Is there a skeptical/scientific argument against predeterminism?

[SpuriusMaximus]

I'm sorry you misunderstand what I write. What I have said several times is that there is a logical incompatibility between being deterministic and condemning forced euthanasia. That determinists try to overcome the difficulty with incoherence is another issue. I do not accuse determinists of being monsters, but of being inconsistent.

1. Err, no. What you actually said includes such gems as: "If you are determinist the word “persuade” has not many sense. There are caused behaviours. If you can modify a behaviour changing its causes, you do it. If you cannot do it, you can eliminate the problem. This is to say, eliminating retarded persons. The final solution, you know." (message #150)

Or: "A thief, a killer or a corrupt politician are the same for a determinist. They are behaviours which must be stopped. If you can change their behaviours, you do it. If you cannot, you eliminate the individuals. Or you punish them in a so awful way than other possible evildoers are dissuaded." (message #150 again.)

That's saying something completely different. It's flat out making claims about how determinists think. It's an "All X are Y" claim.


2. Even taking it that way, you still haven't shown a single determinist author actually ending up struggling with such an implication, or being inconsistent about it. Which, again, makes it just your very own strawman.

You have cited a single name so far, namely "F.B. Skinner" (which already raises red flags because it's actually B.F. Skinner), but nothing in what you quoted actually shows him reaching that implication or being inconsistent about it.


3. I don't think you've actually read Skinner, nor even tried to understand the one paragraph (most likely quote-mined from a secondary source) that you provided here about what he said. Because even your own paragraph contradicts what you then postulate about how determinists think.

E.g., you say that "If you are determinist the word “persuade” has not many sense", but even your own paragraph about Skinner's work contradicts you there. Because it says exactly that persuasion works. Sure, it works best when social pressure is applied, or via deprogramming programs, but it does work.

E.g., you say that if you're a determinist, "you punish them in a so awful way than other possible evildoers are dissuaded." But if you had actually read anything by or even about Skinner, you'd know that what he actually said on the topic of punishments is that relying on punishments to suppress behaviour is at best temporary and can have unintended and unwanted consequences.

More importantly, you'd also know that he introduced a third category besides reward or punishment, namely extinction: the systematic absence of a reward stimulus, as a way to make certain behaviours go away. And incidentally as something to be aware not to do to desired behaviours.

What I actually see there isn't you even really trying to show where Skinner went wrong, but your usual going into your own flights of fantasy based on one quote-mined quote from some secondary source. And even there you do some surreal reading between the lines, while ignoring the actual lines. That's not a proof that Skinner was wrong, but that your style of arguing based on your own fantasy is wrong.

So, again, exactly where DOES Skinner run into this kind of problem and how is he inconsistent about it? Otherwise, again, you're just fighting your own strawmen.

 

[Myriad]

Is that "perceived capacity to sense, decide, and act" a description of free will ?

It's a description of part of how we cognitively model the world. "Making a decision" is something that the entities in our mental models do. This is useful in our mental models because it points to possible opportunities to alter the outcome in advantageous ways.

Our ancestors had no way to perceive "if I perform certain actions that will optically generate certain patterns in a certain photoreceptors belonging to a cooperative colony of cells, it is very likely to set in motion nerve impulses in certain pathway's of the colony's central nervous system cells that will ultimately result in a reaction that signals the colony's contractile tissues in patterns that result in decreasing proximity between myself and the colony's big pointy teeth." The causal pathways involved are hidden from direct perception and are too complex to follow anyhow.

But they could perceive this instead: "If I stand up tall and wave my stick, the bear will likely decide to run away instead of attacking me."

The latter is a narrative mental model that's far simpler to compute and act upon. Being a mere summary, it leaves out details, and it replaces them with idea-chunks instead. Some of those chunks are fairly accurate depictions of reality. "The bear" really does correspond, for the most part, with a particular and persistent collection of matter. "Running away" really does correspond, for the most part, with a particular and (for a while) persistent pattern of change. But one of those chunks is merely a useful fiction: the word "decide."

In nature, nothing makes decisions. The loose rock doesn't decide whether or not to fall, the semiconductor logic gate doesn't decide whether to output 1 or 0, the synapse doesn't decide to strengthen or the neuron to fire. Those are all effects of causes, likely in some cases with quantum randomness involved as well. "Deciding" is something the characters in our mental summary narratives do.

The useful fiction says this: "The mind (or spirit) of the bear has free will and a decision to make. This gives me a chance to affect what happens by my actions, and I can learn and teach what actions are effective it getting the outcome I prefer." Because, of course, it actually is possible to influence the outcome, and it's far easier to understand that in terms of the useful fictions "free will" and "decision" than in terms of the bear's sensory receptors and neural processes.

How do they develop?

They evolved from biological systems of reaction to environmental stimuli.

 

[SpuriusMaximus]

I don't think that the mainstream meaning of "decide" hinges on free will, though. Nor is it the only one, in any case. Computer Science for example is quite happy to talk about, for example, a decision tree. Or a decision list. Or a decision table.

The fact that the agent, in this case a computer, has absolutely no free will whatsoever, doesn't change the fact that most people would say that in a certain situation it "decided" for a certain option, out of the many available in that situation. Or at the very least would understand what you mean if you say the computer decided to do X. E.g., to move the knight to threaten the queen on a chess table.

 

[Myriad]

It doesn't seem to me either that brainwashing a person is morally acceptable. Even if it can be done. Because I believe that the moral person has a dignity. But I don't think the deterministic has any reason to condemn such practices. If there is no freedom, men are like machines. And machines have no dignity. As Hans says in this forum, it's all a question of whether "the majority of society" is interested. If a majority considers it fair to apply aggressive therapies to criminals or our enemies, why not? Or even people who are not properly speaking criminals. If immigrants bother me on the street, why not let them die at sea or in the desert trying to get to my city? Why can't we shoot to kill if they get too close to the border? This is not a mere theorical problem, you know.

Of course, determinists are offended when you explain this. They say they have their morals. I don't doubt it. It's usually one form or another of utilitarianism. But it seems to me that utilitarianism is inconsistent with their deterministic principles.

"I don't think the deterministic [sic] has any reason to condemn such practices."

Yet, those reasons have been pointed out to you repeatedly by several different people in this thread.

Which means, at this point, you are just preaching, and you're preaching the preacher's oldest and vilest preach: "I you don't think as I do you're incapable of morality."

What other versions of that have I heard? Here are a few:

"Atheists don't have any reason to be moral because they don't believe in God or in punishment in the afterlife."

"Christians don't have any reason to be moral because they believe their sins have been redeemed in advance and can be forgiven at any time."

"Muslims don't have any reason to be moral because their scripture promises them paradise if they kill infidels."

"Capitalists don't have any reason to be moral because making money is the only thing that matters."

"Socialists don't have any reason to be moral because the state promises to provide all their needs regardless."

"Gays don't have any reason to be moral because their sexuality doesn't produce offspring so they have no descendants' futures to worry about."


Please do stop teasing and tell me now, what is it that you demand I DO believe about the nature of reality, in order for you to regard me as capable of morality?

 

[Myriad]

I don't think that the mainstream meaning of "decide" hinges on free will, though. Nor is it the only one, in any case. Computer Science for example is quite happy to talk about, for example, a decision tree. Or a decision list. Or a decision table.

The fact that the agent, in this case a computer, has absolutely no free will whatsoever, doesn't change the fact that most people would say that in a certain situation it "decided" for a certain option, out of the many available in that situation. Or at the very least would understand what you mean if you say the computer decided to do X. E.g., to move the knight to threaten the queen on a chess table.

I agree. The way I'd put it is, we apply to the computer chess program the same simplified mental model, the same useful fiction, that we apply to the bear or to the person. And for the same reason: it's too complex (and for most, too hidden) a process to apprehend in terms of its actual steps of cause and effect, even though cause and effect (plus possible randomness) is what's happening. Instead, our mental model invokes a fictional singular entity (the bear's or person's "mind" or the computer's "program"*) that is performing a fictional singular monolithic task, "deciding."

*Wait, doesn't a computer program really exist? Yes, as an collection of information in the computer's memory. But a computer only executes a program one step (or a few steps) at a time. Saying "the program is running" depicts the program as an abstract summary entity doing an abstract summary thing. It's a useful mental model just like "the bear is running."

 

[SpuriusMaximus]

"I don't think the deterministic [sic] has any reason to condemn such practices."

Yet, those reasons have been pointed out to you repeatedly by several different people in this thread.

Which means, at this point, you are just preaching, and you're preaching the preacher's oldest and vilest preach: "I you don't think as I do you're incapable of morality."

What other versions of that have I heard? Here are a few:

"Atheists don't have any reason to be moral because they don't believe in God or in punishment in the afterlife."

"Christians don't have any reason to be moral because they believe their sins have been redeemed in advance and can be forgiven at any time."

"Muslims don't have any reason to be moral because their scripture promises them paradise if they kill infidels."

"Capitalists don't have any reason to be moral because making money is the only thing that matters."

"Socialists don't have any reason to be moral because the state promises to provide all their needs regardless."

"Gays don't have any reason to be moral because their sexuality doesn't produce offspring so they have no descendants' futures to worry about."


Please do stop teasing and tell me now, what is it that you demand I DO believe about the nature of reality, in order for you to regard me as capable of morality?

Well, really just in free will, far as I can tell.

As I was saying, he didn't explain it particularly well here, but there was another thread a while ago that he derailed into morality, and got pushed into explaining how his works. And it really was what I was calling earlier a crap OCPD solution whenever one of those encounters an optimization problem. He reduced it all to one variable, "freedom", and maximizing only that one.

Everything else, he rationalized around that one. E.g., killing was bad because it robs the victim of the most freedom. (He ain't gonna be taking any more decisions after that.)

Of course, he didn't actually seem to have much of a working moral system. That reduction to one variable didn't seem to be able even to say if an assault and battery is justified if you really need something the other person has. But he was adamant that that's the only solution, the only POSSIBLE moral system that could ever work.

Well, enter the premise that you're not "free" if your reasons determine your choice for you, and his whole system stops working. Not entirely sure why, because nobody else ever defined freedom as acting chaotically, free of any rhyme or reason. And one could even redefine the same system to minimize coercion instead. But there we go, if your actions aren't "free" of being caused by any reason whatsoever, his moral system stops working.

I'm sure most people would just take that as an ad absurdum indication that their logic took a wrong turn at Albuquerque, but for him it seems to indicate that everyone ELSE is wrong

 

[winter salt]

Great explanations Myriad und Hans, thank you.

 

[Myriad]

Well, enter the premise that you're not "free" if your reasons determine your choice for you, and his whole system stops working. Not entirely sure why, because nobody else ever defined freedom as acting chaotically, free of any rhyme or reason.

I was going to bring that up eventually. I've pointed out before that the less rhyme or reason we perceive in a person's actions, the less (not more) likely we are to attribute those actions to the person exercising their free will. Instead, we start talking about compulsions, neuroses, phobias, addictions, delusions, acting upon misinformation (such as buying into a scam), being "under the sway" of a bully or a charismatic leader, and so forth.

"I rushed to the hardware store, bought a gallon of bright yellow paint, and poured it all over my own head in the parking lot. All for no reason whatsoever. I'm sure you would never do such a thing, unless you were coerced somehow or pursuing some substantial reward. That proves my free will is freer than yours." Does that make any sense?

 

[David Mo]

1. Err, no. What you actually said includes such gems as: "If you are determinist the word “persuade” has not many sense. There are caused behaviours. If you can modify a behaviour changing its causes, you do it. If you cannot do it, you can eliminate the problem. This is to say, eliminating retarded persons. The final solution, you know." (message #150)

Or: "A thief, a killer or a corrupt politician are the same for a determinist. They are behaviours which must be stopped. If you can change their behaviours, you do it. If you cannot, you eliminate the individuals. Or you punish them in a so awful way than other possible evildoers are dissuaded." (message #150 again.)

That's saying something completely different. It's flat out making claims about how determinists think. It's an "All X are Y" claim.


2. Even taking it that way, you still haven't shown a single determinist author actually ending up struggling with such an implication, or being inconsistent about it. Which, again, makes it just your very own strawman.

You have cited a single name so far, namely "F.B. Skinner" (which already raises red flags because it's actually B.F. Skinner), but nothing in what you quoted actually shows him reaching that implication or being inconsistent about it.


3. I don't think you've actually read Skinner, nor even tried to understand the one paragraph (most likely quote-mined from a secondary source) that you provided here about what he said. Because even your own paragraph contradicts what you then postulate about how determinists think.

E.g., you say that "If you are determinist the word “persuade” has not many sense", but even your own paragraph about Skinner's work contradicts you there. Because it says exactly that persuasion works. Sure, it works best when social pressure is applied, or via deprogramming programs, but it does work.

E.g., you say that if you're a determinist, "you punish them in a so awful way than other possible evildoers are dissuaded." But if you had actually read anything by or even about Skinner, you'd know that what he actually said on the topic of punishments is that relying on punishments to suppress behaviour is at best temporary and can have unintended and unwanted consequences.

More importantly, you'd also know that he introduced a third category besides reward or punishment, namely extinction: the systematic absence of a reward stimulus, as a way to make certain behaviours go away. And incidentally as something to be aware not to do to desired behaviours.

What I actually see there isn't you even really trying to show where Skinner went wrong, but your usual going into your own flights of fantasy based on one quote-mined quote from some secondary source. And even there you do some surreal reading between the lines, while ignoring the actual lines. That's not a proof that Skinner was wrong, but that your style of arguing based on your own fantasy is wrong.

So, again, exactly where DOES Skinner run into this kind of problem and how is he inconsistent about it? Otherwise, again, you're just fighting your own strawmen.

Quoting excerpts out of context form a single post is bad practice. As a comment can be misinterpreted I worried to explain my idea better in other posts. See 117, 154, 174 and 202 among others.

On the power of moral sermons, according to Skinner:

Skinner affirms that familiar or social pressure determines the behaviour. Therefore a person can be influenced if he is blamed by a parent or a friend. But this is not due to moral reasoning but to personal or social influence. Therefore this personal influence can be used in more efficient ways than moral sermons. (117 and again in 130!)​

On the moral consequences of determinism

My argument is analytical. It is based on an inconsistency of determinism. That is to say, the postulates of determinism lead to conclusions that are contradictory to common intuitions and are undesirable even to determinists. (154)
​

It is obvious that this conclusion repulses our moral sense and, in fact, whenever it has been posed in to a deterministic he has tried to avoid it in some inconsistent way. Generally they covertly introduce the free decision. The Nazis and others like them are not so inconsistent. (172)​

My position was definitively summarized in 202.

GENERAL WARNING.
Some of you don't quite understand the problem. I will put it another way: It's not a question of whether indeterminism or determinism drives people to do bad things. Probably the proportion of evil will be the same or similar in both cases. The problem is that if we admit that certain behaviours are morally undesirable what is the ethical theory that can best explain why they are.

I think it's clear that I'm not accusing Skinner or any other determinist in particular of defending concentration camps or police brutality. What I'm saying is that the logic of their positions prevents them from having a consistent moral argument against these and other aberrations. I hope this is definitely clear to you and that you don't continue bothering with the same tune.Because speaking of straw men, you have a great deal of experience in this field, as I have just demonstrated.

 

[SpuriusMaximus]

Mate, I don't know what kind of confusion of the mind makes you think that repeating the same bare assertions, in fact making it clear that you're repeating the same postulates YOU wrote before, is settling the issue of whether it's a strawman. We are not in The Hunting Of The Snark and you are not the Bellman. A bare postulate doesn't become true if you just say it three times.

Show where SKINNER runs into such a consistency issue. Otherwise, yes, you are fighting your own strawman.

 

[SpuriusMaximus]

I was going to bring that up eventually. I've pointed out before that the less rhyme or reason we perceive in a person's actions, the less (not more) likely we are to attribute those actions to the person exercising their free will. Instead, we start talking about compulsions, neuroses, phobias, addictions, delusions, acting upon misinformation (such as buying into a scam), being "under the sway" of a bully or a charismatic leader, and so forth.

Well, technically even acting on bad information, or trying to please a bully or charismatic leader would qualify as reasons when you decide whether to do something or not. As would acting on a phobia or delusion, or acting to satisfy an addiction. They may not be good reasons, or sane reasons, but it's still some data going into the process and determining the output. It's just, as they say, garbage in, garbage out. But the "in" part still determines the "out" part. So it still wouldn't qualify as free in David's view.

I'm rather under the impression that it would have to be truly and completely random and unconnected to any needs or previous experiences where the action ever satisfied any need, to qualify as "freedom" for him. Something like "I was out of cigarettes, so I took a skip around the house, dragging my pet rock on a leash" or "I was getting late for the meeting, so I took the time to hack my front door down and draw a penis on the sidewalk."

Of course, even skipping over how that would just qualify as insane rather than "free", that just rises the question of how that kind of acting free of reasons is even compatible with any imaginable morality system. Because having a moral system also means having certain rules that act as reasons for whatever you decide to do. E.g., my believing that rape is wrong is the reason I don't do more than *ahem* covet my neighbour's ass. If my actions were free of having any reasons, it seems to me like such moral reasons would also not apply.

"I rushed to the hardware store, bought a gallon of bright yellow paint, and poured it all over my own head in the parking lot. All for no reason whatsoever. I'm sure you would never do such a thing, unless you were coerced somehow or pursuing some substantial reward. That proves my free will is freer than yours." Does that make any sense?

Not really, no.

 

[David Mo]

"I don't think the deterministic [sic] has any reason to condemn such practices."

Yet, those reasons have been pointed out to you repeatedly by several different people in this thread.

Which means, at this point, you are just preaching, and you're preaching the preacher's oldest and vilest preach: "I you don't think as I do you're incapable of morality."

What other versions of that have I heard? Here are a few:

"Atheists don't have any reason to be moral because they don't believe in God or in punishment in the afterlife."

"Christians don't have any reason to be moral because they believe their sins have been redeemed in advance and can be forgiven at any time."

"Muslims don't have any reason to be moral because their scripture promises them paradise if they kill infidels."

"Capitalists don't have any reason to be moral because making money is the only thing that matters."

"Socialists don't have any reason to be moral because the state promises to provide all their needs regardless."

"Gays don't have any reason to be moral because their sexuality doesn't produce offspring so they have no descendants' futures to worry about."


Please do stop teasing and tell me now, what is it that you demand I DO believe about the nature of reality, in order for you to regard me as capable of morality?

From my comment 202:

I will put it another way: It's not a question of whether indeterminism or determinism drives people to do bad things. Probably the proportion of evil will be the same or similar in both cases. The problem is that if we admit that certain behaviours are morally undesirable what is the ethical theory that can best explain why they are.​

The accusation that atheism or any other belief is incapable of justifying morality is entirely legitimate. In the case of atheism it is also totally false. But if it were true I would worry about looking for the reasons to hold moral principles. It would be a real problem for me, who am an atheist and believe in moral obligation.

The word "reason" was probably ambiguous. I think in English, as in Spanish, it means either to motivate or give a rational explanation. The second sense corresponds to what I wanted to say.

I have said several times that I was not blaming determinists to be immoral. To maintain inconsistent reasons to do something is a frequent thing in the day to day life. It is because passions are stronger that reason. And good passions are the basis of morality.

What I am after is the justification of moral.

 

[SpuriusMaximus]

You are nevertheless claiming that they haven't solved the problem satisfactorily. I still expect you to provide some quotes that show that to be the case.

So far, frankly, you've only shown that YOUR idea of a moral system falls apart under those conditions. (Not to mention having some bigger problems, like with recognizing rights for the disabled or retarded.) You haven't done anything to show that SKINNER's system has a problem there.

Basically all I see is still just you barking at your own strawmen.

 

[David Mo]

Show where SKINNER runs into such a consistency issue. Otherwise, yes, you are fighting your own strawman.

Ay caramba! I could have sworn that I have been trying for a few days to make you understand that metaphysical determinism is contrary to the concept of freedom and that without freedom we cannot attribute responsibility and that without responsibility there is no condemnation or moral merit.
Do you want me to quote you where Skinner defends determinism? No problem, if you commit to tell me the precise sources of your knowledge of moral determinism.

 

[David Mo]

I continue my argumentation (part 3):
1. There is a contradiction between determinism and the justification of moral principles and responsibility or merit.
2. This contradiction can only be solved by the substitution of one of the two parts.
(I set aside the second and concentrate on the first).
3. The contradiction disappears if we replace the concept of metaphysical (or "scientific") determinism with that of methodological determinism.

That is my subsequent line of argument (part 4). .
1. To begin with: determinism is not a scientific concept. It is a philosophical concept.

 

[SpuriusMaximus]

Ay caramba! I could have sworn that I have been trying for a few days to make you understand that metaphysical determinism is contrary to the concept of freedom and that without freedom we cannot attribute responsibility and that without responsibility there is no condemnation or moral merit.
Do you want me to quote you where Skinner defends determinism?

No, I want you to show where SKINNER's theory is self-inconsistent, since that is what you claim about it.

All you've shown so far is that YOUR dysfunctional moral system has a problem with "freedom", or rather with YOUR very own redefinition of "freedom". And, frankly, it was already obvious that your supposed moral system flat out doesn't work for more than spewing generalities anyway. You've made that amply clear in the previous thread. So, that one more problem breaks it completely, well, I'd venture a guess that it's not surprising anyone.

You just POSTULATE that other moral systems can't solve the problem of morality the way THEY set out to do it, because YOU find it too hard. Essentially it boils down to postulating that if YOU can't solve a given problem, then everyone who says he found a solution (or at least a partial one) must be wrong. Which is exactly on par with Pixie Of Key's insisting that GR is wrong because HE doesn't understand it.

No problem, if you commit to tell me the precise sources of your knowledge of moral determinism.

I'm not the one making the claim that such an inconsistency exists, silly. It's your burden of proof.

 

[winter salt]

Determinism does not imply any kind of too compassionate morality. Quite the opposite.

Should I just forget about this ?
So it was HansMustermann's claim that you were quoting.
Hey Hans ! What did you mean here ?

 

[SpuriusMaximus]

That's most certainly not something I've ever written.

 

[David Mo]

No, I want you to show where SKINNER's theory is self-inconsistent, since that is what you claim about it.

(...)I'm not the one making the claim that such an inconsistency exists, silly. It's your burden of proof.

It's only you getting tangled up one more time.

I've already exposed where the contradiction resides in Skinner (and other deterministic psychologists). You're the one who says I'm explaining Skinner wrong. If you say so, you must prove it. Cite your sources and how I am misleadingly explaining Skinner's position. By quoting. I don't mind quoting Skinner directly. You seem uncomfortable with your sources. Maybe because he doesn't know very well what he's talking about. Quote your sources and I quote mine. Let's see who misinterprets Skinner.

 

[David Mo]

Should I just forget about this ?
So it was HansMustermann's claim that you were quoting.
Hey Hans ! What did you mean here ?

That's most certainly not something I've ever written.

This means that the postulates of metaphysical determinism leave no room for a morality of compassion. Because determinism is a theory about causes and effects. While a morality of compassion presupposes the priority of some feelings over others, of the altruists over the selfish, something that determinism cannot establish. Attempts such as the common good, what the majority wants, etc. are empty.

As for Hans' memory, don't pay much attention to it. It's very bad. Here he is talking about compassion. By the way, it's a good example of how metaphysical determinism doesn't imply compassion. What counts is effectiveness. Compassion is irrelevant. Ask him why, if it is not sufficiently clear.

It's really most philosophically useful to me for the purposes of forgiveness and compassion.

Is it? One of the purposes -- and arguably the MAIN purpose -- of laws and social norms is deterrence. If everything is forgiven, then there is really no reason not to do something evil.

(...)Basically deterministic or not, free will or not, deterrence works. If you think people deciding not to do something unlawful don't have free will in that choice, good. All the better, in fact. I see no reason to change that, then.