Sorry for the delay in posting this; my laptop conked out, and I can't afford to get it fixed yet. I have an hour at the library tonight, so I'll start my notes on
Australia and Appeasement.
The situation in March 1938 (p. 46):
In the Cabinet deliberations, Malcolm MacDowell, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, warned his colleagues that, if Britain got into a war with Germany through France's treaty obligations with Czechoslovakia . . . 'the British Commonwealth might well break in pieces'. He advised that Australia and New Zealand would follow London's lead, but South Africa and Canada 'would see no reason whatever why they should join in a war to prevent Germans from rejoining their fatherland'. In the full Cabinet discussion on 22 March 1938 ministers were informed that any further commitments to Czechoslovakia would be 'very unpopular' in all the dominions, except perhaps New Zealand, and might lead to a crisis with some of them. While the British Cabinet made the specific proviso that its own foreign policy could not be subordinated to the views of the dominions, clearly the empire's reluctance to become involved in central Europe strengthened the hands of those ministers, such as Chamberlain, who opposed making any commitment to defend Czechoslovakia. [notes omitted; bolding mine]
The situation at the end of August (pp. 73-74):
[MacDonald's] advice was that, if war came, Australia and New Zealand would certainly come in, but doubts surrounded the involvement of Canada and South Africa. . . .
On the eve of the Cabinet meeting Lyons met with Percivale Liesching, the Acting U.K. High Commissioner in Canberra. In their conversation Lyons advised that, if Britain went to war, Australia would be committed to active participation. [bolding mine]
So, Henri, as I explained earlier, your contention that Chamberlain believed Australia and New Zealand would not have declared war in 1938 is clearly erroneous. Additionally, as I have also shown, the claim about Canada's doubtful reliability is demonstrably incorrect. I would hypothesize that the civil servants in the Dominions Office greatly overestimated the effect that the Francophone minority's presumed reticence to support the UK would have had on the country as a whole.
More to come in later posts.