Dennis Ross was not the only witness at Camp David and Taba (which is what I was referring to, the final "negotiations"). Others come to different conclusions.
The Truth About Camp David, by Clayton Swisher, based on extensive interviews with many of those invovled (including Dennis Ross), is well-regarded. Your Dennis Ross quote gains no cachet by being from a softball interview on Fox News.
ROSS: Arafat's whole life has been governed by struggle and a cause. Everything he has done as leader of the Palestinians is to always leave his options open, never close a door. He was being asked here, you've got to close the door. For him to end the conflict is to end himself.
This is Ross's belief. Perhaps even his conclusion, although who can tell with beliefs. It seems a very odd one. Were he to be describing
Sharon it would make much more sense. What would Sharon be without the struggle?
Reeling in a sovereign Palestinian state would have been the crowning glory of Arafat's career. It must have seemed impossible in 1950. Nobody wanted a Palestinian state - not Israel, not Jordan, not Syria, not the US. The Palestinians had no voice, they were practically invisible. It was Arafat that created a representative body - the PLO - to speak for them, Arafat that brought it international recognition, Arafat who steered it to accept a state in part of Palestine, Arafat who led it to a quasi-state and a Palestinian Authority after Oslo. That's still his legacy - the possibility of a Palestinian state. It's recognised as necessary by the US, the UN, and everybody but Israel. With Peretz on the scene now, it may even happen.
Arafat said "no", apart from anything else, because he was not being offered a sovereign state. In particular it would not have sovereignty over the Al-Aqsa Mosque. Jewish sovereignty over the Western Wall was not disputed - that had been the Palestinian position since Oslo. Palestinian sovereignty over the Al-Aqsa and the Dome of the Rock was the demand. Barak wouldn't concede it, even though he knew there could be no agreement without it. Why wouldn't he? Why stick to a position that would either be rejected or would be a surrender by the Palestinians, rather than a deal?
The obvious conclusion is that he wanted a surrender, not a deal. He wanted, if anything, an agreement that he could tell the Israeli electorate did
not constitute a sovereign Palestinian state, whatever the world might think. The possibility of further expansion on the West Bank - up to and including all of it - and the re-taking of Gaza would remain open, since these were not sovereign lands. Of course the Palestinians couldn't accept that. Barak didn't even want them to have sovereignty over their own skies - Israel would
military overflight rights as well as commercial - which is presumably the source of
He wouldn't even countenance the idea that the Israelis would be able to operate in Palestinian airspace. You know when you fly into Israel today you go to Ben Gurion. You fly in over the West Bank because you can't -- there's no space through otherwise. He rejected that.
That's deliberately misleading enough to be a lie. (Quite apart from him getting into a tangle over how hard it is to fly into a country with a Mediterranean coastline.)