Is there a skeptical/scientific argument against predeterminism?

[SpuriusMaximus]

Because virtually nobody prior to VERY recent times was even interested in that kind of a definition of free will or its implications. And most of us still aren't.

There are more interesting things to discuss about free will, like, say, in theology why does a benevolent god allow certain actions. Or if we're talking determinism, whether a god can be as omniscient as to know the whole of human history and future from the start. Or in a more secular context, what kind of rules are needed vs how much freedom.

Reducing it all to something as trivial as "derp, you take decisions for REASONS" isn't helping do anything for that except derail it into useless trivia. It doesn't help our understanding of, say, legalism one bit, much less how to optimize it, if the whole thing is derailed into "derp, you take decisions for REASONS". We knew that. That's why we're talking about laws or judicial procedures in the first place. Because we want them to be reasons.

I mean, hell, even theologians will be thrilled to know that people take decisions for reasons, because if people just did random stuff, they could stop preaching what everyone should do

 

[Chanakya]

I'm saying that weather systems, for all their chaotic complexity, are driven by averages of billions of tons of air. Avogadro's number being 6.02214076×10²³ mol⁻¹, the effects of each mollecule are negligible. Whereas in the example I just gave, just ONE specific atom could cause a major effect, that was not mitigated nor depending on any averages.

Statistics may be able to tell you on the average how many people with haemophilia are born in a year or such, but can't tell you that specifically the crown prince of Russia will be one of them. And that situation was not driven by averages, but by a sample of exactly one.

Hans, you may not have followed my argument: which is to say, I may not have adequately explained myself in my earlier comments.

In your example, you're saying the Czar's hemophilia was a black swan event, so to say. And hemophilia can occur deterministically, and therefore be predicted by sufficiently advanced genetics (and sufficiently exhaustive information on people, say the Czar's parents) -- but you're assuming, in this case, that that this was a truly random event, perhaps basis some quantum randomness, or simply de facto genetic randomness. And thus unpredictable. And I agree with your example.

The example I presented, in response to yours, was an apples-to-apples comparable: just as the Czar ended up with hemophilia, think of a butterfly ending up with some random condition. (I'm not sure what condition, it could be anything, something that makes it flap its wings in some manner, that is different from how it would have flapped its wings had that particular mutation not occurred.) And the chances of this happening is exactly parallel to, comparable to, your example of the Czar's hemophilia, wouldn't you say?

Well, just as the Czar hemophilia, via the butterfly effect you describe, ended up having cataclysmic effects in Russia's politics, similarly, the butterfly's mutation can -- hypothetically -- via some literal butterfly effect, end up causing a hurricane. I mean, that's what the butterfly effect literally is, right, the hyperbole within that idea notwithstanding?

Well then, in that case, just as you've shown that human affairs, specifically Russian history of that period, was wholly unpredictable, I hope I've shown that, equally, in this (admittedly exaggerated) hypothetical, weather systems, specially that particular hurricane, is wholly unpredictable. Right?

Well, my objection to your original argument is this: Despite that unpredictability, and despite our inability to make cent per cent infallible predictions, we do think of weather systems as essentially deterministic and (approximately) predictable, don't we?

Well, is there any reason, then, to imagine that we might not be able to predict human affairs with similar approximation, at least in theory, going forward? So that, in principle at least, and basis the example you present, there isn't really any essential difference between weather systems and human affairs. If you're prepared to think of the one as deterministic, why would you not, in principle at least, think of human affairs also as essentially deterministic?

 

[Hlafordlaes]

To make QM deterministic you probably need to go down a rabbit whole of infinite causes with infinitely diminishing effects, say, all particles affecting all others due to being members of the same linked quantum fields. Or something like that. Here is the blog of a stunningly brilliant physicist who is a superdeterminist. She sounds sane.

I fully reject any superdeterminism that purports to be immune to crossing scalar boundaries intact. For example, there is nothing about the subatomic components of atoms that predetermines molecular behavior. You have to observe at that level to see the new effects. More Is Different.

Basically, what are emergent phenomena? Nondeterministic behaviors at the boundaries of changes in scale and/or complexity. Infinite causes do not predict how the first complex molecule had, say, a surfing phonon excitation. That's an emergence from causes newly made possible by specific atomic arrangement.

Can all of observed nature be derived from the properties of quantum fields alone, or does how that nature is arranged come into play, adding a new degree of freedom where, in principle, there had been none? If new degrees of freedom can come into play, ones that cannot be predicted from priors, what then?

In my defense, it's Sunday and I'm digesting a fine meal, while yesterday I walked up a mountain and back down in one quick go, and I believe half my brain is asleep and the other half posting.

 

[dann]

Do you think what you think about things is caused on any level at all?

I'd say your decision to post was caused by numerous factors such as 1) having memories of previous times you've thought about this topic, 2) your current environment of having the time to post your thoughts, 3) ect. and so on.

eta:
dann...can I get you to think about this from another angle?

Think about someone you've known, who "objectively" has made really bad life choices. If you were born with the exact same genetic makeup as them, and had had 100% of the exact same experiences as they had from the moment of conception onwards, do you really think you would have done things differently from them?

Yes, I'm certain that I would, but your premise is absurd. It is the standard argument for determinism, but:
1) even monozygotic twins can make different choices;
2) nobody can have "had 100% of the exact same experiences".

Some people consider things seriously and take their time before they make decisions. Others don't. Some people get laid off, not because of their job performance, but because the company they were working for went bankrupt. Others don't. Etc.

 

[SpuriusMaximus]

@Chanakya
The problem there is that an argument from analogy is only as good as the analogy. And I'd say unfortunately yours is fundamentally broken.

You first build a hypothetical superman butterfly that can cause tornadoes, something which doesn't exist on Earth (it's just a very hyperbollic metaphor,) yet try to keep the premise that, see, on Earth we can predict tornadoes. Yes, we can, but only because such butterflies don't really exist. You haven't shown in any form or shape that that would still be the case if some butterfly could randomly cause hurricanes across the globe.

Here, let me give you an example of the same kind of reasoning where it's more obvious what's wrong with it:

- imagine that by some mutation, someone with actual psychic mind-control powers were born. Kinda like Professor X, if you will.

- so someone could end up in court accused of a crime they were mind-controlled into doing

- IRL we can deal just fine with claims of mind control by dismissing them in court

- therefore we wouldn't need anything special to deal with that psionic mutant, we can just keep dismissing such claims

But actually the premise at the third step is true ONLY BECAUSE the previous two steps have never been shown to have ever happened. If that objectively changes, then so would the way we deal with it.

 

[David Mo]

We don't know that magic does not exist, either. The list of things we do not technically know is almost infinitely long.

Scientific statements can be descriptions of facts or methodological rules. "X is Y" or "For X you must do Y".

If "Every phenomenon has a cause" (Principle of Causality) were a statement of facts it could neither be proved nor refuted. Frequently there appear phenomena whose cause we do not know, but that apparent refutation does not refute the principle. Any other statement of facts would be refuted if it is not fulfilled, but the Principle of Causality is not. Because it is not a description but a rule: "If you want to know something, look for its cause". The rule is valid if it is good for something. And the Principle of Causality has proven its effectiveness many times over.

"Magic exists (sic)" (="Magic phenomena exist"?) can be verified: show yourself a magic phenomenon. It cannot be shown, then it is refuted. And you cannot turn that statement into any rule, as it is the case with the Causality Principle. Therefore it makes no sense because it is neither a description of facts nor a methodological rule.

Other considerations may reinforce the foregoing, but for the moment these seem sufficient.

 

[David Mo]

As I showed before, most of those reasons can be traced to the SAME cause. It's not just for example, whether the economy going down the drain or the backlash against the incompetent government or the backlash against the Tsar's military leadership of the army could cause the revolution without the haemophiliac prince or not, it's that all four can be traced to the SAME root cause. Without a haemophiliac prince, you have no Rasputin dictating to the Tsarina what should be done, and then you don't have official positions sold to incompetent twits for sexual favours by Rasputin, nor would you have the Tsar taking personal command of the military, and thus the other three reasons for anger against the government disappear too.

I don't think any historian is prepared to say that the revolution would have happened even if you removed all four main causes for it. Because that's no longer history, it's rationalizing some kind of magical predeterminism.

The "anger of Russian people against the Tsarism" was not mainly founded on these three simple reasons that you point out. Misery, industrialization, the suppression of peaceful demonstrations or the disasters of war were more determinant reasons. These are the kind of causes that modern historians look for in documents and testimonies. Rasputin and hemophilia are typical of TV documentaries and best-sellers. But this is entertainment not academic history.

Of course, nobody can warrant that the Russian revolution was unavoidable. Just that, given the sociopolitical situation, it was probably unavoidable. Counterfactual conditionals are banned from true history. And prediction is unthinkable.

 

[kellyb]

Yes, I'm certain that I would,

You're certain you would have made different choices even if your genetics and previous experiences had been 100% identical?

1) even monozygotic twins can make different choices;

Of course. They start having different experiences in the womb.

2) nobody can have "had 100% of the exact same experiences".

Agreed, but it's irrelevant to the question of if free will is an illusion or not.

Some people consider things seriously and take their time before they make decisions. Others don't

Yes, and I think the difference there is the result of a combination of
1) genetics
2) previous experiences
3) current environment

If not those things, what?

Some people get laid off, not because of their job performance, but because the company they were working for went bankrupt. Others don't. Etc.

That's just a case of different experiences being the result of different environments.
How does that support "free will"?

 

[SpuriusMaximus]

The "anger of Russian people against the Tsarism" was not mainly founded on these three simple reasons that you point out. Misery, industrialization, the suppression of peaceful demonstrations or the disasters of war were more determinant reasons. These are the kind of causes that modern historians look for in documents and testimonies. Rasputin and hemophilia are typical of TV documentaries and best-sellers. But this is entertainment not academic history.

Yet two of the causes I bolded in your response are exactly linked to mine. Misery took an upswing when government positions were sold by Rasputin for sexual favours, and the disasters of war became directly blamed personally on the Tsar after he took command of the army because Rasputin said so.

So, you know, maybe actually learn history before decreeing what is real history and what's entertainment?

 

[dann]

You're certain you would have made different choices even if your genetics and previous experiences had been 100% identical?

I'm primarily certain that your hypothesis is 100% impossible, which makes it a very bad one.

Of course. They start having different experiences in the womb.

Which just goes to prove the point. It's a very bag hypothesis when you imagine that if something that is absolutely impossible were to occur, something would happen: One person would respond to things exactly the same way as another person with the same genetics and experiences.
It proves one thing only: that you insist on believing in predetermination, not because of your nature, not because of your nurture, but because you think that you have good reasons to believe it.
(When you start inventing a hypothesis that you know is 100% imaginary and impossible, it should occur to you that you probably don't!)

Agreed, but it's irrelevant to the question of if free will is an illusion or not.

And, as mentioned above, this is when I ask the question, What makes you think so?! Your genes? The hormone level in your mother's womb when you were still a fetus? Your biology teacher in 6th grade? Or your parents' religion? Notice that you come up with reasons for your attitude to this question.

Yes, and I think the difference there is the result of a combination of
1) genetics
2) previous experiences
3) current environment

Yes, you do. You imagine that your thinking is caused by nature/nurture, and not by what you are actually doing when you think.

If not those things, what?

The consideration you make when contemplating something. You may not have noticed, but sometimes you actually change your mind. It may happen when you are presented with an argument that you consider to be particularly striking, but even in that case the argument doesn't cause the change: You may dismiss it immediately, you may consider it and reject it, you may let the idea rest for a while until you have more time to contemplate it, you may consider it again or forget it.
In some cases, you might not think what you're thinking without a certain experience that set the whole thing in motion, but it's still your thinking about that experience that makes you reach a certain conclusion.

That's just a case of different experiences being the result of different environments.
How does that support "free will"?

It was my response to your idea:

Think about someone you've known, who "objectively" has made really bad life choices. If you were born with the exact same genetic makeup as them, and had had 100% of the exact same experiences as they had from the moment of conception onwards, do you really think you would have done things differently from them?

(Think about why you put "objectively" in quotation marks.)
It is 100% certain that I couldn't have been "born with the exact same genetic makeup as them, and had had 100% of the exact same experiences," so maybe you should consider why you need this fantasy to prove to yourself that free will doesn't exist.
You also make the mistake of thinking that the fate of people has much to do with "bad life choices." Sometimes it does, sometimes it doesn't, but that still doesn't prove that there's no free will. You can choose to behave in a approximately the same way and still have two very different outcomes. You may even be a very good (or intelligent, whatever) person and yet be struck dead by lightning, but it was still your choice to stand on a hill to get a better view of the spectacle, seek (imaginary) shelter under at tree, try to reach your car before the ligtning struck etc.
I'm not claiming that your decisions would have nothing at all to do with your background, your knowledge of meteorology, for instance. But even with that knowledge, it's still up to you to abide by what that knowledge tells you or to ignore it. It is your decision. And even then, the outcome of that decision is not for you to decide: You're neither omniscient nor omnipotent. You may be struck dead when you're doing what is supposed to be the right thing, and you may survive and prosper when you're doing what is supposed to be unwise. It was still your decision.

 

[kellyb]

I'm primarily certain that your hypothesis is 100% impossible, which makes it a very bad one.

It's a thought experiment. Those don't need to be possible to illuminate a principle.

And, as mentioned above, this is when I ask the question, What makes you think so?! Your genes? The hormone level in your mother's womb when you were still a fetus? Your biology teacher in 6th grade? Or your parents' religion?

All of those things very well might play a part, among other causes/reasons.

Notice that you come up with reasons for your attitude to this question.

Of course.

You may not have noticed, but sometimes you actually change your mind. It may happen when you are presented with an argument that you consider to be particularly striking, but even in that case the argument doesn't cause the change: You may dismiss it immediately, you may consider it and reject it, you may let the idea rest for a while until you have more time to contemplate it, you may consider it again or forget it.
In some cases, you might not think what you're thinking without a certain experience that set the whole thing in motion, but it's still your thinking about that experience that makes you reach a certain conclusion.

I just think we compute things differently at different times for a variety of reasons.
Do you take issue with this hypothesis?
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Computational_theory_of_mind

(Think about why you put "objectively" in quotation marks.)
It is 100% certain that I couldn't have been "born with the exact same genetic makeup as them, and had had 100% of the exact same experiences," so maybe you should consider why you need this fantasy to prove to yourself that free will doesn't exist.

Again, it's a thought experiment. If you could just answer the question instead of misclassifying the thought experiment as a hypothesis and then complaining about its impossibility, you might at least be able to meet me where I'm at so we could discuss it.

You also make the mistake of thinking that the fate of people has much to do with "bad life choices." Sometimes it does, sometimes it doesn't, but that still doesn't prove that there's no free will.

Again, I was just trying to engage you in the thought experiment - thinking of someone you know who took a fantastically dangerous path in life which panned out poorly for them...the sort of person most people have no sympathy for and just write off under the banner of "they brought it all upon themselves."

You can choose to behave in a approximately the same way and still have two very different outcomes. You may even be a very good (or intelligent, whatever) person and yet be struck dead by lightning, but it was still your choice to stand on a hill to get a better view of the spectacle, seek (imaginary) shelter under at tree, try to reach your car before the ligtning struck etc.
I'm not claiming that your decisions would have nothing at all to do with your background, your knowledge of meteorology, for instance. But even with that knowledge, it's still up to you to abide by what that knowledge tells you or to ignore it. It is your decision.

Obviously it's your decision, but your decision was as caused as any other things which happens in this world.

The person who decides to stand on the hill to watch the lightening storm makes that choice based on a combination of genetics (things like this, in this case, perhaps), previous experiences (maybe as a child you saw an amazing lightening storm which made you want to see more with ever better vantage points for forever after), and current environment (there was a storm, and hill to look at it from, right there, right then.)

 

[Hlafordlaes]

It would be interesting to know how valence is signaled neurologically, how the brain represents values that are not simply whole integers (arc of a baseball one is to catch), and if any of these methods of representation or storage and retrieval are subject to random variations at the subatomic level; i.e., subject to quantum effects.* If so, regardless of cognition, human volition would be probabilistic on a basic level.


*Dear god in heaven, not trying to backdoor QM for consciousness, rather, admit of a role at low physical level, such as would be the case, say, for photosynthesis.

 

[SpuriusMaximus]

Oh, cognition is already known to be probabilistic. There is such a thing as synapse STRENGTH. Which is basically a probability for it to actually fire.

Edit: and yes, that is based on QM. That's the random number generator in the probability there. That's not the same as the QM consciousness woowoo that woowoo peddlers propose, but simply a built in random number generator. In fact some trillions of them.

 

[kellyb]

That sort of randomness doesn't create room for free will, though. (Not that anyone argued that it does ...just sayin'.)

 

[SpuriusMaximus]

Well, sure. You created a definition where you tautologically have no free will. If it's random it's not free will, if you have reasons, it's still not free will. You defined a set that tautologically and trivially is empty. Which is why I call it a useless derail. It doesn't add a single bit of information about anything.

But I guess that some people are that determined to find a reason to avoid personal responsibility. I guess the guys who don't have the "the devil made me do it" excuse, have to redefine free will so they still have an excuse to not be responsible for anything in their life.

And I'd even let them have it, really, except as you show, they have to stick it into everything. Doesn't matter that, in your own words, "Not that anyone argued that it does", but you just have to say it anyway. 'Cause surely everyone must be dying to have you turn a talk about synapses into your personal "but I'm still not responsible" soapbox

 

[David Mo]

Yet two of the causes I bolded in your response are exactly linked to mine. Misery took an upswing when government positions were sold by Rasputin for sexual favours, and the disasters of war became directly blamed personally on the Tsar after he took command of the army because Rasputin said so.

So, you know, maybe actually learn history before decreeing what is real history and what's entertainment?

The data you quote are not true, but that is not the issue.
I have long since learned what history is. I read a lot about that subject, especially that of ancient Greece and Rome, but also of other epochs out of curiosity and obligation. I can recommend some reading that illustrates to you the difference between academic history and TV documentaries. To begin with, no documentaries from the Historia channel are quoted in doctoral theses. You'll imagine why.

 

[SpuriusMaximus]

Yet you didn't seem to get in those studies that once you get past the school level, it's no longer about memorizing the bulleted points at a superficial level (including the lists of names and dates), but about causes and interconnects?

 

[David Mo]

Yet you didn't seem to get in those studies that once you get past the school level, it's no longer about memorizing the bulleted points at a superficial level (including the lists of names and dates), but about causes and interconnects?

There is a never ending debate among historians on the subject of causes in history. The predominant opinion is that "cause" cannot be used as in sciences of nature. Some weaker candidates are usually proposed such as "conditions", "forces", "determinations", etc. These candidates never mean efficient causes as in natural sciences.

When a contemporary historian is searching the "causes" of the defeat of Athens in the Peloponnesian war, he almost ever lets in the last place Pericles' death, if ever. And Pericles was probably the most determinant leader in Greece of his time.

 

[kellyb]

Well, sure. You created a definition where you tautologically have no free will. If it's random it's not free will, if you have reasons, it's still not free will. You defined a set that tautologically and trivially is empty. Which is why I call it a useless derail. It doesn't add a single bit of information about anything.

But I guess that some people are that determined to find a reason to avoid personal responsibility. I guess the guys who don't have the "the devil made me do it" excuse, have to redefine free will so they still have an excuse to not be responsible for anything in their life.

And I'd even let them have it, really, except as you show, they have to stick it into everything. Doesn't matter that, in your own words, "Not that anyone argued that it does", but you just have to say it anyway. 'Cause surely everyone must be dying to have you turn a talk about synapses into your personal "but I'm still not responsible" soapbox

It's really most philosophically useful to me for the purposes of forgiveness and compassion.

It's hard or impossible to be angry with someone when you understand that if you were them, you would have done the exact same things.

 

[Myriad]

Things that don't actually follow from determinism (but a lot of people seem to think do):

- It doesn't follow that you're constrained against your wishes or will, because the process of making choices must operate by means of (that is to say, must generate) your wishes and will. "I'd choose the healthy grilled chicken instead of the cheese steak, if only my decisions weren't deterministically generated," is an absurd category error and was never honestly believed by anyone.

- By the same token, on a more basic level, it doesn't follow that you have no choices or will at all. That's what your brain (and probably conscious experience) evolved for. It's only a question of the nature of the process(es) by which those choices come about.

- It doesn't follow that there's no purpose or no rationale for punishing crime. The purpose of punishing crime is to influence behavior, and while the relative merits of various systems of punishment are debatable, the premise that punishment can influence behavior is unaffected under determinism.

- It doesn't follow that it's inappropriate to blame people for their bad behavior. Under determinism, people don't suddenly become passive inanimate objects. Their decision-making minds are processes. We can and do blame processes for their effects. A medical procedure or industrial control system that causes unnecessary deaths will be blamed for those deaths and altered or eliminated. We can look at precursor processes (such as how the misbehaving system was designed or tested, or a murderer's upbringing) but we still also focus blame on the lethal system or murderer itself.

- It doesn't follow that some hypothetical god or supercomputer with sufficient analytical power and complete information about the present could predict all future events, or that the universe if reset precisely to some previous state would repeat the same events. That depends on whether or not quantum events such as radioactive decay are truly random. Random in this case means that knowing everything that actually exists about the present state of e.g. a radioactive atom, and the rest of the universe, is NOT sufficient to predict when the atom will decay. Such hypothetical predictive state information is also called "hidden variables." Current quantum theory interprets recent findings as indicating that hidden variables are ruled out if locality is preserved. But I don't think we can regard the question as definitively settled.