Stupid teleportation topic.

[Z]

Well, you're using loaded terms like "die" that I don't agree with. To use equally loaded terms, my version would be that I would have no problem walking into a teleportation chamber knowing that my identity would be transferred to a new substrate, even though the physical form which composed the old substrate would be destroyed in the process.

Jeremy

GitM!

"Knowing that [my soul] would be transferred to a new [body]...

Yep, there it is. He's imagining a soul transfer.

 

[Z]

I don't think we'll agree on this topic. My position is internally consistent; the problem is simply that we're operating under different definitions of personhood.

Jeremy

Yeah, I'd say your definition of 'personhood' seems to be one dependent upon the external point of view only.

 

[Z]

The point is, zaayrdragon's definition of "self" is not an operational definition. It asserts that there is an original and a copy, and they are different people, but it provides no way to differentiate apart from continuous observation.

I disagree entirely.

The only way that there is no way to 'differentiate' is if - AND ONLY IF - you put up the proverbial smoke screen. For example, if you are told that you will remain here, in the red room, while your clone will appear in a blue room, OBVIOUSLY this will differentiate between the two of you. It's quite clear.

In fact, your definition of 'self' REQUIRES this screen, to prevent people from realizing which person is which.

Consider this: let's say that we agree, for a moment, and both selves are you. Let's also say that, for one hour, there is ABSOLUTELY no divergence (aside from spacetime location) between the two - for whatever reason, the two yous do everything identically.

And then, 61 minutes later, the one on Earth sneezes, and the one on Mars does not.

Now, who sneezed? Can you honestly say that you both sneezed and did not sneeze? Can you honestly say that, at this point of divergence, these two beings are identical selves? And if they aren't identical selves - which, clearly, they are not, who sneezed? One of those people becomes him/her, and one of them remains you... so which one is which?

DD's definition (and mine) is operational. It provides no way to differentiate between the original and the copy either, but that doesn't matter, since it does not assert that "self" cannot be copied.

Incorrect. Even with your definition, many ways can be provided to differentiate. The only problem is, that once we do that, the illusion you are desperately trying to project is washed away.

Also, consciousness is not continuous.

You don't dream?

Weird. I do. And brain activity is continuous.

 

[Z]

Zaayr's definition doesn't even allow you to determine if I'm ME, let alone if I'm dead, unless you have me under continuous observation.

You know, it's funny... any time someone says something that ought to make you think a bit, you declare their argument 'didn't make any sense'; yet you seem to think I created a non-operative definition that provides no way to tell original from clone... yet I have done exactly the opposite.

If you are duplicated, yet continue to live, who are you? Obviously, the original.

If you then die, say, in a car accident on the way home, are you alive, or dead? Obviously, dead.

Why, then, would you be alive if you were killed while being duplicated?

 

[PixyMisa]

I disagree entirely.

The only way that there is no way to 'differentiate' is if - AND ONLY IF - you put up the proverbial smoke screen.

As in, you don't maintain constant surveillance.

In fact, your definition of 'self' REQUIRES this screen, to prevent people from realizing which person is which.

No.

Consider this: let's say that we agree, for a moment, and both selves are you. Let's also say that, for one hour, there is ABSOLUTELY no divergence (aside from spacetime location) between the two - for whatever reason, the two yous do everything identically.

And then, 61 minutes later, the one on Earth sneezes, and the one on Mars does not.

Now, who sneezed?

The me on Earth sneezed. You just said that.

Incorrect. Even with your definition, many ways can be provided to differentiate.

Name one.

You don't dream?

Weird. I do. And brain activity is continuous.

Consciousness is not continuous, as I said. So the you that wakes up in the morning has - by your definition - no way to tell if it is the same you that went to bed the previous night.

The problem with your definition is that you are assigning a property to a system that is neither intrinsic to that system nor emergent from it, but dependent on the history of the system. In the real world, this doesn't matter. But you are applying it to a thought experiment that removes any possibility of any test to determine that property.

The only way you have of distinguishing between the original and the copy is by perpetual surveillance. Without that, even the original and the copy cannot tell.

 

[PixyMisa]

If you are duplicated, yet continue to live, who are you? Obviously, the original.

How can you tell?

 

[Bri]

How can you tell?

It seems to me that the only definition of "self" worth its salt is one in which the individual can tell who she or he is, not one in which others can tell who you are (which is impossible). By your definition, both people are the same person at one point, but then mysteriously they "diverge" into two people. At what point do they become two people instead of one? Do these two people who are the same person EVER feel that they themselves are the same person?

We all define ourselves by using continuity of time and space. If we were to all of a sudden unexpectedly jump into another person's body, or if we were to look in the mirror and have a different face than we expected to see there, we would have a serious identity crisis. After some amount of time, we would get used to the idea and probably begin to identify with the new person.

Using the same notion of continuity, even the copy knows that she/he isn't the original. The original knows before teleporting that if he is suddenly in a different location (i.e. if the teleportation seemed to "work") then he is really a copy of the original. If he remains in the original location (i.e. if it failed) then he is the original. If he finds himself dead, then he would realize what a moron he is for killing himself thinking that he would somehow be the copy simply because he defines the copy to be "the same" as him! It sounds like a lose-lose proposition to me. Certainly in no case does the teleportation really have the desired outcome (actually teleporting from point "A" to point "B" without death).

So, the question remains. Would you use the teleporter given the above facts or would you take the bus to work instead?

-Bri

 

[PixyMisa]

It seems to me that the only definition of "self" worth its salt is one in which the individual can tell who she or he is, not one in which others can tell who you are (which is impossible).

How is that impossible? Everyone does that all the time.

By your definition, both people are the same person at one point

Small but important correction: Two instances of the same person.

but then mysteriously they "diverge" into two people.

Where's the mystery? They have different experiences, so they change.

At what point do they become two people instead of one?

They are two instances of the same person. At an entirely arbitrary point, we may decide to regard them as two different people.

Do these two people who are the same person EVER feel that they themselves are the same person?

What does that mean?

If you mean, do they share each other's subjective or objective experiences, then no, that's absurd.

We all define ourselves by using continuity of time and space.

Not really. We define ourselves by continuity of memory more than anything else. However, in the real world that goes hand in hand with continuity in space-time. (Our experience of time is of course discontinuous.)

If we were to all of a sudden unexpectedly jump into another person's body, or if we were to look in the mirror and have a different face than we expected to see there, we would have a serious identity crisis. After some amount of time, we would get used to the idea and probably begin to identify with the new person.

Erm. If you say so.

Using the same notion of continuity, even the copy knows that she/he isn't the original.

If there is evidence of the discontinuity, yes. If not, then the copy has no way of telling.

The original knows before teleporting that if he is suddenly in a different location (i.e. if the teleportation seemed to "work") then he is really a copy of the original.

You can find yourself in a different location without being copied. That alone is insufficient, as I have pointed out repeatedly.

If he remains in the original location (i.e. if it failed) then he is the original.

Or not. It could be the copy, while the original has been whisked off somewhere else.

The only way to tell is perpetual surveillance.

If he finds himself dead, then he would realize what a moron he is for killing himself thinking that he would somehow be the copy simply because he defines the copy to be "the same" as him!

Well, no. He won't realise anything at all. He's dead.

It sounds like a lose-lose proposition to me. Certainly in no case does the teleportation really have the desired outcome (actually teleporting from point "A" to point "B" without death).

Only because that is your definition of "death". For other definitions of death, this simply doesn't apply. By all immediate evidence, both objective and subjective, the person still exists. The only distinction is a discontinuity the the space-time vector of the body in question.

So, the question remains. Would you use the teleporter given the above facts or would you take the bus to work instead?

What facts? All I see is a definition.

As I've pointed out:

1. Everyone who uses the teleporter (as defined) will be entirely satisfied that it works as promised. There is not only no evidence of any other outcome, there is no possible evidence of any other outcome. You have defined an undetectible problem into existence arbitrarily.

2. Teleporters are impossible.

 

[Beerina]

Well, I suppose so, noting that your hypothetical scenario is so ludicrous that it hardly deserves an answer.

It's called a thought experiment. They're well-known in science and philosophy.

The point is that, although two brains are identical, so what? There are two people experiencing. You kill one of them, they're dead. So what that an identical copy of you exists? You die. End of story...for you...and no mincing of words is gonna change that.

Yes. Like I said to Bri, the disagreement here is simply on how to define a "person." I think a person is defined by the neural configuration which gives rise to memories and personality, and others think that a person is defined by the entire physical body. And still others think a person is defined by some kind of soul. This is a pretty fundamental disagreement, and I don't think there will ever be a consensus.

Yet the greatest remaining problem to physics is how do we get there from here. How do we get to the subjective perceptual experience from atoms and energy "out there"? You observer that, because the stuff "out there" is duplicated, that the parts "in here" are now meaningless. Yet that is the very philosophical problem we are having.

I think you need to demonstrate the existence of parallel universes before that question is meaningful.

Again, a thought experiment. Do we need to demonstrate the existence of teleportation-via-copy before the discussion is meaningful? No? I rest my case.

But regardless, if you kill someone in one parallel universe, information is indeed lost...at least to the people who cared about that person, who will never see him again, since the "copy" is inaccessible to them.

The bad part about murder isn't so much that your loved ones are grieving, but rather that your existence is ended.

In any case, if you are pulling the "information is lost" card out of the bag, then loved ones grieving has nothing to do with it. Indeed, this entire argument is invalid, since in physics, "information loss" includes spacial position and momentum. It's not the crass notion of total knowledge about a particular set of atoms right over there in the corner that can be moved around anywhere.

In a single-universe scenario, the person could be teleported somewhere successfully (say, to another planet), but a supernova occurs while this happens. The person made it OK, but the sender's panels all read failure -- he is dead!

The family grieves, yet no information was lost and the person is still alive.

Should the sender re-assemble the person from the local atoms? Sure!

Guess the original copy is killed in this scenario after all, because he's now back alive.

 

[Z]

As in, you don't maintain constant surveillance.

But the first person point of view does maintain constant surveillance. So unless you take certain measures to ensure the illusion of continuity where none exists, there IS constant surveillance... from within.

No.

I expect better of you than an empty denial. Come up with something better, or the accusation stands.

The me on Earth sneezed. You just said that.

And would that be you, or someone else who falsely thinks it is you?

Name one.

Simple - by looking out the window. Martian landscape? Ooops, I'm a clone.

Consciousness is not continuous, as I said. So the you that wakes up in the morning has - by your definition - no way to tell if it is the same you that went to bed the previous night.

I know this is a minor quibble, and one that applies to less than one percent of the human population, but I actually can maintain awareness during the entire wake-sleep-wake cycle, though it is exhausting to do so. But there is one certainty - unless someone takes lengths to create the illusion of my memories and sensations in someone else's body, there are innumerable ways of knowing whether I'm the same person I was last night.

You know, this argument that comes out of your and DD's fingers, about 'But how would you know who is who', reminds me of an old experiment, where we took pictures of people and carefully manipulated them so that the pictures resembled old sepia-toned pics of their ancestors. When we got done, there was no way of knowing at all (given general-access stuff, of course) that these were not pictures of their ancestors. Did that actually make them pics of their ancestors? No, of course not. And that's the same point I'm trying to get across here - if you can't remove all the layers of illusion and smokescreening and still claim to be in two places at once, then it just doesn't work.

The problem with your definition is that you are assigning a property to a system that is neither intrinsic to that system nor emergent from it, but dependent on the history of the system. In the real world, this doesn't matter. But you are applying it to a thought experiment that removes any possibility of any test to determine that property.

Wrong - a continuous and dynamic existence is certainly intrinsic to the system. Your definition, on the other hand, replaces individual identity with a class archetype. In the real world, we don't have such specific class archetypes; but in this thought experiment, you are confusing a class archetype with an individual identity.

The only way you have of distinguishing between the original and the copy is by perpetual surveillance. Without that, even the original and the copy cannot tell.

Incorrect. Simple location determination in spacetime. Awareness of an altered environment. The knowledge of the scientists involved. In fact, there are innumerable ways to know which is which. By direct observation and comparison, perhaps not. But since existence isn't done from the outside, but from within - then yes, there is perpetual surveillance of the system.

 

[Z]

How can you tell?

THAT question made no sense.

 

[Z]

How [snip] impossible.

In other words, it makes no sense to you, so we must be wrong.

Pixy, I don't normally write off other posters so quickly, but I just don't see any evidence that you're thinking. I'm sorry, but you're not making much sense at all.

 

[PixyMisa]

But the first person point of view does maintain constant surveillance. So unless you take certain measures to ensure the illusion of continuity where none exists, there IS constant surveillance... from within.

You dream, but you never sleep? Odd, that.

I expect better of you than an empty denial. Come up with something better, or the accusation stands.

The statement was false, so the answer stands.

If you can show me how you came to make that statement, which was prima facie absurd, perhaps I can explain why it is wrong.

And would that be you, or someone else who falsely thinks it is you?

An instance of me.

Simple - by looking out the window. Martian landscape? Ooops, I'm a clone.

As has been pointed out any number of times, that is not sufficient.

There are innumerable ways that you could look out the window and see a Martian landscape without being a copy.

I know this is a minor quibble, and one that applies to less than one percent of the human population, but I actually can maintain awareness during the entire wake-sleep-wake cycle, though it is exhausting to do so. But there is one certainty - unless someone takes lengths to create the illusion of my memories and sensations in someone else's body, there are innumerable ways of knowing whether I'm the same person I was last night.

That sounds highly implausible to me, but never mind.

You can easily be rendered unconscious by administration of a general anaesthetic. That switches consciousness off completely.

Then what?

And it simply doesn't matter. The teleportation can be arranged without the event being detectable by you. You can be moved, physically, without the event being detectable by you.

And you will have no way of knowing whether you are the original or the duplicate.

And that's the same point I'm trying to get across here - if you can't remove all the layers of illusion and smokescreening and still claim to be in two places at once, then it just doesn't work.

Ther are no "layers of smokescreen". Your definition requires perpetual surveillance to work.

Wrong - a continuous and dynamic existence is certainly intrinsic to the system. Your definition, on the other hand, replaces individual identity with a class archetype. In the real world, we don't have such specific class archetypes; but in this thought experiment, you are confusing a class archetype with an individual identity.

No.

I am treating identity by its observable characteristics. You are treating it by its history, which is not an observable characteristic. I can answer a question of identity at any time by means of observation. You can only do so by perpetual surveillance. You definition fails if the surveillance fails at any time.

Incorrect. Simple location determination in spacetime.

Tells you nothing.

Awareness of an altered environment.

Tells you nothing.

The knowledge of the scientists involved.

Tells you nothing.

By your own definition of self, none of these can tell you anything.

In fact, there are innumerable ways to know which is which.

No, there is only one. Unless you have a continuous historical record, all you can do is make inferences.

By direct observation and comparison, perhaps not. But since existence isn't done from the outside, but from within - then yes, there is perpetual surveillance of the system.

No there isn't.

 

[PixyMisa]

How [snip] impossible.

In other words, it makes no sense to you, so we must be wrong.

No.

Perhaps you would care to quote what I actually said, and the context in which I said it.

Never mind, I'll do it:

It seems to me that the only definition of "self" worth its salt is one in which the individual can tell who she or he is, not one in which others can tell who you are (which is impossible).

How is that impossible? Everyone does that all the time.

Bri says we can't tell who people are. I can do this. Everyone I have ever met possessed this talent. Bri seems confused. You - since you deliberately misquoted me - seem disingenuous at best (particularly since I asked a question, and you reformed it into a statement).

 

[Earthborn]

Suppose the year is 2265. Scientists have finally found the smallest entities in the universe. They have found that the universe consists of tiny bits of information which behaviour are not determined by its properties. What this means is that the universe acts as a gigantic computer and the laws of physics as its program change the values of the tiny entities of information, but these pieces of information do not act on their own. Scientists call these "Areleons" or ARray ELements. Each Areleon is best understood as a set of coordinates in a 145 dimensional space with an individual identification 'number'. The laws of physics cause the coordinates to continually change and the way in which these changes occur explains the behaviour of everything subatomical, even 'substring'.

Scientist have also discovered how to identify all the Areleons a body consists of. They have even found a way to manipulate large numbers of them. They can enter any coordinate in any Array Element they want, causing it to instantly change position. A bit like moving a character in a computergame:

Areleon(#123).x = 1
Areleon(#123).y = 1

can be changed to:

Areleon(#123).x = 10
Areleon(#123).y = 10

causing it to instantly appear at the new coordinates.

These findings make very fast teleportation possible. And teleporters don't need receivers either. Just step into the machine, get all the Areleons of you body scanned, add an appropriate value to each of them and you are immediately whisked away to whatever place in the universe.

Now here is something for y'all the ponder: do the problems many see with materialist teleportation still exist with Areleon teleportation?

 

[PixyMisa]

Suppose the year is 2265. Scientists have finally found the smallest entities in the universe. They have found that the universe consists of tiny bits of information which behaviour are not determined by its properties. What this means is that the universe acts as a gigantic computer and the laws of physics as its program change the values of the tiny entities of information, but these pieces of information do not act on their own. Scientists call these "Areleons" or ARray ELements. Each Areleon is best understood as a set of coordinates in a 145 dimensional space with an individual identification 'number'. The laws of physics cause the coordinates to continually change and the way in which these changes occur explains the behaviour of everything subatomical, even 'substring'.

Computational Idealism, sure.

Scientist have also discovered how to identify all the Areleons a body consists of. They have even found a way to manipulate large numbers of them. They can enter any coordinate in any Array Element they want, causing it to instantly change position. A bit like moving a character in a computergame:

Areleon(#123).x = 1
Areleon(#123).y = 1

can be changed to:

Areleon(#123).x = 10
Areleon(#123).y = 10

causing it to instantly appear at the new coordinates.

These findings make very fast teleportation possible. And teleporters don't need receivers either. Just step into the machine, get all the Areleons of you body scanned, add an appropriate value to each of them and you are immediately whisked away to whatever place in the universe.

Now here is something for y'all the ponder: do the problems many see with materialist teleportation still exist with Areleon teleportation?

I don't think it makes any difference. Computational Idealism is entirely consistent with Materialism - both give rise to Naturalism as the observed reality.

There are two questions I would ask, though I need to give some thought to the exact nature of their effect on the answer:

1. Is the computation quantized?
2. Is the computation deterministic?

Quantization causes problems for Zaayrdragon's definition, because then nothing is continuous. Of course, he can simply change the definition of "continuous". (And such a change would probably be perfectly valid.)

As far as I can see, the Universe has to be both quantized and deterministic for a teleporter to be possible at all. (Our Universe appears to be the former - at least in a sense - but not the latter, which makes teleporters impossible.)

So I'll say no, it makes no difference. But Zaayrdragon may have his own comments.

 

[Bri]

Bri says we can't tell who people are. I can do this. Everyone I have ever met possessed this talent. Bri seems confused. You - since you deliberately misquoted me - seem disingenuous at best (particularly since I asked a question, and you reformed it into a statement).

That was of course not what I meant. I meant that if two people look exactly the same, you cannot distinguish them, even if they are different inside. The only way to distinguish them would be to observe them over time (for example, talking to them).

-Bri

 

[Z]

You can be moved, physically, without the event being detectable by you.

Oh, really? How?

 

[PixyMisa]

That was of course not what I meant. I meant that if two people look exactly the same, you cannot distinguish them, even if they are different inside. The only way to distinguish them would be to observe them over time (for example, talking to them).

And my answer still stands: We do that all the time.

If two people look the same, their voices may be different.

If their voices are also the same, their choice of words may be different.

If their choice of words is also the same, their thoughts may be different.

If their thoughts are also the same - then who are you to say they are different people?

If you have two people, and you give them an exhaustive series of tests, and in every test their response is identical, you have no grounds to identify them as different people. You can only identify them as two instances of the same person. That's the operational definition of personal identity. You can only distinguish between identities based on properties or processes you can actually measure.

Basically, it comes down to this: If you can't tell the difference, you have no basis to say there is a difference.

That's why I prefer the operational definition; it is testable. It produces answers that some find undesireable or at least counter-intuitive, but it is consistent and workable under all situations.

(A lot of the background for this comes from computer programming, where we do the equivalent of teleportation and duplication all the time. When you map that practical experience onto this thought experiment, the answers are straightforward and obvious.)

 

[PixyMisa]

Oh, really? How?

By being very careful and quiet about it.

What, you allow teleporters but not an electric truck with soft suspension?