'll post back after more reading.

 

[sphenisc]

Yep. But for some reason, there are people who take the concept of p-zombies seriously. It's not my fault that the definition is nonsensical.

There are differing definitions. If you choose one that is nonsensical then you will not take the concept of p-zombies seriously. Other people use a different definition - that is why they can take it seriously.

 

[PixyMisa]

There are differing definitions. If you choose one that is nonsensical then you will not take the concept of p-zombies seriously. Other people use a different definition - that is why they can take it seriously.

Hmm. Can you point me to these differing definitions?

 

[sphenisc]

Hmm. Can you point me to these differing definitions?

post #85

 

[PixyMisa]

Oh, right. I thought you were talking about different definitions of p-zombies, but you're talking about different definitions of consciousness.

Shall we now go into the reasons why the concept of qualia is incoherent?

 

[sphenisc]

Oh, right. I thought you were talking about different definitions of p-zombies, but you're talking about different definitions of consciousness.

Shall we now go into the reasons why the concept of qualia is incoherent?

Yes

 

[Jekyll]

His first one, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus . My Latin spelling is horrible. I think the book is available on-line if you don't own it. I too will likely need to go back and read it, since I was posting from a 3 or 4 year old memory of the book. It might make a good POM thread, cause I need a refresher also.

W. (my speelling also sucks) decided that the premise of his earliest work was flawed, and that it should be disregarded.

This doesn't mean what he says was wrong, but it makes it hard to have a conversation about what W. thought, when you're reading from different books.

 

[PixyMisa]

Yes

Okay.

Qualia are internal, subjective experiences, unconnected with the objective world, right? Pure essence; pure information.

If you ask the p-zombie about them, it will affirm its experience of these qualia. Well, if it's a materialist it will just give you a blank zombie stare, but let's assume it's a Platonic Idealist or somthing. It can narrate to you exactly the nature of these qualia in loving detail. This means that the p-zombie has internal states that behave in all respects exactly like qualia. Since qualia are purely informational, and information is necessarily substrate-neutral, any two representations of a particular set of information are precisely equivalent. This means that the p-zombie has qualia. Since the p-zombie is not conscious (by definition) and qualia are only found in conscious beings (by definition) this means that neither concept is meaningful under any consistent metaphysics.

 

[PixyMisa]

By the way, I don't consider either "proof" to be, well, a proof. Just an argument that - given a very few basic assumptions - these concepts simply are not workable, and that those assumptions appear in most of the contexts where those same concepts apply. Neither one is really logically rigorous, and I'd welcome anyone's efforts to improve them - or contrariwise, to point out serious flaws.

 

[PixyMisa]

Oh, and one more thing: These arguments, even if they are correct, do not prove that p-zombies and qualia do not exist, merely that the concepts are nonsensical. I have no proof as yet that the universe is required to make sense.

 

[Dancing David]

Yes.


Yes, but it is mere speculation, as you will agree.


Certainly.

My point is that this is not necessary for the proof to stand. The proof derives from the definition of consciousness, not from its origins. If consciousness were immaterial in origin, it wouldn't matter; the concept of p-zombies would still be incoherent.

Which is the problem with the idea of p-zombies, it is not a defintition which is usefull. And it can demonstrate nothing.

It is like saying, "I have a dog, it is like a dog in every discernable way, but it is not a dog." This emans that the burden of proof is one the person saying that the thing that looks and acts like a dog is not a dog.

Same for consciousness, people say they have these irreducable qualia thingees, but you need eyes to percieve color and you need ears to percieve sound, therefore the event that is labeled as consciousness is dependant upon the physical properties of perception.

There are no qualia, the same is true for every event of perception, you need the optic nerve to percieve color, you need the optical cortex to see color and you need the frontal cortex, in conjunction with the left language cortex to talk about it.

There is no perception without the physical structure it is dependant upon, the brain is not a black box, you can put wires in it and create false qualia, you can damage it and stop the perception of qualia. There are no free standing qualia.