Stupid teleportation topic.

[Interesting Ian]

In a sense what is happening is that constantly throughout our existence we are spontaneously ceasing to exist every infinitesimal fraction of a second only to be replaced by an almost exact duplicate. That is why a materialist should not fear death or think death is a bad thing because in a sense s/he is constantly dying anyway.

It's a bit like when you were a kid flicking through a notepad with each of the pages having some sort of cartoon character on making it appear that the character is moving. But the movement is an illusion just like the notion of a persisting self is an illusion.

 

[Bri]

I thought we were talking about an identical copy. In which case that is not true. The two people that you say are 'different people' are indistinguishable in terms of 'who was here first'.

Even after the creation of the duplicate, while the two people will start to diverge in experiences, you won't be able to say which was the 'original'.

Of course you can say which is the original. Immediately after duplication, the original is in the same location that he was immediately before duplication. He hasn't even been touched by the duplication process.

If you're saying that we cannot tell the difference without continuous observation, you are correct. Can you identify a person in two seconds from now to be the same person that is sitting in front of you now? Of course you can, but only because of continuity. Without continuity, we would all become different people millions of times every second. But that wouldn't be a very useful definition of "person" would it?

Even if the original and duplicate were "mixed up" so that nobody else could tell them apart, they could tell themselves apart. People continually observe themselves, and each would be able to identify himself as the original or the copy based on his location after the duplication has occurred.

-Bri

 

[Bri]

Yes. A newborn baby who's entire family has been killed. No one loses except the baby, and can anyone honestly tell me they remember being a baby and thinking 'I hope no one kills me?'

Wait, are you saying that we should kill babies who have no families? Do you think that the baby doesn't affect anyone? How about the parents who will adopt the baby? How about the guy whose life the baby will save twenty years from now?

Just because something has potential or real value doesn't mean it is automatically wrong to destroy it.

I think some would disagree when the "something" in question is a person. It's considered murder to most, and it is a crime in most places.

However, destruction for the sake of it would seem rather unethical. I suppose there might have to be some reason for it.

So just any reason would do, or would there have to be a good reason to make murdering someone OK? Do you think that being too lazy to take the bus is a good enough reason for murder?

-Bri

 

[Bri]

Why? How could a materialist care about dying? They're dead, they can't possibly care. Suffering, being tortured to death, those are bad things they can care about.

I don't see many materialists regularly committing suicide in order to avoid the everyday pains and suffering of living, so the evidence seems to be against that statement.

If they know about your attempt to kill them though, you've diverged them, and then killing is an issue.

Oh, so now you're saying that divergence IS an issue.

I say they're different people pretty much any time after teleporting. Which is why I'd want to kill one person at the time of teleporting. I'm also saying they diverge in the same way that everyone changes naturally. I'm certainly not the same person I was a week ago.
At no point did I say it was okay to kill them indefinitely afterwards. I really don't know how you read that.

Please re-read the scenario I posted. We are assuming that killing the original at the time of "teleportation" is only an option, and it is just as easy (in fact easier) to leave the person alive. Imagine that the entire room that the person is sitting in is copied to a new location (not just the person). Let's assume the room has no windows and is sealed so that it will remain exactly the same as the original room indefinitely until the door is opened. Now, the two people inside cannot diverge until they leave their respective rooms. 1) Are these two considered the "same person" until such time as they leave their rooms? 2) Which one of them becomes a different person the moment they open the doors to their rooms and why? 3) Is it OK to kill one of them before they leave their rooms? 4) Would it be OK to kill them after they leave their rooms? 5) Do you think either of them might not want to die? 6) Do you think it would make a bit of difference to either of them whether or not they have left their room?

When the person is using the machine like a teleporter. If I need to hop over to Mars, my family isn't going to be concerned if I come back later as an identical person composed of different atoms, completely indistinguishable from the person I left as by any test they can apply.

The copy won't be indistinguishable from the original as soon as he leaves the room. Obviously the lives of the family would be vastly different between the scenario where the original lives and where the original dies. How do you know the family wouldn't care? Also, how do you know they're OK with having a dead corpse of their loved one left behind? How do you know they wouldn't prefer the original to live? How do you know the original wouldn't prefer to live?

If a copy of me is made, and they diverge, I would fully argue they are 2 similar but different people, similar to identical twins, and would never allow them to be killed for being an unnecessary copy.

Then you'll need to think carefully about the above questions. Why would you allow one of them to be killed the moment before they leave the room, but not the moment after? Which one of them suddenly becomes a different person when they leave the room than they were when they were still inside the room (or do both of them become different people)?

I don't currently have a good reason to suppose a "right to live". Do you demand that all women constantly have babies, based on the potential baby's "right to live"? Killing a perfect duplicate, at the moment of duplication, is about as bad in my eyes as not having a baby. It takes away life from something that doesn't have anything to lose. It doesn't make sense to demand that I have the right to 2 lives, since at that instant, there are only 2 iterations of "me", a single person.

Very different issue. The right to live has to do with an already living person, not with a potential person who doesn't exist yet. Taking a purposeful action to end an already existing life is considered murder, and is a crime in most countries.

Do you really believe that either "copy" even if exactly the same doesn't feel that they have anything to lose by dying? By virtue of them being in two different places, they have potentially very different futures (as do any people who might come in contact with them). Which one would you kill?

The obvious problems of duplicates means I'd also want one of "me" to be killed, and if I can die painlessly, I won't mind before I step into the transporter. I'd mind afterwards, as I've said above, which is why I'd want to be killed painlessly at the moment of teleportation, or at least so soon afterwards that the difference is trivial (something like less than a second of consciousness).

Why would you mind being killed after teleportation but not during teleportation? Does the above scenario with the duplicate rooms change anything? Why or why not?

If I am conscious afterwards of being killed, divergence has occurred and I would now be 2 different people.

The very act of killing someone causes divergence if you consider death to be that the brain ceases to change based on input from the outside world. It would be impossible to kill someone without causing them to be two different people (albeit one of them dead). Sounds like murder to me.

Except I also enjoy being happy, and I know other people care about me. Both of which dissuade me from just avoiding pain.

Interesting, the same can be said about both copies.

Also, I only said a materialist shouldn't care about his death, so long as he strictly is thinking of himself. That doesn't suggest he should kill himself and save the bother. There are plenty of other reasons to stay alive.

I agree completely. Therefore, if the choice were left up to the people involved, neither would likely want to die. At the same time, neither would want to have two copies of himself wanting to sleep with one wife. An excellent reason to take the bus, in my opinion.

A vase is valuable because of it's material. Two vases have twice the material, so they are twice as valuable (ignoring things like lower supply of vases after I smash one).

If you smash one, it has the same material in a different form, so that is clearly not the case. That said, to a materialist (and it's interesting that you use the term "material") there is nothing beyond the material in a person. therefore, the "value" of a person is entirely his or her material, and two people are more valuable than one. Given the potential of markedly different futures, killing one would indeed be a loss.

I, however, see no value in the material of a person. I place the entire value of a person in their information (their mind). Information does not increase in value by duplicating it.

That is a very dualist attitude, I'm afraid. For the materialist, there is no "mind" outside of the material brain. And two brains are certainly better than one.

-Bri

 

[Bri]

Bri, I entirely share all your sentiments. However it's a consequence of materialism. It really is truly staggeringly counter-intuitive.

Here's how to understand it.

I believe I do understand it. However, that doesn't preclude me from coming up with many compelling reasons not to teleport in this manner if materialism is true. I also disagree with the definition of "person" that must be provided in order to make it OK to kill one of the people to avoid one of the major drawbacks of teleportation.

Materialism holds that there is no continuing self. We have a sense of a continuing self, but that's an illusion. There is literally nothing which persists from one second to the next. All that exists are similar psychological states swiftly succeeding one another thereby creating the illusion of a same self having differing experiences. But that's an illusion.

I understand that, yet even materialists use the term "person" in a way that is consistent with persistance from one moment to the next. To define "person" in a different way wouldn't make much practical sense. Furthermore, this definition leads to some of the serious ethical problems already pointed out.

In a sense what is happening is that constantly throughout our existence we are spontaneously ceasing to exist every infinitesimal fraction of a second only to be replaced by an almost exact duplicate. That is why a materialist should not fear death or think death is a bad thing because in a sense s/he is constantly dying anyway.

I don't think even a materialist considers themselves to be dying every moment. If they did, it wouldn't be a crime to kill someone (since they are dying anyway). This illustrates the importance of choosing your definition of "death" carefully.

It's a bit like when you were a kid flicking through a notepad with each of the pages having some sort of cartoon character on making it appear that the character is moving. But the movement is an illusion just like the notion of a persisting self is an illusion.

Under normal circumstances, our material retains cohesion from one moment to the next as required by the laws of physics. Perhaps it is an illusion, but it's a useful one that we depend on in order to understand our existance. To use a term "person" in a different way so that a person doesn't persist from one moment to the next makes the term entirely useless. As does having to invent another term such as "instance" to replace the concept lost by the redefinition.

-Bri

 

[Z]

So I take it materialists don't commonly enter into contracts or legal agreements? After all, they're not the same person now that they were yesterday...

 

[DreadNiK]

Those on the side of 'the duplicate and the original are different' seem to me to be holding a rather untenable position, because basically you have to prove that humans have a continuous consciousness. Philosophically speaking, of course.

Practically speaking, we have to go through life assuming that continuity of self is not an illusion, just as we have to pretend free will isn't either.

 

[Dilb]

I don't see many materialists regularly committing suicide in order to avoid the everyday pains and suffering of living, so the evidence seems to be against that statement.

Do you deliberatly ignore the things I later said on that? Suffering is not the only issue here. Dying, however, involves suffering. Death, on the other hand, involves nothing to a person, personally. For reasons besides themselves, there are reasons to mind being killed, and for reasons for themselves, there are reason to continue living.

Oh, so now you're saying that divergence IS an issue.

When was it not an issue? It's always been the issue of whether or not the person can be killed morally.

Please re-read the scenario I posted. We are assuming that killing the original at the time of "teleportation" is only an option, and it is just as easy (in fact easier) to leave the person alive. Imagine that the entire room that the person is sitting in is copied to a new location (not just the person). Let's assume the room has no windows and is sealed so that it will remain exactly the same as the original room indefinitely until the door is opened. Now, the two people inside cannot diverge until they leave their respective rooms. 1) Are these two considered the "same person" until such time as they leave their rooms? 2) Which one of them becomes a different person the moment they open the doors to their rooms and why? 3) Is it OK to kill one of them before they leave their rooms? 4) Would it be OK to kill them after they leave their rooms? 5) Do you think either of them might not want to die? 6) Do you think it would make a bit of difference to either of them whether or not they have left their room?

1)If the rooms are deterministicly the same, then yes, they are the same person by every meaningful difference. I don't think that would happen (QM and whatnot), however, they would at least be trivially different from each other.

2) They both become different people afterwards. Exactly like Ian says, the materialistic definition of a person is essentially a continuously, infinitessimally, changing set of information. By no meaningful test could define a person better than the information which is represented by the position of atoms in their brain.

3) I'd say yes, provided suffering is avoided.

4) No, although there is going to be some wiggle room. An hour afterwards, I'd definitely say killing them is a problem. A nanosecond after, I don't think the difference would matter, but it could, at least in the legal definition.

5) Irrationally, assuming they use it of their own free will, as a transporter, yes, neither will just slit their own throat. However, before duplication, I can say I would not mind the fact that one iteration of me will be killed to make this work. Which is why the person who is being killed should be killed quick and painlessly, so they do not have time to suffer, either because they are being killed painfully, or because they have time to consider the fact that they will be killed.

6) Like I just said, giving them time to think will cause suffering in a person. (note that I do not care that this person is an iteration of a single "person". This is extended to anything with the capacity to suffer.)

The copy won't be indistinguishable from the original as soon as he leaves the room. Obviously the lives of the family would be vastly different between the scenario where the original lives and where the original dies. How do you know the family wouldn't care? Also, how do you know they're OK with having a dead corpse of their loved one left behind? How do you know they wouldn't prefer the original to live? How do you know the original wouldn't prefer to live?

For the same reasons that families don't grieve about children they chose not to have. That represents the possibility of a new person, not an actual person at the time.

Then you'll need to think carefully about the above questions. Why would you allow one of them to be killed the moment before they leave the room, but not the moment after? Which one of them suddenly becomes a different person when they leave the room than they were when they were still inside the room (or do both of them become different people)?

They both become different people, slightly afterwards. Neither is exactly the person who walked in. People continuously change, always.

Very different issue. The right to live has to do with an already living person, not with a potential person who doesn't exist yet. Taking a purposeful action to end an already existing life is considered murder, and is a crime in most countries.

Do you really believe that either "copy" even if exactly the same doesn't feel that they have anything to lose by dying? By virtue of them being in two different places, they have potentially very different futures (as do any people who might come in contact with them). Which one would you kill?

The one who beforehand, wanted to be killed. If this is being done for no reason (or just as a test), say the copy is 2 feet away and both are unconcious, I suppose it could be random.

Why would you mind being killed after teleportation but not during teleportation? Does the above scenario with the duplicate rooms change anything? Why or why not?

After, if I am not made to suffer in any way, and the only divergence is trivial, I can't say I'd really mind. However, suffering would be inevitable if I know beforehand that one person is to be killed, and "I", at that moment, could be either one of them.

The very act of killing someone causes divergence if you consider death to be that the brain ceases to change based on input from the outside world. It would be impossible to kill someone without causing them to be two different people (albeit one of them dead). Sounds like murder to me.

This just completely misses the point of divergence. Yes, that happens, but it's not meaningful. The divergence as a person is trivial, the functioning of a body is not a good way of defining a person.

Interesting, the same can be said about both copies.

Yes, but I don't consider it enough justificatin to create a life, essentially. Same thing as not having a baby so it can experience the joys of life.

I agree completely. Therefore, if the choice were left up to the people involved, neither would likely want to die. At the same time, neither would want to have two copies of himself wanting to sleep with one wife. An excellent reason to take the bus, in my opinion.

Except if they are not allowed to diverge, they are not losing a "self". I see no problem with copying and then deleting myself, as opposed to just cutting and pasting myself, to use a computer metaphor.

If you smash one, it has the same material in a different form, so that is clearly not the case. That said, to a materialist (and it's interesting that you use the term "material") there is nothing beyond the material in a person. therefore, the "value" of a person is entirely his or her material, and two people are more valuable than one. Given the potential of markedly different futures, killing one would indeed be a loss.

Allright, the vase has value in it's information and material. Destroying it causes changes in the information.

However, there is a difference between a "person", and a "human". A "person", as I'd use the term, only exists in a "human", a human being an animal of such flesh and such organs. However, a "person" could be an alien, or a computer program, or any number of things. The "person" aspect, the part that I'd have a funeral for if it was lost (or at least appeared to be to the best of my knowledge, etc etc), is only the information, which incidentally, is stored in the brain of a "human", for everyone I know.

Information is a perfectly acceptable concept for a materialist. It's just always stored in material things. However, the material is irrelevant, so long as it exists.

That is a very dualist attitude, I'm afraid. For the materialist, there is no "mind" outside of the material brain. And two brains are certainly better than one.

-Bri

Not if they are exactly the same. Making a copy of a program does not increase it's value on my computer. Making a copy of "me", does not increase my value.

Yes, having 2 iterations of a genious would be valuable. However, they would have to diverge before they could do anything.

 

[Bri]

Yes, having 2 iterations of a genious would be valuable. However, they would have to diverge before they could do anything.

I find this funny. As you said, they will certainly diverge unless something very odd happens (such as them being locked in identical rooms). So, it's OK if we kill one of them if it's a normal person, but if it's a genious then having two might be valuable! I don't really need to go into the reasons why this argument is so rediculous, do I?

Practically speaking, we have to go through life assuming that continuity of self is not an illusion, just as we have to pretend free will isn't either.

I understand the materialist concept of the person "dying" at every moment, but there is undoubtedly continuity over time supplied by the laws of physics. If there weren't, we would be replaced by something entirely random at every instance of time. As such, whether or not you believe it is just an "illusion" we use this continuity to define "person" every day. We base much of our lives, our identities, and our ethics on the concept. It would be utterly silly to redefine "person" simply in order to allow killing someone to be ethical so that the concept of "teleportation" by duplication would be less abhorant. Furthermore, I dare say that very few people would agree to it in practice -- nor would you if the person being killed were YOU!

-Bri

 

[Dilb]

I find this funny. As you said, they will certainly diverge unless something very odd happens (such as them being locked in identical rooms). So, it's OK if we kill one of them if it's a normal person, but if it's a genious then having two might be valuable! I don't really need to go into the reasons why this argument is so rediculous, do I?
-Bri

You only see it as rediculous because you see them as already being 2 people. I see it as 1 person, with the potential to split into 2 people. I'd rather not use that potential, exactly like I'd rather not have a child right now. Both cases would raise problems I don't want to deal with.

I say a genious could be valuable only because they represent something limited in supply. You can't crank out new geniouses whenever you decide you need more. It would still be okay to kill one before divergence, I'm just saying unless the person is special there is no reason to want more than one of them, just like you don't indescriminately want more children. If you could chose to have a genious child who would write symphonies at age 8 and make you money, from an economic standpoint you'd have a stronger incentive to have a child. That's purely an issue of economics there.

I say they would have to diverge to do anything useful, because with our perfect duplicater the only novel thing they can produce is information. If they don't diverge, they just produce the same information, which isn't useful.

To the actual matter, rather than ethics and economics (both of which I feel much less certain about), I pose the question to you: Suppose we take our duplicates, and randomly place them in a room. The clones are then left alone, and they use a random process to decide who should open the door. No one has kept track of which one has the original atoms. What possible test could distinguish between them?

I see none, or else our duplication process must not have been perfect (I'm open to thoughts on why it could be perfect, but detectably different). I then forced to ask: Why should we say they are an original and a clone, if that makes no meaningful difference? Why should we suppose that a difference exists between them? And if no differnce exists between them, why do you suppose "you" doesn't exist in both of them?

 

[Z]

Dilb, once again, that is obfuscation, deliberately ignoring the singular first-person perspective of each one of them. And while in regular scientific inquiry, the subjective experience is [largely] irrelevant, if we're dealing with issues of personhood, the singular subjective experience is all-important. For that matter, this is what will become vitally important as regards A.I. and man-made sentience in the future.

Can you still refer to them as the same person if you create them in a divergent environment?

This is the largest blockade we seem to have in establishing intelligent communication - the viewpoint that two physically identical items are the same item. Dilb, do you hold the same point of view with regards to other things, as well? Are two relatively identical cars the same car? Are two relatively identical coffee cups the same coffee cup? They may be the same type of coffee cup or car, and of course there are probably vast differences on minute levels - but disregarding such differences for a moment, are they the same thing?

I know I don't do that - and even though I may not have any way to distinguish between two identical items - for example, it's impossible to distinguish between many of my d10s (I have a large collection) - I don't refer to them as the same item, nor do I treat them as a singular unit.

((QUICK ASIDE - My baby girl wishes you all a "Muah! Ba ba dah duah!!".))

So why would I treat two physically identical people as the same person? Even you (Dilb, et.al.) admit that you cannot continue to treat these two beings as the same being if any divergence - including differences in environment - occurs... and so far no one has been willing to admit that the singular subjective experience of the original gains any aspect of the singular subjective experience of its duplicate if the duplicate is made in a divergent environment. So why the stubborn insistance on singular identity?

I think part of the answer lies somewhere within this bit:

You only see it as rediculous because you see them as already being 2 people. I see it as 1 person, with the potential to split into 2 people. I'd rather not use that potential, exactly like I'd rather not have a child right now. Both cases would raise problems I don't want to deal with.

And there's the rub - that's exactly what has to be considered in this case: how do you maintain singular identity if you cannot continue to do so in all relevant cases?

If one of the singular-self proponents would address these issues sensibly, we might have some sort of intelligent conversation; but so far, the singular-self proponents insist upon obfuscation and misdirection, and refuse to address the issues as described.

 

[DreadNiK]

I understand the materialist concept of the person "dying" at every moment, but there is undoubtedly continuity over time supplied by the laws of physics.

Of physical attributes, yes. That doesn't prove that the 'self' is continuous. Rather, it will be similar over time.

As such, whether or not you believe it is just an "illusion" we use this continuity to define "person" every day.

I believe I said that practically speaking, that is totally correct, but speaking philosophically is another matter.

We base much of our lives, our identities, and our ethics on the concept. It would be utterly silly to redefine "person" simply in order to allow killing someone to be ethical so that the concept of "teleportation" by duplication would be less abhorant.

Was someone trying to do that? I must have missed it.

Furthermore, I dare say that very few people would agree to it in practice -- nor would you if the person being killed were YOU!
-Bri

Indeed not. However, to everyone but the individual, an identical duplicate that is created somewhere else followed by instantaneous or near-instantaneous destruction of the duplicate would be exactly the same as if they had travelled through some sort of wormhole to the location.

 

[Dilb]

Dilb, once again, that is obfuscation, deliberately ignoring the singular first-person perspective of each one of them. And while in regular scientific inquiry, the subjective experience is [largely] irrelevant, if we're dealing with issues of personhood, the singular subjective experience is all-important. For that matter, this is what will become vitally important as regards A.I. and man-made sentience in the future.

And once again, I can't possibly imagine what any of that means. I really have no idea what tangible difference you imply. What is a "singular subjective experince" or a "singular first-person perspective", in a way that has physical consequences? I suppose I'll admit right now that if the difference is not pragmatic, I probably don't care.

Can you still refer to them as the same person if you create them in a divergent environment?

This is the largest blockade we seem to have in establishing intelligent communication - the viewpoint that two physically identical items are the same item. Dilb, do you hold the same point of view with regards to other things, as well? Are two relatively identical cars the same car? Are two relatively identical coffee cups the same coffee cup? They may be the same type of coffee cup or car, and of course there are probably vast differences on minute levels - but disregarding such differences for a moment, are they the same thing?

Yes, because at one single, unchanging moment in time, they would be identical. I do, in fact, believe that two utterly identical cars should be called two iterations of a single "car design". When talking about physical objects, the material is relevant. I see no reason to include the physical parts of a person in their definition. A the atoms of a human body are different from what makes person, even if the person is entirely contained in the body.

I know I don't do that - and even though I may not have any way to distinguish between two identical items - for example, it's impossible to distinguish between many of my d10s (I have a large collection) - I don't refer to them as the same item, nor do I treat them as a singular unit.


((QUICK ASIDE - My baby girl wishes you all a "Muah! Ba ba dah duah!!".))

So why would I treat two physically identical people as the same person? Even you (Dilb, et.al.) admit that you cannot continue to treat these two beings as the same being if any divergence - including differences in environment - occurs... and so far no one has been willing to admit that the singular subjective experience of the original gains any aspect of the singular subjective experience of its duplicate if the duplicate is made in a divergent environment. So why the stubborn insistance on singular identity?

Practicality aside (no duplicate is actually going to be perfect, everything has tolerances, etc.), I see a single identity because, when tested, I can find no difference between the two. I have no reason to suppose anything special about the information being continuously stored in one set of atoms, as opposed to that information being read, stored as electric signals, and then re-stored into different atoms. If there is no measurable difference, it is pragmatically meaningless to say they are different. If they aren't different, they must be the same. If everything which defines a person is the same, I can't see any reason to suppose the person is different.

I think part of the answer lies somewhere within this bit:

And there's the rub - that's exactly what has to be considered in this case: how do you maintain singular identity if you cannot continue to do so in all relevant cases?

If one of the singular-self proponents would address these issues sensibly, we might have some sort of intelligent conversation; but so far, the singular-self proponents insist upon obfuscation and misdirection, and refuse to address the issues as described.

I don't maintain a singular identity. I literally go from a continuously changing, but single iteration of a person, to two continuously changing iterations of a person. After they diverge, though, they are different people. They share the exact same "person" before the split, and they share it equally because no meaningful distinction can be made between them, no distinction which has a tangible, physically necessary consequence.

If you can explain to me what part of "person" must be contained in the atoms of a human, then I could accept the idea that "I" would only ever be the original. Atoms themselves are indistinguishable (assuming the same isotope, etc.), it is not some property of atoms. The only other thing is information, and information can be duplicated perfectly (technically within tolerances, in our case of making human bodies, but within them is close enough to perfect).

 

[Z]

It is not whether or not that information can be duplicated; it's whether or not your continuing experience exists within that duplicate, or whether your continuing experience stays within the original, or ceases when the original is killed. And by 'your' I'm not talking about all iterations sharing your design; I'm talking about the first person singular subjective sensation of experience, which is itself continuous and dynamic. Would YOU experience being on Mars? Or would a copy of you experience being on Mars?

 

[DreadNiK]

It is not whether or not that information can be duplicated; it's whether or not your continuing experience exists within that duplicate.

But such a thing may not even exist in the first place...

 

[Z]

But such a thing may not even exist in the first place...

Deny your own experiences, if you want; even if it's merely an illusion of continuity, it is a persistant and practical one. If that persistant illusion of continuity fails, it fails. Simple enough.

 

[Dilb]

It is not whether or not that information can be duplicated; it's whether or not your continuing experience exists within that duplicate, or whether your continuing experience stays within the original, or ceases when the original is killed. And by 'your' I'm not talking about all iterations sharing your design; I'm talking about the first person singular subjective sensation of experience, which is itself continuous and dynamic. Would YOU experience being on Mars? Or would a copy of you experience being on Mars?

Yes, "I" would. "I", as I see it, am merely continuously changing information, currently stored in a fleshy body. "I", the informaion, can be digitized, beamed around, and re-assembled from whatever. The mars version has the same claim to a history which is continuously connected to the teleporting me as the earth me. He just wasn't fleshy at some points.

 

[Z]

If you have to use scare quotes, I'd say there's a problem. I'm not asking about "I", I'm asking about I. Heck, your own ending demonstrates a difference - "He just wasn't fleshy at some points." Seems you already consider that "I" to be someone else...

So... would you experience being on Mars? Or would "you" experience being on Mars?

 

[DreadNiK]

Deny your own experiences, if you want; even if it's merely an illusion of continuity, it is a persistant and practical one. If that persistant illusion of continuity fails, it fails. Simple enough.

That still doesn't mean there would be a discernible (to anyone) difference between a hypothetical 'destructive' teleport and a hypothetical 'wormhole/instant travel' teleport.

 

[Bri]

Of physical attributes, yes. That doesn't prove that the 'self' is continuous. Rather, it will be similar over time.

In a materialistic worldview, the physical is everything. There is no "self" other than a concept. This similarity over time is retained by the laws of physics, and is how humans define "self." Without it, the concept of "self" would be meaningless, so to suddenly throw away the concept in order to assert that an exact copy of a person and the original person are the same "self" seems a little like shooting yourself in the materialist foot!

I believe I said that practically speaking, that is totally correct, but speaking philosophically is another matter.

You'll have to explain what philisophy has to do with it. If your "philisophical" definition of "self" has no basis in reality, then it wouldn't be very useful for advancing whatever philosophical argument you're making.

Was someone trying to do that? I must have missed it.

Ummm...yeah! That's exactly what we were discussing. toddjh and then Dilb both argued that it would be OK to kill the original at the exact time of the copy in order to call it "teleportation" (rather than simple duplication which has the nasty side-effect of a duplicate running around who thinks he's you). To me, that's like sending a FAX, destroying the original, and calling it teleportation. We can do that now, as long as the information is the only important thing as some have claimed!

Indeed not. However, to everyone but the individual, an identical duplicate that is created somewhere else followed by instantaneous or near-instantaneous destruction of the duplicate would be exactly the same as if they had travelled through some sort of wormhole to the location.

You have a big "but" there (one T, not two!), but I agree. Sure the person would seem to be exactly the same person to anyone who is ignorant about the process. It might even seem real to the person being duplicated (assuming he didn't know about how the process worked), but so what? A really neat magic trick might be to really cut a woman in half, and the audience will be perfectly amazed unless they find out that it's not a trick! Then it would still simply be dishonest and more importantly murder.

The question of the OP was whether there were good reasons not to teleport in this manner. I say that "yes" there certainly are good reasons not to do it. So the question remains: would you do it if 1) you would die, or 2) there would be an exact copy of you wanting to sleep with your wife? Or would you just take the bus instead?

-Bri