Infinitely Powerful

[Bri]

Sorry if I came off as insulting.

No problem! I didn't take it as an insult.

I understand, and as I've already stated, the so-called "problem of evil" is only a problem for certain notions of a god.

Is yours an argument against fundamentalist Christianity, or against an omnipotent, omniscient, benevolent God? There are other notions of an omnipotent, omniscient, benevolent[, insert descriptor here] God that are not fundamentalist Christian notions of God.

Problem is, there are lots of things, including causing suffering, which are not clearly right or wrong.

That is a fair point. But perhaps God doesn't judge us on those things as long as we're doing what we feel is right.

Right and wrong are decided by humans, not by God.

If God created humans, he is responsible for providing our ability to determine right and wrong. Even if he isn't responsible, that doesn't exactly further your argument unless you can prove that having the ability to choose between right and wrong (which would necessarily involve the ability to choose wrong) isn't for the greater good.

On many things, yes, yet there are still cultures which mutilate their children, allow husbands to murder their wives, and perhaps (and of this I am not sure) condone cannibalism. And these are not atheist cultures.

Good point, but I would guess that they believe that mutilating their children is for some greater good, which wouldn't make it needless suffering in their eyes. And they may actually be right, in which case the Problem of Evil wouldn't apply to their god! Or maybe they're all wrong and another god (who doesn't allow such things) is right. The Problem of Evil cannot disprove either possibility.

-Bri

 

[Tricky]

Nope. I can't see an invisible unicorn even in a dream.

Well, you're just not very imaginative, are you.

I'm not saying that "by 'see' I mean 'imagine'." I'm saying that at least one common definition of seeing involves a visual perception, regardless of whether there is actually sensory input to the eyes.

Which defintioin of "visual" are you using?

1 : of, relating to, or used in vision <visual organs>
2 : attained or maintained by sight <visual impressions>
3 : [SIZE=-1]VISIBLE[/SIZE]
4 : producing mental images : [SIZE=-1]VIVID[/SIZE]
5 : done or executed by sight only <visual navigation>
6 : of, relating to, or employing visual aids

I'm guessing it's number 4.
Can you see with your eyes closed? Do you think you could pass a drivers test that way?

 

[Bri]

With due respect to Bri, that definition is useless. What things are "impossible"? Things that God can't do. What things are there that God can't do? Impossible things.

"Impossible" means "logically impossible," not "something that God can't do." If God can't do something that is logically possible, then he wouldn't be omnipotent by that definition.

-Bri

 

[Bri]

I agree you put it better but still they end up from that concept right back at the class of reasons "We can't understand the mind of God". (Which your second reason also fits within.)

Yes, so? What theist believes that we can fully understand the mind of God? If we could, then we'd be God, wouldn't we?

-Bri

 

[Bri]

I don't think you can use logic to prove any god exists whether that god is constrained or not.

Who was trying to prove that God exists? We were discussing whether or not one could logically prove that God doesn't exist.

I'm just trying to make sure people don't forget which definition they are arguing about and therefore which arguments can be used to support it or not.

If you use the definition that God can do the illogical, no logical proof can be used to disprove the existance of that God.

-Bri

 

[Darat]

Who was trying to prove that God exists? We were discussing whether or not one could logically prove that God doesn't exist.



If you use the definition that God can do the illogical, no logical proof can be used to disprove the existance of that God.

-Bri

Typo - should have been disprove.

Yep.

 

[jjramsey]

Can you see with your eyes closed? Do you think you could pass a drivers test that way?

Not unless I was Paul Muad'Dib (after he got his eyes torched by a bomb).

However, those claiming to see auras are claiming to be able to do something roughly similar to what Paul Muad'Dib did, seeing real things as if they were using their eyes, but not actually using their eyes.

 

[Tricky]

No problem! I didn't take it as an insult.

Ah good. I prefer to do my insulting in "Flame Wars", and it is usually funny.

Is yours an argument against fundamentalist Christianity, or against an omnipotent, omniscient, benevolent God? There are other notions of an omnipotent, omniscient, benevolent[, insert descriptor here] God that are not fundamentalist Christian notions of God.

I think I went over this a few posts back. I defined omnipotent as able to do anything, omniscient as knowing everything, and benevolent as wanting all good. I don't characterize that as fundamentalist, but just basic (or "simplistic", as jjramsey would say.)

So if you redefine those words, for example saying, "benevolent means for the greatest good, but I admit I don't know what that means", then you have simply admitted that you cannot define the terms in a consistant way. Admittedly, it is not easy to prove a concept illogical when the concept cannot be defined.

That is a fair point. But perhaps God doesn't judge us on those things as long as we're doing what we feel is right.

If that is the case, then God himself has no morality. It is us (or our feelings) which define right and wrong. So once again, humans decide, not God.

If God created humans, he is responsible for providing our ability to determine right and wrong.

Then if that ability is not functioning correctly, it is God's fault for not providing a functioning sense of morality, wouldn't you say?

Even if he isn't responsible, that doesn't exactly further your argument unless you can prove that having the ability to choose between right and wrong (which would necessarily involve the ability to choose wrong) isn't for the greater good.

Oh, I can give lots of example where I (or others) thought they were doing what was for the greater good, but turned out to be incorrect. Remember a few years ago they sent out a flu vaccine that made more people sick than it protected? Was it wrong to send out that vaccine? Yes. Did they know it? No. What is it that is paved with good intentions?

Good point, but I would guess that they believe that mutilating their children is for some greater good, which wouldn't make it needless suffering in their eyes. And they may actually be right, in which case the Problem of Evil wouldn't apply to their god! Or maybe they're all wrong and another god (who doesn't allow such things) is right. The Problem of Evil cannot disprove either possibility.

Exactly. The answer rests in defining good and bad. My contention is that they require reference to a moral code. You seem to be saying the same thing, if you admit that the child mutilators are doing good by their moral code. Do you think that there such a thing as a "correct" moral code?

So, since morality is relative, you might correctly say that God can do no evil, but you could also correctly say that God can do no good.

My moral code says killing innocent people is bad. If a god kills innocent people then by my moral code, that god is bad. I will not say that terrorists are good because they obey a different moral code. It would be hypocritical give a god that leeway.

 

[Tricky]

Not unless I was Paul Muad'Dib (after he got his eyes torched by a bomb).

LOL. Ah, another "Dune" fan.

However, those claiming to see auras are claiming to be able to do something roughly similar to what Paul Muad'Dib did, seeing real things as if they were using their eyes, but not actually using their eyes.

Agreed, but it gets confusing when you swap definitions. One of the six major senses is vision. In this sense, it means the ability to recieve optic information through they eyes.

However, it does raise interesting questions, like "do bats 'see' in total darkness?"

 

[pgwenthold]

I see no reason why an omnipotent God could not have free will without suffering. A situation where no choice you made led to any suffering (like picking between two desserts).

Or you could just make it so that the "suffering" approach was so unappealing that no one would do it.

For example, supposedly I have free will, which means I am free to make a choice to pound the back of my hand with a sledgehammer if I want. OTOH, I don't see a lot of people doing that. People don't run around setting their genitals on fire, either, but that doesn't mean we don't have free will to do it.

Thus, I don't see why suffering would have to occur even if there were free will.

 

[pgwenthold]

Perhaps humans having the ability to choose between right and wrong is better than a complete lack of human suffering.

But that doesn't mean that "wrong" has to happen.

I have the ability to choose to pound my hand with a sledgehammer, or not pound my hand with a sledgehammer. However, I have never in my life pounded my hand with a sledgehammer.

Thus, the presence of free will does not mean that every action has to occur.

If God can make it so that I never choose to pound my hand with a sledgehammer without infringing on free will, why doesn't he just make it so I never choose to do wrong?

 

[Bri]

The "problem of evil" is a logical syllogism based on the standard definitions of "omnipotent", "omnibenevolent" and "evil". If you start with the definitions that omnipotent means he "can do anything", "omnibenevolent" means he "wants all good" and evil means "against God's will" then you can show that such a concept violates it's own premises and is therefore illogical. If you go back and change the definitions of the words, you are creating a completely separate syllogism. When "wanting all good" is changed to "wanting the greatest good" and evil is defined as "something that Gods will allows because it is necessary" and "omnipotent" means "can do lots of things, but not anything", then the conclusions become quite different because the premises are different.

If you start with a definition of omnipotent that means "can do anything including the illogical," you cannot use the Problem of Evil at all to discuss the existance of such a God. There would be no reason to expect the existance of such a God to result in anything logical.

I'm not sure that your other definitions are as problematic. Let's use your definition of evil (going against God's will) for a moment. The concept of evil itself (the possibility for humans to act against God's will) is a concept that is distinct from the evil acts (acting against God's will). In other words, by your definition, evil could exist without anyone ever choosing to act against God's will. This also means that the term "evil" never applies to God (since God cannot go against his own will). It also means that evil itself might be good while evil acts would not be good. Your definition of "omnibenevolence" as "wanting all good" could also be a valid descriptor for God without creating a logical contradiction, and also explains why he allows evil (which is itself good).

-Bri

 

[Bri]

I have the ability to choose to pound my hand with a sledgehammer, or not pound my hand with a sledgehammer. However, I have never in my life pounded my hand with a sledgehammer.

Thus, the presence of free will does not mean that every action has to occur.

So, let's say someone held a gun to your head and told you to order the Quarter Pounder instead of the Big Mac. Are you claiming that you still have equal freedom to order a Big Mac?

If God wanted us to be able to choose freely between right and wrong, don't you think making all wrong acts really painful might upset the freedom of the choice a little bit?

-Bri

 

[Tricky]

If you start with a definition of omnipotent that means "can do anything including the illogical," you cannot use the Problem of Evil at all to discuss the existance of such a God. There would be no reason to expect the existance of such a God to result in anything logical.

The problem is that just because you show something to be logically inconsistant does not mean that it is impossible, because logic is based on the premises. If you want to talk about "possible" then you must first show that the premises are correct. Here's an example syllogism.

Premise 1: Only things lighter that one ton can be lifted.
Premise 2: A large stone exists that weighs more than a ton.
Conclusion: That large stone cannot be lifted.

Is there anything illogical about that syllogism? No, not at all. But any idiot would spot the flaw in premise 1. But if you say "God cannot do logically impossible things", then you have to define what is logically possible, and I submit that you cannot do such a thing. Would you say, God can only do anything that is possible under the laws of physics? I'm betting you wouldn't.

So if you define God as being able to do supernatural things (like "exist outside of time", jj ), then you've simply removed all restrictions as to what is "logically possible" because you have opened up the premises of your logic to include "things for which evidence is not necessary"

I'm not sure that your other definitions are as problematic. Let's use your definition of evil (going against God's will) for a moment. The concept of evil itself (the possibility for humans to act against God's will) is a concept that is distinct from the evil acts (acting against God's will). In other words, by your definition, evil could exist without anyone ever choosing to act against God's will. This also means that the term "evil" never applies to God (since God cannot go against his own will). It also means that evil itself might be good while evil acts would not be good. Your definition of "omnibenevolence" as "wanting all good" could also be a valid descriptor for God without creating a logical contradiction, and also explains why he allows evil (which is itself good).

Without going into details, I agree that the definitions are problematic. But in order to discuss the possibility of a given concept of God, you must define that concept. That's a pretty tough chore, given that one of the ways we describe God is "beyond our knowledge".

So how can you show that things "beyond our knowledge" exist? You can't. That's where faith comes in. But faith is a double-edged sword. If you are willing to accept that one thing "beyond our knowledge" exists, then it is illogical to state that other things "beyond our knowledge" (like Santa Clause) do not exist.

So it comes down again to Occam's razor. Don't add unevidenced things to the mix. Even if you admit that things beyond our knowledge exist, there are so very many things "beyond our knowledge" that it makes no sense to believe in them. In my mind, it is wiser to restrict the things we believe in to those things of which we have knowledge. Yeah, you may make a few mistakes, but not as many as you would if you believe in lots of things beyond our knowledge.

Is it better if you only believe in one thing "beyond our knowledge"? I submit that such a stance is self-contradictory.

 

[jjramsey]

if you say "God cannot do logically impossible things", then you have to define what is logically possible, and I submit that you cannot do such a thing.

Except that "logically possible" has long since been defined.

 

[pgwenthold]

If God wanted us to be able to choose freely between right and wrong, don't you think making all wrong acts really painful might upset the freedom of the choice a little bit?

No more so than the fact that making pounding your hand with a sledgehammer hurts upsets the freedom of my choice to do that.

Do you think that I have a free choice to pound my hand with a sledgehammer?

There are a ton of things I can list that do not occur, even though I supposedly have free will. Either because god has made them so that I always chose not do them, as with the example above, or because god has made it so I am physically unable to do it. For example, I couldn't chose to fly by flapping my arms, not matter how much I want to do it.

Now, if these are not violations of free will (and I'm not arguing they are), then why should god making it so that I don't chose to do wrong acts be a violation?

 

[pgwenthold]

So, let's say someone held a gun to your head and told you to order the Quarter Pounder instead of the Big Mac. Are you claiming that you still have equal freedom to order a Big Mac?

Let's say someone threatened you with ETERNAL TORTURE for doing wrong instead of doing good? That's a hell of a lot worse than a gun to your head, wouldn't you think?

Do we have equal freedom to do wrong instead of doing good?

If threatening serious punishment for chosing incorrectly is a limitation on free will, then apparently limiting free will is not an issue for god.

BTW, I forgot to mention, your whole suggestion that "free will is for the greater good" is unsupportable, and my responses here should not be construed as agreement that free will is even necessary (if god wants to grant it, it is HIS option, and not essential). But as my responses show, even if free will is present and necessary, it fails in attempting to use it to rationalize wrongdoing.

 

[Tricky]

Except that "logically possible" has long since been defined.

The meaning of "logically possible" has been defined, but not the "things that are logically possible." I have just shown that it is logically impossible to lift something that weighs more than a ton.

But if you look down that link, you'll come upon the term nomologically possible, which means:

possible given the laws of nature that govern our physical universe.

It is logically possible for me to jump to the moon. It is not nomologically possible.

 

[jjramsey]

I have just shown that it is logically impossible to lift something that weighs more than a ton.

Nonsense. There is no logical contradiction involved in lifting a ton.

All you have shown is that you have a gross misunderstanding of what "logically possible" means.

 

[Tricky]

Nonsense. There is no logical contradiction involved in lifting a ton.

All you have shown is that you have a gross misunderstanding of what "logically possible" means.

You apparently didn't read your own link.

So, for example, the false proposition the sky is green is also logically possible, so long as we are able (as we indeed seem to be) to conceive of some logically coherent world in which the sky is green.