Jack by the hedge
Safely Ignored
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- Oct 14, 2009
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... the JAIC just cobbled together something that sounds vaguely plausible ...
You'd never do that of course. "Plausible" indeed. The very idea.
... the JAIC just cobbled together something that sounds vaguely plausible ...
But his first duty was to the safety of the ship. If he disregarded that and plowed on to meet his 'performance measures' he was not a competent man to be captain of a ship.
According to the JAIC the Atlantic lock failed first (when one wonders whether it was ever even locked at all, or even particularly needed)
and this caused the other two locks, virtually at the same time, to also fail. Think about it. The two upper locks were not dependent on the bottom lock other than marginally (re bearing tension). When one wheel comes off a wagon, not all the other wheels come off the same time or even nanoseconds after. Yet the JAIC are asking us all to suspend credulity and just believe.
Let's imagine for argument's sake 'wave impact' caused the bow visor to fall off. The JAIC affirm it was the bottom lock that failed first, then the port and then the starboard.
An independent expert mechanical engineer specialist who has written literally hundreds of papers on machine tools, nuts and bolts, probably one of the foremost experts in Europe (not up to your standards, of course), Dr-Ing Hans-Werner Hoffmeister then of Hamburg Technical University caried out his own tests, as appointed by Meyer Werft, the shipbuilders of the vessel, and his wholly scientific results (= which means they are replicable under the same conditions) showed that in fact, the weakest link was the starboard locks, nuts and bolts, then the port and last of all, the bottom lock, and this is the sequence they would have failed had such a hypothetical force was exerted on the bow visor.
Oh dear. A totally illiterate interpretation of the laws of physics. Whilst the metal was indeed corroded, cracked and fatigued (cf Hoffmeister), under such conditions, the Atlantic lock would not have failed first as it was not the weakest or most stressed. Secondly, it was normal for that vessel to journey with up to 100 tonnes of sea water swishing about inside the bow visor due to a gap in the starboard side. There is a red mattress and various blankets and towels visible in the videos of the car ramp, which the JAIC dismisses as having come loose from a clothes storage. You and it fail to even ask why would such a storage space be by the car ramp, if not to be used for anything other than to plug the incoming seawater and rain? What other use would such a storage facility have on a car deck?
In addition, the only way water to enter the superstructure pre-capsize would be through the upper pipes situated along the middle of the ship and middle stairwell. If the ship was listing to starboards, then the water is accumulating to the right not the centre and as it leant towards stern you can then visualise the water level would be towards aft and starboards. It doesn't go anywhere near the centre of the ship for such slow flooding to occur, as happened with Oceanos. So, to get the necessary amount of water to ingress the vessel, the JAIC has to feed us the totally implausible scenario of it floating at 90° without fully capsizing - when we know that within seconds of a ship passing its angle of stability (nearer 40°, when the engines cut out as a result) it should overturn completely (as did the Oceanos after 18 hours of starboard list at about 30°, before it passed the point of no return and capsized within nine minutes completely).
But you believe it floated on its superstructure of twenty minutes whilst the windows and inner dividers broke - again the waves - even though the reinforced glass is designed to withstand wind speeds of 41m/s.
How can "seawater gushed into the open vehicle deck, and started finding its way (via gravity) to all the decks below" when it was at a 90° angle??? The water via gravity would descend to the starboard walls, not the lower decks!!!
According to the JAIC the Atlantic lock failed first (when one wonders whether it was ever even locked at all, or even particularly needed) and this caused the other two locks, virtually at the same time, to also fail. Think about it.
When one wheel comes off a wagon, not all the other wheels come off the same time or even nanoseconds after. Yet the JAIC are asking us all to suspend credulity and just believe.
An independent expert mechanical engineer specialist who has written literally hundreds of papers on machine tools, nuts and bolts
probably one of the foremost experts in Europe (not up to your standards, of course)...
The utterly ridiculous assertion that the Lusitania was sunk because it ran on time.
I have, and unlike you I am qualified to think accordingly. A sequence of failure is entirely different than simultaneous failure.
No, you're just trying to think intuitively rather than analytically.
But isn't that circular reasoning? The ship was involved in a sudden mysterious sinking, with strange communications blackouts for the duration, therefore, it must be the fault of the captain? The crew are entirely faultless on the other hand, even though Sillaste and Treu don't seem to have informed the bridge they were 'up to their knees in water' in the ECR.
Yes, the buck stops with the Captain but the JAIC don't blame the Captain. They do not make any effort to tell us, the people, what happened to the Captain.
If it was sabotage, then whilst it should have been Andresson's duty to guard against such a thing, he may not have had an awful lot of control over the situation.
Whoa! I didn't say Andresson's contract 'gave him no choice', but the fact is he wasn't being paid the USD equivalent of $3,000 pcm without all kinds of perfomance measures thrown in.
But isn't that circular reasoning? The ship was involved in a sudden mysterious sinking, with strange communications blackouts for the duration, therefore, it must be the fault of the captain?
You didn't explain why it was ridiculous. Walther Schwieger was a competent mariner who knew Lusitania's schedule and the constraints imposed on it by the tides at the recipient port. Lusitania was sunk in large part because she was predictable. And she was predictable because she was beholden to the tides. How is that ridiculous?
No. Circular reasoning is something entirely different from a captain being first and foremost responsible for the safety of his ship. What did you think was circular about that?But isn't that circular reasoning?
It's not really a mystery. Sorry to disappoint.The ship was involved in a sudden mysterious sinking
No.with strange communications blackouts for the duration
Don't seem to = there is no evidence either way. You're guessing about that. And who claimed the crew were faultless?therefore, it must be the fault of the captain? The crew are entirely faultless on the other hand, even though Sillaste and Treu don't seem to have informed the bridge they were 'up to their knees in water' in the ECR.
They were not making a movie. They had a job. They did it.Yes, the buck stops with the Captain but the JAIC don't blame the Captain. They do not make any effort to tell us, the people, what happened to the Captain.
It wasn't.If it was sabotage, then whilst it should have been Andresson's duty to guard against such a thing, he may not have had an awful lot of control over the situation.
Vixen, what do you think circular reasoning is?
The utterly ridiculous assertion that the Lusitania was sunk because it ran on time.
From Lusitania: An Epic Tragedy, by Diana Preston, p. 178:
In fact, Turner had another reason for reducing speed, apart from the fog. He was planning to steam through the final stretch of the Irish Sea in darkness, timing his arrival at the Mersey bar to catch the tide in the early hours. He then intended to sail straight over the bar without waiting for a pilot, to avoid delaying in waters known to be infested with submarines. High tide at the Mersey bar was 6:53 A.M., giving him a window of opportunity of some five hours.
There is some debate about how actively Schwieger was searching for the Lusitania, as he did not survive the war, and the German government attempted to downplay the extent to which the ship had been specifically targeted, due to the international condemnation of the sinking. But the fact remains that if Turner had not reduced speed when he did, he would not have encountered U-20.
From Lusitania: An Epic Tragedy, by Diana Preston, p. 178:
In fact, Turner had another reason for reducing speed, apart from the fog. He was planning to steam through the final stretch of the Irish Sea in darkness, timing his arrival at the Mersey bar to catch the tide in the early hours. He then intended to sail straight over the bar without waiting for a pilot, to avoid delaying in waters known to be infested with submarines. High tide at the Mersey bar was 6:53 A.M., giving him a window of opportunity of some five hours.
There is some debate about how actively Schwieger was searching for the Lusitania, as he did not survive the war, and the German government attempted to downplay the extent to which the ship had been specifically targeted, due to the international condemnation of the sinking. But the fact remains that if Turner had not reduced speed when he did, he would not have encountered U-20.