The Clinton email investigation was one of the highest profile investigations
in the FBI’s history; however, it is just one of thousands of investigations handled
each year by the approximately 35,000 FBI agents, analysts, and other
professionals who dedicate their careers to protecting the American people and
upholding the Constitution and the rule of law. Through the collective efforts of
generations of FBI employees, the FBI has developed and earned a reputation as
one of the world’s premier law enforcement agencies.
The FBI has gained this reputation, in significant part, because of its
professionalism, impartiality, non-political enforcement of the law, and adherence
to detailed policies, practices, and norms. However, as we outline in this report,
certain actions during the Midyear investigation were inconsistent with these longstanding
policies, practices, and norms.
First, we found that several FBI employees who played critical roles in the
investigation sent political messages—some of which related directly to the Midyear
investigation—that created the appearance of bias and thereby raised questions
about the objectivity and thoroughness of the Midyear investigation. Even more
seriously, text messages between Strzok and Page pertaining to the Russia
investigation, particularly a text message from Strzok on August 8 stating “No. No
he’s not. We’ll stop it.” in response to a Page text “[Trump’s] not ever going to
become president, right? Right?!,” are not only indicative of a biased state of mind
but imply a willingness to take official action to impact a presidential candidate’s
electoral prospects. This is antithetical to the core values of the FBI and the
Department of Justice. While we did not find documentary or testimonial evidence
that improper considerations, including political bias, directly affected the specific
investigative actions we reviewed in Chapter Five, the conduct by these employees
cast a cloud over the entire FBI investigation and sowed doubt about the FBI’s work
on, and its handling of, the Midyear investigation. It also called into question
Strzok’s failure in October 2016 to follow up on the Midyear-related investigative
lead discovered on the Weiner laptop. The damage caused by these employees’
actions extends far beyond the scope of the Midyear investigation and goes to the
heart of the FBI’s reputation for neutral factfinding and political independence.
Second, in key moments, then Director Comey chose to deviate from the
FBI’s and the Department’s established procedures and norms and instead engaged
in his own subjective, ad hoc decisionmaking. In so doing, we found that Comey
largely based his decisions on what he believed was in the FBI’s institutional
interests and would enable him to continue to effectively lead the FBI as its
Director. While we did not find that these decisions were the result of political bias
on Comey’s part, we nevertheless concluded that by departing so clearly and
dramatically from FBI and Department norms, the decisions negatively impacted
the perception of the FBI and the Department as fair administrators of justice.
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Moreover, these decisions usurped the authority of the Attorney General and upset
the well-established separation between investigative and prosecutorial functions
and the accountability principles that guide law enforcement decisions in the United
States.
As we further outline in this report, there was a troubling lack of any direct,
substantive communication between Comey and then Attorney General Lynch in
advance of both Comey’s July 5 press conference and his October 28 letter to
Congress. With regard to the July 5 events, Comey affirmatively concealed his
intentions from Lynch. When he did finally call her on the morning of July 5—after
the FBI first notified the press—he told her that he was going to be speaking about
the Midyear investigation but that he would not answer any of her questions, and
would not tell her what he planned to say. During that call, Lynch did not instruct
Comey to tell her what he intended to say at the press conference. With respect to
the October 28 letter, Comey chose not to contact Lynch or then Deputy Attorney
General Yates directly; rather, he had FBI Chief of Staff Rybicki advise Yates’s
senior advisor (then PADAG Axelrod) that Comey intended to send a letter to
Congress and that Comey believed he had an obligation to do so. Given these
circumstances, Lynch and Yates concluded it would be counterproductive to speak
directly with Comey and that the most effective way to communicate their strong
opposition to Comey about his decision was to relay their views to him through
Axelrod and Rybicki. We found it extraordinary that, in advance of two such
consequential decisions, the FBI Director decided that the best course of conduct
was to not speak directly and substantively with the Attorney General about how
best to navigate these decisions and mitigate the resulting harms, and that
Comey’s decision resulted in the Attorney General and Deputy Attorney General
concluding
