Is there a skeptical/scientific argument against predeterminism?

[SpuriusMaximus]

This means that the postulates of metaphysical determinism leave no room for a morality of compassion. Because determinism is a theory about causes and effects. While a morality of compassion presupposes the priority of some feelings over others, of the altruists over the selfish, something that determinism cannot establish. Attempts such as the common good, what the majority wants, etc. are empty.​

That is still just your own bare postulates, pulled out of your own posterior, and not supported in any way other than your saying so. By quote from yourself.

At best the above is illustrating a rather silly confusion on your part beween CAUSE and GOAL. It isn't obvious at all that if one believes they can manipulate the CAUSES, they can't have stuff like the common good in mind as a GOAL. In fact, acting to CAUSE an effect or a change is at best random nonsense if one doesn't have a GOAL in mind.

You just POSTULATE that if one believes in certain cause-possibilities, then they'd automatically have the worst possible goals. Like saving a few bucks on the government budget by killing the retarded. But you haven't actually shown that to be the case.

If you want to claim that believing in certain causes is mutually exclussive with certain goals, please do present the evidence for that. Just postulating it to be so is not it.

Myriad was right: you're just preaching. And I'd add, quite fallaciously at that. All you've done is a big case of poisoning the well, if you're too unequipped intellectually to address the truth value or lack thereof of determinism.

Edit: and I'd add that this was already pointed out to you before. So just repeating the same dumbassery and pretending that you're still waiting for an answer, instead of supporting your claims as you were asked, is just more dishonest arguing from you.

 

[David Mo]

At best the above is illustrating a rather silly confusion on your part beween CAUSE and GOAL. It isn't obvious at all that if one believes they can manipulate the CAUSES, they can't have stuff like the common good in mind as a GOAL. In fact, acting to CAUSE an effect or a change is at best random nonsense if one doesn't have a GOAL in mind.

You just POSTULATE that if one believes in certain cause-possibilities, then they'd automatically have the worst possible goals. Like saving a few bucks on the government budget by killing the retarded. But you haven't actually shown that to be the case.

If you want to claim that believing in certain causes is mutually exclussive with certain goals, please do present the evidence for that. Just postulating it to be so is not it.

(...).

I don't understand what you're trying to reproach me for, but I'll try to answer:

It is obvious that if you want to change something you have to have a goal. For a determinist, goals are also effects of previous causes. Also, if you want to decide or judge which goals are better, you will have to base yourself on values. But values are also effects of previous causes. And if you intend to judge the causes, your values will be conditioned by previous causes that conditioned you to have these values. Therefore, either you get to justify a value for reasons independent of the causes or you cannot justify anything morally. In the first case you are no more a deterministic. In the second case you cannot make justified decisions about the “stuff” of common good nor any other.

I haven't "postulated" any "cause-possibility". I don't even know what that means. On “killing the retarded” I have simply said that if you are a determinist you cannot ]rationally condemn forced euthanasia.

Nor have I said that "certain causes are mutually exclusive with some goals". Causes of what? I don't even know what you're talking about.

 

[SpuriusMaximus]

Actually, you have made a claim that goes a lot further than 'whether you can condemn euthanasia.' What you kept banging on for a while was "whether Hitler was right to eliminate the weak-minded who were a burden to the state" (my emphasis) under determinism. Copy and pasted from your message #129. And then you kept banging on how determinism would indeed make gassing the retarded somehow the right decision.

The two are very different questions.

Whether you can CONDEMN it is, well, at least contingent on which meaning of "condemn" you use. It can and has been argued that you can't call it something a "moral evil", if there is no free will. As I was saying before, it just moves it from "moral evil" to "bad", but ok, I can see how one could say it is no longer a moral claim then.

Whether determinism makes it RIGHT, is a completely different claim, though. The claim this time isn't that it would move it from "moral evil" to "bad", but that it somehow would move it to outright "good". And it's a claim I have seen you make repeatedly, but never justify it anywhere near adequately.

In fact, it's been a textbook illustration of the motte and bailey fallacy.

But sure, if you want to strictly claim the former one this time, I can grant that one.

 

[David Mo]

Actually, you have made a claim that goes a lot further than 'whether you can condemn euthanasia.' What you kept banging on for a while was "whether Hitler was right to eliminate the weak-minded who were a burden to the state" (my emphasis) under determinism. Copy and pasted from your message #129. And then you kept banging on how determinism would indeed make gassing the retarded somehow the right decision.

The two are very different questions.
.

If you want to interpret what I say without heeding what I say we can go anywhere. I did not say that Hitler eliminated retarded men because he was a determinist, but because he had a weak sense of morality. I didn't say that determinists would gas anyone or justify it (I suppose some would and some wouldn't). I'm talking about the reasons for justifying or condemning an action that almost every normal person finds reprehensible. Which is the same as saying whether Hitler was wrong or right. And I maintain that determinism cannot provide reasons for that. I have explained this quite a few times. Please stick to what I say.

In comment 129 I say nothing else.

For the rest of your comment I have not time now. I will be back.

 

[Chanakya]

I suppose that you have no objection to the first part of the argument. The alleged deterministic has harmful effects.

No, why on earth would you suppose anything of the kind?

This is strange! As I've made very clear across multiple posts addressed to you -- and as I clarify one last time, now -- what I'm asking is you is what you propose to do with your 'project' to show that determinism throws up less than desirable results.

My question is, suppose you do show that determinism throws up baleful effects -- that's a supposition, not in any way or form a blanket agreement with your idea -- even given that supposition, what use is this information, unless you also examine the truth value of determinism?

You've agreed with me that, no matter how horrific the effects of determinism (or atheism, or a heliocentric universe, or anything at all under the sun) might turn out be, it would be "absurd" to pretend these are false, if in fact they're true. Given that, I find it strange that you seem so eager to leave the truth value of determinism unexamined, while choosing to focus your energies on examining the effects of determinism.



As far as your arguments re. the effects of determinism, I see you've addressed many posts on this to different posters on this subsequent to writing that last post addressed to me, that I haven't yet read. Sure, I'll go through your arguments, as well as those of the others who've posted here -- but you do realize that, despite addressing multiple posts responding to me, you've left my actual question unanswered, don't you?

I'm afraid that sounds to me like what winter salt describes it as: tap dancing!

Surely my question is clear enough? What is your answer? To recap, what I'm asking you is:

(a) Do you think determinism is true? Yes or no?

(b) Whether determinism leads to beneficient effects or wholly horrific effects, in what way is this question at all relevant, without also examining the truth value of determinism? Suppose you find that it has beneficient effects, what then? If baleful, what then? Why is it important to answer this question at all?

Now comes the second part. In it I will try to answer your question.
But if I have to answer so many comments I'm afraid it won't come right away. It's just that writing in English isn't as easy for me as it is for you. I do what I can.

Take your time, David Mo, whenever you're comfortable responding! As you see, I'm not always very prompt in returning back to posting here myself!

(In fact, I'm yet to read your subsequent posts -- posts addressed to others here, subsequent to your previous posts to me -- so perhaps you've already addressed that question. I'll check out those posts.)

 

[Chanakya]

So technically speaking determinism is false.

Free will, well, it depends on how you define it.

I'm not well-versed enough in QM to speak to whether quantum randomness might actually impact our macro world.

If it doesn't, then it becomes a non sequitur as far as both free will and determinism.

If it does, then, like I said before, it would seem the issue become non-binary. Sure, determinism becomes impossible, given randomness. But so does free will!

You seem to be suggesting that there is some definition of free will for which, even given quantum randomness (that impacts our macro world), free will would still operate.

What definition might that be? "Free" of what?

 

[Myriad]

I don't understand what you're trying to reproach me for, but I'll try to answer:

It is obvious that if you want to change something you have to have a goal. For a determinist, goals are also effects of previous causes. Also, if you want to decide or judge which goals are better, you will have to base yourself on values. But values are also effects of previous causes. And if you intend to judge the causes, your values will be conditioned by previous causes that conditioned you to have these values. Therefore, either you get to justify a value for reasons independent of the causes or you cannot justify anything morally. In the first case you are no more a deterministic. In the second case you cannot make justified decisions about the “stuff” of common good nor any other.

I haven't "postulated" any "cause-possibility". I don't even know what that means. On “killing the retarded” I have simply said that if you are a determinist you cannot ]rationally condemn forced euthanasia.

Nor have I said that "certain causes are mutually exclusive with some goals". Causes of what? I don't even know what you're talking about.

It might clarify your argument if you were to give one or two examples of justifying a value for reasons independent of causes.

 

[SpuriusMaximus]

@Chanakya
Free of coercion. I thought I've mentioned it repeatedly.

 

[SpuriusMaximus]

It might clarify your argument if you were to give one or two examples of justifying a value for reasons independent of causes.

Seems to me like the poor confused puppy is basically saying: you dislike murder only because you've been conditioned to dislike murder, so you can't file it under moral objections. Because it's coming from your previous experiences, basically, rather than being something randomly pulled out of thin air.

It's that concept of being free of any rhyme or reason all over again, really.

Not sure though why he thinks that:

A) it somehow applies only if you believe in determinism. Anthropology can tell you that enculturation is a real thing, regardless of any assumptions about how the brain works.

B) it makes any difference when it comes to judging stuff as good or bad for society. We can tell that people in Somalia are less happy than, say, those in the UK, even if one wants to believe that the only dislike to starvation or being abducted by some pirate warlord is only because you're somehow only conditioned to dislike starving.

But anyway, essentially he seems to have read somewhere the argument that if you don't believe in free will, you can't really morally blame someone. Which is true for certain definitions of moral blame. But he runs with it in all kinds of stupid directions that were not a part of that argument, and aren't really equivalent to it. Like sliding back and forth from the more moderate claim that you can't assign moral blame, to the completely different position that you can't even judge something as good or bad at all.


IF it is intentional, it has the name of Motte And Bailey Fallacy: one makes a grander claim X (e.g., "specifically my God is the real god", or in this case, "determinists would find it justified to gas the retarded") but when pressed, one retreats into defending a much smaller and more defensible claim (e.g., "I only said the universe has a beginning", or in this case "I only said that you couldn't call it MORALLY wrong if Hitler had no free will.") You know, like the defense in early medieval siege warfare worked. Hence the name of the fallacy.

But in his case, I'm starting to suspect that this is genuinely the kind of mental skills he can muster when he's not quoting from some famous dead guy.

 

[Chanakya]

@Chanakya
Free of coercion. I thought I've mentioned it repeatedly.

You may have. I've only glossed over, just quickly run my eyes through, the mass of posts that came in since I'd last posted here -- the last two or three pages. Apologies if I've made you repeat yourself.

What you're saying makes sense in an everyday -- and limited -- kind of sense. Free of coercion. Like, someone hypnotized has no free will, or someone with a gun to their head, something like that, right? Sure, if you're coerced in that sense, then your will is less free than if you hadn't been so coerced.

But that limited and everyday sense apart, I'd suggest that free will itself has nothing to do with this kind of external impediment. Your "coercion" invesiages an additional barrier placed on, overlain on, something that is otherwise free.

Well, this additional-barrier-less and external-coercion-free 'free will': how would you define it, in a way that lets it retain its free-ness despite quantum randomness spilling over into our macro world? Because it would seem that what we will is itself, in some sense, random -- and so outside our control.

 

[SpuriusMaximus]

Well, what I'm saying is that there is more than one definition of "free will", but obviously each has its limitations and is more fit for some purposes than others. I would say that historically the "nobody's making you do it" one has been the most used, and it was in dealing with issues like God hardening the Pharaoh's heart.

I mean, literally, according to the book the guy had already said to Moses, "OK, you can go." But then God is not done showing off yet, so he magically makes the guy take back his word. Just so God can punish him and the Egyptians some more for it. We're not talking about "free will" as in "free to take it against any good reasons not to" there, but literally being mind-controlled into doing something you didn't want to do in the first place.

You can probably see how that would be a problem if one wants to rationalize a perfectly just god. And thus how it would be of interest to theologians for the last 2000 years straight.

Even that "gun to the head" version, it's why we needed to include concepts like "duress", "self defense", etc, in our legal systems. We recognize that people can be forced to do stuff that they wouldn't normally do, or even wouldn't ever want to do in normal circumstances.

I'm not saying they're the only definitions of "free will", really. But until very modern times we kinda had more pressing matters to deal with than whether taking decisions based on reasons is really free or not.

 

[David Mo]

Continuation of comment 304:

First of all: Your sentence “determinism makes it right” is ambiguous. What is “it”? Gassing deficient men? I will suppose you mean this. What “makes” means? I suppose that you mean “to judge”, “justify” or similar.

If this is the meaning of your sentence it is a misunderstanding again. I don’t say that determinism “makes forced euthanasia right”. I say that it has not means to rationally judge it. That is, to say if it is right or wrong.

Of course, I am using “evil” and “bad” in a moral sense. Therefore they are the same. You cannot “to pass” from one to the other. What difference you see between bad and evil in a moral context?

 

[David Mo]

(a) Do you think determinism is true? Yes or no?

Take your time, David Mo, whenever you're comfortable responding! As you see, I'm not always very prompt in returning back to posting here myself!

It has taken me time to compile some of my comments that already answered your first question. We'll leave the second one for when we're done with this one, if you like.

Metaphysical determinism is a philosophical theory about the whole universe. Things are not deterministic, but the idea we have of them.
Simply put, determinism states that everything has a cause or set of causes and that the same causes produce the same effects. What I'm saying (it is not said by me only, but it's a fairly widespread philosophical thesis today) is that metaphysical determinism cannot be proven or refuted. That is why it is metaphysical.

But that does not detract value to the principle of causality. It just has to be interpreted in a different way. Hence my question:
"Take the hammer by the handle.
Is it a true or false proposition or neither?

"You must take the hammer by the handle."
How do you prove this is true?
A hint: this statement is an order or a recommendation. An order is not true or false.

Determinism is not a factual theory that can be proven or refuted. Even Skinner recognizes this it (...). There is not a single article with a scientific demonstration of determinism as a theory of the universe. Name one if you know it. This would say that determinism is a philosophical theory that is discussed in journals and philosophical books with philosophical arguments. I can send you to a philosophical search engine where you will find a lot of material.

What is the meaning of this? First of all, that determinism is a philosophical theory. Is it a metaphysical theory? If this were so, it would be an empty theory. But it is not. Determinism is not a factual theory because it is a methodological mandate: "If you want to know and manipulate things you have to look for their causes" This does not mean that we know that everything has a cause. In fact, we do not know the causes of a large number of human actions (almost all in real life), but this does not mean either that the principle of causality is false. Nor that it is true. It is useful for knowledge.

And that is why determinism cannot be proven by science. And this is the question of this thread. Is it not?

I hope this will answer your first question.

 

[David Mo]

It might clarify your argument if you were to give one or two examples of justifying a value for reasons independent of causes.

You are asking about ethics or philosophy of morality. Almost all theories of ethics are not deterministic. Intuitionism, emotivism, utilitarism, existentialism, rationalism, naturalism, dialogism, etc. They suppose you have reasons, not causes, to act. They suppose that you are responsible for your acts because, even though the stimulus might be strong in a sense, you might have done a different thing than the thing you have effectively done.

 

[Roboramma]

You are asking about ethics or philosophy of morality. Almost all theories of ethics are not deterministic. Intuitionism, emotivism, utilitarism, existentialism, rationalism, naturalism, dialogism, etc. They suppose you have reasons, not causes, to act. They suppose that you are responsible for your acts because, even though the stimulus might be strong in a sense, you might have done a different thing than the thing you have effectively done.

When a chess computer examines two different moves and the branches that could arise from each, it is in a sense supposing that "you might done a different thing than the thing you have effectively done", and yet that process can be entirely deterministic.

There's no need to remove determinism in order for a process to examine the repercussions of different potential actions before choosing one.

 

[SpuriusMaximus]

Continuation of comment 304:

First of all: Your sentence “determinism makes it right” is ambiguous. What is “it”? Gassing deficient men? I will suppose you mean this. What “makes” means? I suppose that you mean “to judge”, “justify” or similar.

If this is the meaning of your sentence it is a misunderstanding again. I don’t say that determinism “makes forced euthanasia right”. I say that it has not means to rationally judge it. That is, to say if it is right or wrong.

The problem is that you've repeatedly made claims that are more than that. Yet when pressed to defend them, you rush back to saying you only said the above. That's what makes it a Motte And Bailey Fallacy.

If you only want to say the above, then actually do say only the above. Don't post hyperbollic extrapolations that claim substantially more.

Of course, I am using “evil” and “bad” in a moral sense. Therefore they are the same. You cannot “to pass” from one to the other. What difference you see between bad and evil in a moral context?

This on the other hand is just flat out stupid.

The reason some claim you can't judge something as morally evil in a determinist concept is already basically just a word game. It's essentially just claiming that since moral "evil" is just something "bad" for which you hold someone responsible, and (with enough handwaving about what "responsible" means) you can't hold someone responsible in a deterministic concept, then that "bad" doesn't qualify as "evil".

To then go some version of 'but if it's in a moral context BAD would mean EVIL, so then we can't call it BAD either' is trying to sneak back in the holding someone responsible part that was discarded in the first place.


But anyway, the difference is this:

- if the software in the new Boeing 'decides' to fly the airplane into the ground, as happened recently, we call it "BAD". Because the software can't be held responsible in a moral sense, to make it "EVIL".

- if a human 'decides' to fly a full airplane into the ground, it's usually called "EVIL" because it's a "BAD" and you can hold a human responsible for it.

Waivering moral responsibility for the human by claiming that essentially he acted just as deterministically as the software, may stop it from qualifying as "EVIL", but doesn't stop it from qualifying as "BAD" just like it would for the software.

And it sure as heck doesn't stop anyone from using considerations like the good of society or such, in judging whether it's good or bad, and whether it should be prevented in the future.

 

[David Mo]

But anyway, the difference is this:

- if the software in the new Boeing 'decides' to fly the airplane into the ground, as happened recently, we call it "BAD". Because the software can't be held responsible in a moral sense, to make it "EVIL".

- if a human 'decides' to fly a full airplane into the ground, it's usually called "EVIL" because it's a "BAD" and you can hold a human responsible for it.

Any person in his right mind would distinguish the evil that a person has committed by an inevitable mistake.

In the case you propose:
An error due to the malfunction of a program, a person with a gun to the back of their neck, and a terrorist who alters the plane's system so that it crashes.

It is obvious that these cases are quite different. Above all, the latter implies a concept that the determinists are unwilling to recognize: intention, consciousness, free will. They are all simple cause-effect relations for him. They are all the same. There is no evil, there is no responsibility that bases the merit or demerit of actions.

But this theory is counterintuitive because it would lead to the rational impossibility of judging, praising or morally censoring. So you and the determinists try to save the right to act morally with some additional principle. You have proposed the principle of happiness: an action is reprehensible when it goes against happiness. (Starvation or abduction are things that everybody try avoiding).

This principle is very insufficient. Happiness is an ambiguous concept. Not all people think that happiness is the same. Worse still, not all people think that happiness is caused by the same things. Worse still, people can be induced to be happy in circumstances that everyone else would consider undesirable. Have you read Huxley's Brave New World? I highly recommend it. If you don't like to read much you can find a summary here: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brave_New_World

Secondly, because of its vagueness, the sheer principle of universal happiness is unsustainable in reality. Some people need things for their happiness that they take away from others. It is then necessary to make choices betseen contradictory options. This has given rise to a casuistry that provokes many controversies between opposite principles. The best known is the lesser happiness of the greater number versus the greater happiness of the lesser number.

I challenge you to respond to this dichotomy without introducing principles other than the determination of behaviors, that is to say the psychological determinism. I would like to see how you do it.

 

[SpuriusMaximus]

But again, the fact that we can't qualify something as "evil", doesn't mean we can't qualify it as "bad". As in, detrimental.

If the plane were hit by lightning, which caused the software to glitch and fly into the ground, nobody would really find someone to call "evil". Nevertheless, we can say that having a plane loaded with 100+ people fly into the ground is "bad". It's undesirable.

And we can think of ways to prevent that from happening again in the future. Like maybe we'll put a farraday cage around the computer, so it can't get EMP-ed out by lightning that easily. Or maybe we'll have redundant computers and hope they can't ALL get EMP-ed out at the same time. Or maybe we'll allow the pilot to temporarily override the computer, and trust his judgment more. Or whatever.

Just the fact that no human can be blamed doesn't change the fact that certain outcomes are less desirable than others, and that we can take measures to increase the odds of the desirable outcomes and reduce the odds of the undesirable ones.

All you can say is perhaps that then it's no longer a morality problem. And sure, that would even be a fair point. But we can still decide it's a problem anyway, and we can still try to solve it.

 

[SpuriusMaximus]

As for the whole 'but happiness is subjective' argument, all I can say is, "well, duh." Didn't stop any of the schools of subjectivism from dealing with it anyway. I would have expected someone who claims to be a proponent of intersubjectivism to be pre-clued, so to speak, that there's a reason it has "subjective" right in the name

In fact, you seem to be the only one who seems to think that any flavour of SUBJECTIVism needs OBJECTIVE everything to work.

 

[Myriad]

You are asking about ethics or philosophy of morality. Almost all theories of ethics are not deterministic. Intuitionism, emotivism, utilitarism, existentialism, rationalism, naturalism, dialogism, etc. They suppose you have reasons, not causes, to act. They suppose that you are responsible for your acts because, even though the stimulus might be strong in a sense, you might have done a different thing than the thing you have effectively done.

But reasons have causes. If a man steals food because he's hungry, he's hungry for reasons.

We can judge the evil of his act as lesser, or not, depending on our moral theory. We can assert that he could have acted differently if circumstances were different, such as if he were not hungry, if he had more respect for the law, or if the punishments were harsher. But we can do this with or without accepting determinism.

We could also assert that the food thief could have acted differently if all circumstances were identical, but that's making an assumption of nondeterminism. We cannot then use that argument or the follow-ons from that argument to argue against determinism. That would be begging the question.

If there are moral theories that assume nondeterminism, then those theories are useless in asserting that nondeterminism is true. No matter how many of them there are.