What Should the Default Skeptical Position on Telepathy Be?

[Fudbucker]

This whole thread questions the propriety of the null hypothesis being the default skeptical position on an existential claim.



Again, that's questioning the standard of proof, not the propriety of the default hypothesis.



Why does telepathy suggest a lower standard of proof?



Not as the default, no. The default position is the null hypothesis. If you want to falsify the null, you must do so to an agreeable standard of proof, then a conclusion can be drawn that is the considered position, not the default position.

Anecdotes bereft of empirical controls don't meet that standard as the skeptics set it.



Why should that result in a change in how skeptics see the issue? If you're asking what the skeptical response to a claim should be, you've heard it. If you feel differently and therefore don't want to identify as a skeptic, that's your business.



Straw man. Proposing a default position of non-existence does not draw the conclusion that it's impossible.



That's not how the null hypothesis works. It arises as the reverse of the affirmative claim. You haven't yet said what's so special about telepathy that means skeptics should give it its own particular brand of reasoning.



The default position is the null hypothesis. It's called the "default" because it's what holds before you start examining the evidence, and what continues to hold if the evidence cannot unseat it. An examination of the evidence has the potential to falsify the null by producing observations that deductively can't follow from the null (and ideally must follow only from the affirmative claim). That would be the considered conclusion, which is utterly different than the default position. You haven't even come close to producing those observations. By your own admission the effects you proffer are undetectably confounded and seem to disappear entirely when the confounds are controlled for.

The operative hypothesis is always in the "maybe" box in the hypothetico-deductive model. But "maybe" is not the same as "Telepathy is real." "Maybe" is not knowledge.



They were sloppy and jumped to conclusions, and when the full data were available for review, it was shown exactly in what way they were sloppy and exactly what the gaps were that they leaped over in arriving at their conclusions.



Not as expert as their reviewers. Robert Jahn was a retired engineer with little or no training in psychology research or human-subject protocols. While I think he meant well, the PEAR studies suffered from exactly the sorts of ills that would arise from people who weren't used to doing that kind of research. Their critics such as Alcock, Palmer, and others were lifelong researchers in the psychology and parapsychology fields and knew it well. If you are going to respect expertise, you must respect it on both sides of the question.



Irrelevant -- the sunken cost fallacy.



Their conclusions are not any more correct because they were attached to a major university. The correctness of their conclusions derives from the merits of their efforts, which have been reviewed and found to be in error. While they researched at Princeton, their findings -- save for a few papers -- were all published in fringe journals. They could not meet the standards of research demanded by the more appropriate journals.



Dr. Jahn had a very distinguished career as an aerospace engineer. That gives him a measure of clout by which to pursue personal interests, privately funded, under the auspices of the university to which he belonged for some time and from which he could demand a certain indulgence. That indulgence did not last forever, however. You will hardly find a trace of PEAR in Princeton's public offerings. The general interpretation is that it was an embarrassment to the university.



That's tautologically correct, but not really where the discussion started or went. You seem to be arguing that skeptics should be more like idealists. That's really not a thing you can ask without engendering some backlash at a skeptics' forum. In any case, you haven't been very persuasive.



If you think this distinguishes you from skeptics then you don't understand science at all. Science is predicated on the certainty that we've gotten something wrong about the laws of nature. Toward that end we have evolved -- and continue to refine -- a stringent, methodical way of gathering observations and drawing parallels and contrasts so that we can do our best to detect wherein we may be in error, or have incomplete knowledge. That process starts with the null hypothesis and proceeds to a considered conclusion. Suggesting that skeptics short-circuit that process for a pet belief is blatantly special pleading.



And some of today's woo was yesterday's woo and will be tomorrow's woo. Science is never settled to the point where it can't be unseated by thorough observation and testing. Every conclusion drawn by the hypothetico-deductive model is "forever tentative," in the words of one of our noted philosophers of science.

The problem I see is your impatience with that process where it touches what I assume is a cherished belief. You want to skip the hard part and go right to the triumph. This is something you as an idealist may be comfortable with, but it is completely antithetical to the skeptic philosophy.

I don't have time for a long reply, but the bolded jumped out at me. You think we might have gotten the laws of thermodynamics wrong? We might be wrong about how fast light really goes or whether it's a constant or not? That fusion powers stars? Plate tectonics? Evolution? The age of the Earth? Those are things you think we might find out we're wrong about someday? That's some radical skepticism there.

And that begs the question: if you think we could be wrong about laws of nature, could we (i.e., the skeptical community) also be wrong about ghosts? Bigfoot? Alien abduction?

 

[JayUtah]

You think we might have gotten the laws of thermodynamics wrong?

We might, but it's not likely since they have held up well under all kinds of observations and are reasonably predictive as they are. But if at some time we were to make repeatable, controlled observations that seem to be at odds with what we know about thermodynamics, then changing their formulation is not off the table.

We might be wrong about how fast light really goes or whether it's a constant or not?

We might, but it's not likely since these too have held up well over many observations, as I describe above. When I say we know they are certainly wrong, that's really just a philosophical stop on precluding revision. It doesn't mean it's likely that our understanding is drastically wrong in theories that are widely and accurately predictive.

That fusion powers stars? Plate tectonics? Evolution? The age of the Earth? Those are things you think we might find out we're wrong about someday? That's some radical skepticism there.

No, it's actually very ordinary empiricism, and textbook skepticism. Skepticism is to follow the data, wherever they lead. Theory must give way to observation, and there is no theory presently held by science that is so sacrosanct it could never be challenged by observation. That said, "observation" is much more than merely casual anecdotes and assumptions. But the notion of skeptics as entrenched curmudgeons regarding the prevailing scientific understanding is comically wrong. It's a mode imposed upon skepticism by its critics. A good skeptic will always follow the data, but he will also always test the data to see how good it is.

And that begs the question: if you think we could be wrong about laws of nature, could we (i.e., the skeptical community) also be wrong about ghosts? Bigfoot? Alien abduction?

Our understanding of the laws of nature will always be incomplete and therefore, to some degree, wrong. If we could make repeatable, controlled observations that seemed to be at odds with even a longstanding theory, then that theory will need to be revised to accommodate it. Science at no point closes the books and says, "No, this theory is perfect, correct, and covers all cases."

We haven't closed the books on ghosts, Bigfoot, or alien abduction. And as soon as the skeptical community can be provided with repeatable, controlled observations that falsify the null hypothesis regarding those claims, they can be asked to reject the null hypothesis in favor of a new theory. And no, the observations and attributions offered so far don't even come close. That's why, maybe, you should help us make this thread about standards of proof, since that's really want you seem to want to talk about. The notion of a "default conclusion" immediately brings to mind the null hypothesis in a hypothetico-deductive exercise, which is most familiar to skeptics. But I gather now that you probably didn't intend it to go that way. You wanted to ask what a reasonably considered conclusion for skeptics should be regarding telepathy, incorporating whatever evidence you can bring to the table.

 

[Fudbucker]

We might, but it's not likely since they have held up well under all kinds of observations and are reasonably predictive as they are. But if at some time we were to make repeatable, controlled observations that seem to be at odds with what we know about thermodynamics, then changing their formulation is not off the table.



We might, but it's not likely since these too have held up well over many observations, as I describe above. When I say we know they are certainly wrong, that's really just a philosophical stop on precluding revision. It doesn't mean it's likely that our understanding is drastically wrong in theories that are widely and accurately predictive.



No, it's actually very ordinary empiricism, and textbook skepticism. Skepticism is to follow the data, wherever they lead. Theory must give way to observation, and there is no theory presently held by science that is so sacrosanct it could never be challenged by observation. That said, "observation" is much more than merely casual anecdotes and assumptions. But the notion of skeptics as entrenched curmudgeons regarding the prevailing scientific understanding is comically wrong. It's a mode imposed upon skepticism by its critics. A good skeptic will always follow the data, but he will also always test the data to see how good it is.



Our understanding of the laws of nature will always be incomplete and therefore, to some degree, wrong. If we could make repeatable, controlled observations that seemed to be at odds with even a longstanding theory, then that theory will need to be revised to accommodate it. Science at no point closes the books and says, "No, this theory is perfect, correct, and covers all cases."

We haven't closed the books on ghosts, Bigfoot, or alien abduction. And as soon as the skeptical community can be provided with repeatable, controlled observations that falsify the null hypothesis regarding those claims, they can be asked to reject the null hypothesis in favor of a new theory. And no, the observations and attributions offered so far don't even come close. That's why, maybe, you should help us make this thread about standards of proof, since that's really want you seem to want to talk about. The notion of a "default conclusion" immediately brings to mind the null hypothesis in a hypothetico-deductive exercise, which is most familiar to skeptics. But I gather now that you probably didn't intend it to go that way. You wanted to ask what a reasonably considered conclusion for skeptics should be regarding telepathy, incorporating whatever evidence you can bring to the table.

Excellent post. Yes, I should have emphasized degrees of belief and standards of proof. I will come back to the other points when I have more time.

 

[arthwollipot]

I don't have time for a long reply, but the bolded jumped out at me. You think we might have gotten the laws of thermodynamics wrong? We might be wrong about how fast light really goes or whether it's a constant or not? That fusion powers stars? Plate tectonics? Evolution? The age of the Earth? Those are things you think we might find out we're wrong about someday? That's some radical skepticism there.

The methods of science are predicated on the idea that it is always possible to modify previous conclusions based on new evidence. And yes, this applies even to our most well-tested ideas like thermodynamics and evolution.

However, any new evidence must continue to explain our previously well-tested conclusions. Einstein didn't disprove Newton, he modified Newton's conclusions in previously unconsidered circumstances.

And that begs the question: if you think we could be wrong about laws of nature, could we (i.e., the skeptical community) also be wrong about ghosts? Bigfoot? Alien abduction?

Yes, we could indeed. So let's see the evidence. We modify our previous conclusions based on solid, verifieably tested evidence, which for ghosts, bigfoot, alien abduction and telepathy there has been none - zero - zip - nada.

Let's get some good evidence that telepathy exists, then we'll modify our conclusions.

 

[theprestige]

Fudbucker, do you have evidence that falsifies *any* null hypothesis about telepathy?

Even if it's just a null hypothesis that you devised on the spot to fit the evidence you have in mind. I just want to know what evidence you want us to deal with, here.

What, according to you, should a skeptic rule out, or rule in, based on the evidence you've considered?

 

[EHocking]

I have proved psychic powers, because when I read this:



...I knew with p<.02 certainty that the woo claimant would reply with something like this:

Thank you for posting a perfect example of post-diction. Hopefully the OP will take note.

Also, my wife and I often crave the same food at the same time. QED, bitches.

Nearly inevitably my wife will ask me if I picked up a metric pint of milk for her coffees when I pick her up after work - even though I drink mine black.
That’s just love.

(Although I can’t empirically prove that it is love, anecdotally most of my friends and family (esp. my wife) accept it as proof)

 

[EHocking]

A lot of them really are basically fancy anecdotes:
https://jnnp.bmj.com/content/jnnp/23/3/247.full.pdf

And are treated as such.
The difference is that medical evidence (anecdotes if you wish) is then (or should be) examined using the principles of the scientific method. And if you understand the scientific method, you’ll know that most conclusions are “as far as we know”.

There are some absolutes in medicine, but they are usually quite trivial.
Nearly always it is an x% prediction. As it should be.
I’ve no doubt many here have had to weight up medical percentages, sometimes trivial (antibiotics or not) and sometimes less trivial (major surgery and/or massive doses of chemo), but in either case you’re usually offer “odds of success”.

Belief, of course, doesn’t work this way.

The thing is that so called paranormal anecdotes are nearly never scrutinised in this manner. People would rather believe the news story on it than read the scientific paper. Meh, science is hard. People are more often than not too lazy to bother trying to understand it, but mostly have no wish to even look at it ‘cos it is more comfortable not knowing.

For example, Trump’s “truth” is a symptom of this current trend.
It “enables” people to ignore actuality in favour of what they’d rather believe.

“The Boxer”, etc.

BTW - I’m not having a go at you. Your post merely gave me the opportunity to share my opinion.

 

[Dave Rogers]

I don't have time for a long reply, but the bolded jumped out at me. You think we might have gotten the laws of thermodynamics wrong? We might be wrong about how fast light really goes or whether it's a constant or not? That fusion powers stars? Plate tectonics? Evolution? The age of the Earth? Those are things you think we might find out we're wrong about someday?

Yes, these are al subject to revision and modification in the light of compelling evidence. And yet these are the things that pseudoskeptics would pretend are the religious tenets of scientific skeptics, never to be challenged under any circumstances. A hundred and fifty years ago, one could have said the same thing about Newton's laws, yet those have since been found to be incomplete as a description of reality, and have been refined by Einstein. That's how science works, and how it should.

And that begs the question: if you think we could be wrong about laws of nature, could we (i.e., the skeptical community) also be wrong about ghosts? Bigfoot? Alien abduction?

Yes, and if compelling evidence ever emerges we will revise our understanding accordingly. Absent such compelling evidence, which has yet to be provided, we can stick to the provisional conclusion that fits all the existing evidence, which is that none of them exist.

Dave

 

[MRC_Hans]

That's not how it works when people report anecdotal accounts. If someone claims to have gone to China, is the null position, "No you didn't"? You don't go around doubting everything everyone says.

No, because it is entirely plausible that someone went to China.

Hans

 

[MRC_Hans]

I claim I've been to China.

Have I, in fact, been to China?

I have been to China (many times) and I can prove it.



Hans

 

[MRC_Hans]

Why? What makes it extraordinary? I'm perfectly willing to accept the possibility I occasionally "know" what my wife is thinking and vice-versa. I assume this happens with most people. What's extraordinary about that?

Nothing is extraordinary about that, but it is not telepathy. It is inference.

Hans

 

[MRC_Hans]

Have we been here:

Define 'telepathy'?

1) Sometimes knowing what your spouse thinks. Not telepathy, but knowing that the person usually thinks.

2) Sometimes knowing what other people, to whom you may not be acquainted, think. Not telepathy, but inference, plus reading of body language, and other subtle clues.

3) Somehow receiving the thoughts of another person, under circumstances that are not covered by #1 and #2. That is telepathy.

The skeptic position on #1 and #2 is that they are real and trivial. The skeptic position on #3 is that it lacks any real evidence and that the default assumption is that it does not exist.

Hans

 

[Nay_Sayer]

Prove it.

Nothing more, nothing less.

 

[This is The End]

I'm perfectly willing to accept the possibility I occasionally "know" what my wife is thinking and vice-versa. I assume this happens with most people.

Okay now you are just confusing deduction with telepathy.

You are much more likely to remember the times you succeed at deduction than all of the times you fail.

Confusing deduction with telepathy would be like thinking that you just gained the power to smell farts from miles away when all you did was smell a fart in a room full of people.

 

[Fudbucker]

I thought of a quick way to sum up my position:

1. Evidence is viewed through the metaphysical framework of a person's belief about reality
2. Some metaphysical frameworks are more plausible than others
3. Materialism is not a plausible metaphysical framework
4. It follows from (3) that evidence should be viewed through a dualistic or idealistic framework.
5. Idealistic and dualistic frameworks are more accepting of radical changes in established principles. That is to say, what is accepted as true now, is more amenable to change under idelaism/dualism than materialism.

 

[kellyb]

3. Materialism is not a plausible metaphysical framework

Why do you say that?

 

[Fudbucker]

Why do you say that?

That would require a new thread. I've talked about it in other threads. I think the failure to explain how consciousness arises from matter is catastrophic to materialism. I see too many unresolved paradoxes (e.g., Mary's Room) to think materialism will eventually explain it.

 

[kellyb]

I think the failure to explain how consciousness arises from matter is catastrophic to materialism.

Okay, but there was a time when failure to explain weather was seen as strong evidence of "Thor and Zeus" theory.

Not defaulting to something like "it's magic!" when looking at the currently unexplained is kind of at the heart of "the skeptical position".

 

[theprestige]

That would require a new thread. I've talked about it in other threads. I think the failure to explain how consciousness arises from matter is catastrophic to materialism. I see too many unresolved paradoxes (e.g., Mary's Room) to think materialism will eventually explain it.

No. "plausible metaphysical framework" is a subjective opinion. Whatever handwave you threw out in some of other thread, it's still incumbent on you to present a scientific argument here, for any claim you intend to hold weight here.

 

[kellyb]

I see too many unresolved paradoxes (e.g., Mary's Room) to think materialism will eventually explain it.

I just wikied that, and I think it's silly, and it's basically an argument against "straw materialism".

"Materialists" and "physicalists" agree with you that concepts and experiences (qualia, etc) do exist, and they exist strictly within minds. How that all works is kind of odd, not well understood, and difficult to articulate. That doesn't mean there's another "plane of existence" or whatever, tho.