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Split Thread WWII & Appeasement

Well, it's a fair summation of Mein Kampf, sorta. It's more complex. Or more chaotic, if you will. It's a lot more against the Treaty Of Versailles than any two of those combined, though. Also the issue of the Jews may not get the most page space PER SE, if you combine it with the idea of a pure ethnic ("völkisch") state, it does really become most of the book.

The thing is, though, Mein Kampf was more than 10 years old, and for all anyone could tell, he hadn't really done more speeches on those topic for more than 10 years, except for Versailles, so it looked like it was something easy to concede. The rearmament was easy to overlook considering what Germany started from after Versailles, and the fact that for better or worse it was bordering France which had mobilized something like 1 in 8 men at that point.

I'd say it was a bit hard to forbid Germany to have about 850,000 soldiers, when France had easily twice that. Hell, Czechoslovakia had one cool million, at much less population than Germany. Really, only the UK had less army than Germany at that point, but the UK had a huge moat around itself. Essentially it was easy to mistake it for just building up to the point where it can DEFEND itself.

There WAS some sabre rattling towards the east, but that was strictly against the USSR. And frankly at the time it sounded like a good thing to most of the west. Nobody liked the USSR at the time, really.

And in the context of Munich, at the time Adolf was hammering ONLY on the right to self-determination of the Germans there. I suppose you can connect it with Mein Kampf in retrospect, but at the time it wasn't that obvious a connection between wanting to unite the German majority areas and wanting to conquer anyone else.

Essentially all I'm saying is that politics is... politics, really.
 
Essentially all I'm saying is that politics is... politics, really.

And what everyone else is saying is that Chamberlain was really bad at it. At every turn he made poor choices, pursuing appeasement long pas the point where he should have been questioning what it was actually achieving.
 
And what everyone else is saying is that Chamberlain was really bad at it. At every turn he made poor choices, pursuing appeasement long pas the point where he should have been questioning what it was actually achieving.

And where exactly was that point?
 
And what everyone else is saying is that Chamberlain was really bad at it. At every turn he made poor choices, pursuing appeasement long pas the point where he should have been questioning what it was actually achieving.

Was he, though?

Remember that ovation he was given after Munich? In fact, it wouldn't be until 1940 that his memory started to turn really unpopular. Basically it wasn't until they actually got bombed, that the average Brit started thinking, "Bloody 'ell, mate... we oughtta stopped that Adolf chap back in 38."

Basically what I've been saying all along is that in a democracy -- which the UK certainly was -- the politicians are supposed to do what the voters want, or at least what makes them happy. I submit the simple idea that what Chamberlain delivered was really just that: what made the voters happy. The proof of the pudding being in the eating and all that, it did make most British downright exuberant.
 
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Was he, though?

Remember that ovation he was given after Munich? In fact, it wouldn't be until 1940 that his memory started to turn really unpopular. Basically it wasn't until they actually got bombed, that the average Brit started thinking, "Bloody 'ell, mate... we oughtta stopped that Adolf chap back in 38."


So what? This isn't about the popular view, this is about what Chamberlain's actions. He was Prime Minister, he would be expected to have a slightly better grasp of the bigger picture than the man in the street.

what I've been saying all along is that in a democracy -- which the UK certainly was -- the politicians are supposed to do what the voters want, or at least what makes them happy. I submit the simple idea that what Chamberlain delivered was really just that: what made the voters happy.

Except politicians in a democracy do things that make people unhappy all the time, the job is not make people happy its to make decisions about what's best for the country, and not just for the next five minutes. Generally the politicians who make the biggest impact are those who are willing to take the hard decisions, not duck them in pursuit of popularity.

The proof of the pudding being in the eating and all that, it did make most British downright exuberant.

They were relieved war hadn't broken out, the exuberance came from Chamberlain's 'peace in our time' claim. If as some claim he knew better he was lying and then proceeded to do a poor job of preparing the people for what was to come, and a lacklustre job of overseeing rearmament. If on the other hand he believed his own rhetoric then he was an inept leader who refused to deal with reality.
 
And where exactly was that point?

Probably the Anschluss at the latest. It was too all intents and purposes an invasion and made it clear that Hitler was going to impose his plans regardless. As soon as it looked like the plebiscite might go against him Hitler used force, in a situation where he could hardly claim to be restoring German territory or rolling back the Versailles Treaty.
 
I'm not saying he was particularly clued or anything. Just that when you look at the popular sentiment about the war, you can kinda see how a politician would make that kind of decision. Is all.
 
Probably the Anschluss at the latest. It was too all intents and purposes an invasion and made it clear that Hitler was going to impose his plans regardless. As soon as it looked like the plebiscite might go against him Hitler used force, in a situation where he could hardly claim to be restoring German territory or rolling back the Versailles Treaty.

Actually, he kinda could claim the latter. One of the conditions imposed after WW1, was that Austria stays separate.

And it went against concerns that a separate Austria, stripped of its pre-ww1 territories, might not have the economic base to be actually viable. Which actually proved to be so, when starvation promptly started to happen in Austria in the '20s. Yeah, it's not something you associate with a western nation in the 20th century, but basically their economy imploded even harder than the Weimar Republic's.

By 1936, Austria essentially declared itself a German state. As in, you know, one of the states of Germany. Autonomous, but still, essentially it declared itself a part of Germany, Just because it couldn't actually survive without the trade with Germany.

And really a LOT of Austrians wanted to unite with Germany, even just because of that. There WERE estimates from the 30's that put the Anschluss desire at around 80% among Austrians. Probably a lot less after the Nazis started their terror attacks in Austria, but still, let's just say that the people greeting the Germans in the streets with flowers were real and not staged.

Basically that too was a political mess created by the Versailles treaty, that the UK decided it can just walk away from,
 
There is an analysis of Churchill's want of judgment with regard to appeasement at this website:

www.vaguelyinteresting.co.uk/operat...an-that-would-have-started-a-third-world-war/

Field Marshal Brooke was less diplomatic, writing that: ‘the idea is, of course, fantastic and the chances of success quite impossible. There is no doubt that from now onwards Russia is all powerful in Europe.’
The Cabinet Office planners also pointed to the failure of Nazi Germany’s invasion of the Soviet Union to highlight the futility of such a military engagement.

Unsurprisingly, the report suggested that the Soviet Union was likely to respond aggressively to such an attack. Whilst the allies concentrated on Poland, the Red Army could overrun Norway, Turkey, Greece and potentially take the oil fields of Persia and Iraq.

War weariness will be the predominant feature
Even if Churchill had got the top brass on board, how could they possibly convince soldiers and civilians to make further sacrifices?
 
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Hitler was really worried that the British and French would use military means to prevent the illegal occupation of the Rhineland in
1936. This was the first time he had tried annexing territory outside of Germany since becoming Chancellor in 1933. Unfortunately
the French over estimated the number of troops on the Rhineland border while the British did not see it as a threat to them and so
therefore nothing was done about it. After this Hitler no longer worried because he knew he would have zero resistance from them

Contrast this initial apprehension with his behaviour at Munich just two years later where he banged his fist on the table demanding
the annexation of the Sudetenland with the rest of Czechoslovakia from Chamberlain and Daladier whom he referred to as maggots

Also the British and French between 1919 and 1939 never once investigated the rearmament of Germany despite it being expressly
forbidden by the Versailles Treaty whose terms and conditions they drafted themselves. So it is therefore a myth that it began after
Hitler became Chancellor in 1933. He just carried on with what was already happening albeit at a much greater rate of productivity
 
Hitler was really worried that the British and French would use military means to prevent the illegal occupation of the Rhineland in
1936. This was the first time he had tried annexing territory outside of Germany since becoming Chancellor in 1933.

You may want to check the highlighted bits. The Rhineland was part of Germany, so it wasn't an annexation. Germany had been forbidden to maintain any fortifications in the Rhineland by the Treaty of Versailles, and what Hitler actually did was move military forces into the area in violation of the treaty.

Dave
 
There is an analysis of Churchill's want of judgment with regard to appeasement at this website:

www.vaguelyinteresting.co.uk/operat...an-that-would-have-started-a-third-world-war/


First you claimed that Churchill "appeased" Stalin by allowing him to dominate Eastern Europe. Now you claim that he showed a "want of judgement" by ordering the Joint Planning Staff to explore the feasibility of using force to prevent Stalin from dominating Eastern Europe. You're trying to have it both ways. Fail.
 
Jaw Jaw is better than war war.


Try telling that to the Czechs. It's a fatuous comment used by those desperately trying to justify a policy that led to a larger and more bloody war than the one that would have been fought in 1938.
 
Talking.

Or as the Oxford dictionary defines it:

"Talking, especially lengthy and pointless discussion."

Which kind of sums up Henri's posts.

Thanks.

Also sums up Chamberlain's tragical approach to issue. (Its easy to propose Jaw against War when it is not one's country under attack...)
 
The verdict of history will be that Chamberlain was right.

I think that 80 years after Munich, historians can probably have at least a provisional assessment that he was wrong.

Unlike you, he didn't have the benefit of hindsight, though.

He was also negotiating with a terminal illness, which also probably affected his outlook - whether he knew it was or not.
 

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