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Cont: The Russian invasion of Ukraine part 7

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I don't think it's been noted in this thread yet that a lot of the current fighting is apparently in front of the Russian defense lines as Russia sends counterattack after counterattack into largely open and unfortified areas, rather than using the defenses they built for their ostensible purpose of inflicting serious losses upon the attackers and then, if breached, triggering focused counterattacks from the second line of defenses to try to regain such. I'm not exactly complaining, but... this seems like one of those "WTF, Russia?" things.

It's a tactic the allies used against Germany in the Normandy campaign in 1944. German doctrine was always to counterattack. When the initial attack is only intended to provoke that predictable response, it leaves you exposed and vulnerable to artillery or air strikes.

I was about to remark that it's surprising if the Russians are letting themselves be drawn out by the same ruse, but no, it's unsurprising. Reminds me of a comment by Al Murray recently: Russia don't know how to win, because they have never been honest with themselves about how they won in WW2.
 
I'm pretty sure "always counterattack" is a fairly universal doctrine. Yes, it is predictable, but apparently it's also still the best option. The problem isn't in the doctrine itself, but in the execution. Even if your tactical objective is to break contact with the enemy and withdraw, the first step is to try to shock them out of their momentum so that they're unable to effectively pursue you as you retreat.

You always attack into an ambush. Naturally, part of setting up an ambush is to mine the area in front of you, so that the victim's counterattack charges into your mines instead of overrunning your position. But still, the victim's best option is to put your preparations to the test.

It seems that in mortal combat, one of the greatest treasures is violent aggression. The side that can bring more of it to bear is the side that wins.

So it's not a question of whether the Ukrainians are triggering a predictable response. It's a question of whether Moscow's counterattacks are swift enough, and violent enough to shatter them. And it's a question of whether the Ukrainian attack itself is violent enough to consume or brush away the counterattack. This is down to training, morale, and coordination in the field.

One could imagine a poorly-trained, dispirited assault being drained of its power before reaching the enemy lines, by a spirited counterattack. One could also imagine a well-organized assault grinding up a poorly-conceived and poorly-supported counterattack "just as planned".
 
I'm pretty sure "always counterattack" is a fairly universal doctrine. Yes, it is predictable, but apparently it's also still the best option. The problem isn't in the doctrine itself, but in the execution. Even if your tactical objective is to break contact with the enemy and withdraw, the first step is to try to shock them out of their momentum so that they're unable to effectively pursue you as you retreat.

You always attack into an ambush. Naturally, part of setting up an ambush is to mine the area in front of you, so that the victim's counterattack charges into your mines instead of overrunning your position. But still, the victim's best option is to put your preparations to the test.

It seems that in mortal combat, one of the greatest treasures is violent aggression. The side that can bring more of it to bear is the side that wins.

So it's not a question of whether the Ukrainians are triggering a predictable response. It's a question of whether Moscow's counterattacks are swift enough, and violent enough to shatter them. And it's a question of whether the Ukrainian attack itself is violent enough to consume or brush away the counterattack. This is down to training, morale, and coordination in the field.

One could imagine a poorly-trained, dispirited assault being drained of its power before reaching the enemy lines, by a spirited counterattack. One could also imagine a well-organized assault grinding up a poorly-conceived and poorly-supported counterattack "just as planned".


I disagree in part with what you say. Ukraine didn't really counterattack much in Bakhmut. Defend vigorously, and retreat to predetermined defensive lines when covered by artillery/drones/smoke etc. is another option.

This video - for example has section ambushes, followed by platoon ambushes, followed by main battle, so not really any counterattacks.
 
I disagree in part with what you say. Ukraine didn't really counterattack much in Bakhmut. Defend vigorously, and retreat to predetermined defensive lines when covered by artillery/drones/smoke etc. is another option.

This video - for example has section ambushes, followed by platoon ambushes, followed by main battle, so not really any counterattacks.

Mmm. For quite a while, I seem to recall that there was counterattacking? Places were lost and then regained over and over and over? Ukraine then held positions that could attack longer open killing fields until they came under heavy fire and retreated until they could counterattack and retake those positions. That did change in the long stretched out final phase where Russia made gains around Bakhmut and Ukraine was driven out very gradually, though. Sorta hard to tell whether that was intentional strategy by Ukraine to focus Russia's forces and attention there, either way, as the only remaining place where they had been making any actual gains.
 
Mmm. For quite a while, I seem to recall that there was counterattacking? Places were lost and then regained over and over and over? Ukraine then held positions that could attack longer open killing fields until they came under heavy fire and retreated until they could counterattack and retake those positions. That did change in the long stretched out final phase where Russia made gains around Bakhmut and Ukraine was driven out very gradually, though. Sorta hard to tell whether that was intentional strategy by Ukraine to focus Russia's forces and attention there, either way, as the only remaining place where they had been making any actual gains.

Fair enough. But it isn't blindly counterattacking as the claim is about the Russian tactics.

And the video certainly isn't. It's a managed retreat, shoot and skoot.
 
The Ukrainian counter attacks have been on the flanks. Attacking into the city is just a good way to end up with a lot of dead soldiers and not much real estate to show for it.

Also about ambush reponse. The turn into it and attack is not about defeating the ambushers but it is about trying to survive. If a close ambush is set up correctly anything else gets you killed. Get close to them and they end up in a friendly fire situation trying to kill you. The odds of survival are terrible no matter what you do. They are just a little better if you make it harder to shoot you.
 
Drone footage appears to show explosive-rigged car atop Ukraine's Kakhovka Dam before collapse

Russia had the means, motive and opportunity to bring down a Ukrainian dam that collapsed earlier this month while under Russian control, according to exclusive drone photos and information obtained by The Associated Press.

Images taken from above the Kakhovka Dam and shared with the AP appear to show an explosive-laden car atop the structure.

Two officials also said Russian troops were stationed in a crucial area inside the dam where the Ukrainians said the explosion which destroyed it was centred.

The Russian Defense Ministry did not immediately respond to a request for comment.
 
This is by far the best and most graphic close up combat footage i've seen.

Unbelievable what I'm seeing with Russians wearing tennis shoes and hoodies.

https://twitter.com/wartranslated/status/1670706258326765569?s=20

Didn't see any rifles in the hands of the first three Russians. Makes it look a bit odd that they advanced into the fire of the Ukrainians. If they were trying to surrender, they should have just yelled it out and waited. Maybe panicking and badly trained.

The grenade use is interesting. Might be more effective throwing them down the length of the trench rather than over and above. But that also comes with the risk of a bad bounce. Also have to worry about how well supplied they are with them.
 
This is by far the best and most graphic close up combat footage i've seen.

Unbelievable what I'm seeing with Russians wearing tennis shoes and hoodies.

https://twitter.com/wartranslated/status/1670706258326765569?s=20

I see it on maps, but I do wonder what sort of defenses these lines that Russia has made. Are they just trenches they've dug with some barbed wire? I don't think they've had time to recreate the Maginot line or something. If they're manned by poorly trained, poorly equipped, "mobiks", then all they will be is a delay for Ukraine with some brief viscous CQB combat.
 
I see it on maps, but I do wonder what sort of defenses these lines that Russia has made. Are they just trenches they've dug with some barbed wire? I don't think they've had time to recreate the Maginot line or something. If they're manned by poorly trained, poorly equipped, "mobiks", then all they will be is a delay for Ukraine with some brief viscous CQB combat.

I've seen some video last week about them .. but sadly can't find it. The defenses are substantial, and they go along the whole current front, from south to north. There was one line with barbed wire to stop / slow down foot soldiers, another line designed to stop / slow down tanks, and then trenches, to provide cover for defenders. All like 50 meters from each other. No cover between them. Mines everywhere. Looks like simple but effective design, under current circumstances.
But it's usually only one of this triple line. Only some places have several of them. So if you make a break through, you can quickly get behind, and raid the trenches with humvees. And with trench defenders dealt with, you can get over tanks, as long as you clear passage through mines.
Russia then tries to address these breakthroughs and make quick counterattacks, presumably with their better troops.
 
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I see it on maps, but I do wonder what sort of defenses these lines that Russia has made. Are they just trenches they've dug with some barbed wire? I don't think they've had time to recreate the Maginot line or something. If they're manned by poorly trained, poorly equipped, "mobiks", then all they will be is a delay for Ukraine with some brief viscous CQB combat.

Sorry to nitpick here but the idea of the combatants wading through treacle does amuse slightly - maybe you mean the word vicious.
;)
 
The Ukrainian counter attacks have been on the flanks. Attacking into the city is just a good way to end up with a lot of dead soldiers and not much real estate to show for it.

Also about ambush reponse. The turn into it and attack is not about defeating the ambushers but it is about trying to survive. If a close ambush is set up correctly anything else gets you killed. Get close to them and they end up in a friendly fire situation trying to kill you. The odds of survival are terrible no matter what you do. They are just a little better if you make it harder to shoot you.

Expanding a little bit on the explanation of why 'attacking into the ambush' is the least bad option, a lot of the reason it is the least bad option have to do with the basic principles of an ambush.

In an ambush you want the targets in the worst place for them that they will pass through before you spring the ambush. This means if you're in the position of the force being ambushed, wherever you are is the worst places you can be. Now there might be several better or good places to be, but if the ambushing force is large enough those will almost all have opposition there to keep the ambushed in place. But that's not often the case, so the ambushing force has to pick where to put their troops.

This means the best places to be (best cover with most line of fire to the ambushed starting spot and hopefully places to fall back to) isn't going to be a random unopposed direction, but is very likely to be where the enemy forces are.

The basic premise of an ambush is to put the other force in the worst position and your own in the best. So if you're ambushed the most valuable evidence you're likely to have to hand of where is a good place to be is where the ambushers have chosen to be.
 
Didn't see any rifles in the hands of the first three Russians. Makes it look a bit odd that they advanced into the fire of the Ukrainians. If they were trying to surrender, they should have just yelled it out and waited. Maybe panicking and badly trained.

The grenade use is interesting. Might be more effective throwing them down the length of the trench rather than over and above. But that also comes with the risk of a bad bounce. Also have to worry about how well supplied they are with them.

Yes, are the Russian conscripts being sent to the front without rifles? or are they just untrained with their rifles? Did they throw them down or just not have any. Remember these Russians are not attacking, so they can't pick up a fallen comrade's rifle as they advance (this was a tactic in Bakhmut & of course highly mentioned in Eastern Front Russian attacks)

Since the last conscript was wearing basketball shoes, i'm assuming they don't have combat boots for the conscripts, which leads me to think aren't being issued rifles either.
 
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