Absolute and Relative Time

[Mike Helland]

What's wrong with the full scale experimental apparatus we're currently using? There's no need to simulate the universe, when we have the universe itself ready to hand.

We make models to get predictions, which we compare against real world experiments to test the models.

Let's put an idealized thermometer on the surface of the sun, in a simulation. The thermometer will give us a temperature.

Let's put a physical thermometer on the surface of the sun, in a simulation. The thermometer will burn up and not say anything.

Which model is closer to real world experiments?

I think it's the one where the thermometer and the sun are modeled as a physical systems of particles.

I'm sure you'll disagree.

 

[hecd2]

I have pointed out more than once that the predictions of SR have consequences in the real world and are tested billions of times a day by real observers. Do you take that in? No, it goes straight over your head and you just repeat the same gobbledegook.

I'm not disputing that at all.

Of course you are. You think that somehow real observers will make measurements that are somehow different from the predictions made by considering "idealised" observers. But the validation of the theory is routinely made by real physical observers who see no difference between their observations and the predictions made by the theory.

You're making assumptions about what my point is, and you're mistaken.

That's possible since you have made half a dozen attempts to state what the point of this thread is, none of whichh agree with the others and none of which make any sense at all.

My point is that "relative time is what a clock measures", and with a massive enough simulation, we should be able to model an observer making a clock reading, which would be an example of Everett's relative state interpretation.

Why would anyone want to do that?

 

[hecd2]

Let's put an idealized thermometer on the surface of the sun, in a simulation. The thermometer will give us a temperature.

Let's put a physical thermometer on the surface of the sun, in a simulation. The thermometer will burn up and not say anything.

Which model is closer to real world experiments?

Or we could just measure the temperature of the surface of the Sun, as we have done, and skip the simulations.

 

[theprestige]

We make models to get predictions, which we compare against real world experiments to test the models.

Let's put an idealized thermometer on the surface of the sun, in a simulation. The thermometer will give us a temperature.

Let's put a physical thermometer on the surface of the sun, in a simulation. The thermometer will burn up and not say anything.

Which model is closer to real world experiments?

I think it's the one where the thermometer and the sun are modeled as a physical systems of particles.

I'm sure you'll disagree.

Of course I'll disagree. A properly simulated thermometer on a properly simulated sun will simulate burning up and not saying anything.

But in fact we're already measuring the temperature of the various surfaces and regions of the sun, without needing to simulate anything. We just use the systems of particles already at our disposal.

 

[Steve]

Mike's trying to achieve a physics breakthrough by substituting English for math and exploiting the ambiguity of natural languages.

This is Mike Helland's SOP in every thread he has started here. Hasn't worked yet but he gets a couple of points for persistence..

 

[Mike Helland]

Of course you are.

You are mistaken.

I'm not doubting relativity or trying to undermine it any way.

It is experimentally validated.

The idea, I got from Everett, whether you agree with it or not, is simply that making the observer's physical systems give you lots of principles of nature for free.

You don't think that's the case. You might be right.

Hence my interest in seeing to what extent that's true.

 

[hecd2]

I have pointed out more than once that the predictions of SR have consequences in the real world and are tested billions of times a day by real observers. Do you take that in? No, it goes straight over your head and you just repeat the same gobbledegook.

I'm not disputing that at all.

Of course you are. You think that somehow real observers will make measurements that are somehow different from the predictions made by considering "idealised" observers. But the validation of the theory is routinely made by real physical observers who see no difference between their observations and the predictions made by the theory

.You are mistaken.

In what way? You have spent days trying to persuade us that physical observers make different observations from idealised observers, including putting forward the ludicrous idea that the physical structure of observers moving at a large fraction of c (with respoect to what? - who knows?) will "start to fail" and setting out various scenarios that involve the reaction time of human observers. What are we supposed to think your idea is then? And when I point out that the theory is validated by real physical observers and not idealised observers, you hand wave that away.

If your simulated physical observers don't get the same results as the real physical observers, then it's a useless simulation. But in any case, what's the point? We already know what physical observers measure so why simulate it? What can you possibly learn that you don't already know?

 

[Mike Helland]

In what way? You have spent days trying to persuade us that physical observers make different observations from idealised observers...

Not quite.

Everett says, p 19:

"Therefore all predictions of the
usual theory will appear to be valid to the observer in amost [sic] all observer
states.

In particular, the uncertainty principle is never violated since the latest
measurement upon a system supplies all possible information about the rel-
ative system state, so that there is no direct correlation between any earlier
results of observation on the system, and the succeeding observation. Any
observation of a quantity B, between two successive observations of quantity
A (all on the same system) will destroy the one-one correspondence between
the earlier and later memory states for the result of A. Thus for alternating
observations of different quantities there are fundamental limitations upon
the correlations between memory states for the same observed quantity, these
limitations expressing the content of the uncertainty principle."

What I gathered from this is that things like the uncertainty principle are "expressed" by the patterns of a physical observers measurement records.

If the observer could hear, and was in an environment with sound, simply moving the observer around relative to the sound waves, would cause the observer to express the Doppler effect, as another example.

The statement isn't so much that ideal observers (iow, not Everett's purely physical observers) are incapable of matching real world measurements. But that physical observers in a model might get a lot of phenomena without an explicit statement of it in the underlying model.

We already know what physical observers measure so why simulate it? What can you possibly learn that you don't already know?

Why would scientists want to build models that predict measurements, rather than just measure things? C'mon, man. Isn't that self-evident?

 

[theprestige]

We already have models that predict measurements. And we already have measurements that validate or falsify the models. What are you trying to add, that we don't already have?

 

[Mike Helland]

We already have models that predict measurements. And we already have measurements that validate or falsify the models. What are you trying to add, that we don't already have?

The point of this thread was absolute and relative time, what Newton, Einstein, and Everett thought, in their own words.

So I'll quote Everett's introduction and conclusion to answer your question.

----

The task of quantizing general relativity raises serious questions about the
meaning of the present formulation and interpretation of quantum mechanics
when applied to so fundamental a structure as the space-time geometry itself.
This paper seeks to clarify the foundations of quantum mechanics. It presents
a reformulation of quantum theory in a form believed suitable for application
to general relativity.

The aim is not to deny or contradict the conventional formulation of
quantum theory, which has demonstrated its usefulness in an overwhelming
variety of problems, but rather to supply a new, more general and complete
formulation, from which the conventional interpretation can be deduced.
The relationship of this new formulation to the older formulation is there-
fore that of a metatheory to a theory, that is, it is an underlying theory in
which the nature and consistency, as well as the realm of applicability, of the
older theory can be investigated and clarified.

...

While our theory ultimately justifies the use of the probabilistic interpre-
tation as an aid to making practical predications, it forms a broader frame in
which to understand the consistency of that interpretation. In this respect
it can be said to form a metatheory for the standard theory. It transcends
the usual “external observation” formulation, however, in its ability to deal
logically with questions of imperfect observation and approximate measure-
ment.

The “relative state” formulation will apply to all forms of quantum me-
chanics which maintain the superposition principle. It may therefore prove a
21fruitful framework for the quantization of general relativity. The formalism
invites one to construct the formal theory first, and to supply the statistical
interpretation later. This method should be particularly useful for inter-
preting quantized unified field theories where there is no question of ever
isolating observers and object systems. They all are represented in a single
structure, the field. Any interpretative rules can probably only be deduced
in and through the theory itself.

Aside from any possible practical advantages of the theory, it remains
a matter of intellectual interest that the statistical assertions of the usual
interpretation do not have the status of independent hypotheses, but are
deducible (in the present sense) from the pure wave mechanics that starts
completely free of statistical postulates.

----

https://github.com/mikehelland/everetts-observer/raw/master/papers/relative_state.pdf

I think Everett is trying to say that the current theory works pretty well. We need some clarifications at the foundation, which results in a metatheory (superset) where eventually through mechanical observers connected to the objects being observed, the "usual" theories emerge.

I wasn't trying to subvert special relativity, just as Everett isn't trying to subvert the "usual" (Copenhagen) paradigm. But find an alternative route to it. Make it even more robust. Which I wouldn't take credit for. I feel Everett and DeWitt's correspondence made that connection.

 

[hecd2]

In what way? You have spent days trying to persuade us that physical observers make different observations from idealised observers...

Not quite.

Yes quite. Or are you pretending you didn't put forward the ludicrous idea that the physical structure of observers moving at a large fraction of c (with respect to what? - who knows?) will "start to fail" and setting out various scenarios that involve the reaction time of human observers, which you have since abadoned.

All of this is up the thread and visible to us all. So yes, you have absolutely been trying to suggest that physical observers will get different answers from the "idealised" observers in the theory, however much you deny it now.

In fact what you are trying to demonstrate morphs radically from day to day, from hour to hour, from minute to minute sometimes.

I think you are very confused.

If the observer could hear, and was in an environment with sound, simply moving the observer around relative to the sound waves, would cause the observer to express the Doppler effect, as another example.

Only if you already had a theory of the Doppler effect and you built that into the model. So what would that tell you about the Doppler effect that you didn't already know?

The statement isn't so much that ideal observers (iow, not Everett's purely physical observers) are incapable of matching real world measurements. But that physical observers in a model might get a lot of phenomena without an explicit statement of it in the underlying model.

Models can produce emergent phenomena, so for example the models of the early Universe evolution produce the filamentary structure that we observe. But the underlying physics has to be understood and put into the model in the first place. And unless you have a situation where the interaction of the observer with the system is itself part of the phenomenon, which is only plausible for the observation of quantum events, phenomena obeying quantum statistics (and where the term observer has to be understood to be the quantum state of the detection system, say the quantum state of a molecule or ensemble of molecules in a CCD for example, not a human being), and not for the observation of macroscopic phenomena which do not obey quantum statistics, then you get exactly the same result whether you include the observer or not.

 

[Mike Helland]

Yes quite. Or are you pretending you didn't put forward the ludicrous idea that the physical structure of observers moving at a large fraction of c (with respect to what? - who knows?) will "start to fail" and setting out various scenarios that involve the reaction time of human observers, which you have since abadoned.

I haven't abandoned it.

If someone actually builds a model with an Everett observer, time dilation would be the first thing I'd check to see works.

How about you? Let me guess.

"No, you're wrong. There is no such thing."

Cool. No need to reply.

 

[hecd2]

[FONT=&quot]It's at times like this when the aphorism "shut up and calculate" becomes most compelling.
[/FONT]
[FONT=&quot]

That said, my point is this: In the case where the mathematics of a theory only allows for one type of time, then there is a valid reason to choose one. And since relative time is what is actually observed, and it is desirable for theories to describe what is actually observed, then relative time is the best choice. But what about a physical theory whose mathematics allow for two types of time?

[/FONT]

To illustrate, consider F=ma.
The a is acceleration of course, m/s/s, which is a distance over a duration over a duration.
Or E=mc2, where the c is m/s.
My point is, these equations only allow for one kind of time and space.

Here's what I'm getting at: "Space, Einstein said, is merely what we measure with a ruler; time is what we measure with a clock". The "time is what a clock measures" is often attributed to Einstein. Did he actually say that anywhere? Any find a reference? Point is, that's how Newton defined relative space and time. That gets overlooked. So I'm drawing attention to it.

In any case, the point is this: "Is time absolute or relative?" is a false dilemma. Everett's relative state formulation is an example of a theory where it helps to have multiple notions of time, including a type of time that exists as measurement records made by interal observers of the model.

Yes, basically the point is this:
Newton: I envision a universe with a world of absolute time and space, separated from the world of relative time and space by measurement. My math is for the absolute world.
Einstein: envision a universe with a world of absolute time and space, separated from the world of relative time and space by measurement. My math is for the relative world.
Everett: I envision a universe with a world of absolute time and space, separated from the world of relative time and space by measurement. My math describes the measurement, and thus both worlds.
Common people: there is only one world, the one we observe. And we have a measurement problem.

What is the point of this thread again?
Simple. Newton defined relative time as a measurement. Everett implores to examine measurements made internally in the relative state formulation.

My point is that "relative time is what a clock measures", and with a massive enough simulation, we should be able to model an observer making a clock reading, which would be an example of Everett's relative state interpretation.

 

[theprestige]

The point of this thread was absolute and relative time, what Newton, Einstein, and Everett thought, in their own words.

So I'll quote Everett's introduction and conclusion to answer your question.

----

The task of quantizing general relativity raises serious questions about the
meaning of the present formulation and interpretation of quantum mechanics
when applied to so fundamental a structure as the space-time geometry itself.
This paper seeks to clarify the foundations of quantum mechanics. It presents
a reformulation of quantum theory in a form believed suitable for application
to general relativity.

The aim is not to deny or contradict the conventional formulation of
quantum theory, which has demonstrated its usefulness in an overwhelming
variety of problems, but rather to supply a new, more general and complete
formulation, from which the conventional interpretation can be deduced.
The relationship of this new formulation to the older formulation is there-
fore that of a metatheory to a theory, that is, it is an underlying theory in
which the nature and consistency, as well as the realm of applicability, of the
older theory can be investigated and clarified.

...

While our theory ultimately justifies the use of the probabilistic interpre-
tation as an aid to making practical predications, it forms a broader frame in
which to understand the consistency of that interpretation. In this respect
it can be said to form a metatheory for the standard theory. It transcends
the usual “external observation” formulation, however, in its ability to deal
logically with questions of imperfect observation and approximate measure-
ment.

The “relative state” formulation will apply to all forms of quantum me-
chanics which maintain the superposition principle. It may therefore prove a
21fruitful framework for the quantization of general relativity. The formalism
invites one to construct the formal theory first, and to supply the statistical
interpretation later. This method should be particularly useful for inter-
preting quantized unified field theories where there is no question of ever
isolating observers and object systems. They all are represented in a single
structure, the field. Any interpretative rules can probably only be deduced
in and through the theory itself.

Aside from any possible practical advantages of the theory, it remains
a matter of intellectual interest that the statistical assertions of the usual
interpretation do not have the status of independent hypotheses, but are
deducible (in the present sense) from the pure wave mechanics that starts
completely free of statistical postulates.

----

https://github.com/mikehelland/everetts-observer/raw/master/papers/relative_state.pdf

I think Everett is trying to say that the current theory works pretty well. We need some clarifications at the foundation, which results in a metatheory (superset) where eventually through mechanical observers connected to the objects being observed, the "usual" theories emerge.

I wasn't trying to subvert special relativity, just as Everett isn't trying to subvert the "usual" (Copenhagen) paradigm. But find an alternative route to it. Make it even more robust. Which I wouldn't take credit for. I feel Everett and DeWitt's correspondence made that connection.

Everett's ideas seem a little too aspirational and not well-enough established by actual prediction and experiment for my taste, but otherwise unobjectionable.

But they don't seem to have anything at all to do with the notions of "absolute and relative time" you're trying to discuss in this thread. Why even introduce Everett at all, when it's clear he has nothing to say on this topic?

 

[theprestige]

If someone actually builds a model with an Everett observer, time dilation would be the first thing I'd check to see works.

What would be the purpose of your check?

We already know that time dilation is a real phenomenon in the real world.

If it doesn't work in Everett's model, that just tells us the model is wrong.

 

[Steve]

What would be the purpose of your check?

We already know that time dilation is a real phenomenon in the real world.

If it doesn't work in Everett's model, that just tells us the model is wrong.

The thought occurs to me that Mike Helland has little interest in discussing reality.

 

[hecd2]

What would be the purpose of your check?

We already know that time dilation is a real phenomenon in the real world.

If it doesn't work in Everett's model, that just tells us the model is wrong.

Moreover, as with the case of acoustic Doppler Mike brought up earlier, the simulated observer would only observe time dilation according to the Lorentz transform, if you put the special theory of relativity into the model in the first place. So you would learn nothing.

Mike seems to think that somehow if you simulate the physical observer, somehow the laws of physics will magically fall out of the simulation. (Needless to say, that is nothing like Everett's claims).

 

[Mike Helland]

What would be the purpose of your check?

To see if the model is right.

If it doesn't work in Everett's model, that just tells us the model is wrong.

Look at that, you answered your own question.

 

[Mike Helland]

Everett's ideas seem a little too aspirational and not well-enough established by actual prediction and experiment for my taste, but otherwise unobjectionable.

But they don't seem to have anything at all to do with the notions of "absolute and relative time" you're trying to discuss in this thread. Why even introduce Everett at all, when it's clear he has nothing to say on this topic?

What do you suppose "relative state" refers to, if not the state of the model in relative time and space?

Maybe "relative state" means, like North and South Dakota?

 

[hecd2]

What do you suppose "relative state" refers to, if not the state of the model in relative time and space?

Maybe "relative state" means, like North and South Dakota?

It's obvious how you can become confused when, section 4 of Everett's thesis, which defines what he means by "relative state" begins:
[FONT=&quot]"We now investigate some consequences of the wave mechanical formalism of composite systems. If a composite system S, is composed of two subsystems S1 and S2, with associated Hilbert spaces H1 and H2, then, according to the usual formalism of composite systems, the Hilbert space for S is taken to be the tensor product of H1 and H2 (written H = H1⊗H2). This has the consequence that if the sets {ξ[/FONT]_i[FONT=&quot]^S1} and {η_j^S2} are complete orthonormal sets of states for S1 and S2, respectively, then the general state of S can be written as a superposition:"...and goes on in the same vein with the mathematics of wave functions for three pages until the definition is complete.

His definition of relative state is in this section, but since you can't understand even the first two lines of it, you have no idea what he is talking about in his thesis.[/FONT]

[FONT=&quot]And no, relative state does not refer to "[/FONT]the state of the model in relative time and space".

And now we have arrived at your basic misconception - the word relative as used by Everett in his thesis has nothing to do with relative as used in relativity. I could explain roughly in words (the precise definition is in the maths of section 4) what Everett means by relative state, but what's the point, since you never learn anything.