How do we know that places like Narnia do not exist?

[PixyMisa]

And we infer that other people are conscious because they say they are, and act as if they were.

So where's the problem?

 

[Interesting Ian]

Thanks for clarifying, Ian. It's been 15 years or more since I read the Chronicles.

Ah, so you have read them. I couldn't forget they all died at the end. I thought it was wonderful! Mind you, the last book (the last battle) was pretty crap until near the end where everyone got threw in the barn. I think "the magicians nephew" (the first one) was my favourite (of the course it wasn't the first one he wrote, that was the Lion, the Witch and the Wardrobe). Which was your favourite?

 

[PixyMisa]

Thus people would act and say precisely as they do even if nobody was ever conscious

That statement has no meaning.

If they act precisely as they would if they were conscious, from their reports of personal awareness and the insights thereof right down to the individual neural firings correlating with your own, then you can't say they're not conscious.

The P-Zombie is not a coherent concept under materialism. It just doesn't mean anything.

(which is why the materialist has to say that certain appropriate physical events logically necessitate consciousness -- a thesis which is patently false).

What?

 

[Interesting Ian]

And we infer that other people are conscious because they say they are, and act as if they were.

So where's the problem?

Because everything they ever do or say is a result of physical laws and not thier consciousnesses.

Consider an android. The exact same principle applies. It can be programmed to say it is conscious and to act as if it is conscious. But we know precisely why it says and acts as it does and it has nothing to do with consciousness.

We have to acknowledge that consciousness is causally efficacious, otherwise we cannot legitimately infer that other people are conscious.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Yep.

As you might guess, that pissed me off enormously. Hurrah! We're all dead!

Feh.

No, I had no idea it would piss you off. It's psychologically fascinating though. Perhaps this is connected in some way to your vehement dismissal of the possibility of an afterlife. I thought the ending was absolutely wonderful!

 

[PixyMisa]

Because everything they ever do or say is a result of physical laws and not thier consciousnesses.

But you can't say that. They are conscious; they make conscious choices.

Consider an android. The exact same principle applies. It can be programmed to say it is conscious and to act as if it is conscious.

And I would answer: No, you cannot do that. You cannot make an android that acts as if it were conscious without it being conscious. It's not good enough to say "yes" when asked if it is conscious; it must be able to report what and why it is thinking and doing. And if it can do that, then it is conscious.

We have to acknowledge that consciousness is causally efficacious, otherwise we cannot legitimately infer that other people are conscious.

Okay, got you. There is no problem at all with that under materialism.

 

[PixyMisa]

No, I had no idea it would piss you off. It's psychologically fascinating though.

Perhaps it is.

Perhaps this is connected in some way to your vehement dismissal of the possibility of an afterlife.

Exactly so. Since there is not the slightest shred of evidence of any such thing, any more than there is for Narnia, the idea that death is some wonderful liberating event is nauseating to me; it is a repudiation of what life itself offers.

I thought the ending was absolutely wonderful!

I am not surprised.

 

[PixyMisa]

A correction to the original manuscript:

Then Aslan turned to them and said:

"You do not yet look so happy as I mean you to be."

"You stupid miserable overstuffed toy!", cried Lucy. "We've all been [rule 8] killed! How the [rule 8] do you expect us to be [rule 8] happy?" Then she pulled out a snub-nosed .38 revolver and shot Aslan dead.

"See how you like it."

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

They all die in the end? Cripes! I only read a couple of the books. Ah yes, they all die in the end. "I'm the author and I want to stop writing and I don't know what else to do."

Feh, indeed.

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Exactly so. Since there is not the slightest shred of evidence of any such thing, any more than there is for Narnia, the idea that death is some wonderful liberating event is nauseating to me; it is a repudiation of what life itself offers.

Well, if there is some grand liberation upon death, Ian can say he told us so. If we're just dead, then we won't know, but at least Ian won't suffer with the knowledge that he was wrong.


~~ Paul

 

[Interesting Ian]

Any generalised statement about the real world is arrived at inductively. You can't know everything, so you follow what you do know. As I said, there is, so far, no evidence that magic or magical worlds exist; none whatsoever. And we have looked. Oh, how we have looked.

As far as I'm aware there is no evidence for other worlds/Universes. Having said that one would not expect any evidence. After all, they are different Universes we're talking about here. If we could just get there by traversing a physical distance then they wouldn't, by definition, be a differing Universe, but this one.

You have looked? What do you mean? Where did you look?

Further, if there were magic or magical worlds, what we think we know of how the Universe really works would be wrong

Well it almost certainly is wrong. As all our previous models in the history of science have been wrong, then by inductive reasoning it seems reasonable to presume our current model is wrong too. Our laws are always an approximation. This approximation might get better and better as time goes on, but it seems reasonable to assume we will never have a T.O.E.

- and yet, we have tested our knowledge countless times, and it isn't wrong. (At least, not in such a way as would permit magic.)

But it is wrong. My consciousness which is non-physical, is causally efficacious. I am demonstrating this right now by typing out my message. This proves the world is not physically closed. This is proof for the supernatural. Follow and read the link in my sig.

As for magical worlds that don't interact with our Universe; they don't exist. By definition. They are imaginary. That's it. To exist is to interact; they don't; therefore they don't.

No, to exist is not to interact. That is logical postivistic crap.

This doesn't apply to galaxies beyond the edge of the observable Universe, because although they are not causally connected to us now, we can infer their existence from the properties of the Universe.

Yes of course. There is no evidence for such galaxies nor could they be, not even in principle (assuming wormholes in the space -time continuum that one could travel through are in principle impossible), but it would be absurd to suggest they don't exist!

We don't just make them up; we don't assume they are there because they are possible; we have physical evidence that the Universe is larger than we can observe. (Which sounds weird, I agree.)

We have a hypothesis about how the Universe arose. That hypothesis has it that the Universe is vastly larger than what we observe. If for example there wasn't any galaxies beyond the cosmic horizon this would mean that our local group of galaxies is at the centre of the Universe. This goes against the principle that the Universe is homogeous.

 

[PixyMisa]

As far as I'm aware there is no evidence for other worlds/Universes.

Right.

Having said that one would not expect any evidence. After all, they are different Universes we're talking about here. If we could just get there by traversing a physical distance then they wouldn't, by definition, be a differing Universe, but this one.

Right.

You have looked? What do you mean? Where did you look?

Behind the house, in the garden, under my bed. I looked in books, I looked in nooks, I even onetime asked some crooks.

Well it almost certainly is wrong. As all our previous models in the history of science have been wrong, then by inductive reasoning it seems reasonable to presume our current model is wrong too.

Never mind that, Ian, we know our current model is wrong. Relativity and Quantum Mechanics don't work together.

Our laws are always an approximation. This approximation might get better and better as time goes on, but it seems reasonable to assume we will never have a T.O.E.

No, that doesn't necessarily follow.

But it is wrong. My consciousness which is non-physical

Why do you claim that? You most certainly do not have any evidence for such an assertion.

is causally efficacious. I am demonstrating this right now by typing out my message. This proves the world is not physically closed. This is proof for the supernatural. Follow and read the link in my sig.

Okay, hang on... Read read... Well, qualia don't exist; the concept isn't even coherent under materialism. If you assume that qualia exist, you have assumed that materialism is false. So his entire argument is nonsense.

No, to exist is not to interact. That is logical postivistic crap.

Well then, mister illogical negativist, you provide an alternative definition.

Yes of course. There is no evidence for such galaxies nor could they be, not even in principle (assuming wormholes in the space -time continuum that one could travel through are in principle impossible), but it would be absurd to suggest they don't exist!

Because there is evidence suggesting that the Universe extends beyond the observable limit.

We have a hypothesis about how the Universe arose. That hypothesis has it that the Universe is vastly larger than what we observe.

No, that isn't part of the hypothesis.

If for example there wasn't any galaxies beyond the cosmic horizon this would mean that our local group of galaxies is at the centre of the Universe.

No.

This goes against the principle that the Universe is homogeous.

No.

 

[PixyMisa]

Oh good grief. That paper refers to PEAR for support.

 

[Z]

Ah, so you have read them. I couldn't forget they all died at the end. I thought it was wonderful! Mind you, the last book (the last battle) was pretty crap until near the end where everyone got threw in the barn. I think "the magicians nephew" (the first one) was my favourite (of the course it wasn't the first one he wrote, that was the Lion, the Witch and the Wardrobe). Which was your favourite?

Like I said, it's been a decade and a half, but I seem to recall that The Voyage of the Dawn Treader was my favorite.

The Magician's Nephew, the first time I read it, was presented as book 6, and I think it absolutely works better after you've been introduced to the mysteries of Narnia, as such. After you've read the series once, returning to the intended order is OK, but for a first time through, TLTWATW has GOT to be the first book read.

What I find ironic is the Pagans who are trying to use this clearly Christian allegory to teach Paganism lessons...

 

[Z]

Because everything they ever do or say is a result of physical laws and not thier consciousnesses.

Consider an android. The exact same principle applies. It can be programmed to say it is conscious and to act as if it is conscious. But we know precisely why it says and acts as it does and it has nothing to do with consciousness.

We have to acknowledge that consciousness is causally efficacious, otherwise we cannot legitimately infer that other people are conscious.

The error here is that you are automatically assuming that consciousness has something to do with something other than the material/physical 'symptoms' of consciousness. If a thing acts and behaves consciously, it is conscious by definition. Under materialism, there's no such thing as a 'p-zombie'.

 

[Interesting Ian]

The error here is that you are automatically assuming that consciousness has something to do with something other than the material/physical 'symptoms' of consciousness. If a thing acts and behaves consciously, it is conscious by definition.

Yes this is so under most materialist positions, particularly functionalism.

Under materialism, there's no such thing as a 'p-zombie'.

That's right. More accurately under materialism they must be logically impossible.

But to take the case of an android, I take it as clearly ludicrous to say that it is conscious by definition. We can pull the sucker apart to see how it works. An android is basically no different from a chess computer. A chess computer works by certain rules eg put rook in empty rank, take piece if none of its pieces are endangered etc. There's absolutely zero reason to think it is conscious. And if that is so for a chess computer then it is so for an android. An android is simply not restricted to playing just one task, but can do as many tasks as human beings. But at the end of the day its just a mechanical contraption and we have no more reason to think it is conscious then any other computer, or indeed even a clockwork clock.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Okay, hang on... Read read... Well, qualia don't exist; the concept isn't even coherent under materialism. If you assume that qualia exist, you have assumed that materialism is false. So his entire argument is nonsense.

Yes, qualia are simply presumed to exist. He and I take the existence of qualia as being absolutely 100% certain.

And yes, it is true that the existence of qualia necessitates that materialism is false.

(for those of you who don't know qualia refers to our immediate experiences eg what it is like to experience the smell of coffee, or to experience greenness, or to experience the actual taste of a choc ice etc. Indeed it's absolutely any experience whatsoever and not restricted to those experiences provided by the 5 main senses. In other words qualia is simply consciousness so long as we understand that when we say consciousness, we are not talking about physical events in the brain, but rather the raw feel of consciousness or experiences. I take it an an axiom that I at least am conscious and have experiences).

 

[Z]

Yes this is so under most materialist positions, particularly functionalism.



That's right. More accurately under materialism they must be logically impossible.

But to take the case of an android, I take it as clearly ludicrous to say that it is conscious by definition. We can pull the sucker apart to see how it works. An android is basically no different from a chess computer. A chess computer works by certain rules eg put rook in empty rank, take piece if none of its pieces are endangered etc. There's absolutely zero reason to think it is conscious. And if that is so for a chess computer then it is so for an android. An android is simply not restricted to playing just one task, but can do as many tasks as human beings. But at the end of the day its just a mechanical contraption and we have no more reason to think it is conscious then any other computer, or indeed even a clockwork clock.

Then what is the component of consciousness that you take as given, that a human being can possess, but an android cannot? After all, we can pull this sucker (i.e. a human body) and see how it works. A human is no different from an organic android.

Indeed, any chess computer which meets the qualifications of 'consciousness' is also, by definition, conscious.

So the real question (here, at least) is: just exactly, PRECISELY, how do you define 'consciousness'?

 

[Z]

Yes, qualia are simply presumed to exist. He and I take the existence of qualia as being absolutely 100% certain.

And yes, it is true that the existence of qualia necessitates that materialism is false.

(for those of you who don't know qualia refers to our immediate experiences eg what it is like to experience the smell of coffee, or to experience greenness, or to experience the actual taste of a choc ice etc. Indeed it's absolutely any experience whatsoever and not restricted to those experiences provided by the 5 main senses. In other words qualia is simply consciousness so long as we understand that when we say consciousness, we are not talking about physical events in the brain, but rather the raw feel of consciousness or experiences. I take it an an axiom that I at least am conscious and have experiences).

In other words, if you take it as axiomic that materialism is false, then materialism must not be true.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

And yes, it is true that the existence of qualia necessitates that materialism is false.

We have waited years for a proof of this assertion, since it is not an empirical claim. The proof does not appear to be forthcoming.

~~ Paul