Cont: The Sinking of MS Estonia: Case Re-opened Part III

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Perhaps this link might aid Vixen in her woefully poor comprehension:

https://safety4sea.com/cm-ms-estoni...t4.8mGfLNbs-1635681468-0-gqNtZGzNAmWjcnBszQhR


Quoted from the above (my bolding for emphasis):

Furthermore, Estonia’s distress beacons or EPIRBs had to be manually activated, something that did not happen. If they were activated, they would have made it immediately obvious that the ship had sunk and the location would have been clear. As a result, All EPIRBs were then required to be automatic, while it is considered that the accident played a key role to legislate Voyage Data Recorders.


Something like this would have been laughably easy for someone with a sincere attempt to understand the truth to have sought out. I dunno: maybe in Vixen's worldview, even the people running this (reliable) website are either stupid or in on the conspiracy themselves..... :rolleyes:
 
Everybody that hear a Mayday cannot respond to the ships that is in distress. If you hear distress traffic where somebody already have responded you listen in and when suitable contact MRCC or the responding vessel and report your position and how quick you can get to the position. On he YouTube clips you can hear other ships report to Silja Europa that they are available.

After some time MRCC will designate one ship as OSC, on scene commander (today called on scene coordinator), and they act as an extension to MRCC making decisions and communication locally. Usually multiple VHF channels are setup for different traffic. For example search vs rescue vs helicopter operations.


Exactly. Too many respondents to a Mayday can be almost as bad as none at all. From a comms perspective, it can jam, heterodyne or cause cacophony on the emergency channel. And from a logistical perpective, too many ships converging on the scene can cause problems of their own - especially in the case of larger ships which obviously cannot turn on a dime.

But hey: the likes of you and I live in the world of the rational, the (reasonably) intelligent, the analytical, and the well-informed. Not a world that everyone inhabits, evidently......
 
The Bridge contains all of the controls and the chart room. The bridge personnel are heavily reliant on navigation and radio contact.

When a message is received from another ship the correct format is to say, 'Mariella - Estonia' and thus Thornroos had a duty to respond similarly.

Only Mariella and Europa responded which indicates only they got the Mayday message at the time. It is all very well saying retrospectively the itemised lists show 14 stations received a Channel 16 contact when none responded. The JAIC assume this was incompetence because it never investigated the claim of signal blockage as reported by Rear Admiral Heimo Iivonen, head of Finnish Coast Guard.

The Finns are a seafaring nation, technologically highly innovative and there is no way they were especially incompetent that night (cf their rescue of USS Park Victory in 1947; they even gave the survivors a sauna). The Captain of Mariella had to use his NMT hand set to contact the coast guard. That tells you there was a problem with the signals.

The JAIC refused to consider this.

Estonia didn't send any Mayday until after the power went off and the ship was capsized and sinking, that is why they relied on a hand held set with only 5w of power and a small antenna.
They were lucky that anything was picked up by anyone at all.

Channel 16 is not just a distress channel. It is also the channel to use for 'Sécurité' broadcasts of things like NOTAMS and a vessel leaving or entering a harbor or narrow channel.
It is also the general hailing channel for contacting other vessels or stations.

Up uintil 2013 maritime radio stations were required to observe radio silence on 500 kHz for the three minutes between 15 and 18 minutes past the top of each hour, and for the three minutes between 45 and 48 minutes past the top of the hour, and were also required to observe radio silence on 2182 kHz for the first three minutes at the top of each hour and for the three minutes following the bottom of the hour.

This is to allow faint signals to be heard.

For 2182 kHz, this is still a legal requirement.

Once a mayday is received, the controlling station can order other stations to stop transmitting with the order "Seelonce Seelonce Seelonce". (The word uses an approximation of the French pronunciation of the word silence). Once the need for radio silence is finished, the controlling station lifts radio silence by the order "Seelonce FINI"
 
Vixen appears to be clinging to the idea that the Estonia's EPIRBs, which were found switched off, might have had automatic activation.

It just occurred to me that she is conflating the function of a manual on/off switch with a different switch which could disable automatic activation. Those are very different functions.

Vixen, if you would like to show us any model of EPIRB Estonia might have carried which has such a switch, to disable automatic activation, I would be happy to consider it. A YouTube video showing its operation would be fine. Otherwise I'll regard the existence of the type as imaginary.
 
Not if the signals were blocked.


How do you know a Mayday had not been attempted previously?

Couldn't see the reference to Estonia in your link.

What would block the signals?

You have had VHF radio explained to you.

To block the signal from the Estonia there would need to be a transmitter close to the ship broadcasting a signal on Channel 16. Every other ship would have heard it.

Channel 16 is monitored all the time, in addition to being the distress channel it is also the main hailing channel and used to broadcast NOTAMS and other information and hazard warnings.
 
Do watch this youtube video which explains how hydrostatic release EPIRBs function.


Releasing the buoy does not activate it.

To activate automatically the buoy would need to have a hydrostatic switch.

Those on the Estonia did not have that feature.
 
Exactly. Too many respondents to a Mayday can be almost as bad as none at all. From a comms perspective, it can jam, heterodyne or cause cacophony on the emergency channel. And from a logistical perpective, too many ships converging on the scene can cause problems of their own - especially in the case of larger ships which obviously cannot turn on a dime.

But hey: the likes of you and I live in the world of the rational, the (reasonably) intelligent, the analytical, and the well-informed. Not a world that everyone inhabits, evidently......

Government of the Republic of Estonia final report on the MV ESTONIA disaster.
17.2 The distress traffic

The ESTONIA addressed her distress calls to the passenger vessels in the vicinity. Also the form of the distress calls did not comply with the formal requirements of the radio regulations. The Commission has learned with regret that in this area distress messages nowadays are very seldom transmitted in the correct form.
However, since the ESTONIA started the traffic by using the Mayday distress signal, the Commission considers that those receiving the message should have been in no doubt that the ESTONIA was requesting immediate assistance and that there was a distress situation on board.
Almost the entire distress traffic was conducted in Finnish. This language was understood by the MRCCs and coast stations in the area, and on board the nine vessels nearest to the ESTONIA.
The ESTONIA was asked for, but could not give, her position immediately due to the list and ”black-out”. It took about seven minutes from the 1st Mayday call until the position was reported. No subsequent distress traffic was received from the ESTONIA.
Edited by Agatha: 
Trimmed for rule 4


https://onse.fi/estonia/chapt17_1.html
 
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Do watch this youtube video which explains how hydrostatic release EPIRBs function.


The Government of the Republic of Estonia

Final report on the MV ESTONIA disaster

Chapter 8.11 The EPIRB beacons

The EPIRB beacons along with some liferafts and lifejackets were found on 2 October 1994 by two Estonian fishing vessels in the vicinity of Dirhami on the north coast of Estonia. The beacons were switched off when found.
On 28 December 1994 the condition of the above EPIRBs was tested by the Finnish experts. The radio beacons proved to be in full working order when switched on.
On 24 January 1995 both EPIRBs were activated on board the Estonian icebreaker TARMO, when they worked without interval for four hours. According to the Russian COSPAS Mission control centre, whose area of responsibility includes the Estonian waters, the radio beacons were transmitting the signal in the normal way throughout the test period.


https://onse.fi/estonia/chapt08_6.html
 
The Government of the Republic of Estonia

Final report on the MV ESTONIA disaster

Chapter 8.11 The EPIRB beacons




https://onse.fi/estonia/chapt08_6.html


And all of this shows conclusively that:

a) these EPIRBs would have transmitted exactly as designed/intended, had they been manually switched on by a crewmember in the time period between the crew realising that the Estonia was going to sink, and the ship actually sinking;

and

b) in fact, the EPIRB transmitters did not get manually switched on by any crewmember during the timescale outlined above - meaning that they released themselves into the sea "dumb", without transmitting any radio signal, and they ultimately washed ashore with the transmitter switches still in the "off" position.


This is all so, so simple to figure out. For almost anyone.
 
Oh, really now? :D


Hehehe.

Oh how the conspiracy theorists would love to be the ones to write the final chapter (or at least force the final chapter ultimately to be written by the authorities), on account of their dogged refusal to roll over and swallow the Establishment lies, and their equally-dogged uncovering of the "truth" of the case. Basking in glory at their brilliance and the vindication they would have received..... :D :rolleyes:
 
And all of this shows conclusively that:

a) these EPIRBs would have transmitted exactly as designed/intended, had they been manually switched on by a crewmember in the time period between the crew realising that the Estonia was going to sink, and the ship actually sinking;

and

b) in fact, the EPIRB transmitters did not get manually switched on by any crewmember during the timescale outlined above - meaning that they released themselves into the sea "dumb", without transmitting any radio signal, and they ultimately washed ashore with the transmitter switches still in the "off" position.


This is all so, so simple to figure out. For almost anyone.

They didn't wash ashore, they were picked up by two fishing boats.
 
Cant switch off an EPIRB without it first having been switched on, which would require contacting the rescue services to report a false signal sent in error.

The Estonia EPIRB's had been inspected the week before and were found to be in good working order., i.e., all the lights and beeps were in place. In addition, they were hydrostatically released on contact with 1 - 4m of water as well as being available for operation by pressing the switch on button.


Is this clearer now?

It kind of seems clearer, but I'll bet we'll go round the same circles.

Let me just see if I understand what you wrote. It seems to me that you've acknowledged the EPIRBs were manual, so that one must turn them on before they start signaling. Whether on or off, they will be released when the water rises to the bracket holding them, but being underwater (or floating on the surface) will not activate the device. The only way to activate it is to turn it on by flipping the switch (and once that is done, the EPIRB will begin sending its signal almost immediately, regardless of whether it is wet or dry).

That's what the second paragraph seems to mean to me. Is that what you meant? If so, we can dispense with the bits about how the only explanation for their failure to activate is sabotage, since clearly they would not have activated unless manually turned on.
 
It kind of seems clearer, but I'll bet we'll go round the same circles.

Let me just see if I understand what you wrote. It seems to me that you've acknowledged the EPIRBs were manual, so that one must turn them on before they start signaling. Whether on or off, they will be released when the water rises to the bracket holding them, but being underwater (or floating on the surface) will not activate the device. The only way to activate it is to turn it on by flipping the switch (and once that is done, the EPIRB will begin sending its signal almost immediately, regardless of whether it is wet or dry).

That's what the second paragraph seems to mean to me. Is that what you meant? If so, we can dispense with the bits about how the only explanation for their failure to activate is sabotage, since clearly they would not have activated unless manually turned on.

As the report says, when they were recovered they were switched off and when tested working OK.

Wouldn't it be more believable to claim that whoever the saboteurs were threw them overboard before the ship started sinking so that they couldn't be activated by the crew?

As the Mayday message was received and acted on it is a moot point anyway.
 
Only Mariella and Europa responded which indicates only they got the Mayday message at the time. It is all very well saying retrospectively the itemised lists show 14 stations received a Channel 16 contact when none responded. The JAIC assume this was incompetence because it never investigated the claim of signal blockage as reported by Rear Admiral Heimo Iivonen, head of Finnish Coast Guard.


The highlighted may or may not be true. You're relying on the testimony of the Mariella captain (I think) and there's no reason to think he's untrustworthy, but he can only report what he heard. He only heard the Europa's reply, but that doesn't mean that other stations or ships were not also replying. It does mean that none were close enough in these conditions for him to hear anyone else replying.

I don't know that anyone else replied, mind you. Maybe others here know. My only point is that you immediately conclude that only two radio operators replied when your evidence is merely that one captain heard no other replies.
 
As the report says, when they were recovered they were switched off and when tested working OK.

Wouldn't it be more believable to claim that whoever the saboteurs were threw them overboard before the ship started sinking so that they couldn't be activated by the crew?

As the Mayday message was received and acted on it is a moot point anyway.

And it's beyond a moot point if the conspiracy theory says saboteurs wanted the ship to sink to destroy part of its cargo. Disabling the buoys is pointless.

The buoys wouldn't be activated if the sinking didn't happen. Once the ship has sunk, their evil mission is accomplished and they can go down with the ship, happy in the knowledge that they've killed themselves doing their duty for Mother Russia and it no longer matters whether the ship's location is known or not. In the event, distress calls worked faster than the EPIRB system would have worked anyway, even if it was operating. The saboteurs did nothing to secure all the radios. The storyline of the evil plot falls apart.
 
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