President Bush
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- Mar 27, 2005
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From today's U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee hearing on Wartime Executive Power and the National Security Agency's Surveillance Authority:
Ummmm........ yeah.FEINSTEIN: All right, but you sidestepped FISA, using the plenary authority as commander in chief. The problem there, as I see it, is that Article 1 Section 8 gives the Congress the authority to make the regulations for the military. NSA is part of DOD; therefore the Congress has the right to make those regulations.
GONZALES: I think that the clause you're referring to is the clause in Section 8 of Article 1 which clearly gives to the Congress the authority and power to make rules regarding the government and regulation of our armed forces.
And then the question is, well -- electronic surveillance -- is that part of the government and regulation of our armed forces?
There are many scholars who believe that, there, we are only talking about, sort of, the internal administration of our military, like courts-martial, like selective service.
And so, I think there would be a question, a good debate and discussion about whether or not -- what does that clause mean and does it give to the Congress, under the Constitution, the authority to impose regulations regarding electronic surveillance?
I'm not saying that it doesn't. I'm just saying that I think that's obviously a question that would have to be resolved.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/02/06/AR2006020600931.html
Another point I was glad to hear raised:
GRAHAM: But it's clear to me that the Congress has the authority to regulate the military, to fund the military. And the Uniform Code of Military Justice is a statutory scheme providing guidance, regulation and punishment to the military that the Congress passes.
GONZALES: I think most scholars would say that would fall under the clause in Section 8 of Article I giving the Congress the authority to pass rules regarding government and regulation of the armed forces.
GRAHAM: And I would agree with those scholars.
And the point I'm trying to say is that we can tell our military, "Don't you do this to a detainee." And you, as commander in chief, can tell the military, "We've got to win the war, we've got to protect ourselves."
Now, what I'm trying to say is that I'm worried about the person in the middle here. Because if we had adopted the reasoning of the Bybee memo -- that's repudiated, appropriately -- the point I was trying to make at your confirmation hearing is that the legal reasoning used in determining what torture would be under the Convention of Torture or the torture statute not only was strained that made me feel uncomfortable, it violated an existing body of law that was already on the books called the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
If a military member had engaged in the conduct outlined by the Bybee memo, they could have been prosecuted for abusing a detainee because it's a crime in the military, Mr. Attorney General, for a guard to slap a prisoner, much less have something short of major organ failure.
This is really a big deal for the people fighting the war. And if you take your inherent authority argument too far, then I am really concerned that there is no check and balance.
GRAHAM: And when the nation's at war, I would argue, Mr. Attorney General, you need checks and balances more than ever, because within the law we put a whole group of people in jail who just looked like the enemy.
GONZALES: Senator, if I could just respond. I'm not -- maybe I haven't been as precise with my words as I might have been.
I don't think I've talked about inherent exclusive authority. I talked inherent authority under the Constitution and the commander in chief.
Congress, of course, and I've said in response to other questions, they have a constitutional role to play also during a time of war.
GRAHAM: We coexist.
Now, can I get to the FISA statute in two minutes here? And I hope we do have another round, because this is very important. And I'm not here to accuse anyone of breaking the law. I want to create law that will help people fight the war know what they can and can't do.
The FISA statute -- if you look at the legislative language, they made a conscious decision back in 1978 to resolve this two-lane debate. There's two lanes you can go down as commander in chief. You can act with the Congress and you can have inherent authority as commander in chief.
The FISA statute said, basically, "This is the exclusive means to conduct foreign surveillance where American citizens are involved." And the Congress, seems to me, gave you a one-lane highway, not a two- lane highway. They took the inherent authority argument, they thought about it, they debated it, and they passed a statute -- if you look at the legislative language -- saying, "This shall be the exclusive means." And it's different than 1401.
So I guess what I'm saying, Mr. Attorney General, if I buy your argument about FISA, I can't think of a reason you wouldn't have the ability if you chose to to set aside the statute on torture if you believed it impeded the war effort.
GONZALES: Well, Senator, whether or not we set aside a statute, of course...
GRAHAM: But inherent authority sets aside the statute.
GONZALES: That's what we're talking about here. We don't need to get to that tough question.
GRAHAM: If you don't buy the force resolution argument, if we somehow magically took that off the table, that's all your left with is the inherent authority. And Congress could tomorrow change that resolution, and that's dangerous for the country if we get in a political fight over that.
All I'm saying is that the inherent authority argument, in its application, to me, seems to have no boundaries when it comes to executive decisions in a time of war. It deals the Congress out, it deals the courts out.
And, Mr. Attorney General, there is a better way. And on our next round of questioning we will talk about that better way.
GONZALES: Can I simply make one quick response?
SPECTER: You may respond, Attorney General.
GONZALES: Well, the fact that the president, again, may have inherent authority doesn't mean that Congress has no authority in a particular area. And when we look at the words of the Constitution, and there are clear grants of authority to the Congress in a time of war.
And so if we're talking about competing constitutional interests, that's when you get into, sort of, the third part of the Jackson analysis.
GRAHAM: That's where we're at right now.
GONZALES: I don't believe that's where we're at right now.
GRAHAM: That's where you're at with me.
For comic relief:
SCHUMER: Last week in the hearing before the Intelligence Committee, General Hayden refused to state publicly how many wiretaps have been authorized under this NSA program since 2001. Are you willing to answer that question, how many have been authorized?
GONZALES: I cannot. No, sir. I am not at liberty to do that.
I believe -- and, of course, I have not been to all the briefings to the congressional leaders and the leaders of the Intel Committee -- I believe that that number has been shared, however, with members of Congress.
SCHUMER: You mean the chair of the Intelligence Committee or something?
It's not a classified number, is it?
GONZALES: I believe it is a classified number -- yes, sir.
SCHUMER: But here's the issue. FISA is also important to our national security. And you've praised the program, right?
GONZALES: I couldn't agree more with you, Senator.
SCHUMER: OK.
GONZALES: It's very important.
SCHUMER: Now FISA makes public every year the number of applications. In 2004, there were 1,758 applications. Why can't we know how many under this program? Why should one be any more classified than the other?
GONZALES: I don't know whether or not I have a good answer for you, Senator.
SCHUMER: I don't think you do.
(LAUGHTER)
I oughta have a pretty clean garage by the time C-Span radio is through broadcasting this.