JayUtah
Penultimate Amazing
While mental fitness might have played a part in the most recently concluded trial, the facts show plainly that Mr Fetzer's entire career incorporated conspiracy-related allegations in one genre or another, with no material question raised as to his mental or intellectual competency. Fetzer's acquaintanceship with the truth and with sound investigative methods has been fleeting at best for decades, and we have tried to hold him accountable on the customary footing. His performance here in this forum certainly leaves much to be desired. Mr Fetzer's victims have a right to be pleased at the court's punishment, regardless of the amount. The judgment means this particular body of facts has a legal decision attached to it, and this pattern of facts now forms part of the legal landscape.
My point was strictly legal. My understanding of argumentation at law is that certain bodies of fact, if alleged, prreclude -- or "estop" -- actions that contradict them. For example, one of my tenants came to me last month and told me he wanted to change jobs and, due to payroll latency, would have to be late in paying October's rent. I wrote him a letter telling him I would waive the late fee accordingly for October. I am now legally estopped from attempting to enforce that provision under those circumstances since the tenant's decision ultimately to proceed with changing jobs may have relied upon my written promise not to enforce an otherwise enforceable provision of our contract to his detriment. And this would be the case even if he did not end up changing jobs because, in my haste, I did not condition the waiver upon the eventual facts. My tenant can keep his present job and pay his rent late for October without consequence because he has a relatively airtight defense in promissory estoppel. We pay lawyers because it's their job to remember all those important details in the moment.
My knowledge of the relevant legal doctrine is only that of a layman, so I'm probably applying it incorrectly here. It appears the plaintiff proposes to argue in the case against Alex Jones that Fetzer's (again, alleged and unspecified) mental unwellenss was so evident that Jones' error in relying Fetzer's scholarship constitutes either negligence or malice. Jones' own habitual behiavior makes it hard to argue he has a solid bedrock of judgment regarding mental wellness. But in any case, since Jones is not an expert in mental health, the plaintiffs would need to establish that Fetzer's mental state -- however characterized -- was so evidently untrustworthy as to make it negligent for any reasonable person to trust his judgment. Jones' defense is that his reliance on Fetzer satisfied his duty of care to the plaintiff. Therefore the reasonableness of that reliance is at issue in the case against Jones.
But I can see that same argument from the plaintiff importing against the element of defamation that requires a false statement purporting to be fact. If the allegation of fact is patently absurd, it is less likely to be believed as fact. "Jeffrey Epstein raped Mickey Mouse" is a (probably) false statement that, in form, resembles an allegation of fact. But it is not likely to be taken as fact because Mickey Mouse is evidently a fictional character and a reasonable person would therefore not believe the claim. The likelihood that a statement will be taken as fact by a third party would, in my lay estimation, bear on whether the statement is defamatory. If the plaintiff argues on the one hand that Mr Fetzer's mental state is such that no reasonable person should rely on him, this makes it hard to aver under different legal circumstances -- but the same body of fact -- that a reasonable person would accept his claims as putative reliable fact. The substantive principle of estoppel is that a party before the court cannot have his cake and eat it too.
This is the part where a real lawyer would have to come in and correct my theory. And hopefully carve out a more accurate and expository contour for this fact pattern. And I imagine one of those contours might say that if the claim itself is merely credible on its face then a reasonable third party will take it as fact, and does not have any duty to research the mental state of its claimant before the defamed party has a cause of action. Then that of course undercuts the plaintiff's case against Jones, whose defense would rightly be able to argue that Jones was not at fault in relying upon Fetzer if Fetzer's claims can be considered facially plausible. I'm wondering what the plaintiff's legal strategy is here. The summary judgment against Fetzer is evidence enough for me that his Sandy Hook claims were facially plausible and thus rose to the level required to constitute a false statement purporting to be -- and taken as -- fact. I wonder how that will play in the Jones case.
To sum up, this is purely a question of how the argument would work in two court cases incorporating the same body of facts. I don't propose to defend the actions of either Jones or Fetzer, nor do I believe either of them has acted in good faith, in good conscience, or in any sort of morally defensible way. Fetzer is a career conspiracy theorist and, as far as I'm concerned, deserves what he got. Jones is a professional conspiracy theorist and. in my opinion, a craven coward. Any time he is called upon to take legal responsibility for the effects of his incoherent rants, he disavows everything and runs and hides. He clearly does not have the strength of his supposed conviction. I hope this time he finally gets caught.
Now as to the size of the award and the ability of Fetzer to pay it if it is upheld on appeal, I side with trustbutverify. It's not the defendant's ability to pay that matters, but what price is publicly set for that degree of misbehavior. If the judgment were lowered to what Fezter could reasonably pay, a successor to Fetzer having deeper pockets might decide that that's just the cost of doing business and proceed undeterred. Now any publisher who contemplates publishing books questioning the authenticity of Sandy Hook knows he had better set aside at least half a million dollars in additional cost.
My point was strictly legal. My understanding of argumentation at law is that certain bodies of fact, if alleged, prreclude -- or "estop" -- actions that contradict them. For example, one of my tenants came to me last month and told me he wanted to change jobs and, due to payroll latency, would have to be late in paying October's rent. I wrote him a letter telling him I would waive the late fee accordingly for October. I am now legally estopped from attempting to enforce that provision under those circumstances since the tenant's decision ultimately to proceed with changing jobs may have relied upon my written promise not to enforce an otherwise enforceable provision of our contract to his detriment. And this would be the case even if he did not end up changing jobs because, in my haste, I did not condition the waiver upon the eventual facts. My tenant can keep his present job and pay his rent late for October without consequence because he has a relatively airtight defense in promissory estoppel. We pay lawyers because it's their job to remember all those important details in the moment.
My knowledge of the relevant legal doctrine is only that of a layman, so I'm probably applying it incorrectly here. It appears the plaintiff proposes to argue in the case against Alex Jones that Fetzer's (again, alleged and unspecified) mental unwellenss was so evident that Jones' error in relying Fetzer's scholarship constitutes either negligence or malice. Jones' own habitual behiavior makes it hard to argue he has a solid bedrock of judgment regarding mental wellness. But in any case, since Jones is not an expert in mental health, the plaintiffs would need to establish that Fetzer's mental state -- however characterized -- was so evidently untrustworthy as to make it negligent for any reasonable person to trust his judgment. Jones' defense is that his reliance on Fetzer satisfied his duty of care to the plaintiff. Therefore the reasonableness of that reliance is at issue in the case against Jones.
But I can see that same argument from the plaintiff importing against the element of defamation that requires a false statement purporting to be fact. If the allegation of fact is patently absurd, it is less likely to be believed as fact. "Jeffrey Epstein raped Mickey Mouse" is a (probably) false statement that, in form, resembles an allegation of fact. But it is not likely to be taken as fact because Mickey Mouse is evidently a fictional character and a reasonable person would therefore not believe the claim. The likelihood that a statement will be taken as fact by a third party would, in my lay estimation, bear on whether the statement is defamatory. If the plaintiff argues on the one hand that Mr Fetzer's mental state is such that no reasonable person should rely on him, this makes it hard to aver under different legal circumstances -- but the same body of fact -- that a reasonable person would accept his claims as putative reliable fact. The substantive principle of estoppel is that a party before the court cannot have his cake and eat it too.
This is the part where a real lawyer would have to come in and correct my theory. And hopefully carve out a more accurate and expository contour for this fact pattern. And I imagine one of those contours might say that if the claim itself is merely credible on its face then a reasonable third party will take it as fact, and does not have any duty to research the mental state of its claimant before the defamed party has a cause of action. Then that of course undercuts the plaintiff's case against Jones, whose defense would rightly be able to argue that Jones was not at fault in relying upon Fetzer if Fetzer's claims can be considered facially plausible. I'm wondering what the plaintiff's legal strategy is here. The summary judgment against Fetzer is evidence enough for me that his Sandy Hook claims were facially plausible and thus rose to the level required to constitute a false statement purporting to be -- and taken as -- fact. I wonder how that will play in the Jones case.
To sum up, this is purely a question of how the argument would work in two court cases incorporating the same body of facts. I don't propose to defend the actions of either Jones or Fetzer, nor do I believe either of them has acted in good faith, in good conscience, or in any sort of morally defensible way. Fetzer is a career conspiracy theorist and, as far as I'm concerned, deserves what he got. Jones is a professional conspiracy theorist and. in my opinion, a craven coward. Any time he is called upon to take legal responsibility for the effects of his incoherent rants, he disavows everything and runs and hides. He clearly does not have the strength of his supposed conviction. I hope this time he finally gets caught.
Now as to the size of the award and the ability of Fetzer to pay it if it is upheld on appeal, I side with trustbutverify. It's not the defendant's ability to pay that matters, but what price is publicly set for that degree of misbehavior. If the judgment were lowered to what Fezter could reasonably pay, a successor to Fetzer having deeper pockets might decide that that's just the cost of doing business and proceed undeterred. Now any publisher who contemplates publishing books questioning the authenticity of Sandy Hook knows he had better set aside at least half a million dollars in additional cost.
