Sorry, I forgot about this thread.
Okay, that's your position. I get it. But the question is what should the skeptical position be. That's not answered or aided by stating your different position, unless your goal is to argue that the skepticism should be like some other philosophy.
If a model of reality is deeply flawed, as I believe materialism is, then the skeptical position would be to reject such a model and embrace the consequences of non-materialistic models of reality.
Sure, but you go even farther here than the typical discourse about perceptual filters and so on that we turn to empirical controls to help mitigate. You seem to be suggesting that if one believes reality can just change out from under us for unfathomable reasons, this can be an excuse to ignore careful observation and believe whatever one wishes. In a sense you're arguing for a private reality, which is arguably a logical fallacy in one sense and a mental illness in another. It's not quaint or old-fashioned to start with the axiom that an objective reality exists.
No, I believe it should be obvious to anyone that materialism has failed to explain consciousness and subjective experience. Positing a reality of mind-independent stuff naturally raises the question of how mind-independent stuff can give rise to minds. Materialism has so far utterly failed to make any progress in that area and the various proposals offered all fall prey to various absurdities (e.g., the notion a universe of conscious beings can be simulated by moving rocks around on an endless plain). So positing the existence of mind-independent stuff is a dead-end, and materialism should not be seriously considered.
If materialism is abandoned, then the competing models of reality receive an epistemic boost. Under competing models of reality (dualism and idealism), violations of the supposed laws of nature are much more likely. Under materialism, we expect the future to resemble the past. Under idealism/dualism this expectation is not so strong. Also, under idealism/dualism, it would be far more likely for local violations of laws of nature to happen. In other words, if this is all a dream, then it's possible the dream may change abruptly, or parts of the dream would differ from other parts (e.g., telepathy might never emerge in controlled settings, but might happen occasionally in non-controlled settings simply because the dreamers(s) want it to be that way).
"Plausible" in whose judgment and by what standard? This is the part where you beg the question.
There's no question begging: materialism is a failed theory for specific reasons. No theory that fails to explain something as fundamental as consciousness and subjective experience is plausible. You can argue that that's not the case, but there's no question-begging in that assertion.
Just because X is bad doesn't mean Y is good. That doesn't follow at all from (3). You're committing a false-dilemma fallacy for starters, and you're asserting that idealism and dualism are better, not because it follows logically but for reasons you're about to give :---
There's no false dilemma. Reality can go three ways: materialism, dualism, and idealism. If one was agnostic, one would assign a 1/3 probability to each model of reality. If a model of reality is taken off the table, the probability of the other models increases. This is true even if you're not agnostic. If you're wedded to dualism, and you find out it fails in some fundamental way, then idealism and materialism are going to get a big epistemic boost.
It's no different than having five suspects for a murder, and exculpatory evidence emerging that exonerates two of the suspects. The probability that one of the three remaining suspects is the murderer is going to increase. There's no way it can't.
If materialism takes an epistemic hit, which I believe it should, the other models of reality will benefit, and that has consequences in how we evaluate evidence.
That's a bug, not a feature. Materialism is accepting of change, so long as there is a reliable observation such that radical change is the parsimonious way to accommodate it. This was true when Einstein changed radically our understanding of mechanical dynamics.
The assertion that there is mind-independent stuff is at the heart of materialism, and also why it fails as a theory. There have been no changes in materialism, so far, on that front. Although with QM, mind has emerged as a much bigger "player" in the scheme of things. Max Tegmark believes the universe is made of math. Gregory Matloff believes in a consciousness field. Christof Koch is a panpsychist. So things are moving away in the right direction.
As a natural scientist, I find a version of panpsychism modified for the 21st century to be the single most elegant and parsimonious explanation for the universe I find myself in.
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/is-consciousness-universal/
Your system is simply less critical of reasons for change, which makes it susceptible to self-serving reasons. Setting the bar high for radical change is what forces us to look for reasons we didn't contemplate before, which is really where new knowledge comes from. "Well, it must be magic," doesn't expand our understanding. That doesn't have to mean much to you, but it means a lot to skeptics. So if you want to know why skeptics think that way, you have to accept as an axiom that radical change requires extraordinarily robust observation.
If a model of reality allows for radical change (e.g., simulation theory), then the bar for radical changes has to be lowered. Suppose this is all a simulation. Then we're at the mercy of the programmer(s), are we not? Living in a simulation would entail the nature of reality could change on a dime, and other crazy things become much more probable: the simulation could allow for miracles to occasionally happen, or that the simulation started five minutes ago and we all have false memories, or that miracles happen constantly but our minds are being scrubbed of the memories. It would all depend on the simulation creator.
If you found out this was a simulation, would you be skeptical of telepathy? Would you be skeptical of
anything? Why would you be? The same thing applies with idealism and dualism.